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This thesis expounds and analyses Paul T i l l i c h ' s doctrine of the 
S p i r i t as set out i n the t h i r d volume of his Systematic Theology and 
other relevant passages from hi s writings. A f t e r a b r i e f introduction 
to his theological method , his understanding of God and the symbolic 
nature of our knowledge of the divine i s examined, specific reference 
being made to the meaning of ' S p i r i t 1 and the T r i n i t a r i a n symbols. A 
chapter on the nature of l i f e and i t s ambiguities i n the spheres of 
morality, culture and r e l i g i o n , with which the doctrine of the S p i r i t i s 
correlated i n T i l l i c h ' s thought, prepares the way f o r a more detailed 
analysis of t h i s doctrine. This analysis deals f i r s t with T i l l i c h ' s 
understanding of the divine S p i r i t i n r e l a t i o n to the s p i r i t of man, the 
S p i r i t ' s manifestation i n the world, and the marks of the S p i r i t u a l 
Presence i n h i s t o r i c a l mankind, culminating i n the Christ and the 
creation of the S p i r i t u a l Community. The importance of the S p i r i t ' s 
work i n resolving l i f e ' s ambiguities by means of an unambiguous l i f e of 
transcendent unity i s indicated. The succeeding chapters expand t h i s 
discussion and deal with the S p i r i t ' s impact i n the realm of r e l i g i o n , 
the l i f e of the church and the individual w i t h i n the church; i n the realms 
of culture and morality, the wider l i f e of society; and f i n a l l y , i n the 
t o t a l context of man's l i f e i n the work of healing. A concluding chapter 
points out the implications of the concept of the transcendent unity of 
unambiguous l i f e , suggesting that T i l l i c h ' s understanding of the S p i r i t 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y deviates from orthodox Christian pneumatology, but also 
emphasising that i n the f i n a l analysis T i l l i c h has made a s i g n i f i c a n t 
contribution to contemporary theological study of the S p i r i t * 
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INTRODUCTION BASIC CONCERNS 
PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY IN TILLICH'S SYSTEM 
Before beginning our examination of Paul T i l l i c h ' s doctrine of 
the S p i r i t ^ we must f i r s t look at some of the presuppositions which 
l i e behind his theological system, and at the main directions i n 
which his thinking moves* At the very heart of his thinking there 
i s a correl a t i o n of theology and philosophy that i s cr u c i a l to his 
system as a whole* T i l l i c h i s well aware that many contemporary 
theologians consider that to attempt such a correlation i s v i r t u a l l y 
'high treason against theology 1,* but he believes i t must be made* 
This i s not t o deny the importance of kerygmatic theology, whose 
purpose i s to 'reproduce the content of the Christian message i n an 
2 
ordered and systematic way', yet such a theology i s incomplete i n 
i t s e l f * I f one of the functions of theology i s to int e r p r e t the 
gospel, i t must of neoessity use philosophical terms and categories, 
and 'even kerygmatio theology must use the conceptual tools of i t s 
period* I t cannot simply repeat b i b l i c a l passages'.^ Kerygmatic 
and philosophical, or apologetic, theology must therefore go hand i n 
hands they are complementary to each other* 
T i l l i c h says that both philosophy and theology ask the question 
of being, though each i n i t s own way* Though contemporary philosophy 
does not seem to occupy i t s e l f to any great extent with t h i s question, 
a l l true philosophy must i n the long run ask ontblogical questions, 
and even epistemology must have some ontological basis* So, maintains 
T i l l i c h , philosophy i s essentially ontology* I t 'asks the question 
of r e a l i t y as a whole; i t asks the question of the structure of being*• 
This i s not a return to old-fashioned metaphysics, f o r the word 
2 
'metaphysics' suggests something that i s beyond our present exper-
ience, and therefore i n the realm of speculation, whereas when we 
concern ourselves with the question of being, we are concerned with 
that which i s nearer to us than anything else; ' i t i s we ourselves 
as f a r as we are and at the same time as human beings are able to 
ask what i t means that we are'. 
Theology also asks the question of being, but not the question 
of being i n i t s e l f , but rather of being f o r us, of being as our 
ultimate concern* I t deals w i t h 'what concerns us inescapably, 
ult i m a t e l y , unconditionally 1,^ and i n so doing i t i s asking not f o r 
one being among others, but f o r the very ground and power of being 
i t s e l f which determines our existenceo I t asks f o r the way i n which 
t h i s ground and power of being expresses i t s e l f i n and through the 
realms of being, so that man can be encountered by i t , and know and 
aot towards i t } and how i t s appearance i n the world of nature, or 
the events of h i s t o r y , or the experience of s e l f , can express f o r us 
i n concrete^, e x i s t e n t i a l terms that which concerns us ultimately* 
The f a c t that theology and philosophy are both concerned with the 
question of being, despite t h e i r divergence of emphasis, implies a 
convergence which makes t h e i r correlation possible and necessary* 
Such a convergence i s already apparent both i n the f a c t that the 
philosopher himself cannot help but be conditioned by his e x i s t e n t i a l 
s i t u a t i o n and w i l l therefore tend to see his ideas as ultimately 
7 
relevant f o r human existence, and i n the faot that the theologian 
i n asking the question of being f o r us in e v i t a b l y implies the question 
of being i n i t s e l f i n i t s meaning and structure as well as i t s p a r t i c u l a r 
manifestations* Because of th i s inevitable overlap, 'both philosophy 
and theology become poor and distorted when they are separated from 
3 
each other'*: 
Just as there i s divergence and convergence i n the question 
asked by philosophy and theology, the question of being, so there i s 
divergence and convergence i n the way each dis c i p l i n e seeks to answer 
that question* I n order to discover the meaning of being, the 
philosopher uses the power of h i s own reason, assuming 'that there 
i s an i d e n t i t y , or at least an analogy, between objective and subjective 
reason, between the logos of r e a l i t y as a whole and the logos working 
o 
wi t h i n him* . Because the logos i s universal, the ontologioal pursuit 
i s the permanently v a l i d endeavour through which the logos i n every 
man openB up the objective logos of a l l being* I n other words, there 
i s what we may c a l l a universal revelation of the meaning of r e a l i t y 
available to man through the capacity of reason w i t h i n him, and i t 
i s with t h i s that the philosopher i s primarily concerned* The theologian, 
however, i s concerned not with the univ e r s a l i t y of the logos, but with 
i t s p a r t i c u l a r manifestation 'at a special place i n a special t i m e ' , ^ 
and the source of his knowledge therefore i s the Logos 'who became 
f l e s h ' , a revelation which i s t e s t i f i e d to by the t r a d i t i o n s and l i f e 
of the church* Put i n a n u t s h e l l , the divergence may be stated thusi 
the theologian i s concerned w i t h the concrete logos, received through 
believing commitment, whereas the philosopher i s concerned w i t h the 
universal logos, received through r a t i o n a l detachment* 
But alongside t h i s second divergence, there i s also an important 
convergence* For philosophy, though i t i s concerned with and must 
emphasize the univ e r s a l i t y of the logos, cannot escape the f a c t that 
not everyone discovers the revealing word, but that i t i s , as i t were, 
'granted' only to a few earnest seekers a f t e r t r u t h i n various times 
and places. The philosopher, therefore, i s also concerned with a 
4 
concrete revelation and how i t i s received* He must of course move 
quickly on from t h i s more concrete aspect of his study to consider 
i t s universal implications and application, to ask f o r the t r u t h 
which transcends a l l concrete bases, but the very f a c t that he i s 
ooncerned with the plaoe Where revelation occurs, means that there i s 
a most important convergence between philosophical and theological 
enquiry* The Christian philosopher would go on to say that the point 
at which such a convergence i s at i t s most powerful i s i n that man i n 
whom the logos has appeared f u l l y , Jesus of Nazareth. I t i s on the 
r e a l i s a t i o n of t h i s point of contact that philosophical theology i s 
based* So also, whereas .the.theologian i s f i r s t and foremost concerned 
with the appearance of the logos at a special plaoe and i n a' special 
time, and his task i s to demonstrate how that appearance conoerns 
man u l t i m a t e l y , the philosophical theologian must go furthers he 
must seek t o demonstrate th a t t h i s appearance of what concerns us 
ultimately i s none other than'the universal logos 'of being*' 'In. other 
words,, he t r i e s to show that Jesus as the Christ i s the 'logos'*** 
I n any t r u l y philosophical theology, therefore, there must be a 
c o r r e l a t i o n between philosophy and theology, and this i s a central 
feature i n the structure of T i l l i c h ' s system* Philosophy provides 
the concepts and the categories together with the problems implied 
i n them, and theology provides the.answers to these problems i n terms 
of the Christian message* Thus the problems implied i n the concept of 
reason are answered i n the doctrine of revelation, those i n the concept 
of being i n the doctrine of God, those i n the concept of'existence i n 
the doctrine of the Christ, those i n the concept of l i f e i n the doctrine 
of the S p i r i t , and those i n the concept of history, i n the doctrine 
12 
of the Kingdom of God* But i t i s not enough merely to give these 
5 
answers i n t h e i r theological terminology and ooncreteness* Their 
wider relevance must be demonstrated by tr a n s l a t i n g them i n t o those 
very philosophical concepts which have universal currency, and i n 
doing t h i s the method of correlation i s completed* I t w i l l be seen 
from t h i s that philosophical theology i s at the heart apologetic, f o r 
i t s t arts from an e x i s t e n t i a l analysis of the human s i t u a t i o n and the 
questions asked by i t , and then goes on to demonstrate, that the symbols 
of the Christian message are the universally relevant answers to those 
questions. And f o r T i l l i c h , a l l t h i s i s possible because Jesus as the 
Christ i s none other than the concrete occurrence of the universal 
logos* I n him the answer to every human problem i s resolved, and 
philosophy and theology f i n d t h e i r ultimate warrant f o r correlation* 
I t can already be seen that the doctrine of the S p i r i t must 
be viewed i n the context of T i l l i o h ' s system as a whole* I t has i t s 
proper place w i t h i n the method of correlation as the theological answer 
given to the problems implied i n the concept and categories of l i f e , 
which i s ontologically distinguishable from the concepts and categories 
of being and existence, the specific problems of which are resolved 
i n the doctrines of God and the Christ respectively* However, even 
at t h i s early stage i n our analysis, i t i s relevant t o point out that 
God, Christ and the.Spirit cannot be separated from each other any more 
than being, existence and l i f e * But as i n every theological system, 
there i s a methodological point of departure here which i s inevitable 
f o r c l a r i t y of discussion and adequacy of treatment* 
So f a r there are two main problems which arise i n T i l l i c h * s 
attempt to correlate philosophy and theology* The f i r s t concerns 
T i l l i c h ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of philosophy i t s e l f . Philosophy, he says, 
asks the question of r e a l i t y as a whole, i t asks the question of the 
6 
structure of being* I t should be pointed out that not every type of 
philosophy has concerned i t s e l f with t h i s question* T i l l i o h i s aware 
of t h i s i n his comments on epistemology, but one wonders whether he 
takes contemporary emphases i n philosophy seriously enough* That 
there i s a well-established philosophical t r a d i t i o n , which has 
been represented at a l l stages i n hi s t o r y , which i s concerned primarily 
with r e a l i t y as a whole, i s undoubtedly t r u e , but t h i s does not mean 
that i t i s the only t r a d i t i o n that merits consideration* One would not 
claim superiority f o r twentieth century philosophical analysis, but 
i t must c e r t a i n l y be reckoned with* I t i s true that T i l l i c h does not 
e n t i r e l y ignore contemporary thinking, as i s evidenced by his evalua-
13 
t i o n and use of phenomenologLcal method, but he subordinates any 
such influences to the much stronger influences of olassical philosophy 
mediated to him through German idealism* Of course, i t can r i g h t l y 
be asserted that no philosophy can have completed i t s task unless i t 
asks ontological questions, but t h i s does not mean that a blind eye 
can be turned on those schools of philosophy whose preliminary emphases 
l i e i n other directions* 
This too u n c r i t i c a l an acceptance of the c l a s s i c a l - i d e a l i s t 
t r a d i t i o n i n philosophy comes out i n his assertion that there i s an 
i d e n t i t y between subjective and objective reason, between the logos 
working w i t h i n and the logos of r e a l i t y as a whole* This assertion 
makes two assumptions* I n the f i r s t place, the concept of a logos of 
r e a l i t y as a whole i s one which would not be accepted by a l l 
philosophers* This does not mean that one cannot envisage i t as a 
point of view or an a r t i c l e of f a i t h , nor that i t i s an unreasonable 
concept to hold t o , and i t i s c e r t a i n l y one which has been used widely 
i n certain theological schools, though by no means always i n the same 
7 
way, but i n so f a r as i t i s a presupposition and not a demonstrable 
f a c t , i t s currenoy i n philosophical c i r c l e s must at least be 
seriously devalued* One can argue f o r a universal logosj but 
philosophically one has no grounds f o r accepting i t as an a p r i o r i * 
I n the second place, the i d e n t i t y between the universal logos and 
the p a r t i c u l a r logos, between objective and subjective reason, which 
i s fundamental to T i l l i c h ' s system, cannot be taken f o r granted, which 
T i l l i c h seems to do* This i s another assumption', an assumption 
necessary to T i l l i c h ' s understanding of philosophy however, i n so 
far'as the concept of the logos common to both man and ultimate 
r e a l i t y i s the key which unlocks the door to an understanding of 
r e a l i t y as a whole. ..But i t i s a presupposition nevertheless* As 
J* Heywood Thomas commentsi 
I f we were to ask how we know that there i s essentially t h i s 
union, that the law of reason i s the law of nature w i t h i n 
mind and r e a l i t y , i t does not seem that T i l l i o h has any 
answer other than that t h i s i s what was held by philosophers 
i n the "classical t r a d i t i o n . " T i l l i c h never discusses t h i s 
central epistemological d i f f i c u l t y and seems to be content 
to j u s t i f y his position by appealing to the classical 
t r a d i t i o n as an authority.14 
As we s h a l l see, t h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the human logos i n the universal 
logos i s one which has important implications f o r T i l l i c h ' s r e w r i t i n g 
of theology, and therefore f o r his doctrine of the S p i r i t * 
The second major problem a r i s i n g from the attempt to correlate 
theology with philosophy concerns the personalistic categories used 
i n theological language, whioh are essentially absent from philosophical 
thought, or to put i t simply, the issue of b i b l i c a l personalism. 
T i l l i c h ' s awareness of t h i s problem i s shown i n his book B i b l i c a l 
15 
Religion and the Search f o r Ultimate Reality, -* i n which he seeks to 
resolve the tension between the two modes of thinking. The problem, 
he points out, centres on the phrase 'ultimate r e a l i t y ' , the ultimate 
8 
concern of both philosophy and theology, and what we mean by i t . 
I n b i b l i c a l theology, one becomes conscious of ultimate r e a l i t y through 
a personal experience of 'the Holy', and therefore 'the Holy! becomes 
personified* The concept of a personal God becomes basic* Ontology, 
however, does not think of God i n t h i s way* I t interprets ultimate 
r e a l i t y as 'being-itself'* the power of being above the subject-
object structure of e x i s t e n t i a l r e a l i t y , at once an impersonal concept* 
God as be i n g - i t s e l f cannot possibly be considered as *a person among 
others, related to them as an I to a thou***** How then can there 
possibly be a corre l a t i o n between the theological idea of God as 
personal, and the ontological view of God as 'bein g - i t s e l f ' , when i t 
would seem that i n the ontological question the idea of God himself 
i s transcended? Such a problem becomes even more acute when one 
considers the divine-human relationship* For theology, t h i s i s i n 
the nature of a person-to-person encounter, i n which both God and 
man maintain t h e i r d i s t i n c t i o n , a. separation which i s emphasised i n 
such theological dootrines as oreation, incarnation, sin and grace* 
But i n ontology, the basic concept i s that of p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the 
f i n i t e i n the ultimate* How oan these two concepts of encounter and 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n possibly be brought together? 
The t r a d i t i o n a l answer i n theological c i r c l e s has been to say 
that they cannot be reconciled, and the seeming f a i l u r e s at synthesis 
underline t h i s * T i l l i c h , however, i s confident that i t can be done, 
and his s t a r t i n g point l i e s i n the concept of the logos, f o r i t i s i n 
t h i s concept as we have seen that he believes a confrontation of 
philosophy and theology i s possible* The theology of the Word, he says, 
whioh i s basic to a l l encounter theologies, i s not a theology of ' t a l k ' , 
but rather a theology of 'self-manifestation': the concrete logos i n 
9 
Christ manifests the. universal logos, i n which all.men participate* 
But because the logos manifests i t s e l f a t a p a r t i c u l a r time, and place, 
the experience of that manifestation can meaningfully be called an 
encounter. I t i s the l i f e of r e a l i t y i t s e l f i n which we a l l share 
which appears to us and encounters us as i t makes i t s e l f known i n 
concrete si t u a t i o n s . There i s thus i n T i l l i c h ' s mind no opposition 
between the concepts of encounter and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i f both are under-
stood i n their.proper contexts* I t i s along these l i n e s also that we 
must understand the b i b l i c a l ooncept of a personal God* When one 
speaks of 'a personal God', one generally gives the impression of a 
personal being who exists apart from other beings. Yet i f God and 
ultimate r e a l i t y are i d e n t i c a l , God cannot be a being separate from 
f i n i t e r e a l i t y , but rather that i n which every r e a l i t y participates 
f o r i t s own being'and existence* I t i s more accurate to speak of God, 
therefore, as •'being-i t s e l f ' , that ultimate power of being which gives 
being to everything that i s * I t i s when.this ultimate r e a l i t y reveals 
i t s e l f i n concrete manifestations which are the basis of man's, 
encounter with the di v i n e , that God appears to man as personal* But 
t h i s does not mean that God i s one person among many, but rather, as 
the ultimate r e a l i t y , 'the Personal-itself, the ground and abyss of 
18 
every person', i n which every personal being participates and from 
which i t receives i t s l i f e * 
I t has not been our purpose to make a f u l l analysis of B i b l i c a l 
Religion and the Search f o r Ultimate Reality, but enough has been said 
to show that the way i n which T i l l i c h attempts to ef f e c t a r e c o n c i l i a -
t i o n between b i b l i c a l personalism and ontologLcal philosophy i s to 
rein t e r p r e t b i b l i c a l r e l i g i o n i n terms of ontological categories, or 
as he himself would put i t , to see the concrete revelation i n terms of 
10 
universal revelation. 7 Nevertheless, i f a theology of encounter -. 
sometimes tends to over-emphasise or even absolutise the separateness 
of God and man, i t w i l l become increasingly clear i n the course of t h i s 
essay that a theology based on ontologLcal p a r t i c i p a t i o n comes 
dangerously near to saying that the i n f i n i t e and the f i n i t e , God and 
man, are ultimately-one, as monism and certain types of mysticism do, 
and that i n order to realise his true being man must, transcend the 
d i s t i n c t i o n which creates the e x i s t e n t i a l i l l u s i o n of separation* As 
we sha l l see many times i n our analysis of the doctrine of the S p i r i t , 
T i l l i c h often comes very hear to making t h i s assertion* - I f t h i s i s so, 
then the word 'p a r t i c i p a t i o n ' has certain overtones which are d i f f i c u l t 
to reconcile with any genuine rei n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Christian theology, 
f o r any method of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that suggests that ultimately the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between man and God i s so transcended t h a t . i t ceases to be, 
cannot be considered as Christian at a l l * For t h i s reason we would 
dare to suggest that T i l l i c h ' s attempt at synthesis f a i l s , not necessarily 
because we are s a t i s f i e d with a crude form of b i b l i c a l personalism which 
sees God as another being.who can be encountered i n any normal way, but 
because his specific concept of ontological p a r t i c i p a t i o n carried to 
i t s l o g i c a l conclusion ultimately violates the one thing that Christian 
theology must always a f f i r m , the eternal d i s t i n c t i o n between man and 
God. Or to put i t another way, we do not object to the use of 
philosophical tools of c r i t i c i s m or even philosophical categories 
to help us i n our task of r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , but we cannot accept the 
implications t h a t the subordination of b i b l i c a l theology to an ontology 
of p a r t i c i p a t i o n involves* 
11 
REASON AMD REVELATION 
According to T i l l i c h , i t i s the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the f i n i t e i n 
the ultimate, of the human i n the divine, of the concrete logos i n the 
universal logos, that makes revelation possible, thus opening up the 
meaning of God f o r us. Here we meet the corre l a t i o n of reason with 
20 
revelation i n T i l l i c h ' s system. The problem i s how reason can 
open up the meaning of God f o r us when, despite i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 
the universal logos, i t i s thwarted by the l i m i t a t i o n s and d i s t o r t i o n s 
of man's e x i s t e n t i a l state. I t i s not easy to follow T i l l i c h i n the 
answer he gives, but i t l i e s i n his use of two terms, 'the depth of 
reason' and 'ecstatic reason'. By 'depth of reason' T i l l i c h i s 
r e f e r r i n g to something which precedes reason and which reason reveals.' 
He never gives us a precise d e f i n i t i o n of what t h i s i s , but he seems 
to mean that i n which a l l reason i s grounded, the underlying unity 
between the human and the divine, of which man i n his e x i s t e n t i a l 
state i s not generally conscious. How man actually becomes aware of 
t h i s i s not d i r e c t l y but through the element of mystery which presents 
i t s e l f to him through the experience of the numinous, which breaks 
through certain phenomena or events, events which may be termed 
miracles or perhaps signs, and which give b i r t h to symbols and myths 
through which they are expressed and handed down. I n these mysterious 
events or phenomena man becomes i n t u i t i v e l y aware of the divine, and 
his unity with i t , and thus revelation has occurred. His mind has 
been grasped by something beyond himself, his reason has been 
transcended. Yet i t i s s t i l l his reason that apprehends i t , i t i s 
s t i l l h is mind that experiences i t - hence the term 'ecstatic reason', 
reason driven beyond i t s e l f t o grasp something which under normal 
circumstances i t could not grasp. Ecstatic reason, therefore, or 
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reason beyond the l i m i t a t i o n s of the subject-object world, becomes 
the organ through which revelation i s received, and without i t there 
can be no revelation, f o r revelation i s incomplete unless i t i s 
received* I n every genuine revelation both the objective event which . 
evokes the numinous awe and the subjective reception of the significance 
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of that event must be present. T i l l i c h asserts that every genuine 
revelatory experience i s due to the 'inspiring presence of the 
S p i r i t ' which makes i t possible, and i t i s the S p i r i t who i s active 
i n d r i v i n g man's reason beyond i t s e l f i n t o i t s ecstatic state at 
that moment when revelation i s received* This we shall return to 
and disouss more f u l l y when we analyse the meaning of ecstasy i n the 
context of his doctrine of the S p i r i t u a l Presence. 2^ 
T i l l i c h distinguishes between o r i g i n a l and dependent revelation, 
the former being a t o t a l l y new constellation of events, i n which 
miracle and ecstasy are joined together f o r the f i r s t time, and i n 
which both are o r i g i n a l , and the l a t t e r being where the o r i g i n a l 
miracle and ecstatic reception already joined now act together to 
create a new response i n the l i v e s of individuals and groups. For 
example, the New Testament revelation i s o r i g i n a l i n that the 
revelatory event of Jesus as the Christ and i t s corresponding ecstatic 
reception i n Peter's confession together create a t o t a l l y new s i t u a -
t i o n , but i n every successive Christian revelation the event of Jesus 
as the Christ and the acceptance of that event by the disciples combine 
to produoe an ecstatic reaction that i s dependent on the o r i g i n a l * 
I n t h i s way i t i s possible to widen the use of the word 'revelation' 
to include every moment i n the l i f e of the Christian i n which 'the 
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divine S p i r i t grasps, shakes and moves the human s p i r i t ' * 
The knowledge received through revelation, says T i l l i c h , i s not 
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the sort of knowledge/that we can add to that which we already possess 
regarding the external world* Rather i t i s a knowledge that reveals to 
us something of the mystery of b e i n g - i t s e l f , that i s , knowledge of 
God.' I t can be called 'analogous1 or 'symbolic' knowledge, because 
i t i s mediated through the analogia entis or the r e l i g i o u s symbol: 
God cannot be known as the f i n i t e world i s known, by d i r e c t observa-
t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , t h i s knowledge cannot be tested as we would test 
empirical knowledge, by v e r i f i c a t i o n . The only c r i t e r i o n f o r judging 
i t s authenticity i s i m p l i c i t i n the revelation i t s e l f , i t s a b i l i t y 
to negate i t s e l f as a f i n i t e r e a l i t y in.order that i t may e f f e c t i v e l y 
express the ultimate r e a l i t y to which i t points* This does not mean 
that, i t loses i t s e l f ; on the contrary i t s r e a l significance i s now 
affirmed. This c r i t e r i o n T i l l i c h sees above a l l i n the f i n a l revelation 
of Jesus as the Christ, where the 'power to negate i t s e l f without losing 
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i t s e l f i s most f u l l y realised. Thus on the Cross, Jesus t o t a l l y 
denied his own f i n i t u d e even to the point of s e l f - a n n i h i l a t i o n , but i n 
so doing affirmed his own significance as one who revealed w i t h i n his 
own person the eternal unity between God and man* For T i l l i c h , therefore, 
Jesus 'stands the double t e s t of f i n a l i t y ; uninterrupted unity w i t h 
the ground of his being and the continuous s a c r i f i c e of himself as 
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Jesus to himself as the Christ '• 
Such a necessarily b r i e f summary of the g i s t of T i l l i c h ' s ' 
doctrine of revelation i s hardly the basis f o r any evaluation, but 
one or two comments which concern our f u r t h e r study should be noted* 
We must, of course, bear i n mind the f a c t that T i l l i c h - bases his. 
doctrine of revelation on the coincidence of the human and divine 
logos which i s made possible through the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the f i n i t e 
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i n the ultimate, the implications of which we have already discussed* 
The 'depth of reason', despite the ambiguities of the phrase, serves 
to underline t h i s continuity or correspondence between human reason 
and divine reason, rooted as both are i n the ultimate r e a l i t y * 
I n f a c t , what T i l l i c h says here helps us to see the p r i o r importance 
he attaches to the concept of a universal ontological revelation, and 
i n t h i s wayt Man i s not aware of the depth i n which his own reason 
i s grounded u n t i l some awareness of the mystery of being presents 
i t s e l f to him through the revelatory event i n which his own reason 
i s e c s t a t i c a l l y grasped* But having received t h i s revelation, he 
i s now able to inter p r e t something of i t s ontological significance 
precisely because the universal power of reason i s at work w i t h i n 
him. I n other words, the point of the concrete revelation would be 
l o s t unless there were an ontologioal key already present w i t h i n 
the mind of man which when grasped by the S p i r i t could unlock i t s 
real meaning* So even i f we allow temporal p r i o r i t y to the concrete 
revelation as opening up the meaning of being f o r us, we must give 
the ultimate primacy to the ontological structure of reason that 
makes i t possible f o r us to understand what that revelation i s a l l 
about* Therefore, though i n actual sequence the concrete revelation, 
including the f i n a l revelation i n Jesus as the Christ, comes f i r s t , 
i t i s the deeper ontological revelation afforded by the universal 
logos e c s t a t i c a l l y present i n the mind of man that i s our primary 
concern* I t i s d i f f i c u l t , however, to reconcile t h i s sort of thinking 
with orthodox Christian thought, which refuses to subordinate the 
eternal message of the Gospel to any doctrine of a universal revela-
t i o n based on a coincidence of divine and human reason, but empha-
sises quite categorically both the primacy and the ultimacy 
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of God's revelation i n Christ* 
The role of symbolism i n revelation i s also seen to be of 
considerable significance, f o r i t i s the symbol that enshrines the 
revelatory event. We s h a l l defer our discussion on t h i s u n t i l we 
come to discuss the meaning of symbol i n our analysis of the doctrine 
of God. 
EXISTENCE AMD THE CHRIST 
T i l l i c h ' s assertion that a l l concrete revelation i s to be judged 
i n the l i g h t of the supreme revelation i n Jesus as the Christ leads us 
to speak a l i t t l e more f u l l y about t h i s central Christian event. His 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the significance of the Christ i s set out i n the 
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second volume of h i s Systematic Theology. ' According to the method 
of c o r r e l a t i o n , i t i s developed i n answer to the questions implied i n 
human existence. These problems arise from the.fact that man, i n 
his e x i s t e n t i a l state, i s not at one with his essential being. He i s 
unable f u l l y to, actualise the powers which are p o t e n t i a l l y his because 
of his f i n i t e l i m i t a t i o n s . I t can be said, then, with Plato, that 
man i n his e x i s t e n t i a l state has ' f a l l e n ' away from h i s true nature, 
thus causing a s p l i t between what he i s i n actual f a c t and what he i s 
essentially. I n other words, he i s estranged from his true being. 
This classical concept of the F a l l has influenced T i l l i c h strongly, and 
he interprets Genesis 1-3 along these l i n e s . F i r s t l y , there i s the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of the F a l l , f o r man has the element of freedom i n himself 
to make the t r a n s i t i o n from essence to existence. Secondly, the 
Genesis myth points to the motives behind the F a l l . I f man i s to 
overcome the threat of non-being which causes him anxiety, i f he i s 
to become more than mere p o t e n t i a l i t y , i n a state of 'dreaming innocence* 
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then he must take the plunge to actualise at least some of his p o t e n t i a l -
i t i e s . The desire to do so arouses his sense of freedom, and i n the 
self-end he 'decides f d r / a c t u a l i s a t i o n , thus producing the end of dreaming 
innocence '•^ Thirdly, i t w i l l be seen that the- F a l l i s the 
'original fact'y because i t i s 'actual i n every f a c t ' i i t i s the f i r s t 
event i n every process of a c t u a l i t y * To see t h i s i s to acknowledge 
that the F a l l i s something of f a r wider significance than s i n i n the 
sense of moral f a i l u r e s i t i s of cosmic dimensions, involving the 
whole of e x i s t e n t i a l r e a l i t y i n i t s estrangement* This comes out 
very c l e a r l y i n the myth of the Transcendent F a l l , which universalises 
the truths to which the b i b l i o a l myth i s pointing*' Sin has i t s roots 
therefore not only i n the moral freedom of man, but i n the t r a g i c 
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element of universal destiny* F i n a l l y , i n the l i g h t of these 
statements one must ask the question as to the r e l a t i o n of the F a l l v 
to the Creation* Does not the d e f i n i t i o n of the F a l l as the t r a n s i t i o n 
from essence to existence make 'sin' i n the l i f e of man ontologically 
necessary?^ T i l l i c h answers that Creation and F a l l do indeed coincide 
i n so f a r as there was no point i n the past at which created goodness 
was actualised - no primeval Utopia. I n t h i s sense, actualised oreation 
and estranged existence are i d e n t i c a l * But the coincidence i s not 
l o g i c a l , f o r i n i t s essential character creation i s good* I t i s 
only when i t becomes actualised that i t f a l l s i n t o universal estrange-
ment. Yet t h i s t r a n s i t i o n 'has the character of a leap and not a 
str u c t u r a l necessity. I n spite of i t s tragic u n i v e r s a l i t y , existence 
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cannot be derived from essence1* Creation and F a l l are not one and 
the same thing* 
T i l l i c h ' s way of understanding si n therefore i s to define i t i n 
terms of estrangementi man's e x i s t e n t i a l estrangement from his essential 
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beingi which shows i t s e l f i n three d i f f e r e n t ways, i n estrangement from 
the ground of being, from the beings of others, and from one's own 
being. Though the Bible never uses the word, such a concept, maintains 
T i l l i c h , i s central to i t s understanding of man* Yet i t i s s t i l l good 
to r e t a i n the word 'sin' because i t expresses more sharply the 
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personal character of estrangement in. personal freedom and g u i l t . 
T i l l i c h f i x e s on three d i f f e r e n t expressions to elucidate f u r t h e r the 
nature, of t h i s estrangement! unbelief, or , u n f a i t h ' , i n which man i n 
the t o t a l i t y of his being turns away from God; hubris, i n which man 
elevates himself i n his desire to.become the centre of a l l things, 
thus making himself equal with God, refusing to acknowledge his own 
f i n i t u d e and absplutising everything he i s and does i n t o i n f i n i t e 
significance; and concupiscence, again characterised by self-centredness, 
by which man seeks to draw the whole world i n t o himself as a compensa-
t i o n f o r his poverty r e s u l t i n g from his estrangement from God*^ 
As a sinner i n the state of estrangement, man i s engaged i n Hie 
pursuit of his own destruction, f o r sin causes an inner contradiction 
i n his essential being* The ontological elements i n his nature, at 
one essentially, now war against each other i n t h e i r e x i s t e n t i a l 
estrangement* Freedom, distorted i n t o arbitrariness and divorced 
from destiny, causes l i f e to. become empty and meaningless; whereas 
destiny, separated from freedom, becomes dist o r t e d i n t o mechanical 
necessity* Dynamics, separated from form, become distorted i n t o a 
formless urge f o r self-transcendence, d r i v i n g man i n a l l directions; 
whereas form, separated from dynamics, becomes an empty legalism 
without c r e a t i v i t y whioh leads i n turn to rebellious outbreaks of 
dynamic forces* I n d i v i d u a l i s a t i o h , divorced from p a r t i c i p a t i o n , causes 
man to become shut up.within himself; whereas p a r t i c i p a t i o n without 
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i n d i v i d u a l i s a t i o n results i n submergence i n the c o l l e c t i v e * A l l these 
tendencies are present i n man i n his e x i s t e n t i a l state of estrangement -
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a l l . are the symptoms of s i n . 1 
. Faced with the p o s s i b i l i t y of the disintegration of himself and 
his world, man asks .the question as to how he can conquer his existen-
t i a l estrangement. True to his Reformed t r a d i t i o n , T i l l i c h affirms 
that i t i s impossible for. man to resolve the predicament himself* 
What, i s necessary i s f o r man's unity with God to be re-established, 
or a T i l l i c h puts . i t , f o r essential being to appear under the conditions 
JO 
of existence* This i s what T i l l i c h means by 'the New Being'* 'Man, 
i n r e l a t i o n to. God,, cannot do.anything .without him* He must receive 
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i n order to act * . .. .Only a New Being can produce a new action'. 
The New Being i s new i n two respects: f i r s t l y , i n contrast t o the 
merely potential character of essential being; and secondly, i n 
contrast to the estranged character of e x i s t e n t i a l being, thus .over-
coming the subject-object s p l i t of e x i s t e n t i a l r e a l i t y . T i l l i c h says 
that the history of r e l i g i o n i s the record of man's quest f o r t h i s 
New Being, whether his search be above history or as the aim of hi s t o r y , 
and such a quest i s indeed an important work .of the S p i r i t i n man* 
This does not mean that r e l i g i o n i s i d e n t i c a l with the New Being, f o r 
every r e l i g i o n i s open to d i s t o r t i o n , but i n every genuine revelatory 
experience at the heart of. r e l i g i o n , the New Being i s t o be found* 
I t i s supremely present i n that event which l i e s at the heart of the 
Christian r e l i g i o n , Jesus as the Christ* The Christ i s the bearer 
of the New Being, and Jesus as the Christ i s he who brings the New 
Being to man i n his own person i 'Jesus of Nazareth «... i s actually 
namely, be 4 0 the Christ,/who brings .the new state of things, the New Being*. 
I n f a c t , the history of the symbol 'the Christ', with i t s Hebrew origins 
and the influence of non-Hebrew religions upon i t , demonstrates that i t 
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i s an adequate symbol f o r the f u l f i l m e n t of both h i s t o r i c a l and non-
h i s t o r i c a l expectations of the New Being* C h r i s t i a n i t y affirms that 
the d i f f e r e n t forms i n which the quest f o r the New Being have been 
made are a l l f u l f i l l e d i n Jesus as the Christ, and i n thi s context, 
T i l l i c h sees the Christ-mystioism of Paul and h i s p a r a l l e l doctrine 
of the S p i r i t as 'an important bridge across which the non-historical 
•type' of expectation if could enter C h r i s t i a n i t y ' * ^ So the New Being 
as i t has appeared i n Jesus as the Christ becomes the oomplete 
answer to man's e x i s t e n t i a l predicament* 
For T i l l i c h there i s a most important d i s t i n c t i o n between 'Jesus 
of Nazareth 1 and 'the Christ'• 'Jesus of Nazareth' points t o the 
h i s t o r i c a l existence of the man Jesus, whereas 'the Christ' points to 
the significance of t h i s man, the f a c t that i n him the New Being, 
'essential God-Manhood', has appeared i n our human existence and sub-
jected i t s e l f to i t s conditions without being defeated by them. To 
maintain t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n means that 'the Christ* as such i s free t o 
appear i n other forms outside the sphere of human his t o r y , but that 
as f a r as man i s concerned i t i s Jesus of Nazareth who appears as the 
Christ f o r us. I t also means that Christology i s not replaced by a 
false 'Jesuology', which has frequently been the case i n the l i f e of 
the church. 'One cannot a t t r i b u t e to the eternal Logos i n himself the 
face of Jesus of Nazareth or the face of h i s t o r i c a l man or of any 
par t i c u l a r manifestation of the/ground of being. But ce r t a i n l y the 
face of God manifest f o r h i s t o r i c a l man i s the face of Jesus as the 
Chr i s t ' . ^ 2 T i l l i c h also feels that t h i s essential separation of 
'Jesus' and 'the Christ* i n our Christologioal understanding helps 
us t o place the h i s t o r i c a l Jesus i n correct perspective. He has 
l i t t l e time f o r the l i b e r a l quest f o r the h i s t o r i c a l Jesus, and seems 
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to suggest that what r e a l l y matters i s the picture one i s given of 
t h i s man i n the Gospels rather than the actual h i s t o r i c a l existence* 
This does hot mean that he i s denying-that there was no man on whom 
the picture was based* I n f a c t , to ignore t h i s would be to ignore: 
the basic Christian assertion that essential God-Manhood has appeared 
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i n history* But i t i s the picture that i s of v i t a l i n t e r e s t to 
us - t h e p o r t r a i t of a man who, because the New Being was present i n 
him as the Christ, conquers the ambiguities of existence and opens 
up the way f o r a l l men to do the same* 'The proof of the h i s t o r i c a l 
existence' of t h i s man l i e s not i n any attempt to demonstrate that he 
was born and l i v e d and died at a certain time i n h i s t o r y , or even 
that he was Jesus of Nazareth, but i n the f a c t that the l i v i n g , 
personal r e a l i t y which shines through the Gospel story transforms 
a l l those who accept t h i s r e a l i t y as the Christ* I t i s an experiential 
proof, a proof of f a i t h . So f a i t h guarantees *a personal l i f e i n 
which the New Being has conquered the old being. But i t does hot 
guarantee his name to be Jesus of Nazareth?.^ 
Jesus as the Christ, therefore, i s the supreme revelation 
because i n him the estrangement of man from his true being and from 
God i s overcome once and f o r a l l , and supremely i n the event of the 
Cross, where he surrendered the f i n i t e part of himself, the Jesus-
element, to the New Reality which he bears, the Christ-element* 
Yet i n every part of his l i f e the conquest of sin i s to be seen, and 
the three characteristic, marks of e x i s t e n t i a l estrangement, unbelief, 
hubris,'>and concupiscence, do not appear at any plaoe i n the b i b l i c a l 
p o r t r a i t of Jesus as -the Christ. He was ce r t a i n l y tempted i n these 
respects, but he never f a i l e d to demonstrate his complete unity w i t h 
God. Indeed, the f a c t that he was tempted serves to show that i n the 
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New Being, f i n i t u d e , anxiety, ambiguity and tragedy are s t i l l present, 
but are so taken i n t o the divine l i f e i n Christ-that they lose t h e i r 
destructive power. T i l l i c h ' s picture of Jesus as the Christ, then, 
i s 'not the picture of a divine-human automaton without serious 
temptation, real struggle or. tragic involvement i n the ambiguities 
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of l i f e ' , - but rather the picture -of a l i f e which although subjected 
to every consequence of estrangement, completely conquers i t and 
retains his complete unity with God* 
. Tillich-makes a thorough analysis of the Christological dogma, 
reje c t i n g Harnack's allegation that the use of Greek concepts led to 
an unnecessary i n t e l l e o t u a l i s a t i o n of the Gospel, by pointing out 
that i f the church were to f u l f i l i t s apologetic task, i t s work of 
mission, i n the f i r s t three centuries, i t had no alternative but to 
use h e l l e n i s t i c concepts, the only concepts available'to i t f o r the 
expression of the Christian message*^ However, he i s aware that these 
very concepts are ones which create'major d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r us today, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n our contemporary apologetic... task, and therefore need 
to be replaced .by ways of thinking that are more -acceptable* But he 
reminds us that one must beware l e s t i n attempting to rephrase the 
Christological dogma, one loses the important truths that Nicaea 
and Chalcedon sought to preserve, even though they did i t with 
'inadequate t o o l s ' . ^ What i n f a c t we need to reject,-and can r e j e c t 
without any loss.of r e a l significance, i s the 'two^nature theory' 
which was based on an idea of substance or' s t a t i c essence which i s 
ho longer v a l i d , i n favour of a new dynamic r e l a t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
which substitutes f o r the expression 'the divine nature', 'eternal 
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God-man unity'', or 'eternal God-Manhood % . The essential t r u t h i s 
that i n Jesus as the: Christ we see that essentially God and Man-are1 one* 
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Finally,' T i l l i c h asserts that the person and work of Christ are. 
r e a l l y two aspects of one and the same" thing* Christ i s Saviour . 
primarily because, of what he i s . But i f Christ i s the .bearer of the 
New: Being,, then his work is., as we have seen, t o conquer the existen-
t i a l ambiguities of l i f e i n the power of the New Being, and t h i s leads 
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to the question of the Atonement* I n the New Testament, the two 
major symbols of the Atonement, the Cross and Resurrection, point to 
the same th i n g , the conquest by Christ of the estrangement between 
man and God, a conquest made possible; by the w i l l i n g surrender of 
himself as Jesus t o himself' as the Christ, and the resultant v i c t o r y 
symbolised by the' Resurrection*' The formulation, which we c a l l the 
dootrine of the Atonement i s , f o r T i l l i c h , 'the-description of the 
eff e c t of the New Being in.Jesus as the Christ on those who-are 
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grasped by i t i n t h e i r . s t a t e of estrangement xy a d e f i n i t i o n which 
refers t o both objective'and subjective sides of the'atoning process, 
the conquest of estrangement which i s responsible f o r a l l human g u i l t , 
and the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n effected i n the l i f e of him who accepts the 
divine o f f e r i n his own l i f e * I t i s the second of these aspects that 
w i l l more p a r t i c u l a r l y concern us i n our consideration of the doctrine 
of the S p i r i t . ^ However, there i s need f o r reinterpretation of the 
doctrine of the Atonement j u s t as of the Christological dogma, and 
whil s t T i l l i c h does not develop t h i s i n d e t a i l , he does suggest 
several broad principles which should be held i n mind i n any attempt 
at reformulation. F i r s t , there must be t o t a l emphasis on the divine 
i n i t i a t i v e : a l l atoning processes are created by God and God alone* 
Secondly, there i s no c o n f l i c t i n God between'his reconciling love 
and-his r e t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e * T h i r d l y , God's forgiveness i n no way 
implies that he overlooks the r e a l i t y and depth of e x i s t e n t i a l estrange-
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ment. Fourthly, his atoning a c t i v i t y i s to be seen as his' p a r t i c i p a -
t i o n i n that estrangement and i t s consequences* This i s the very 
heart of the Atonement* F i f t h l y , i n the Cross of Christ the divine 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n e x i s t e n t i a l estrangement becomes manifest* And 
f i n a l l y , through p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the New Being i n Jesus as the Christ 
man i s able also to participate i n the manifestation- of the atoning 
a c t i v i t y of God* T i l l i c h maintains that i n t h i s sense the concept of 
par t i c i p a t i o n i s much nearer to a real understanding of the Atonement 
than the t r a d i t i o n a l language of substitution* 
This p a r t i c i p a t i o n by man i n the New Being i n Jesus as the Christ 
i s what theology has called regeneration* Christ brings the New Reality 
and i n entering i n t o i t man participates i n i t and i s reborn* When 
this p a r t i c i p a t i o n occurs man i s accepted by God, he i s ' j u s t i f i e d ' 
before him* I n t h i s sense, salvation i s both regeneration and j u s t i -
f i c a t i o n * Though the terminology points to two d i f f e r e n t facets, 'as 
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a divine act, regeneration and j u s t i f i c a t i o n are one*. But salvar- , 
t i o n can also be described as s a n o t i f i c a t i o n , or transformation, and 
i n t h i s sense, i t i s to be distinguished from both regeneration and 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n 'as a process i s d i s t i n c t from the event i n which i t i s 
i n i t i a t e d ' * I t i s t h i s process, i n which the New Being transforms 
personality and community, both w i t h i n and outside the church, that i s 
the work of the divine S p i r i t , who i s the actualisation of the New 
Being. Because of t h i s , neither the doctrine o f man nor the doctrine 
of the Christ can come to an end at t h i s point. Their implications 
must be worked out i n the midst of the ambiguities of l i f e and history* 
I f the revelation i n Jesus as the Christ i s to be supreme, then i t needs 
to be received by men i n the depth of t h e i r l i v e s at every stage of 
his t o r y , i n and through the l i f e of the Church, arid t h i s means that the 
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doctrine of the S p i r i t , and that of the Kingdom of God, i s an i n t e g r a l 
part of the Christological work. 
I t has been necessary to make t h i s analysis of the main directions 
i n T i l l i c h ' s Christological thought, fo r without some understanding of 
his teaching regarding Jesus as the Christ i t i s impossible to under-
stand many of the things he has tonsay about the work of the S p i r i t * 
I f the S p i r i t i s 'the S p i r i t of Christ' as the New Testament asserts, 
then what T i l l i c h has to say about the Christ must inevitably influence 
his doctrine of the S p i r i t , and t h i s comes out c l e a r l y i n his affirma-
t i o n that the S p i r i t i s at work among man to actualise the New Being 
i n his l i f e and experience by bringing him face to face with the 
Christian revelation*' The S p i r i t therefore i s active i n the.creation 
of the New Being, wherever and"whenever t h i s takes place* Fart of 
our task w i l l be to demonstrate what t h i s means f o r T i l l i c h , and how 
he -interprets i t i n the ontological categories which he has chosen 
to use. One or two comments need to be made here, however, wi t h 
regard to his concepts of estrangement and the Christ* 
F i r s t l y , we may venture to suggest that i n his r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of the b i b l i c a l myth of the F a l l , T i l l i c h ends up with something-
rather d i f f e r e n t from what the Genesis story i s r e a l l y saying. What 
he i s r e a l l y doing i s presupposing the t r u t h behind the Platonic myth 
of the Transcendent F a l l from essence to existence, and then t r a n s l a t i n g 
the b i b l i c a l myth accordingly. I n doing t h i s , he seems.not only to 
be taking the b i b l i c a l concept of sin less than seriously, but also i n 
his close alignment of sin with f i n i t u d e coming very near to i d e n t i f y i n g 
creation with the F a l l . Despite his denial of t h i s , and his assertion 
that i t i s i n i t s essential character that creation i s good, the 
problem remains. The concept of an essential creation over against an 
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actual creation i s a d i f f i c u l t , one to grasp, and one must ask the 
question i n what way creation can t r u l y be creation i f i t i s not 
actualised? I t i s extremely hard to give any meaning at a l l to t h i s 
sort of d i s t i n c t i o n * 
What concerns us more s p e c i f i c a l l y i s T i l l i c h ' s d e f i n i t i o n of -
s i n i n terms of estrangement* I n many ways i t i s a useful term. Not 
least does i t point to the f a c t that sin i s something f a r deeper than 
mere transgression, serious though t h i s may be* Perhaps the classical 
prophets, when they spoke of hot knowing the Lord as the root of 
moral e v i l , were saying the same sort of thing* S i m i l a r l y , i n the 
realm of human re l a t i o n s , the concept" of estrangement underlines that 
s i n i s not.merely a matter of words and actions, but has i t s roots 
withi n an a t t i t u d e of mind that i s basically self-centred and h o s t i l e 
towards the other one* Again, depth psychology has so emphasised the 
in t e r n a l c o n f l i c t s found i n every man, preventing him from r e a l i s i n g 
his essential nature, that one can meaningfully speak of one's estrange-
ment from oneself* However, the real problem i n T i l l i c h ' s concept of 
estrangement i s his assertion that i t i s the inevitable consequence of 
e x i s t e n t i a l separation. For such a statement there would seem to be no 
authority, save that of T i l l i c h ' s system i t s e l f * Outside the system 
such a l i n k i s certainly not established and the argument i s unconvincing* 
Furthermore, T i l l i c h ' s assertion implies that the healing of estrange-
ment, and thus the defeat of s i n , i s contingent on the conquest of the 
subject-object s p l i t which characterises the e x i s t e n t i a l world* I t . i s 
d i f f i c u l t to see how this can be reconciled.with b i b l i c a l thought* The 
New Testament has nothing to say about the need to. transcend any exis-
t e n t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n whether between man and God,' or. man and man, i n 
i t s teaching on r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , which i t i s quite content to express i n 
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r e l a t i o n a l terms which preserve the i n d i v i d u a l i t y of a l l concerned* 
I n assessing T i l lien's understanding of s i n i n terms of estrangement., 
these reservations must be borne i n mind* 
Secondly, though we would not necessarily quarrel with T i l l i c h ' s 
assertion that the quest f o r the New Being i s universal, i t should be 
pointed out that i t i s i n no way apparent that the precise aim of the 
quest i s always as T i l l i c h would define i t , that i s , a quest f o r an 
order of r e a l i t y i n which the subjeot-object order of existence i s 
overcome* I t i s f a r too sweeping to say that a l l r e l i g i o n s , l e t alone 
mankind i n general, are engaged i n t h i s sort of quest* Certainly the 
search f o r a new l i f e i n which man may experience new b i r t h and the 
conquest of s i n i s to be found everywhere, but i t i s by no means always 
thought of i n the precise ontological terms i n which T i l l i c h defines 
i t . Despite t h i s , T i l l i c h obviously f e e l s that every concrete and 
h i s t o r i c a l form of expectation i n which new l i f e has been sought must 
be seen i n the l i g h t of what i s f o r him the only v a l i d goal of such 
a quest, p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a state of essential humanity, or perhaps 
'eternal Gdd-man-unity.', where a l l ambiguities are resolved as every 
form of e x i s t e n t i a l separation i s overcome. So i n the long run 
i t i s not the ind i v i d u a l himself that, r e a l l y matters, but the state 
of New Reality i n t o whioh he enters*' This i s borne out i n 
T i l l i c h ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Jesus as the bearer of the New Being. As 
an individual i n h i s own r i g h t he i s of secondary importance* His 
real significance i s that he brings to man the New Reality i n t o which 
man can enter; he opens up f o r man what essential God-man-unity i s . 
This, not the l i f e of the i n d i v i d u a l , i s the all-important thing. But 
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there i s no warrant i n the New Testament f o r the subordination of 
indi v i d u a l men t o a state of eternal God-man-unity as sucho We sh a l l 
see l a t e r , i n T i l l i e n ' s discussion on the S p i r i t , how t h i s p r i o r i t y 
of the New Being as a r e a l i t y i n i t s e l f i n t o which man enters rather 
than a new l i f e which he, as an in d i v i d u a l receives, influences T i l l i c h ' s 
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whole approach to the doctrine of regeneration. 
I n the t h i r d place, one wonders whether T i l l i c h takes the h i s t o r -
i c a l question of Jesus as the Christ seriously enough* His af f i r m a t i o n 
that even i f f a i t h does not guarantee the h i s t o r i c i t y of the name of 
Jesus i t nevertheless guarantees a personal l i f e i n whom the New Being 
has appeared, such as one sees i n the Gospel picture of Jesus, i s rather 
strange* For does t h i s r e a l l y say anything more than i f there ever 
was an appearance of the New Being i n h i s t o r y , then f a i t h would guarantee 
tha t he would be l i k e the character we see portrayed i n Jesus of 
Nazareth? Certainly f a i t h cannot adduce any evidence that such a 
character actually existed. For t h i s reason one feels that T i l l i c h 
does not r e a l l y come to grips with the h i s t o r i c a l question. Faith 
cannot l i b e r a t e us from a legitimate h i s t o r i c a l quest. I n f a c t , to 
suggest otherwise would have serious implications not only f o r 
Christology but also f o r the doctrine of the S p i r i t , i n that i t would 
open the way f o r a primarily mystical understanding of the S p i r i t of 
Christ that does not depend on any essential h i s t o r i c a l foundation. 
F i n a l l y , turning to more s p e c i f i c a l l y Christological issues, there 
are several points one would wish to raise. T i l l i c h ' s attempt to 
provide a Christology f o r contemporary man i s laudable, yet one wonders 
whether the conceptual tools he uses are any more adequate than those 
of Nicaea and Chalcedon which he disclaims. One of the tests of t h e i r 
adequacy must surely be whether they are able to convey the essential 
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meaning and message of the Gospel, and one feels from t h i s point of 
view they have serious defects* Instead of 'divine nature* T i l l i c h 
suggests that we replace the phrase 'eternal God-man-unity' or 
'eternal God-Manhood'• One wonders whether t h i s i s r e a l l y a s a t i s -
factory substitute* I t seems to o b l i t e r a t e the d i s t i n c t i o n always 
emphasised i n the doctrine of the two natures between the human and 
the divine, and though one c e r t a i n l y feels the need f o r reinter p r e -
te t i o n , i t appears that here they'are confused rather than explained* 
This may be no disadvantage w i t h i n the system as a whole, which pre-
supposes an essential continuity between the human and the divine, but 
i t i s a serious disadvantage outside the system, where i t s fundamental 
propositions are not accepted* Furthermore, T i l l i c h maintains that 
his new d e f i n i t i o n replaces s t a t i c essence by dynamic r e l a t i o n * 
However, the very f e e l i n g that one gets about phrases l i k e 'God-man-
unity '• or 'God-Manhood''is that they are s t i l l t i e d to concepts which 
are not so very d i f f e r e n t from those used by the early Christian 
theologians* They s t i l l have an a i r of s o l i d substantiality about 
themJ One fe e l s that had T i l l i c h moved towards a description of the 
relationship between Christ and God as one of dynamic love, which the 
S p i r i t continues to manifest i n the world of men, one may have been 
nearer to a more eff e c t i v e substitute of dynamic relations f o r s t a t i c 
essences* ' 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t to make any satisfactory evaluation of T i l l i c h ' s . 
understanding of the Atonement, because what he provides us with i s 
r e a l l y a l i s t of c r i t e r i a according to which the doctrine can be 
developed i n the contemporary period rather than a r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
i t s e l f . I f one i s to make any c r i t i c i s m i t would be that any i n t e r -
pretation of the Atonement i n the ontological categories which T i l l i c h 
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suggests may well rob i t of the sharpness of i t s impact* One also feels 
that the brevity of h i s treatment of the objeotive aspects o f the 
Atonement; under the respective headings of regeneration, j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
and s a n c t i f i o a t i o n , such as one finds i n Volume I I of his Systematic 
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Theology, compares unfavourably w i t h his more detailed analysis of 
these themes from the subjective standpoint with which we s h a l l be 
concerned i n our study of the S p i r i t * This could suggest that either 
his pneuraatology i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y Christologically based, or t h a t r 
the Spirit-orientated experience i s of more significance than the -
once and f o r a l l action of' God i n Christ,' or perhaps both* 
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CHAPTER ONE , THE DOCTRINE OF GOD 
I . BEING AMD GOD 
The doctrine of the S p i r i t i s an important aspect of the 
doctrine of God* However, i n so f a r as i t i s only one aspect, we 
sha l l make no attempt to discuss the doctrine of God as a whole, but 
confine ourselves to those things which are d i r e c t l y relevant to the 
theology of the S p i r i t . 1 
I n accordance wi t h the method of correlation the idea of God i n 
T i l l i c h ' s theology i s developed i n answer to the question implied i n 
man's f i n i t u d e , the question of. being* Man i s prompted to ask t h i s 
question because he experiences the shock of non-being which everywhere 
2 
surrounds him i n his f i n i t e existence* This awareness of nothingness 
i s a very r e a l part of his f i n i t u d e , and i t gives r i s e to a deep--
seated anxiety which underlies the whole of human l i f e * This anxiety 
cannot be eliminated, however, i t can only be accepted and borne as 
part of himself with a courage that enables him to assert his being 
i n spite of the threat of non-being which hangs over him* I n his 
l i t t l e book The Courage to Be,^ T i l l i o h says that such a courage may 
appear sometimes as the courage to be part of a larger whole, or some-
times as the courage to stand alone* But above a l l man's ontological 
anxiety i s more completely resolved i n the courage to acoept the fa c t 
that he i s carried by the creative power of being i n which every being 
participates *^ 'The courage which takes * * . anxiety i n t o i t s e l f 
must be rooted i n a power of being that i s greater than the power of 
oneself and the power of one's world*• The question of being therefore 
must be considered supremely i n the l i g h t of those experiences which 
have been known throughout h i s t o r y i n which the power of being has been 
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manifest, experiences which have given men courage to assert them-
selves i n the name of that power against the l i m i t a t i o n s of f i n i t u d e 
and the threat of nothingness which are constantly there. Sometimes 
t h i s experience may be i n the nature of a mystical awareness i n which 
the individual becomes i n t u i t i v e l y aware of his p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the 
power of being.^ At other times i t may take the form of a divine-
human encounter, i n which there i s the consciousness of a r e l a t i o n 
of'personal communion wi t h the source of courage 1, r e s u l t i n g , as i t 
did at the Reformation, i n a courage of confidence based on God alone. 
But always i t w i l l be 'the state of being grasped by the power of 
being which transcends everything that i s and i n which everything that 
i s participates'• The person who i s i n t h i s state, which i s the 
essence of f a i t h , 'is able to a f f i r m himself because he knows that he 
Q 
i s affirmed by the power of be i n g - i t s e l f ' . ^ This i s what T i l l i c h 
c a l l s 'the courage to accept acceptance',^ so that i n knowing that 
we are accepted and affirmed by the ground of being, we have the 
courage to assert our being even i n the face of radical despair. 
The question posed by our humanifinitude, therefore, - the question 
of being - i s answered -and -resolved courageously when we are grasped 
by the power of being i t s e l f . This then i s that which concerns us 
ultimately, Being-itself i s the object of man's ultimate concern, i t i s 
the answer to man's questioning. Religion and theology have t r a d i -
t i o n a l l y given the name 'God' to t h i s ultimate concern. But there i s 
a problem here* For the name 'God' i s associated with something 
'concrete' which can be encountered, a highest being among beings, 
whereas our ultimate concern, i f i t i s to be t r u l y ultimate, must 
transcend every concrete encounter. I f i t i s to answer the question 
implied i n f i n i t u d e , i t must transcend the whole realm of the f i n i t e . ^ 
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The true God, therefore, says T i l l i c h , i s the 'God above God1, who 
i s hidden i n every mystical experience and who i s behind every divine-
human encounter, the power of be i n g - i t s e l f , the ultimate r e a l i t y , 
which transcends everything that i s . So T i l l i c h prefers to speak of 
God as • f b e i n g - i t s e l f • or 'the ground of being 1, and he i s of the 
opinion that 'many confusion's i n the doctrine of God and many apolo-
getic weaknesses could be avoided' i f God were understood f i r s t of a l l 
i n t h i s way."^ 
Al t e r n a t i v e l y , he suggests that we may' legitimately refer to 
God i n his ultimacy as: the 'power of being', f o r t r a d i t i o n a l l y the 
concept of bei n g - i t s e l f i n philosophy and theology has pointed to the 
power within everything which enables i t to' r e s i s t non-being. So we 
can say that God; is' the 'power of being i n everything and above 
everything, the i n f i n i t e power of being'.^ Those theologies which 
do.not i d e n t i f y God and the power of being lapse into a sort of monarchic 
monotheism of the most l i t e r a l type, which sets God above the world, 
but makes him yet another being and thereby subject to be i n g - i t s e l f * 
But God cannot be subject to anything, 'he i s "by himself"; he possesses 
"aseity". 1 And t h i s can only be said of him i f he i s the.power of 
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being, b e i n g - i t s e l f . ' : ' 
When.we t a l k of God as 'being-itself' we are also affirming, 
says T i l l i c h , that God i s above any d i s t i n c t i o n between 'essential 
being' and 'e x i s t e n t i a l b e i n g * . I n the ontologioal analysis of the 
nature of being as we know i t we are able t o distinguish between the 
essence of being and the existence of being; between potential ground 
and actual form; between the .nature of a thing and the expression of 
that nature. But th i s d i s t i n c t i o n between'essence and existence cannot 
be applied to God, for as bein g - i t s e l f he must be beyond such a contrast. 
36' 
T i l l i c h puts t h i s c l e a r l y i n his "'Dialogues wi-th Students', where 
he says, "There i s of course that being which i s -beyond essence and • 
existence, which i n the t r a d i t i o n of -the classical theology of a l l 
centuries we c a l l God - or i f you prefer, " b e i n g - i t s e l f " or "the 
ground of being"* And this- "being" does-not merely exist and'is not 
merely essential, but transcends t h a t - d i f ferentiation., which others .. 
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wise belongs to everything f i n i t e 1 ' . Thus i t i s incorrect to-say 
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either that God exists or that God i s the "universal essence'* On 
the one hand-, i f we say. that God is''universal essence1 then-we i d e n t i f y 
him with the unity and t o t a l i t y .of a l l f i n i t e p o t e n t i a l i t i e s , which 
i s somewhat d i f f e r e n t from saying that he i s the power of being w i t h i n 
them a l l , and which would therefore suggest that he does, not transcend 
them, which i s what pantheism tends to assert* On the other hand, 
i f we say that God exists;, we are thereby .contradicting the idea of 
a creative ground of both essence and existence* - I t i s more-accurate 
therefore to speak of the ' r e a l i t y of God*, which points -to his true 
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nature as b e i n g - i t s e l f * 
This i n s i g h t , says . T i l l i c h , helps-Us-to take a f i r s t step towards 
solving the problem of the transcendence and the immanence of God, 
for " as. the power of being, God transcends both every being and also 
the t o t a l i t y of being. "Being-itself i n f i n i t e l y transcends every . 
f i n i t e being. - There i s no proportion or gradation between the f i n i t e 
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and the i n f i n i t e . ' There is'an Absolute break, an i n f i n i t e "jump'". 
This i s the basis of the doctrine of the transcendence of God. On the 
other hand, every f i n i t e being participates i n b e i n g - i t s e l f , i n the 
power of being., otherwise i t would never have emerged out of non-
being. I t i s t h i s fact that/enables us to speak of the immanence of 
God. So'when we c a l l God creative, or immanent, we are emphasising, t h a t . ; 
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everything participates i n the power of being; and i n c a l l i n g him 
abysmal, or transcendent, we are emphasising that a l l beings are 
i n f i n i t e l y transcended by t h e i r creative ground* 
The expression 'ground of being' helps us to understand the 
r e l a t i o n of God, as b e i n g - i t s e l f , to man, as f i n i t e being* The word 
'ground' can be interpreted i n the sense of both cause and substance* 
Interpreted as substance, the r e l a t i o n of bei n g - i t s e l f to f i n i t e 
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being was c l a s s i c a l l y expressed by Spinoza i n his n a t u r a l i s t i c 
pantheism, which merged bein g - i t s e l f and a l l f i n i t e beings i n t o one* 
But t h i s type of pantheism made the Christian assertion of man's 
f i n i t e freedom impossible* So Christian theology came to re j e c t the 
int e r p r e t a t i o n of 'ground' as substance, because of t h i s way of 
thinking, i n favour of i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as 'cause', as developed f o r 
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example by Leibnitz on the basis of Thomistic t r a d i t i o n * The 
advantage seemed to be obvious* The concept of causality seemed to 
make both the created order dependent on God and also e f f e c t i v e l y 
separated the f i n i t e from bein g - i t s e l f * However, with the s c i e n t i f i c 
assertion that cause and ef f e c t could not be separated, the category 
of causality also f e l l down. So, maintains T i l l i c h , i t i s impossible 
to i n t e r p r e t 'ground of being 1 i n terms of causality or substance i f 
we are to use these expressions l i t e r a l l y . However, there i s some 
t r u t h i n them i f they are used as symbols, which point to a t r u t h 
rather than express i t * Symbolically, we can say that God i s both 
the 'cause* of the e n t i r e series of causes and e f f e c t s , and that he i s 
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the 'substance* which underlies the whole process of becoming. I n 
other words, 'there i s no difference between prima causa and ultima 
substantia. Both mean what can be called i n a more d i r e c t l y symbolic 
term "the creative and abysmal ground of being" 1. 
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Because God i s the ground of being, he i s the ground of the 
structure of-being also. Though he himself i s not subject to t h i s 
structure, the structure i s grounded i n him. T i l l i c h affirms: 'He 
i s this structure, and i t i s impossible to speak about him except i n 
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terms of t h i s structure'. J This assertion, he says, has two 
important implications. I n saying that God i s not subject to the 
structure of being, we avert the danger of positing a structure of 
being above God, which would make him less than b e i n g - i t s e l f . I n the 
second place, to say t h i s means that we can approach God cognitively 
through the s t r u c t u r a l elements of b e i n g - i t s e l f , elements which we 
can understand i n some degree through the structure of our own being. 
These elements make God a l i v i n g concern f o r us and enable us to use 
symbols which point to the ground of r e a l i t y * 
One or two comments may be made at t h i s stage. Several c r i t i c i s m s 
have been levelled at T i l l i c h ' s use of the expression 'being-itself* 
and i t s p a r a l l e l expressions 'the power of being* and 'the ground of 
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being'. Most of these are concerned'with inherent ambiguities 
withi n these expressionst f o r example, MacQuarrie points out that the 
phrase 'power of being* could mean eit h e r 'power to be' or 'power 
exerted by being 1, though one could reply to t h i s that the power supremely 
exerted by being i s indeed the power to be, and thus no ambiguity i s 
r e a l l y present*' We shall not concern ourselves with these c r i t i c i s m s , 
but rather with the precise r e l a t i o n between the f i n i t e and the 
ultimate as i t i s expressed i n T i l l i c h ' s doctrine of b e i n g - i t s e l f , f o r 
i t i s t h i s question that i s of p a r t i c u l a r relevance to the doctrine of 
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the S p i r i t * , Though there are times when he makes specific reference 
to the distance between the f i n i t e world and God (as f o r example, when, 
he speaks of an absolute break, an i n f i n i t e jump,- between the ultimate 
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and the f i n i t e ) , there are also many times when he much more force-
f u l l y emphasises the factor of p a r t i c i p a t i o n which' enables.the power 
of.the f i n i t e , including man, to share i n the power of ultimate 
r e a l i t y which i s the ground of i t s being. One feels that t h i s dominant 
concept of p a r t i c i p a t i o n must imply at least some sort of continuity 
between ultimate power and the f i n i t e power of being. The problem as 
i t affects our assessment of T i l l i c h ' s doctrine of the S p i r i t w i l l 
appear i n t h i s wayi ' I f the power of being i n God and man are contin-
uous, then i t would seem to follow that between the divine S p i r i t and 
the human s p i r i t there i s some point of i d e n t i t y , or perhaps even that 
the human s p i r i t i s the f i n i t e aspect of the 'divine S p i r i t i n which i t 
participates. This point w i l l arise again, not only i n our discussion 
on T i l l i c h ' s . concept of symbol and the way i n which T i l l i c h speaks of 
the s p i r i t of man as a symbol of the S p i r i t of God, but also i n 
our- f i n a l assessment of the meaning of the transcendent' unity of 
unambiguous l i f e to which Till'ich's doctrine of the S p i r i t i s closely 
geared.-
One other comment, which i s not unconnected with the above -
remark, arises from T i l i c h ' s suggestion that because the s t r u c t u r a l 
elements of our f i n i t e l i f e are grounded i n b e i n g - i t s e l f we are thereby 
able to understand something about God through an examination of the 
structure of our own l i f e and beings This i s r e a l l y to say that there 
i s a universal, ontological revelation of God which stems from man's 
pa r t i c i p a t i o n i n the l i f e of God through the structures of-being. , This 
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confirms what we have already pointed out i n our introductory chapter,, 
that u l t i m a t e l y . f o r T i l l i c h i t i s t h i s universal, ontological revelation 
that i s all-important, since i t i s only because we have t h i s revelation 
deeply embedded i n our own being that we can understand- the'significance 
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of every concrete revelation we receive* The fact that we have t h i s 
inner revelation also prepares us-to see that as f a r as T i l l i c h i s . 
concerned i t i s only through an examination of the meaning of s p i r i t 
i n human l i f e that we can come to. understand the meaning of the 
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Divine S p i r i t * The key to understanding l i e s w i t h i n us* 
I I o THE CONCEPT OF SYMBOL AMD THE DOCTRINE OF GOD 
According to T i l l i c h * therefore, God i s to be understood as 
'being-itself'. The question which t h i s i n e v i t a b l y poses i s how we 
can go on to speak meaningfully of such a God. We cannot, T i l l i c h 
argues, l i t e r a l l y express the t r u t h about God i n human terms, associated 
as they are with f i n i t e experience and the subject-object structure of 
language. How then can we speak about God? 
. T i l l i c h ' s answer i s that our language about God, or our know-
ledge of him, i s symbolic* Only when we speak of God as 'being-
i t s e l f ' are we speaking l i t e r a l l y , f o r t h i s i s a statement which i n no 
way points beyond i t s e l f * ^ But apart from t h i s every other state-
ment about God must be symbolic. ' I f anything beyond t h i s bare 
assertion i s said about God, i t i s no longer a dir e c t and proper 
statement, no longer a concept. I t i s i n d i r e c t , and i t points to 
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something beyond i t s e l f . I n a word, i t i s symbolic*• 
This brings us to one of the most important features of T i l l i c h ' s 
theology: the concept of symbol. He says, 'The centre of my theplo-
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gic a l doctrine of the knowledge of God i s the concept of symbol*• 
We need therefore to spend a l i t t l e time i n considering t h i s important 
concept* T i l l i c h distinguishes between a symbol and a sign* Both 
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point beyond themselves to something else, but whereas a mere sign 
i n no sense participates i n the r e a l i t y or power f o r which i t stands, 
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t h i s i s precisely what a symbol does: i t not only points beyond 
i t s e l f , i t also participates i n the power and meaning of that to which 
i t points. For example, a f l a g i s a meaningful symbol because i t 
participates i n the power of the king or nation which i t symbolises; 
and s i m i l a r l y , the words of l i t u r g i c a l and poetic language participate 
i n those experiences or situations which they represent, and thus 
become l i n g u i s t i c symbols which cannot be replaced. T i l l i c h c a l l s 
this p a r t i c i p a t o r y character of a symbol i t s 'representative' or 
'basic' functioni i t represents that i n the power of which i t 
p articipates* This representative function of a symbol leads d i r e c t l y 
to i t s second or 'main' function, which i s to open up levels of 
r e a l i t y which would otherwise be hidden and which cannot be grasped 
i n any other way. Thus the function of a r t , f o r example, i s to 
open up levels of r e a l i t y which cannot be otherwise perceived, and f o r 
t h i s reason every a r t i s t i c creation has a symbolic character* The 
same i s true of d i f f e r e n t types of language, whether i t be poetic, 
philosophical or s c i e n t i f i c * Having opened up those levels of 
r e a l i t y , the genuine symbol must also be able to i n i t i a t e a response 
in'the human soul by opening up a corresponding level of i n t e r i o r 
r e a l i t y . So, says T i l l i c h , the 'opening-up f u n c t i o n 1 of the symbol 
has two aspects, 'namely, r e a l i t y i n deeper levels and the human soul 
i n special levels'*,^ 
I f t h i s i s so, then i t i s clear that symbols cannot j u s t be 
replaced ad l i b by other symbols i n the same way as signs, f o r every 
symbol has a special function which i t alone can f u l f i l . 'Genuine 
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symbols are not interchangeable at a l l ' * ^ For symbols, unlike signs, 
are not a r b i t r a r i l y invented; they are born. They are born out of 
the c o l l e c t i v e unconscious of the group to which they belong, which 
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acknowledges i n th i s or that p a r t i c u l a r symbol the ultimate concern of 
i t s own being* 'This implies that the symbol i s socially rooted and 
soc i a l l y supported* Hence i t i s not correct to say that a thing i s 
f i r s t a symbol and then gains acceptance; the process of becoming a 
symbol and the acceptance of i t as a symbol belong together**^ And 
ju s t as th i s or that p a r t i c u l a r symbol i s born, so also i t can die, i f 
the s i t u a t i o n arises when i t no longer draws out a 'yes' from the group 
unconscious, when i t no longer opens up f o r the group those levels of 
exterior r e a l i t y which i n i t i a t e a response i n the human soul* 
So much f o r symbols i n general: we must now turn to a consider-
ation of r e l i g i o u s symbols* I t follows that the f i r s t characteristic 
of a r e l i g i o u s symbol i s that i t participates i n the ultimate r e a l i t y 
t o which i t points* Any segment of f i n i t e r e a l i t y which has become a 
vehicle of a concrete assertion about God, as a r e s u l t of an experience 
of the Holy i n a concrete encounter, not only points t o God but also 
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participates i n the power of God* The cr u c i a l question i s how a 
segment of f i n i t e r e a l i t y can be the basis f o r any assertion about 
that which i s ultimate* T i l l i c h answers that t h i s i s possible 
precisely because everything that has being must necessarily participate 
i n the power of ' b e i n g - i t s e l f 1 * This makes possible an analogy of 
f i n i t e things, an analogia e n t i s , by means of which we can speak about 
God i n a symbolic way* So the re l i g i o u s symbol opens up f o r us 'the 
depth dimension of r e a l i t y i t s e l f , the dimension of r e a l i t y which i s 
the ground of every other dimension and every other depth • • • the. 
ultimate power of being** Furthermore, i n doing t h i s , i t also 
opens up the experience of the dimension of t h i s depth i n the human 
soul: i t i n i t i a t e s an i n t e r i o r response* As we have seen, i f a 
symbol f a i l s to i n i t i a t e t h i s response, i t declines and dies, and t h i s 
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i s equally true of the religious symbol as of any other* There i s a 
par t i c u l a r tendency f o r t h i s ' t o happen i n an age such as our own, 
when i n an increasing secular climate,, the 'sacramental' or 'theonomous' 
significance of the material content of the symbol i s often denied, 
so that symbols begin to lose t h e i r power and are i n danger of d i s -
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appearing altogether* r 
What T i l l i c h says here t i e s i n very neatly with what he says about 
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revelation* I n his analysis of the meaning of revelation he pointed 
out that the numinous experience i n which man encounters the mystery of 
the Holy, the power of b e i n g - i t s e l f j through certain phenomena or events, 
gives b i r t h to symbols and myths which seek t o preserve the o r i g i n a l 
revelation* At the same time, because every revelatory experience 
must be an experience that i s received, i t must i n i t i a t e a response 
i n the human soul* So also the symbol which seeks to express the 
o r i g i n a l revelation, f a i l s , i n i t s function as a symbol unless i t i n i t i -
ates the inner response* I t i s t h i s that causes i t s eventual decline and 
death* 
When a segment of. f i n i t e r e a l i t y , whether i t be an object, word 
or action, becomes a re l i g i o u s symbol, i t raises that p a r t i c u l a r 
segment of r e a l i t y to a new level, of significance, so that the r e a l i t y 
becomes 'holy', or as we have said, 1 sacramental*• Nevertheless, 
t h i s does not mean that i t i s to be i d e n t i f i e d with the Holy i t s e l f ' , 
the ultimate r e a l i t y to which i t points and i n which i t participates* 
A true symbol, therefore, i s both affirmed and negated, affirmed i n 
the sense of i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n , negated i n the sense that i t always 
points beyond i t s e l f . I t i s when symbols are absolutised and i d e n t i f i e d 
with the Holy that id o l a t r y i s bom, so that that which participates 
i n the holy i s now in 1 danger of becoming demonic. So when the religious 
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symbol f u l f i l s i t s proper use, i t i s creative, revealing the hidden 
God and c a l l i n g f o r t h an inner response i n mail, but when i t i s absolu-
tised and thus demonised i t becomes inherently destructive* 
T i l l i c h distinguishes between two 'levels* of reli g i o u s symbols, 
'a supporting l e v e l i n which r e l i g i o u s o b j e c t i v i t y i s established and 
which i s based i n i t s e l f ; and. a level supported by i t and pointing to 
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objects of the other l e v e l ' • The f i r s t l e v e l he refers to as 
'objective r e l i g i o u s symbols', the second level as *self-transoending 
r e l i g i o u s symbols', such as aids to devotion and so on* I t i s the 
f i r s t group w i t h which he i s mainly concerned* I n t h i s group he 
detects several types* The f i r s t and basic type i s that of the 
divine beings, or i n monotheistic r e l i g i o n , the supreme Being, "God". 
I t i s important that we distinguish two elements i n t h i s idea of Godt 
the non-symbolic element, God as the ultimate r e a l i t y , ' being-itself', 
which we have already discussed, and the symbolic element, the image 
of a highest being with the characteristics of highest perfection. 
There i s therefore an immediate tension i n the use of t h i s basic 
symbol, and unless t h i s i s realised, there i s always the p o s s i b i l i t y 
that the ultimate, or the Unconditioned, w i l l i t s e l f become o b j e c t i f i e d , 
that God w i l l be made i n t o a t h i n g , which leads as we have seen to 
demonic i d o l a t r y * So 'God as an object i s a representation of the 
r e a l i t y ultimately referred to i n the re l i g i o u s act, but i n the word 
"God" t h i s o b j e c t i v i t y i s negated and at the same time i t s represen-
t a t i v e character i s asserted'.^ 2 The second group of objective 
r e l i g i o u s symbols consists of those concerned with the nature and 
actions of God, such as love, mercy, and so on. I n a sense these 
symbols presuppose that God i s an object, although they do indicate 
the f i g u r a t i v e nature of that presupposition. Because there i s a 
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fundamental awareness that a l l knowledge of God i s i n some way of a 
symbolic nature, t h i s immediately q u a l i f i e s the way i n which these 
symbols are used. Nevertheless, t h i s does not undermine the t r u t h 
such symbols seek to express* The t h i r d group of objective symbols 
consists of natural and h i s t o r i c a l objects which become •holy* or 
'theonomous' when drawn i n t o the religious sphere* The most important 
of these are. h i s t o r i c a l personalities* such as Jesus Christ or 
Gautama Buddha, who have become the objects of reli g i o u s acts* As 
symbolic representations of the ultimate they have no place i n the 
objective world, even though they were o r i g i n a l l y h i s t o r i c a l person-
a l i t i e s * They have become c u l t i c symbols i n so f a r as 'they represent 
the presence of the -unconditioned transcendent i n the empirical 
o r d e r ' . ^ This does not, of course, deny that they have an h i s t o r i c a l , 
empirical aspect, and i t i s the task of h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m to 
delineate between the two aspects and so prevent them from being demon-
ised i n t o f a l s e o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n s , 'by recognising the problematic 
character of the empirical element and by emphasising the importance 
of the symbolic element*• Yet t h e i r v a l i d i t y as r e l i g i o u s symbols 
depends not on h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m , but rather on the measure of 
t h e i r effectiveness to express the ultimate* I n t h i s group also 
T i l l i c h would presumably place the great sacraments: natural objects 
which have become sacramental i n so f a r as they have been drawn i n t o 
the sphere of the church and linked with the great h i s t o r i c a l events 
of the Gospel and t h e i r ontological significance* And l a s t l y , the 
fourth group of objective symbols consists of what T i l l i c h c a l l s 
'pointing symbols', which include signs and actions which have special 
significance i n that they refer to the great symbols of re l i g i o u s 
f a i t h : r i t u a l acts, perhaps, which point to the primary symbols 
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which i n t h e i r turn point to the ultimate* Sometimes i t i s , of course, 
d i f f i c u l t to distinguish these from T i l l i c h ' s second ' l e v e l ' of 
symbols, and f o r t h i s reason they need not concern us here* 
Despite the immense variety of symbols, T i l l i c h realises that 
i n ah increasingly secular society there may be those who would wish 
t o move away from symbolic language altogether, and speak more 
d i r e c t l y about the ultimate r e a l i t y * I t i s impossible to do.this, 
however, f o r there, can be no t o t a l penetration of the ultimate by 
the f i n i t e , no 'unmythical treatment of the unconditioned transcendent•« 
as he has demonstrated* I f i t were possible,' then r e a l i t y and symbol 
would become i d e n t i c a l * What i s needed therefore i s not a move away 
from symbolism i n our. attempt to speak about God, but rather to 
appreciate the real nature of our language when we attempt to express 
i n human terms something of the meaning of the'ultimate* And i n 
t h i s , the concept of symbol, even though i t affirms the f a c t that 
f i n i t e r e a l i t y i s riot f u l l y united :with the ground of i t s being, i s 
basic to our f u l l e r understanding* 
Before making a n y ' c r i t i c a l comments on T i l l i c h ' s concept of 
symbol, i t i s important to point out the central place t h i s sort of 
concept holds i n our t a l k i n g about God*. Though the significance, 
and indeed necessity, of using symbols i n religious.language.and 
experience has always been recognised i n Christian thought to a 
greater or lesser extent, the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of theological expression 
demanded by contemporary l i n g u i s t i c philosophy has led to a new explor-
ation and understanding of the meaning'of symbol* To t h i s examination 
T i l l i c h makes an important contribution* His analysis'is detailed 
and painstaking, and though there, are points which c e r t a i n l y need 
c l a r i f i c a t i o n , i t i s obvious that i t merits, our c r i t i c i s m precisely 
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because i t i s so penetrating* T i l l i c h ' s assertion that i t i s 
impossible to get away from some' sort o f symbolism i n our t a l k i n g 
about God i s one with which most contemporary theologians would agree* 
I f one considers also the new evaluation of symbols i n depth psychology, 
and i t s influence on theological expression, one could say that i n 
the r e ligious world we are on the verge of a new and dynamic apprecia-
t i o n of the use of symbols i n man's search f o r the meaning and ultimate 
concern of l i f e * I f , to put i t i n the words' of Antony Bridge, 'there 
are good grounds f o r believing that men are longing to be freed from ' 
the i n t e l l e c t u a l and s p i r i t u a l l i m i t a t i o n s imposed upon them by the 
narrow dogmatic assumptions of humanist materialism, and that a return 
to symbolic and analogical ways of. thought and communication' i s not 
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as improbable a contingency as i t ' may s u p e r f i c i a l l y appear- to be', 
then the work of T i l l i c h i s s i g n i f i c a n t not only f o r theological 
thought, but f o r the whole of man's c u l t u r a l l i f e * 
The main d i f f i c u l t y i n T i l l i c h ' s doctrine of symbolism i s that 
of the precise meaning of 'p a r t i c i p a t i o n ' • This i s a word which he 
uses i n a variety of contexts* We' have already noted that i n his 
attempted synthesis-between b i b l i c a l r e l i g i o n and ontology, the concept 
of p a r t i c i p a t i o n of man i n the divine l i f e i s of fundamental importance 
i n any re i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the theology of encounter, and l a t e r we shall 
see how important the same concept i s to what T i l l i c h c a l l s 'the 
transcendent unity of unambiguous l i f e ' i n which, i n the power Of the 
S p i r i t , the subject-object structure of e x i s t e n t i a l r e a l i t y i s over-
come. I n f a c t , T i l l i c h himself admits that he uses the concept i n a 
variety of ways: 'the' symbol participates i n the r e a l i t y i t symbolises; 
the knbwer participates i n the known; the lover participates i n the 
beloved; the e x i s t e n t i a l participates i n the essences which make i t 
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what i t i s lander the conditions of existence • • . Every relation, kvy; 
includes a kind of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . * . ^ W.L. Howe says"that t r y as we 
may i t i s impossible f o r us to define with any degree of precision 
what T i l l i c h means by p a r t i c i p a t i o n f o r t h i s very reason, and t h i s 
makes i t doubly d i f f i c u l t to say j u s t what T i l l i c h means when he says 
that symbols participate i n the r e a l i t y to which they p o i n t . ^ On the 
other hand, Gustave Weigel wishes to be more precise, and he suggests 
that T i l l i c h ' s use of the word means that the participant i s a 
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constituent element of that i n which i t participates, and J. Heywood 
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Thomas has pointed out that T i l l i c h nowhere denies t h i s . y Now 
although t h i s suggestion may not apply i n every case, i n his analysis 
of symbol, T i l l i c h ' s use of the concept of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s c e r t a i n l y 
open to the in t e r p r e t a t i o n Weigel puts upon i t . I n other words, i t 
suggests the sort of ontdlogical continuity that we have already 
mentioned i n our discussion on the r e l a t i o n between ultimate r e a l i t y 
and the f i n i t e power of being. So f o r T i l l i c h the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
symbolism must rest on a concept of ontological p a r t i c i p a t i o n which 
we must take with the utmost seriousness. One realises t h a t , 
according to T i l l i c h , t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y does not become an a c t u a l i t y 
u n t i l there i s a revelatory experience of and creative encounter with 
the Holy which gives b i r t h to p a r t i c u l a r symbols, determining which 
segments of f i n i t e r e a l i t y actually becomes symbolic i n the experience 
of man. But this does not undermine the fact that f o r T i l l i c h the 
essential v a l i d i t y of the re l i g i o u s symbol must rest on a*view of 
r e a l i t y in1., which there i s an ontological continuity between the f i n i t e 
and i t s ultimate ground. 
This i s one reason why one feels rather uneasy about T i l l i c h V s 
equation of symbol with the t r a d i t i o n a l concept of analogy. Although 
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t h i s concept i t s e l f i s open to d i f f e r e n t shades of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i t 
i s not t i e d to the idea of ontological p a r t i c i p a t i o n , as i s T i l l i c h ' s 
doctrine of symbol* Certainly i t presupposes a. relationship between 
the i n f i n i t e and f i n i t e , b u t the relationship has not been defined i n 
thi s way, at least not i n i t s c lassical formulations* The grounds 
f o r analogy are seen rather i n the s i m i l a r i t y or likeness which i s 
made possible by the creature's dependence on the creator f o r i t s l i f e * 
There i s no suggestion here that the f i n i t e i s an aspect of the 
i n f i n i t e , a constituent part of ultimate r e a l i t y . For t h i s reason one 
prefers the concept of analogy i n our attempt to understand our 
5 0 
language about God rather than T i l l i c h ' s understanding of symbol. J 
The comparison between symbol, and analogy raises also the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of 'analogous l i t e r a l i s m * • T i l l i c h , as we have seen, 
refuses to admit that there i s any sense i n which r e l i g i o u s language 
may be interpreted l i t e r a l l y . But Gustave Weigel maintains that there 
i s an ambiguity about the word ' l i t e r a l * which T i l l i c h f a i l s to 
recognise and which may mislead us here. 'Is i t simply t r u e 1 , he 
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asks, 'that we cannot use any word l i t e r a l l y of God?'. To use 
a word analogically, rather than symbolically, he states, does not 
necessarily divest i t of any l i t e r a l meaning. We can say that the leg 
of a table i s analogous to the leg of a man i n the sense that both have 
cert a i n functions in. common, they may not be i d e n t i c a l , but i n either 
case we are using the word, l i t e r a l l y . So also we can predicate certain 
things of God because there i s an analogous relationship between God 
and the created order. That which we predicate of God and the creation 
may not be i d e n t i c a l i n each s i t u a t i o n , but thi s does not mean to say 
that as f a r as each separate s i t u a t i o n i s concerned i t i s not l i t e r a l l y 
true. For example, we say that man i s wise and we say that. God i s wise. 
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I n saying th i s we are a f f i r m i n g that there i s a certain s i m i l a r i t y 
between the wisdom of man and the wisdom of God which enables us to 
draw the analogy, even though we would not pretend that the two are 
one and the same thing* Though we are not using the same word 
i d e n t i c a l l y i n each s i t u a t i o n , t h i s does not mean to say that i t i s 
not being used l i t e r a l l y * We are meaning that l i t e r a l l y God i s wise, 
even though we are recognising that h i s wisdom i s d i f f e r e n t from our 
wisdom* So, says Weigel, 'the concept analogy t e l l s us that there i s 
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the a p r i o r i p o s s i b i l i t y of analogous l i t e r a l i s m * . 
Weigel has an important point here which must not be overlooked. 
Perhaps T i l l i c h ' s reply would be that even though we may concede the 
point to some degree, we are s t i l l unable to say l i t e r a l l y what the 
wisdom of God means and involves i n a l l i t s aspects. ' I t may be true 
that God i s wise, or loving, or kind, but we cannot express what that 
may mean except i n human terms, which immediately means inadequate 
terras, i n that we are t r y i n g to say more than what our language w i l l 
allow us to say. Nevertheless, i f one understands l i t e r a l i s m as 
'analogous l i t e r a l i s m ' rather than verbal exactitude to the furthest 
degree, there i s no reason why one should not speak of much of our 
language about God i n t h i s x*ay. I t would seem, f o r example, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
appropriate to the second group of objective r e l i g i o u s symbols i n 
T i l l i c h ' s analysis, the group which includes such predicates of God as 
love, mercy and t r u t h , and more p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r our present purpose 
when we speak of God as S p i r i t . John B a i l l i e says that when the 
Westminster Shorter Catechism refers to God as S p i r i t who i s 'eternal 
and unchangeable, i n his being, wisdom, power, holiness, j u s t i c e , 53 goodness, and t r u t h 1 , i t i s using language that i s d i r e c t l y applicable• 
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I t i s a point that must c e r t a i n l y not be overlooked. 
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I I I . GOD AS THE 'LIVING1 GOP AND THE MEANING OF THE 'SPIRIT* 
The most s i g n i f i c a n t symbol f o r God i n the b i b l i c a l revelation i s 
that of l i f e * God i s the ' l i v i n g God' f o r both Hebrews and Christians. 
Yet, asks T i l l i c h , i n what sense can we say that God lives? His 
answer i s that we can say that 'God l i v e s i n so f a r as he i s the 
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ground of l i f e ' . The symbol of ' l i f e * i s thus an adequate one 
and affirms that our l i f e i s rooted i n him. Yet more can be said 
than t h i s . We can make certain observations about the processes of l i f e , 
c ertain ontological observations, which enable us to speak more f u l l y 
about the nature of b e i n g - i t s e l f , a l b e i t symbolically. God i s the 
structure of being and a l l being participates i n t h i s structure, and 
thus from an examination of the ontological structures we can point 
to certain aspects w i t h i n the nature of ultimate r e a l i t y i t s e l f * 
T i l l i c h ' s d e f i n i t i o n of l i f e follows i n the classical and German 
i d e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n s . The classical emphasis i s seen i n his d e f i n i t i o n 
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of l i f e as 'the process i n which potential being becomes actual being'• 
I n t h i s process three elements are present: p o t e n t i a l i t y , a c t u a l i t y 
and the process of actualisation. The relationship between these 
three elements i s worked out according to the d i a l e c t i c characteristic 
of German i d e a l i s t philosophy. Without i t s actualisation, potential 
being would remain as complete i d e n t i t y , power without form, ground 
without expression. I t thus needs to become actualised and i n so 
doing separates i t s e l f from i t s e l f i n form, expression and meaning. 
However, actual being cannot be completely separated from the power 
which i t expresses. There must be a continuous movement between the 
potential and the actual, the actual and the p o t e n t i a l , so that both 
separation and reunion are essential to every l i f e process, and without 
t h i s d i a l e c t i c a l movement there would be no l i f e at a l l . 
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When we apply the symbol of l i f e to God, therefore, according 
to T i l l i c h , we are asserting 'that he i s the eternal process i n which 
is 57 separation i s posited and/overcome by reunion', and i t i s i n t h i s 
sense that God l i v e s * The d i a l e c t i c of l i f e as we know i t i s a symbol 
of the structures of the divine l i f e , the process symbolically present 
within the l i f e of God. We are thus able to speak of three 'moments' 
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within the process of the divine l i f e * • The f i r s t two 'moments' 
r e f l e c t the two ontological- elements of potential and actual being, of 
power and meaning, of dynamics and form, the 'subject' and 'object' 
sides of the ontological structure* The one speaks of the divine 
depth, 'the basis of Godhead, that which makes. God God', the inex-
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haustible ground of being* The other speaks of the divine form, 
cl a s s i c a l l y referred to as the logos* I t i s t h i s form or meaning 
that opens up the divine ground, ' i t s i n f i n i t y and i t s darkness', 
and 'makes i t s fulness distinguishable, d e f i n i t e , f i n i t e 1 , and without 
t h i s p r i n c i p l e of separation, of s e l f - o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n , the f i r s t 
p r i n ciple would remain 'chaos, burning f i r e ' rather than creative-
ground* One problem here i s -that t h i s second moment, i n i t s a c t u a l i t y , 
or expressiveness, does f o r T i l l i c h necessitate f i n i t u d e , and t h i s 
raises the question as to whether f i n i t u d e can have any part i n the 
divine l i f e , a problem which we have already mentioned*^ T i l l i c h 
i s aware of t h i s d i f f i c u l t y , and i s hesitant to posit f i n i t u d e , with 
the accompanying principle of non-^-being, i n the divine l i f e l i t e r a l l y * 
He therefore i n s i s t s that we are only positing i t symbolically, so 
that i n the l i f e of God the element of f i n i t u d e i s d i a l e c t i c a l l y 
present* This he maintains must be so i f there i s nothing outside 
God, i f God i s t r u l y to be ultimate* So God i s ' i n f i n i t e because he 
has the f i n i t e * . * w i t h i n himself united with his i n f i n i t y ' * ^ 1 
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However we are meant to understand t h i s , the point i s that the s e l f -
expression of God i n actual form i s the universal logos, and t h i s 
universal logos i s to be found i n a l l r a t i o n a l beings, giving know-
ledge of God by means of symbols and thus opening up f o r man the depths 
of the divine r e a l i t y * 
This leads us to the t h i r d 'moment* i n the process of the divine 
l i f e : the u n i t i v e action which actualises, f u l f i l s and reunites the 
other two principles* This corresponds to the t h i r d element i n the 
d i a l e c t i c a l t r i a d * I t i s t h i s principle that underlies the whole 
process of l i f e as we know i t , u n i t i n g the ontological elements, 
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summarised as dynamics and form, with the very telos of l i f e i t s e l f * 
I t i s t h i s u n i t i v e action.in l i f e which brings together the whole 
structure of being and enables i t to f u l f i l i t s e l f * This pr i n c i p l e 
T i l l i c h c a l l s ' s p i r i t ' , the unity of power and meaning* What t h i s 
means f o r the doctrine of the S p i r i t T i l l i c h states thus 1. 
S p i r i t i s the unity of the -ontological elements and 
the telos of l i f e * Actualised as l i f e , b e ing-itself i s 
f u l f i l l e d as s p i r i t * The word telos expresses the r e l a t i o n 
of l i f e and s p i r i t more precisely than the words "aim" or 
"goal"* I t expresses the inner directedness of l i f e toward 
s p i r i t , the urge of l i f e to become s p i r i t , to f u l f i l i t s e l f 
as s p i r i t * -Telos stands f o r the inner, essential, necessary 
aim, f o r that i n which a being f u l f i l s i t s own nature* God 
as l i v i n g i s God f u l f i l l e d i n himself and therefore s p i r i t . 
God is_ s p i r i t . This i s the most embracing, d i r e c t , and 
unrestricted symbol f o r the divine l i f e . I t does not heed 
to be balanced with another symbol, because i t includes a l l 
the ontological elements* 63 • * • 
Several important points stand out here* I n the f i r s t place, 
the symbol ' s p i r i t ' i s the most profound symbol we can use f o r God* 
I n one sense i t refers to a special principle at work w i t h i n the. 
Godhead, yet i n another sense i t symbolises the whole l i f e of God, i n 
so f a r as i t . i s the S p i r i t which makes i t possible both f o r God to go 
out of himself and express himself i n the logos, and reunite the logos 
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with the divine fulnesso I n t h i s way, T i l l i c h says he i s affirming.. 
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the Johannlne t e x t , 'God i s S p i r i t ' • Secondly, i n so f a r as the 
logos, bringing together one group of ontological elements, i s embraced 
by the S p i r i t , and the logos i t s e l f i s expressed through f i n i t e 
a c t u a l i t y , i t i s the S p i r i t who not only makes the f i n i t e possible, but 
who also reunites i t with the ground of i t s being* The S p i r i t eternally 
unites the f i n i t e with'the i n f i n i t e * Within the ultimate r e a l i t y , 
as we have seen, T i l l i c h says that we can only assert t h i s symbolically, 
or d i a l e c t i c a l l y s., 'through the S p i r i t the divine fulness i s posited 
i n the divine l i f e as something d e f i n i t e , and at the same time i t i s 
as f i n i t e 
united i n the divine ground* The f i n i t e i s posited/within the process 
of the divine l i f e , but is-reunited with the i n f i n i t e w i t h i n the same 
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process 1* But t h i s assertion-is also important i n our understanding 
of the work o f 1 t h e S p i r i t i n r e l a t i o n to the i n f i n i t e and f i n i t e i n 
e x i s t e n t i a l r e a l i t y , f o r as we shall, see i t i s the same u n i t i v e action 
of the Spirit- that i s s t i l l at work, r e l a t i n g a l l things to t h e i r 
divine ground, and overcoming the e x i s t e n t i a l s p l i t between subject 
and object.which characterises l i f e as we know i t , thereby creating 
unambiguous l i f e through transcendent reunion* Thirdly, i n expanding 
the affirmation that the s j p i r i t includes a l l the ontological- elements, 
T i l l i c h says that the meaning of s p i r i t i s ' b u i l t up through the 
meaning of the ontological elements and t h e i r u n i o n ' . ^ The p o l a r i t y 
between p o t e n t i a l and actual being i n every l i f e process i s seen i n 
the ontological elements of i n d i v i d u a l i s a t i o n and p a r t i c i p a t i o n , 
dynamics and form, freedom and destiny, i n each case the subjective 
side of the ontological structure standing over against the objective 
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side. Yet i f l i f e i s not to be disrupted these p o l a r i t i e s must 
continually be held together so that there i s no exclusive emphasis 
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on ..one side or .the other* I t i s the S p i r i t that transcends t h i s 
d u a l i t y and effects a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and unity between the various 
elements, the all-embracing function i n which a l l elements.of being 
participate * - I t i s v i t a l then that we r e s i s t a l l attempts to define 
s p i r i t as part of l i f e . S p i r i t i s the symbol which refers to l i f e i n 
i t s e n t i r e t y , and i f we say that l i f e as s p i r i t can be found only i n 
man, t h i s i s because i n him alone among the f i n i t e creation i s the 
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structure of being completely realised. 
However, when we go on to speak.of God as S p i r i t , we are saying 
that i n him there i s the perfect unity of those ontological elements 
which we have already discerned i n the l i f e of man. The history of 
theological thought has shown- the d i f f i c u l t y of balancing one side of 
the ontological p o l a r i t y against the other when speaking of God. Thus, 
T i l l i c h points out, there has always been the tendency to over-^emphasise 
the i n d i v i d u a l i t y of God as a person, a tendency which must be balanced 
by a real appreciation of the meaning of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The scholastics 
spoke of the p o l a r i t y of dynamics and form, of p o t e n t i a l i t y and actual-
i t y , and i n so doing ran the r i s k of ignoring the creative process of 
l i f e , which i s actualisation rather than a c t u a l i t y , e f f e c t i v e l y 
u n i t i n g the actual w i t h i t s potential ground. I t has always been easy . 
to apply the concept of freedom to God, but i t must not be forgotten 
that God i s also his own destiny, i n the sense of the ultimacy of his 
own being, and i n his eternal p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n becoming and i n histo r y . 
So a f u l l application of the ontological elements to b e i n g - i t s e l f 
prevents any one-sided doctrine of God from developing. I n t h i s way 
i t can be seen that the symbol of l i f e , f i l l e d out i n the all-embracing 
symbol of S p i r i t , when applied to God opens up f o r us the' richness 
of the meaning of ultimate r e a l i t y * 
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So T i l l i c h concludes: 
God i s not nearer to one "part" of being or to a 
special function of being than he i s to another* As 
S p i r i t he i s as hear to the creative darkness of the 
unconscious as he i s to the c r i t i c a l l i g h t of cognitive 
reason. S p i r i t i s the power through which meaning l i v e s , 
and i t i s the meaning which gives d i r e c t i o n to power* 
God as S p i r i t i s the ultimate unity of power and meaning. 
I n contrast to Nietzsche, who i d e n t i f i e d the two 
assertions that God i s S p i r i t and that God i s dead, we 
must say Uiat God i s the l i v i n g God because he i s S p i r i t * 69 
I t i s true to say with William Nicholls 'that T i l l i c h thinks of 
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God more t y p i c a l l y as S p i r i t than i n any other way', and that the 
S p i r i t i s not only the unity between the elements of power and meaning 
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i n the Godhead,1 but also the 'ultimate synthesis to which the d i a l e c t i c 
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of being and existence points'. T i l l i c h ' s analysis of the symbols 
of ' l i f e ' and ' S p i r i t ' when applied to God i s c e r t a i n l y very profound 
and merits our f u l l consideration. However, there are several points 
of c r i t i c i s m we would make at t h i s stage. The f i r s t i s t o question 
the assumption that the meaning of l i f e and s p i r i t can only be under-
stood i n d i a l e c t i c a l terras. I t i s by no means proven that the elements 
of power and expression i n l i f e are two opposites that stand i n need 
of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n or synthesis. This i s a transference from logic 
to ontology whose only authority i s the classical t r a d i t i o n of p h i l o -
sophy i n which Hegel and the German i d e a l i s t s stand. One i s tempted 
to r e t o r t , 'Where i n f a c t are these elements opposed saved i n the 
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dialectician's head?' T i l l i c h i s thus f i l l i n g out the concept of 
s p i r i t with ideas which are purely speculative* Thus though we may 
allow that there i s a degree of a f f i n i t y between human l i f e and the 
l i f e of God, between the s p i r i t of man and the divine S p i r i t which 
makes i t possible to speak of God meaningfully, we cannot apply a 
d i a l e c t i c a l understanding of s p i r i t to God because such an understanding 
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i t s e l f i s open to question* 
The second point follows on from t h i s . I n his concept of symbol 
we saw hoii T i l l i c h referred to the religious symbol as that which 
opens up 'the depth dimension of r e a l i t y i t s e l f , which i t i s able to 
do because of i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n that r e a l i t y * By speaking of God 
as S p i r i t , therefore, he i s affirmi n g that the human s p i r i t opens up 
the meaning of the divine l i f e because.it participates ontologically 
i n the l i f e of God. We have already suggested that the concept of 
par t i c i p a t i o n must necessarily imply a continuity between the sjymbol 
and the r e a l i t y to which i t points* I t would seem then, i f we are 
going to take the doctrine of symbolism seriously, that T i l l i c h i s 
v i r t u a l l y affirming a continuity, a point of i d e n t i t y , between the 
human s p i r i t and the divine S p i r i t that i s immediately suspect i n 
the l i g h t of Christian theology* This does not mean that there i s 
no a f f i n i t y between the two. But i t does mean that i n any para l l e l s 
we may draw we must be careful to maintain the ontological d i s t i n c t i o n 
between man and God* 
This leads us to question T i l l i c h ' s contention that the f i n i t e 
must indeed be posited i n the l i f e of God, yet not l i t e r a l l y , but 
d l a l e c t i c a l l y . I t i s not easy to see j u s t what t h i s means* Are we 
to i n f e r that because we apply the concept of f i n i t u d e d i a l e c t i c a l l y 
rather than l i t e r a l l y i t i s any the less real? - i n other words, that 
f i n i t u d e ceases to be what we r e a l l y mean by f i n i t u d e when we apply 
i t to God, but rather some sort of abstract principle of f i n i t u d e 
which i t i s d i f f i c u l t to define with any further precision? This 
cert a i n l y seems to be one way out of the incongruities i n the assertion 
that God has the ' f i n i t e w i t h i n himself united with his i n f i n i t y ' , but 
i t i s unconvincing. We cannot say that i t i s actually true of God, so 
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we say that i t i s d i a l e c t i c a l l y trueJ I f t h i s i s so, then a l l our 
t a l k about God seems to be l i t t l e more than a set of d i a l e c t i c a l 
abstractions. I t would surely be much better to say, i n accordance 
with t r a d i t i o n a l Christian theology, that God has the capacity w i t h i n 
himself to create f i n i t e beings. There i s another p o s s i b i l i t y , however. 
For i f we say that God and the world are ultimately one, ultimately 
continuous, as the concept of p a r t i c i p a t i o n and the language of 
symbol seem to suggest, i t would cer t a i n l y be possible to posit f i n i t u d e 
w i t h i n the l i f e of God, seeing that the world i t s e l f i s not to be 
considered as something outside the divine l i f e * One feels that t h i s 
i s what T i l l i c h i s r e a l l y wanting to say. Yet there i s obviously 
here a moving away from t r a d i t i o n a l Christian emphases on the r e l a t i o n 
between God and the world, which would c e r t a i n l y not consider the 
world as outside the experience of God but which would equally empha-
sise that i t i s not a constituent element i n the divine l i f e . Perhaps 
i t i s because T i l l i c h senses t h i s v i t a l discrepancy that he t r i e s . t o 
express his conviction i n ' n o n - l i t e r a l * terms, and thus avoid parting 
company too obviously with the Reformed t r a d i t i o n of Christian theology 
i n which he stands.^'*^ 
THE' TRINITARIAN SYMBOLS 
T i l l i c h contends that the analysis of the symbols ' l i f e * and 
' S p i r i t ' , with the d i a l e c t i c a l emphasis on the three *moments* i n 
the l i f e process, suggests that we have arrived at a ' p r e t r i n i t a r i a n 
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formula which makes t r i n i t a r i a n thinking meanihgful*• I t i s a 
pre-Christian framework which can be f i l l e d out more s p e c i f i c a l l y i n 
Christian theology by the Christian doctrine of the T r i n i t y , which can 
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only appear with the assertion that Jesus i s the Christ. Yet even 
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without t h i s assertion, we can s t i l l speak of t r i n i t a r i a n p r inciples, 
based on the concept of God as S p i r i t * This does not mean that the 
T r i n i t y ceases to be a mystery. A l l being i s mystery, and the concept 
of the T r i n i t y i s indeed the mystery of being. But, as we have seen, 
the mystery i s d i a l e c t i c a l rather than i r r a t i o n a l or paradoxical* 
Once t h i s i s realised we s h a l l not run the r i s k of reducing i t to a 
numerical r i d d l e . We shall see that i t i s a profound expression 
of the mystery i n a l l being and therefore i n the structure of being 
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i t s e l f , a 'precise description of a l l l i f e processes'. 
Alongside t h i s ontological motive f o r ' t r i n i t a r i a n thinking, 
T i l l i c h places another motive, which from the point of view of human 
experience precedes i t . that of the tension between the absolute and 
concrete elements i n our ultimate concern. 'The concreteness of man's 
ultimate concern drives him towards poly t h e i s t i c structures; the 
reaction of the absolute element against these drives him towards 
monotheistic structures; and the need f o r the balance between the 
concrete and the absolute drives him towards t r i n i t a r i a n structures'*'• 
Consequently, i n the great monotheistic systems, i n order that God 
shall be known, there appear divine figures which mediate the ultimate 
i n concrete form. For example, i n certain types of monarchical 
monotheism, the highest god sends 'lower d i v i n i t i e s ' or 'half-gods'. 
Then i n mystical monotheism, we could c i t e the example of Brahma, 
Vishnu and Shiva, united together i n a divine t r i a d as symbols of the 
Brahman p r i n c i p l e . I n Judaism, there are mediating powers such as 
Wisdom, Word and Glory, or the heavenly angel messengers, culminating 
i n the expectation of a Messiah* A l l these, claims T i l l i c h , are 
preparations f o r a f u l l t r i n i t a r i a n doctrine. The idea of a t r i n i -
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t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e i s already there* 'The t r i n i t a r i a n problem i s the 
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problem of the unity between ultimacy and concreteness i n the l i v i n g . 
God*. 
The t h i r d motive f o r t r i n i t a r i a n t h i n k i n g , says T i l l i c h , i s 
the s p e c i f i c a l l y Christian motive, 'the threefold manifestation of 
God as creative power, as saving love, and as ecstatic transformation', 
the culmination of the Christian revelation, summarised i n the symbolic 
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formula- Father, Son and Holy S p i r i t * There are two things that need 
to be said i n connection with t h i s . F i r s t l y , i t should not be thought 
of as purely subjective, three d i f f e r e n t ways of looking at the same 
thing. The symbols of Father, Son and-Holy S p i r i t i n the Christian 
revelation 'have a fundamentum i n 're, a foundation i n r e a l i t y 1 . Bach 
symbol refers to a d i f f e r e n t aspect of God, the Father as the aspect 
expressed i n the symbol of creation, the Son as the aspect expressed 
i n the symbol of salvation, and the S p i r i t as the aspect of God 
'ecstatically present i n the human s p i r i t and i m p l i c i t l y i n everything 
which constitutes the dimension of s p i r i t ' * However, there i s a 
subjective element necessarily present, for the t r i n i t a r i a n symbols -
are also a re l i g i o u s discovery that had to be 'made, formulated, and 
defended'• The story of that discovery i s the substance of the New 
Testament, and i t s formulation and defence part of the history of the 
early church* Secondly, because the emphasis i n t h i s t h i r d motive f o r 
t r i n i t a r i a n thinking i s so t i e d up with the subject of revelation, we 
should not be blinded to the fa c t that the previous two motives are 
also revelatory* The motive of the tension between the absolute and 
concrete elements i n our ultimate concern also stems from revelatory 
experiences of man's encounter with the Holy at various stages of his 
l i f e and history, and the d i a l e c t i c a l motive i s based on what we have 
called ontological revelation, enabling us to arrive at t r i r i i t a r i a n 
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thinking through an analysis of l i f e as we know i t o I n f a c t , says 
T i l l i c h , 'there i s no such thing as t r i n i t a r i a n "speculation" (where 
"speculation" means conceptual phantasies)* The substance of a l l 
t r i n i t a r i a n thought i s given i n revelatory experiences, and the form 
has the same r a t i o n a l i t y that a l l theology, as a work of the logos, must 
v. • 82 have 1 • 
We have already mentioned T i l l i c h ' s attempt at a rei n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of the ChristologLcal dogma i n terms,of 'dynamic-relational 1 concepts. 
I t s relevance t o the doctrine of the T r i n i t y , and our understanding 
of the t r i n i t a r i a n dogma i s obvious. The problem which Nicaea and 
Chalcedon'sought to resolve i n r e l a t i o n to the d i v i n i t y of Christ, 
namely how ultimate concern can be expressed i n two divine figures, i s 
now extended to pneumatological considerations* We are faced with the 
problem of the d i v i n i t y of the S p i r i t , and how a furt h e r f i g u r e can also 
be an expression of ultimate r e a l i t y * 'How can ultimate concern be 
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expressed i n more than one hyposbasis?' Or, i n terms of religious 
devotion, which i s p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned with the l i f e of the S p i r i t , 
when one prays to one persona i n whom the divine substance e x i s t s , i s 
one addressing someone d i f f e r e n t from another of the three to whom the 
same prayer may also be directed? I f not, why not j u s t pray to God? 
I f so, are we not i n danger of f a l l i n g i n t o t r i t h e i s m and thus opening 
up to the way of prayer to others i n addition to God? 
T i l l i c h i s certain that there i s no answer to these questions along 
t r a d i t i o n a l l i n e s . The solution to the question of the S p i r i t must l i e 
along the same lines of rei n t e r p r e t a t i o n as that of the question of the 
Christ, i n terms of dynamic r e l a t i o n rather than s t a t i c substance, 
though unfortunately he does not spe l l out f o r us what t h i s may involve* 
He*-sees a precedence f o r t h i s r e l a t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of . t r i n i t a r i a n 
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doctrine i n Augustine, who emphasises that the three hypostases of the 
Trinity do not refer to three individuals, but rather to three different 
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modes- of being within the one personality* Had this Western reinter-
pretation been allowed to develop, maintains T i l l i c h , our understanding 
of the Trinity may have been somewhat clearer, but the Eastern formula 
remained, and with i t the persistent temptation to tritheism. 
T i l l i c h feels that several consequences followed from this refusal 
to consider new ways of t r i n i t a r i a n thinking. In-the f i r s t " place, the 
framework of t r i n i t a r i a n symbolism was so influenced by the Greek inter -
pretation of reality i n terms of 'grades' or 'levels'1 that i t became 
eventually possible to speak of the subordination of the Son to the 
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Father, and the Spirit to both. Secondly, any later attempt to deviate 
from the formula became heretical, as well as p o l i t i c a l l y dangerous* 
Thirdly, the real purpose of the doctrine was forgotten, and the formula 
1became an impenetrable mystery, put,on the altar to be adored1, a 
numerical riddle, a weapon for ecclesiastical authoritarianism and 
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suppression of thought*- Fourthly, i n Protestantism^ a more severe 
consequence began to emerge*- This* was the tendency to unitarian ways 
of thinking* As a denomination, Unitarianism as such never extended 
far and wide, yet i t s influence on Protestantism was profound* For 
no new understanding of the Trinity was produced, for many centuries, 
and the dogma remained stultefied, though never exactly rejected. Falling 
into disuse, i t tended to be replaced i n practice -by a .type of 
•Christocentrie unitarianism 1, which emphasised the teachings of Jesus 
at the expense of any attempt to understand the mystery of God, and 
also prevented a real appreciation of the Spirit of God atwork in :the 
church and the wprld. Despite this, the t r i n i t a r i a n creeds remained the 
hallmark of orthodoxy i n Protestantism, and t r i n i t a r i a n formulae are 
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s t i l l used i n Protestant worship* Finally, a more indirect consequence 
of the similarity between traditional t r i n i t a r i a n formulae and tritheism 
i s the way i n which this tendency opened up i n Catholicism moves 
towards a quaternity, by elevating the Virgin Mary to such an extent that 
there i s always the possibility of her becoming a matter of ultimate 
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concern* This danger i s seen when one studies the history.of the 
3ymbol, and i t i s i n this context particularly that one must consider as 
dangerous the doctrine of the co-redemptrix. Part of this elevation of 
the Virgin Mary i s obviously a reaction against the interpretation of 
the Godhead in terms of male symbols from which even the Spirit does not 
escape. Such an emphasis on masculine symbols does not satisfy the 
psychological need'for devotion to the feminine principle, evident i n 
a l l religions, even i n Protestantism, where often an effeminate Jesus i s 
to be found. T i l l i c h suggests that two things must be emphasised i n 
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order to rectify this* F i r s t l y , i t should be pointed out. that the 
correspondence of the number 'three' to the intrinsic dialectics; of l i f e 
i s i t s e l f a safeguard against using-any additional symbols in our 
description of ultimate concern." And secondly, i t should be underlined 
that God is above any distinction between male and female. In fact, the 
symbol 'ground of being' could point equally to the. 'mother quality 
of giving b i r t h , carrying, and embracing' as to the more masculine role of 
'calling back, resisting independence of the created, and swallowing 
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i t ' . Similarly, i n the concept of the Logos', revealed as man i n 
Jesus Christ, the self-sacrifice there to be.observed transcends any 
male-female alternative. The very act of self-sacrifice i s the denial 
of sexual differentiation. The.concept of the' Spirit as ecstatic trans-
formation likewise transcends both rational' and emotional elements i n 
l i f e , which are usually attributed to male and female types respectively. 
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Thus the personalism of traditional religion, as expressed i n the masculine 
image of God, must be overcome, and i n T i l l i c h * s opinion, the t r i n i t a r i a n 
symbols, -when understood as he would interpret them, have the power to do 
this. 
Finally, mention should be made of the way i n which the t r i n i t a r i a n 
symbols, need to be correlated to the existential questions man asks* 
•Like every theological symbol, the t r i n i t a r i a n symbolism must be'under-
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stood as an answer to the questions implied i n man's predicament1* I t 
is i n fact the most inclusive answer to the existential question. As we 
have seen, the human predicament is characterised by three concepts: 
finitude with respect to his essential being as a creature, estrangement 
with respect to his existential being i n time and space, and ambiguity 
with respect to his participation i n l i f e " universal. Each of these 
questions is answered by a specific t r i n i t a r i a n symbol: finitude by 
the doctrine of God'and i t s symbols, estrangement by the doctrine of the 
Christ and i t s symbols,, ambiguity by the doctrine of the Spirit and 
i t s symbols. These answers express 'that which i s a matter of ultimate 
concern! i n symbols received from revelatory experiences, and the truth 
of these symbols 'lies i n their power to express the ultimacy of the 
ultimate i n a l l directions*. Every problem confronting man, therefore, 
according to T i l l i c h , i s answered i n a nutshell i n the doctrine "of the 
Trinity. I n conclusion, therefore, the Tri n i t y i s not an irrelevant 
speculation, i t is a matter of deep existential concern. 
We have already questioned the validity of T i l l i c h ' s claim, that 
there is a dialectical structure within reality which provides an onto-
logical foundation for the doctrine of-the Trinity.- To this we may now 
add one or two other criticisms. In the f i r s t place, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to 
see why the tension between, the absolute and-concrete elements i n bur 
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ultimate concern should lead to t r i n i t a r i a n thinking as such* Now i t may 
be true that things often seem to come i n threes and also that we find 
the number three useful for the purposes of analytical thinking,: i n which 
case i t may be helpful to think about God i n this sort of way* But this 
i s not an argument for saying that the reality of God i s essentially 
t r i n i t a r i a n * There is no essential reason why the number three should 
be chosen to resolve the tension between the concrete and the absolute* 
Why not* for example* choose four (the number held to signify completion 
i n certain magical forms), or two (as i n Zoroastrianism and the dualistic 
religions), or even one (as i n Judaism and Islam)? One concludes that 
T i l l i c h ' s preference for three lies rather i n other directions - namely 
his dialectical view of r e a l i t y - and that this i s his ultimate j u s t i f i -
cation for selecting this number rather than any other* 
One must also question T i l l i c h ' s implication that there are 
vestigia t r i n i t a t i s i n other religions which act as a preparation f o r 
the doctrine of the Trinity. Though the Hindu triad of Brahma* Vishnu 
and Shiva i s frequently referred to as the 'Hindu t r i n i t y * i n the West, 
on closer examination i t has very l i t t l e i n common with the Christian 
understanding of the t r i n i t a r i a n God* I f one is to draw a parallel, then 
presumably one must place the Sp i r i t alongside the god Shiva, and this 
i s clearly unacceptable* Similarly, one sees very l i t t l e resemblance 
between the early Jewish emphasis on 'Wisdom, Word and Glory' and the 
Christian 'Father, Son and Holy S p i r i t ' , particularly i n view of the fact 
that i n Christian circles both Wisdom and Word became synonymous with the 
Son* I t may well be that these are genuine attempts to solve the problem 
of the unity of differing facets of the divine r e a l i t y i n other religions, 
but this i s not the same as saying that they are preparations for a f u l l 
t r i n i t a r i a n concept of God* I f so, one would have expected Judaism to 
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move towards a doctrine of the Trinity long ago. So T i l l i c h takes i t 
for granted far too easily that the tension between the concrete and 
absolute elements i n our ultimate concern i s a proven motive for t r i n i -
tarian thinking* His assertion is purely speculative, and has no j u s t i -
fication i n Christian theology whatever, whose only motive for t r i n i t a r i a n 
thinking about God i s the Christian revelation of God i n Christ, mediated 
to us through the Holy Spirit* 
T i l l i c h ' s analysis of the t r i n i t a r i a n dogma states the problem 
clearly enough, but his attempt at working towards a solution is i n need 
of further elucidation* One certainly does not object i n principle to his 
interpreting the Trinity i n terms of dynamic relations, but i t i s clear 
that when he does this he i s really doing something other than describing 
the inner relations of the Godhead* He is describing more significantly 
the essential relation between God and the world culminating i n the l i f e 
of man, so that the divine nature of Christ becomes eternal God-man-unity 
and the Spi r i t that which effects this transcendent unity between God and 
man* Such an interpretation i s rather different from how orthodox 
theology has normally understood the Trinity* As Nicholls says, 'Tillich's 
doctrine of God i s evidently not t r i n i t a r i a n i n the traditional sense . • . 
The three aspects of the doctrine of God do not correspond to the three 
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persons of a traditional T r i n i t y * . They correspond rather to the three 
'moments' i n the dynamic relation between God and the world, pointing 
to the essential unity between the i n f i n i t e and the f i n i t e , between God 
and man. In t h i s , the influence of nineteenth-century German monistic 
and dialectical philosophy stands out clearly, and i t is i n this context 
that one must perhaps view Ti l l i c h ' s lack of interest i n other and more 
orthodox contemporary treatments of t r i n i t a r i a n dootrine and his failure 
to consider their contribution to a new understanding of the Trinity in 
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our time. 
One must> of course, point out that T i l l i c h does not set out to 
give a completely new statement of t r i n i t a r i a n doctrine. I n his con-
93 elusion to his ,brief section on the doctrine i n his Systematic Theologr 
he states': 'The doctrine of the Trinity is not closed. I t can be 
neither discarded nor accepted i n i t s traditional form. It-must be 
kept open i n order to f u l f i l i t s original function - to express i n 
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embracing symbols the self-manifestation of the Divine Life to man1. 
Certainly i t would be dangerous to consider the doctrine as closed. Yet, 
whilst one certainly appreciates many of the points T i l l i c h has raised, 
one cannot help but feel that i f we. proceed in the direction along which 
he i s moving, we shall f i n i s h up .with a doctrine of the Trinity which i s 
something rather other than what i t originally set out to be* 
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CHAPTER TWO THE MEANING OF LIFE AMD ITS AMBIGUITIES 
I . THE CONCEPT OF LIFE 
The doctrine of the Sp i r i t i n T i l l i c h 1 3 system i s developed i n 
correlation with the ambiguities and questions implied i n the concept 
and categories of l i f e * I n this chapter therefore we shall examine 
Til l i c h ' s understanding of l i f e and his analysis of the specific 
problems associated with i t . * 
As we have already noted, T i l l i c h ' s definition of l i f e proceeds 
along classical lines* Life is the 'actuality of being 1, or better 
s t i l l , the 'actualisation of being', the process i n which that which 
2 
i s potential i s actualised, and this interpretation of l i f e unites 
the two main qualifications of being employed by T i l l i c h , the essential 
and' the existential,, a crucial distinction i n his system* On the one 
hand, potentiality i s 'that kind of being which has the power, the 
dynamic, to become actual'j^ i t i s essential being* On the other 
hand, when being i s actualised, i t subjects i t s e l f to the conditions 
of -existence: i t i s existential being, even though i t s t i l l retains 
i t s essential character* I f we thus define l i f e as a 'mixture* of 
essential and existential elements, then i t w i l l be seen that we 
are speaking of something that i s universally present, for the process 
of actualisation is everywhere to be observed, i n the inorganic sphere 
as much as i n the realms of organic l i f e and human experience, and this 
is important for T i l l i c h ' s analysis. 
Basic to T i l l i c h ' s analysis of l i f e i s his concept of multi-
dimensional unity.^ Traditionally, the problem of how to create a 
unity i n l i f e i n spite of i t s diversity has been solved by postulating 
a hierarchical order, i n which every 'level' of reality has i t s proper 
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place, moving from the lower levels upwards u n t i l God himself i s 
reached* T i l l i c h feels that such a solution i s both a r t i f i c i a l and 
too r i g i d l y defined* i t allows no participation of one type of 
re a l i t y i n another, which is contrary to a l l physical, biological and 
psychological principles; and i t is particularly dangerous i n i t s impli-
cations for theology, not only because i t insists upon a fundamental 
difference of kind between religion and culture, the one being God-
given and the other man-made, but also more insidiously because i t leads 
to a 'theological supranaturalisra' which maintains an eternal distinc-
tion between man and God* Instead of unity we are, i n fact, l e f t 
with some sort of ontological pluralism* 
According to T i l l i c h , a much more accurate way of describing the 
unity of l i f e is to think of i t i n terms of a series of dimensions, each 
of which intersects and interpenetrates the other without any conflict 
such as one inevitably finds i n a hierarchical interpretation of 
rea l i t y . This is not to deny that there is conflict i n l i f e , but to 
affirm that the conflict arises not from the essential structure of 
rea l i t y i t s e l f but rather from the ambiguities which inevitably follow 
when the dimensions of l i f e become actualised i n an existential state* 
This interpretation of l i f e ' s dimensions means two things. I t means 
that every 'lower* dimension i s actually present i n every 'higher' 
dimension, and i n this sense the presence of the 'lower' dimensions i s 
necessary for the actualisation of the 'higher' dimensions (for example, 
the inorganic dimension i s necessary for the actualisation of the 
organic, the organic for the animal, and so on)* Similarly, i t means 
that every 'higher' dimension i s potentially present,in every 'lower' 
dimension (for example, the human dimension i s potentially present i n 
the animal dimension) i n the sense that i t remains hidden, as i t were, 
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perhaps for millions of years, awaiting those particular conditions 
that w i l l allow i t to become actualised. 
According to this procedure, T i l l i c h classifies four main dimen-
sions! the inorganic, the organic (more specifically referring to the 
plant world), the dimension of self-awareness (more specifically the 
animal world) to which he also gives the name 'psychological', and the 
dimension of s p i r i t , the specifically human dimension, actualised i n 
.the personal-communal realm i n which man lives* The use of the word 
' s p i r i t ' to refer to the specifically human dimension of l i f e i s signi-
ficant, and must be understood i n the l i g h t of T i l l i c h ' s earlier 
definition of s p i r i t as 'the unity of the ontological elements', which 
he summarises under the two poles of power and meaning, with 'the telos 
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of l i f e ' * I n other words, s p i r i t i s that which makes possible the 
complete fulfilment of the inner directedness of l i f e which seeks to 
give total meaning and expression to the power of being* The fulfilment 
of this process i s seen only i n the l i f e of man, i n whom power and. 
meaning are held together i n unity, so that i n him i t can tru l y be said 
that l i f e comes to understand i t s e l f * Thus man is appropriately 'the 
dimension of s p i r i t ' , the sphere i n which s p i r i t f u l f i l s i t s desired end. 
But having said -this, i t i s important to see that no lopsided 
definition of ' s p i r i t * can do real justice to the meaning of the word, 
and the frequent confusion of ' s p i r i t 1 with 'mind* robs i t of i t s dynamic 
element, leading to an exclusive emphasis on in t e l l e c t * Both of these 
elements must be held together, for that which i s genuinely s p i r i t 
Contains within i t s e l f both power and int e l l e c t i n unity* When this 
is realized, the identification of the dimension of s p i r i t with the 
l i f e of man can unhesitatingly be made*^  
The actualisation of the. dimension of s p i r i t , then, takes place 
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when such conditions appear within the animal realm, or the dimension 
of self-awareness, as make this possible; not indeed at one moment i n 
time, but over a long period i n which the new struggles to be born 
u n t i l that leap i s made which brings about the dominance of the dimen-
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sion of s p i r i t . I n one sense the same sort of struggle s t i l l goes on 
i n every man, as he strives to become a creative human being, more 
than just aware of himself i n a psychological sense. So, out of a 
constellation of psychological faotors, there i s created something that 
i s new, a personal centre, a 'totally centred self, that i s to say, one 
that i s free'* I t i s this personal centre which i s able to take, for 
example, the raw materials of knowledge, things like sense expressions, 
experiences, volitional and emotional elements, and coordinate them, 
analyse them, and work on them according to logical or methodological 
c r i t e r i a , and i n this way not only to unite the elements which make up 
what may be called the psychological self through i t s own free deliber-
ation and decision, but also to transcend them and transform them i n a 
creative act of knowledge. I t is the personal centre which, again, 
takes the raw materials of morality, drives, desires, inclinations and 
so on, selecting them or rejecting them as i t wishes, and by working on 
them and synthesising them, transcending them and transforming them, 
thus making possible the moral act* But i n neither case could there 
be any creative act without the personal centre, which freely transcends 
the raw materials of psychological experience with which i t i s provided* 
So, says T i l l i c h , a leap forward has been made from mere self-awareness, 
which is possible only for the t o t a l l y centred self to make, and this 
act of self-transcendenoe demonstrates the presence of the dimension 
of s p i r i t . However, i t is clear that the personal centre which makes 
this act of self-transcendence possible i s not something 'added to* 
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what i s already there, l i k e an immortal soul* I t is already potentially 
present, waiting to be actualised when the appropriate concatenation 
of elements and circumstances appear, so that i t may unite them and 
centre them i n i t s e l f * Thus the dimension of s p i r i t i s neither to be 
set over against nor-; dissolved into the psychological dimension* 
There is rather an essential unity between them, and through the 
process of becoming which is potentially present i n a l l dimensions, 
the one i s carried forward into and transcended by the other* In this 
way, says T i l l i c h , the unity of a l l dimensions i s preserved* 
T i l l i o h points out that the freedom with which the personal oentre 
acts upon the raw material with which i t is presented i s possible 
only because there are 'norms' to which the s p i r i t subjects i t s e l f i n 
order that i t may be genuinely free, so that i t can be said that i n 
the l i f e of man 'freedom and subjection to valid norms are one and the 
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same thing'. The source of such norms, he maintains, lies beyond any 
c r i t e r i a based on their pragmatic or inherent value; i t i s , i n fact, 
nothing less than the essential nature of man and his world. Yet to 
assert this only throws us back onto the problem of how we can know 
about the essential nature of man and his world* To this problem, says 
T i l l i c h , -there is no certain answer, for the essential is always partly 
visible and partly hidden* We can know about i t only through ' i t s 
ambiguous manifestations which i s l i f e ' , manifestations which conceal as 
well as reveal* And this means that every conorete aot of freedom 
which seeks to subject i t s e l f to the essential norms of l i f e so that 
i t may indeed be free i s both *a venture and a r i s k 1 * * 0 I t means that 
l i f e w i l l contain an element of daring, an element which w i l l be 
present i n every creative act, whether i n the sphere of morality, or 
of culture, or of religion* Nevertheless, this does raise the problem 
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of the quest f o r unambiguous l i f e , i n which man realises his essential 
being) even under the conditions of existence, and as we shall see t h i s 
i s the central issue i n T i l l i c h ' s doctrine of the S p i r i t i n r e l a t i o n 
to l i f e ' s ambiguities* 
Evaluation 
Without entering i n t o a detailed analysis of the concepts of 
p o t e n t i a l i t y and a c t u a l i t y , much of which would not be s t r i c t l y r e l e -
vant t o our present study, i t i s important f o r us to see that we are 
dealing here with an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of l i f e that i s set squarely w i t h i n 
the i d e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n * However T i l l i c h envisages the nature of p o t e n t i -
a l i t y , or essential being, i t i s clear that t h i s order of being i s of 
primary significance. I n i t a l l actual being i s grounded, and apart 
from i t nothing could exist* Furthermore, from his assertion that 
potential being i s 'that kind of being which has the power, the dynamic, 
to become actual', one must surely i n f e r that f o r T i l l i c h i t has a 
r e a l i t y of i t s own which i s i n no sense dependent oh i t s actual existence* 
I t i s the essence of every actual being, but the essence i s real whether 
11 
i t has been actualised or not* 
But can we r e a l l y accept t h i s i d e a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p o t e n t i a l -
i t y ? Would i t not, i n f a c t , be more meaningful to define the r e a l i t y 
of p o t e n t i a l i t y or essential being i n terms of capacity or property of 
being, rather than a kind of being i n i t s e l f , as T i l l i c h asserts? To 
do t h i s would not mean r e j e c t i n g the idea of actualisation i t s e l f , but 
to i n t e r p r e t such a process rather d i f f e r e n t l y , so that i t becomes 
that which enables certain properties or capacities of being to actualise 
themselves i n the external world under the appropriate conditions* I n 
other words, i t i s the purposive, d i r e c t i n g a c t i v i t y , present w i t h i n 
being as a whole, enabling i t to make real certain l a t e n t p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
79 
i n l i f e i t s e l f . 
We should also note the way i n which T i l l i c h ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
essential being influences his use of the concept of dimension, and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the way i n which t h i s concept i s put forward as a means 
of solving the problem of the unity of a l l forms of l i f e * Such c o n f l i c t 
and disunity as there i s i n l i f e , he maintains, arises not from the 
essential nature of the dimensions, which intersect arid interpenetrate 
quite f r e e l y , but from the actualisation of those dimensions i n time 
and space* But here we meet the same problem as before* What does 
i t mean to t a l k of the dimensions as they are i n t h e i r essential state? 
I f i t means that they have some sort of r e a l i t y p r i o r t o t h e i r actual 
appearance, then we are faced with an i d e a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
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r e a l i t y which i s clearly unacceptable* Surely, i f we are to discover 
any unity i n l i f e , we must look not i n some essential order of r e a l i t y 
beyond our present e x i s t e n t i a l order of things (and therefore beyond 
v e r i f i c a t i o n ) , but i n l i f e as we know i t , as i t appears to us experi-
e n t i a l l y and empirically, i t may well be that t h i s unity i s not immedi-
ately apparent, that the f i r s t thing that strikes us about l i f e i s i t s 
disunity and c o n f l i c t * Yet no s c i e n t i s t , f o r example, would deny the 
basic unity of the natural world. Such a unit y i s apparent not only 
i n the interdependence of the various s c i e n t i f i c d i s c i p l i n e s , i t i s 
apparent also i n the whole story of the evolution of l i f e , from the 
smallest electron to the f i r s t c e l l of organic l i f e , from the t i n y 
protoplasm to the sophisticated brain of man. We can speak of a 
fundamental, multidimensional unity of l i f e without having to resort 
to an i d e a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of r e a l i t y to warrant i t , a unity which 
i s apparent i n the f a c t that every organic process, whether animal or 
vegetative, can be broken down i n t o biochemical formulae, and that every 
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c e l l can be seen i n terms of atoms or bundles of energy* 
So T i l l i c h ' e a f f i r m a t i o n that the higher dimensions are already 
p o t e n t i a l l y real i n the preceding dimensions before t h e i r actualisation 
must be viewed with suspicion, because of i t s i d e a l i s t overtones* 
Nevertheless* we can c e r t a i n l y say that given certain conditions and 
concatenations of events w i t h i n a lower dimension there i s a strong 
p o s s i b i l i t y that a new and higher dimension w i l l be born, that there 
may be certain q u a l i t i e s or capacities within a lower dimension that 
w i l l f i n d t h e i r opportunity f o r development when the appropriate circum-
stances arise* But t h i s i s rather d i f f e r e n t from saying that the 
higher dimension i s already essentially present. Even i f the b i r t h of 
a new dimension i s , to use the words of L.A. Birch, the 'concrete 
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r e a l i s a t i o n of what i s p o t e n t i a l l y possible', we are not to think that 
the 'potentially possible* already has a r e a l i t y of i t s own waiting 
to be actualised* Surely a p o s s i b i l i t y i s a p o s s i b i l i t y , not a r e a l i t y * 
So empirical understanding would suggest that no new dimension has 
any r e a l i t y u n t i l those circumstances appear which w i l l allow i t t o 
emerge. The unity of the dimensions of l i f e i s a developing unity, 
which proceeds as each new dimension i s born, and i t i s i n t h i s devel-
oping unity that the S p i r i t i s at work.*^ 
Referring to T i l l i c h ' s d e f i n i t i o n of the s p e c i f i c a l l y human dimen-
sion as the dimension of s p i r i t , one must point'out that we can accept 
thi s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n without seeking to prove i t i n accordance with the 
principles and presuppositions of the d i a l e c t i c a l ontology of T i l l i c h ' s 
system. The b i b l i c a l l i t e r a t u r e frequently uses the concept of s p i r i t 
to describe the l i f e of man without subscribing to any such predilections. 
But i t i s important to see that T i l l i c h ' s analysis of s p i r i t i s more 
philosophical than theological, and that i n allowing the equation of the 
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dimension of the s p i r i t with the t o t a l l i f e of man we are not thereby 
saying that the s p i r i t of man can only be understood or defined i n t h i s 
sort of way. 
T i l l i c h ' s discussion of the advent of the dimension of s p i r i t 
raises several important points which need underlining. F i r s t l y , his 
reje c t i o n of the t r a d i t i o n a l idea of God adding an immortal soul to the 
human body at a specific moment of time on the grounds that t h i s would 
destroy the unity of the psychological and s p i r i t u a l facets of man's 
nature by 'importing' i n t o man something from the outside i s s i g n i f i c a n t , 
i n view of the fact that there are s t i l l Christian scholars who seek to 
resolve the tension between evolution and t r a d i t i o n a l Christian thinking 
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on the o r i g i n of man i n t h i s way. ' T i l l i c h ' s point of view that the 
s p i r i t of man, his 'personal centre', that which makes him man and not 
merely an animal, i s something which evolves quite naturally from that 
which i s already present, takes much more seriously the purposes of the 
S p i r i t of God which are present w i t h i n the whole evolutionary process, 
leading i t upwards towards i t s desired end. Secondly, despite the f a c t 
that the advent of the. humanespirit i s a natural stage i n the process 
of evolution, his reference to t h i s as a 'leap* does point to i t s 
momentous significance i n that f o r the f i r s t time l i f e , i n the form of 
man, i s able to stand outside of i t s e l f , as i t were, i n an act of s e l f -
transcendence.^ And f i n a l l y , T i l l i c h ' s understanding of the freedom 
with which man as a personal oentre acts upon the psychological material 
with which he i s provided to f u l f i l the dimension of s p i r i t , as sub-
j e c t i o n to v a l i d norms, i s a useful correction to any in t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of freedom i n terms of t o t a l permissiveness. One cert a i n l y accepts 
his assertion that the only ultimately v a l i d norms are those which are 
i n accordance with man's essential being, but the statement does need 
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s t r i p p i n g of the i d e a l i s t i c overtones we have already come to associate 
with T i l l i c h ' s use of the phrase 'essential being*. When stripped of 
these* i t i s a f o r c e f u l reassertion of the Christian view that only 
when man seeks to become what God intends him to be, an in t e n t i o n that 
i s indeed w r i t t e n i n the framework of his personality, both i n r e l a -
t i o n to himself and to his world, can he avoid misusing that freedom* 
Anything that would cause him to v i o l a t e his true nature and stunt his 
own growth towards the f u l f i l m e n t of the divine purpose f o r him w i t h i n 
the world would v i o l a t e that freedom and r e s u l t i n a further estrange-
ment from himself, his world and God. And the fa c t that his attempt 
to discover his real purpose and significance i n l i f e w i l l involve the 
taking of r i s k s and the p o s s i b i l i t y of selecting the wrong course of 
action, r i g h t l y opens up f o r him the question of how l i f e can be free 
from these ambiguities and thus prepares the way f o r an understanding 
of the work of the S p i r i t of God i n the l i f e of man* 
H. THE SELF-ACTUAllSATION OF LIFE AMD ITS AMBIGUITIES 
T i l l i c h discerns three basic functions of l i f e which occur during 
the process of actualisation* F i r s t l y , there i s the function of s e l f -
i n t e g r a t i o n , a sort of c i r c u l a r movement constituted by the three 
elements i n the process of actualisation, s e l f - i d e n t i t y , s e l f - a l t e r a t i o n 
and the return to one's s e l f ; a movement 'from centredness through 
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a l t e r a t i o n back to centredness 1 i n which the i d e n t i t y of the centre 
i s retained* Secondly, there i s the function of self-creation, f o r 
the process of actualisation involves not only a c i r c u l a r movement but 
also a horizontal movement forward i n producing new centres separate 
from the. o r i g i n a l s e l f , but created by i t . T h i r d l y , there i s the 
function of self-transcendence, a v e r t i c a l movement i n which the o r i g i n a l 
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s e l f transcends i t s e l f by being driven beyond i t s own f i n i t e l i m i t a -
tions out towards the i n f i n i t e * I t i s beoause ' l i f e , by i t s very 
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nature as l i f e * i s both i n i t s e l f and above i t s e l f , that t h i s 
d r i v i n g towards the 'sublime* i s possible. Each of these functions, 
T i l l i c h points out, i s dependent on ce r t a i n ontological p o l a r i t i e s 1 
s e l f - i n t e g r a t i o n on that of i n d i v i d u a l i s a t i o n and p a r t i c i p a t i o n , s e l f -
creation on that of dynamics and form, self-transcendence on that of 
freedom and destiny* At the same time, a l l three functions unite 
elements of s e l f - i d e n t i t y with elements of s e l f - a l t e r a t i o n , but such 
a unity i s constantly threatened by e x i s t e n t i a l estrangement, and 
whenever t h i s disruption becomes a r e a l i t y , s e l f - i n t e g r a t i o n i s countered 
by dis i n t e g r a t i o n , self-creation by destruction, and self-transcendence 
by profanisation* So every l i f e process has an ambiguity r e s u l t i n g 
from the mixture of these positive and negative elements, which are 
v i r t u a l l y impossible to separate i n actual l i f e * Thus ' l i f e at every 
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moment' becomes ambiguous* 7 We must therefore go on to discuss the 
basic functions of l i f e , not only i n t h e i r essential nature, 'separate 
from e x i s t e n t i a l d i s t o r t i o n ' , but as they appear withi n the ambiguities 
of existence* I n t h i s discussion, we s h a l l d i r e c t ourselves s p e c i f i c a l l y 
to the dimension of s p i r i t as that with which the divine S p i r i t i s 
more p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned* 
A* The Self-Integration of l i f e 
The f i r s t function of l i f e i n T i l l i c h ' s analysis i s s e l f - i n t e g r a -
t i o n . I n order to become a f u l l y - i n t e g r a t e d s e l f , every individual 
thing i n l i f e , whatever i t s dimension, must create a perfect balance 
between p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n i t s environment and maintaining i t s own i n d i v i -
d u a l i t y * Failure to create t h i s balance leads to a disintegration of 
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the centred s e l f , and i t i s t h i s dilemma that gives r i s e to the 
ambiguity of s e l f - i n t e g r a t i o n * As f a r as man i s concerned, rather 
than have an environment to which he i s slavishly t i e d l i k e other forms 
of l i f e , he has what may more aptly be called a world, i n which he not 
only participates as a t o t a l l y centred s e l f , but which, he i s also able 
to transcend and therefore understand* This means that as a f u l l y 
centred person, he develops his personality i n r e l a t i o n t o the world, 
or more precisely i n r e l a t i o n t o the community to which he belongs, 
i n an act of free decision. I t i s t h i s which, f o r T i l l i c h , l i e s at 
the very heart of morality, so ihat morality becomes not obedience to 
some external law, but that through which every centred person consti-
tutes i t s e l f i n an act of s e l f - i n t e g r a t i o n * Thus, man can respond 
i n knowledge and action to the world to which he belongs; but also 
because he confronts his world, and i n t h i s sense i s free from i t , ' h e 
can respond "responsibly", namely, a f t e r deliberation and decision 
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rather than through a determined compulsion*. So by confronting the 
world he becomes aware of the essential norms of l i f e to which he must 
respond i f he i s to be a t r u l y integrated person. 
These norms appear to man i n the nature of an imperative. Man, 
when he faces the if o r I d , has the whole universe as the potential content 
of his centred s e l f . His p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n his world w i l l mean that 
he w i l l need to take certain elements from the world back i n t o his own 
s e l f and make them h i s own. However, he i s l i m i t e d i n his attempt 
to do th i s by the other s e l f whom he confronts, f o r there i s no way i n 
which the other self can be assimilated as content of his own centredness* 
I t i s T i l l i c h " s contention that i n the very experience of t h i s l i m i t a -
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t i o n man becomes aware of 'the ought-to-be, the moral imperative'• 
The moral c o n s t i t u t i o n of the self i n the dimension of s p i r i t begins 
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with t h i s experience, and true personal l i f e i s only able to emerge i n 
the context of t h i s person-to-person encounter. This i s why the s e l f -
integration of person as person can only occur i n community, where 
mutual encounter of self with s e l f can and does take place. 
The ambiguities i n t h i s process can best be i l l u s t r a t e d , says 
T i l l i c h , when one looks at the concepts of sa c r i f i c e and the moral 
law. I n the f i r s t place, since s e l f - i n t e g r a t i o n necessitates taking 
certain things which i t encounters i n t o the s e l f f o r the purpose of 
i t s own development, the problem inevitably arises which i t shall take 
and which i t sh a l l not. Faced with t h i s dilemma, the self may choose 
to remain as i t i s , but i n so doing i t runs the r i s k of preventing i t s 
own i n t e g r a t i o n . This means that a choice must be madet either 
certain p o s s i b i l i t i e s must be rejected f o r the sake of preserving the 
se l f as i t now i s , or else something already actual must be given up 
for the sake of something possible 'which may enlarge and strengthen 1 
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i t . So l i f e moves backwards and forwards between the possible and 
the r e a l , and requires the surrender of either one or the other. This 
gives r i s e to the s a c r i f i c i a l nature of l i f e , for no man i s able to 
realise a l l his p o t e n t i a l i t i e s and i s therefore faced with the problem 
of having to choose some and rej e c t others. But i n having to make 
such a choice, man i s also having to assess the value of d i f f e r e n t 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s , and i n so doing i s i n constant danger of making the 
wrong decision. Every s a c r i f i c e thus e n t a i l s moral r i s k , and f o r t h i s 
reason i t should never be said that s a c r i f i c e i n i t s e l f i s good. 'The 
moral r i s k i n s a c r i f i c i n g an important p o s s i b i l i t y can be equally as 
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great as the r i s k i n s a c r i f i c i n g an important r e a l i t y ' . I n the same 
way, s e l f - s a c r i f i c e i s also ambiguous, f o r on the one hand the self to 
be sacrificed may not be worthy, and on the other hand that f o r which 
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i t i s sacrificed may not be worthy to receive i t . 'Thus the ambiguity 
of s a c r i f i c e i s a decisive and all-permeating expression of the ambiguity 
of l i f e i n the function of s e l f - i n t e g r a t i o n . I t shows the human 
s i t u a t i o n i n the mixture of essential and e x i s t e n t i a l elements and the 
im p o s s i b i l i t y of separating them as good and e v i l i n an unambiguous 
way'. 
The ambiguities i n the moral law face us i n three d i f f e r e n t ways. 
The f i r s t problem concerns the unconditional character of the moral imper-
at i v e . As T i l l i c h has already implied, the v a l i d i t y of the moral imper-
a t i v e l i e s i n the fact that i t represents man's essential being over 
against his e x i s t e n t i a l estrangement. This means that i t i s , i n the 
wards of Kant, categorical, or unambiguous. We have also seen that . 
man becomes aware of the moral imperative i n his relationships with 
the other person, i n the 'unconditional command to acknowledge him as 
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a person'• J But a l l t h i s , says T i l l i c h , i s no more than a 'preliminary, 
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formal answer1* i t s t i l l needs to be f i l l e d out with meaning. For 
what does i t mean to acknowledge the other as a person? I t means that 
when one encounters and participates i n the l i f e of the other person, 
one accepts his own p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s , those things which i n fact charac-
te r i s e and constitute his personality. I n other words, i t i s the 
'acceptance of the other s e l f by p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n his personal centre'. 
Now t h i s , claims T i l l i c h , i s what the New Testament means by agape. 
So, 'the preliminary formal answer, that the unconditional character 
of the moral imperative i s experienced i n the encounter of person w i t h 
person, has now been embodied i n the material answer, that i t i s agape 
which gives concreteness to the categorical imperative:, centredness to 
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the person and the foundation of the l i f e of the s p i r i t ' • 
I t i s precisely i n t h i s f i l l i n g out of the moral imperative with 
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the material content of love that the p o s s i b i l i t y of ambiguity arises* 
For though agape as i t s ultimate norm i s above the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
the formal and the material, yet nevertheless there i s ambiguity 
precisely because agape does contain a material element* For example, 
says T i l l i c h , the material expression of the moral imperative, demands 
that we participate i n the other s e l f , but how does t h i s demand i n 
i t s e l f guide the actual measure of our p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n or r e j e c t i o n 
of the other self's p a r t i c u l a r characteristics? Or to what extent 
should other forms or q u a l i t i e s of love, such as eros or p h i l i a , 
influence our measure of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and how does the mixture of 
these influences with agape af f e c t the v a l i d i t y of agape as an ultimate 
norm? Such questions serve to show the ambiguity of the moral law, even 
when considered from the point of view of i t s v a l i d i t y * The moral 
imperative as a formal expression remains unambiguously v a l i d , but as 
soon as i t i s f i l l e d out with a material element, ambiguity arises and 
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i t s v a l i d i t y i s thereby questioned* 
This leads us to the second question, the ambiguity of moral 
norms as expressed i n commandments* I f the material expression of the 
moral imperative i n terms of agape gives r i s e to ambiguity, even more 
does i t s more specific expression i n terms of laws and commands* Again, 
such norms are v a l i d i n that they point to man's essential nature as set 
over against his e x i s t e n t i a l condition* But the question arises as to 
how i t i s possible to f u l f i l these norms w i t h i n the 'ambiguous mixture 
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of essential and e x i s t e n t i a l elements which characterises l i f e 1 ? I t 
i s only possible, says T i l l i c h , through agape i t s e l f , which includes 
both the formal principle of j u s t i c e and the freedom to apply t h i s 
p r i n c i p l e i n d i f f e r e n t ways i n d i f f e r i n g concrete situations. This 
answer does, of course, bring us back to where we were before, and 
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raises again the problems i n how one expresses love i n the world of 
human relationships* Indeed, there i s no f i n a l answer to t h i s question, 
i n the context of man's ambiguous l i f e , and every attempt to provide 
an answer i s fraught with moral r i s k . I f there are times when the 
answer breaks through i n revelatory experiences, 'experiences which 
underlie the ethical wisdom of a l l nations', i t never breaks through 
altogether, and i n man's e x i s t e n t i a l state there i s much that remains 
hidden both of his essential nature and of the ultimate norm of agape* 
Even conscience cannot guide us, f o r i t has no moral certainty of i t s 
own* I t i s obvious, concludes T i l l i c h , that we have before us a problem 
that man of himself cannot hope to resolve. I t can be resolved, as 
we shall see, only i n the context of the work of the divine S p i r i t * 
The t h i r d problem i n the agape p r i n c i p l e i s that of moral moti-
vation. As the 'law of love', agape, says T i l l i c h , commands reunion 
with one's essential being, the integration of the centred s e l f . But 
t h i s i s a tiro-edged command, fo r as a motivating power law not only 
prompts to goodness, i t also encourages man to rebel, i n so f a r as the 
commandment to love serves to underline man's estrangement from himself. 
Thus i n bis e x i s t e n t i a l state, obedience and disobedience to the law 
are mixed w i t h i n him. So the law motivates p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t but also 
leads to resistance, r e s u l t i n g i n h o s t i l i t y against God, man and oneself* 
This makes possible three d i f f e r e n t attitudes towards the laws (a) that 
of self-deception, by those who f e e l that because the law has motivating 
power, i t can eventually lead to s e l f - i n t e g r a t i o n ; (b) that of compromise, 
a resigned acceptance of the fa c t that the motivating power of law i s 
indeed l i m i t e d and therefore cannot r e a l l y achieve s e l f - i n t e g r a t i o n j 
(c) and that of r e j e c t i o n , which recognises the v a l i d i t y of the law 
but completely despairs about i t s motivating power, and so opposes i t , 
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rationalises i t , or substitutes f o r i t man-made ideologies. Or as 
T i l l i c h puts i t i n his essay on 'Moralisms and Morality', 'Legalism 
drives either to self-complacency ( I have kept a l l commandments) or 
to despair ( I cannot keep any commandment ) . Moralism of law makes 
Pharisees or cynics, or i t produces i n the majority of people an 
indifference which lowers the moral imperative to conventional be-
haviour' « ^ These considerations show the f u t i l i t y of t r y i n g t o impose 
agape on man as law, and 'the experience of t h i s s i t u a t i o n leads to 
the quest f o r a morality which f u l f i l s the law by transcending i t , 
that i s , agape given to man as reuniting and in t e g r a t i n g r e a l i t y , as 
new being and not as law'.^ 'Moralisra necessarily ends i n the quest 
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f o r grace'/, the workings of the divine S p i r i t i n the l i f e of man. 
Evaluation 
Although the in t e g r a t i o n and development of the individual has 
always been one of the proper concerns of ethios, i t must be pointed 
out t hat to define morality pr i m a r i l y i n terms of s e l f - i n t e g r a t i o n , 
as T i l l i c h does so here, i s by no means without i t s problems. I t 
immediately implies that moral behaviour i s something i n which one 
engages solely f o r the help i t gives to the development and enlarge-
ment of one's own personality* I f t h i s i s so, then the world which the 
se l f encounters, including countless other selves, becomes a t o o l t o 
be used i n much the same way as a cat scratches the bark of a tree 
to sharpen i t s claws or a dog chews a bone to aid i t s digestion* 
But j u s t as i n these cases there i s no real concern f o r either bark 
or bone, so i t would seem that when one defines morality i n t h i s way 
there i s l i t t l e room f o r that genuine concern f o r the encountered 
world which t r u l y characterises Christian morality* The same point 
comes out i n T i l l i c h ' s discussion on the role of 'norms'* We have 
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already seen how he emphasises that the development of one's own 
personal centre necessarily involves subjecting oneself to such norms 
as are essential to the development of a true humanity* and with 
t h i s we have agreed* Nevertheless we must note how easily such a 
statement can be misinterpreted* For we may conclude, as T i l l i c h 
seems to do so here, that the individual's overriding concern should 
be the integr a t i o n and f u l f i l m e n t of his own humanity, to which every-
thing else must be subordinated and i n which context everything else 
must be understood* Hence the primary purpose of agapet as the 
essential moral norm, becomes that by which man achieves something f o r 
himself rather than the means by which he serves his fellows* We 
would c e r t a i n l y agree with T i l l i c h ' s . assertion that agape involves 
'the acceptance of the other s e l f * , " ^ but we cannot agree that the 
primary significance of such an acceptance i s the contribution i t 
makes towards the r e a l i s a t i o n of one's own humanity rather than what 
i t can do f o r the other person concerned* This does not mean that 
love has no part to play i n personal development. On the contrary, 
Christian theology would a f f i r m that no man i s t r u l y integrated unless 
he has the s p i r i t of love. But t h i s i s rather d i f f e r e n t from 
saying that the primary purpose of love i s to achieve t h i s end* 
So i t would seem that T i l l i c h ' s reading of morality i n terms of 
se l f - i n t e g r a t i o n i s fundamentally at variance with the New Testament 
understanding of agape which begins with concern f o r others, not 
with concern f o r oneself* I t may well be that t h i s other-centred 
concern w i l l lead to a deeper in t e g r a t i o n of one's own personality, 
and i n th i s sense morality must be considered as one of the means by 
which God brings a person to true maturity and real f u l f i l m e n t s 
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but s e l f - i n t e g r a t i o n i s not i t s main objective* 
The same issue arises i n T i l l i c h ' s remarks about the ambiguities 
of s a c r i f i c e * The d e s i r a b i l i t y of s a c r i f i c e , and the precise nature of 
whatever s a c r i f i c e i s involved, i s considered e n t i r e l y from the stand-
point of what i s best f o r the purposes of s e l f - i n t e g r a t i o n * When 
some actual s a c r i f i c e i s made the choice must be determined by whichever 
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procedure may 'enlarge and strengthen' the centred s e l f * Even s e l f -
s a c r i f i c e should be measured by the scale of worth! So there i s an 
ambiguity about s a c r i f i c e which arises not from the question, 'What i s 
best f o r the other s e l f ? ' , but, 'What i s best f o r the centred s e l f 
(myself)?' I t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how t h i s understanding of sacri f i c e 
has anything i n common with the Christian concept, according to which 
he who seeks to save his own l i f e s h a l l lose i t and he who loses his 
l i f e f o r the sake of Christ and the Gospel, and therefore f o r the sake 
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of others, shall f i n d i t . The Christian concept of s a c r i f i c e i s 
e n t i r e l y other-centred, and to measure i t s a d v i s a b i l i t y or even i t s 
efficacy by i t s value f o r the purposes of s e l f - i n t e g r a t i o n i s to begin 
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with the wrong premise altogether* 
Sim i l a r l y , T i l l i c h ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of morality i n terms of s e l f -
integration influences his concept of the moral imperative. The sense 
of 'ought' that i s experienced through encounter with the other person 
opens up f o r man the norms of his own essential being* Thus the moral 
imperative of which man now becomes aware i s i n actual f a c t his own 
essential manhood c a l l i n g him to real i s e his true s e l f , to work towards 
sel f - i n t e g r a t i o n * I n i n t e r p r e t i n g the unconditional demand i n t h i s 
way, as the i n t u i t i v e r e a l i s a t i o n of the nature of essential being, 
T i l l i c h sees the moral imperative not so much as the obligation or 
duty one has towards one's fellow men, but as the correct steps one 
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needs to take i n r e l a t i o n t o one's fellows i n order to realise one's 
own essential being* The purpose of the moral imperative i s not to 
benefit the other person, but rather the f u l f i l m e n t of one's own 
essential nature* So the moral imperative i s made to serve the 
interests of se l f * I t seems to me therefore that there i s a grave 
defect at the centre of T i l l i c h ' s understanding of the moral imperative* 
This does not mean, of course, that we have to deny the concept i t s e l f * 
We can s t i l l a f f i r m the sense of 'ought' i n every man i n a formal 
sense. 'But the sense of unconditional obligation that one i s normally 
aware of i s what one must do with one's neighbour rather than what one 
must do i n order to re a l i s e one's own essential humanity* I n f a c t , 
the attempt to use the moral imperative t o serve one's own ends i s 
deliberately to twi s t and d i s t o r t i t , which i s i n i t s e l f surely one of 
the most potent sources of ambiguity. For i f the primary purpose of 
morality i s to s a t i s f y the desire f o r s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t , then i t s very 
self-centredness w i l l lead only further i n t o ambiguity and confusion* 
The Christian assertion i s surely that an unambiguous morality can 
only t r u l y be realised when i t i s based on an outgoing love and concern 
for the other person, such as we see i n Christ, a love which genuinely 
seeks the best f o r the other s e l f , which i s the very foundation of agape* 
None of these c r i t i c i s m s , v a l i d as they are from the standpoint 
of Christian morality, need d i s t r a c t us from T i l l i c h ' s statement that 
of himself i t i s impossible f o r man to l i v e an unambiguous moral l i f e * 
He w i l l always be confronted with the problem of how love can f u l l y 
reveal i t s e l f and what actions i t demands i n given si t u a t i o n s , and his 
decisions to act w i l l always be fraught with the anxiety l e s t he should 
do the wrong thing. I n the face of these things he may well despair i n 
his quest f o r a l i f e free from moral ambiguity, yet i t i s surely p a r t l y 
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i n answer to t h i s despair that the work of the Holy S p i r i t must be seen* 
B. The Self-Creativity of L i f e 
The second function of l i f e according to T i l l i c h f s analysis i s 
self-creation, or as he also terms i t , s e l f - c r e a t i v i t y * I n the pre-
human dimensions of l i f e , t h i s function i s concerned with the p r i n c i p l e 
of growth, i n the sense of both in d i v i d u a l growth and reproduction, 
i n which the s e l f seeks to give form to i t s own power of being. I n t h i s 
process, many ambiguities, such as struggle, pain and even destruction, 
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are present, and T i l l i c h discusses each of these at length. As f a r 
as man i s concerned, a l l these things apply, i n so f a r as he contains 
wi t h i n himself a l l previous dimensions, and p a r t i c u l a r l y the preceding 
dimension of self-awareness which he shares with animal creation* But 
i n man i n his capacity as the bearer of the dimension of s p i r i t , the 
function of s e l f - c r e a t i v i t y i s extended to his r e l a t i o n to the world 
of which he i s part, and p a r t i c u l a r l y to the way i n which he 'cultivates' 
and creates something new from what he encounters w i t h i n i t . I n a word, 
s e l f - c r e a t i v i t y under the dimension of s p i r i t gives r i s e to the phenomenon 
of culture. So T i l l i c h defines culture as 'that which takes care of 
something, keeps i t a l i v e , and makes i t grow*. I t 'creates something 
new beyond the encountered r e a l i t y ' . 
T i l l i c h observes that i n r e l a t i o n to the encountered world, man 
can use his self-creative function i n three ways. He can create 
something new i n a material sense, something technical which he can use; 
or else i n a receptive sense, something theoretical which r e f l e c t s the 
way i n which he looks at his world; or else i n a reactive sense, p r a c t i -
cal means by which men can act upon each other* 
I n the material, or technical, sense, the function of s e l f - 39 c r e a t i v i t y appears i n the 'double creation of language and technology'* 
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For T i l l i c h , the significance of language i s not only that i t i s the 
supreme means of communication) but also that i t creates a 'universe 
of meanings') so that communication means p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n that 
universe of meanings* This i s possible, says T i l l i c h , because man i s 
not i n bondage to concrete situations; he can transcend them, and i n 
transcending them i s able to observe i n every p a r t i c u l a r a universal 
to which he gives a common name* As he puts i t , 'Evary language, 
including that of the Bible, i s the res u l t of innumerable acts of 
c u l t u r a l c r e a t i v i t y * A l l functions of man's s p i r i t u a l l i f e are based 
on man's power to speak vocally or s i l e n t l y * Language i s the expression 
of man's freedom from the given s i t u a t i o n and i t s concrete demands* I t 
gives him universale i n whose power he can create worlds above the 
given world of technical c i v i l i s a t i o n and s p i r i t u a l content'*^ 
Language then must be the basis f o r any discussion on s e l f -
c r e a t i v i t y i n the dimension of s p i r i t , because i t i s fundamental f o r 
a l l c u l t u r a l functions and present i n a l l of them* The study of 
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language therefore becomes 'a door to l i f e i n the dimension o f / s p i r i t ' * 
The f a c t that there are d i f f e r e n t types of language, d i f f e r e n t ways i n 
which language i s used, means that there are d i f f e r e n t types and va r i e t i e s 
of self-creative a c t i v i t y , depending on the way i n which man encounters 
r e a l i t y t technical, r e l i g i o u s , poetic, s c i e n t i f i c and so on* And 
i f we are to understand f u l l y these d i f f e r e n t spheres of c u l t u r a l 
a c t i v i t y and the essential difference between them, i t i s important 
that we both recognise that i n each of them language i s used i n a rather 
d i f f e r e n t way and also seek to understand the significance of those 
d i f f e r e n t usages.^2 Just as language liberates man from the 'here 
and now' by means of universals, so also the technical handling of 
encountered r e a l i t y liberates man from the natural l i m i t a t i o n s of his 
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existence by the production of tools, to which we give the name 
•technology'• But f o r man to produce tools as tools, T i l l i c h states, 
he must have the concept of universals, and i n t h i s sense 'the power 
of tools i s dependent on the power of language. Logos precedes 
e v e r y t h i n g * S o man becomes fre e , bound no longer by his environ-
ment, able to choose from a whole host of technical p o s s i b i l i t i e s * 
But because these technical p o s s i b i l i t i e s are unlimited, he finds 
himself i n an ambiguous s i t u a t i o n . For i n t h i s case, production may 
well become an end i n i t s e l f , a d i s t o r t i o n which can a f f e c t a whole 
culture. Herein l i e s the ambiguity of technology. 
The du a l i t y of these two basic functions of culture, language 
and technology, i s reflected i n the two other types of c u l t u r a l a c t i -
v i t y , to which T i l l i c h refers as theoria and praxis. Theoria refers 
to s e l f - c r e a t i v i t y i n a receptive or ' t h e o r e t i c a l 1 sense; praxis 
refers to i t i n a reactive or ' p r a c t i c a l ' sense. The o r i a , says 
T i l l i c h , 'is the act of looking at the encountered world i n order to 
take something of i t i n t o the centred self as a meaningful, structured 
whole',^ suoh as one finds i n every aesthetic image and every cogni-
t i v e concept. However, though the mind natura l l y s t r i v e s to produce an 
all-embracing image or concept, i n r e a l i t y the universe can never 
appear i n such a d i r e c t way, but can only p a r t i a l l y reveal i t s e l f 
through p a r t i c u l a r images and concepts. Thus each specific creation 
of theoria i s but a 'mirror of encountered r e a l i t y , a fragment of a 
universe of meaning*. This can be i l l u s t r a t e d by language i t s e l f . 
Language moves i n universals, but i t s meaning can only be grasped i n 
specific examples. *World breaks through environment i n every 
universal. He who says, "This i s a tree",' f o r example, 'has grasped 
treehood i n an individual tree and with i t a fragment of the universe 
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of meaning.' The same would be true f o r any other expression of 
theoria - a painting of a tree, f o r instance) becomes an image both 
of universal treehood and of that universe reflected i n a pa r t i c u l a r 
tree* 
As we have seen, the two ways i n which theoria receives r e a l i t y 
are through the cognitive and aesthetic functions, 'concepts' and 
'images'. There i s , says T i l l i c h , i n the nature of the cognitive 
process a basic tension. 'In the act of the cognitive c r e a t i v i t y of 
l i f e . • • there i s a fundamental c o n f l i c t between that which i s 
intended and the s i t u a t i o n that both causes the inte n t i o n and at the 
same time prevents i t s f u l f i l m e n t ' . ^ Such a c o n f l i c t i s based on 
the estrangement between subject and object, though i t should be 
emphasised that without t h i s s p l i t there could be no c u l t u r a l c r e a t i v i t y 
at a l l , f o r 'the cognitive act i s born out of the desire to bridge the 
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gap between subject and object 1* The expression T i l l i c h uses f o r 
such a union, equivocal as i t may be, i s the word ' t r u t h ' , and the 
ambiguity of the cognitive function l i e s i n the f a c t that because t h i s 
union can never be f u l l y achieved, t r u t h can never be completely known* 
The aesthetic function, however, not only seeks to f i n d t r u t h , 
i t also, and perhaps more s i g n i f i c a n t l y , seeks to 'express q u a l i t i e s 
of being which can be grasped only by a r t i s t i c c r e a t i v i t y 1 , such as 
beauty and goodness* So the word 'authenticity' i s a better word than 
' t r u t h ' as f a r as the aesthetic function i s concerned. A work of a r t , 
f o r example, i s authentic ' i f i t expresses the encounter of mind and 
world i n which an otherwise hidden q u a l i t y of a piece of the universe . . . 
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i s united with an otherwise hidden receptive power of the mind 1. I n 
one sense, there i s a union of se l f and world achieved i n the aesthetic 
encounter that i s not possible i n the cognitive function, though there 
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w i l l be d i f f e r e n t degrees of the depth of such unions. This i s why 
some philosophers have seen a r t as the highest expression of l i f e and 
why some cultures have t r i e d to replace the re l i g i o u s by the aesthetic 
function. But t h i s overlooks i t s l i m i t a t i o n s , f o r the aesthetic 
function can reach only certain aspects of the otherwise hidden r e a l i t y : 
i t cannot reach ultimate r e a l i t y i t s e l f , j u s t as the s e l f i t s e l f can 
only grasp t h i s r e a l i t y i n specific images and not with the whole of 
i t s being. So there i s an incompleteness about the aesthetic function 
which gives i t an element of unre a l i t y , of 'not-yet'« 'The ambiguity 
of the aesthetic function i s i t s o s c i l l a t i o n between r e a l i t y and unreal-
i t y . 4 9 
Praxis, says T i l l i c h , as the corresponding function to theoria, 
'is the whole of c u l t u r a l acts of centred personalities who as members 
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of social groups act upon each other and themselves • I n t h i s sense, 
i t i s the s e l f - c r e a t i v i t y of l i f e as expressed i n the 'personal-
communal realm 1. I n some ways, the c u l t u r a l acts of praxis, such as 
social r e l a t i o n s , law, p o l i t i c s , and so on, resemble what we would c a l l 
ethics, but T i l l i c h feels that i t i s better to confine the term 'ethics' 
to the science of the moral act rather than i t s c u l t u r a l expression* 
The c u l t u r a l functions of praxi3 moreover are much wider than ethics, 
and the special content of morality i s only one creation of the 
c u l t u r a l s e l f - c r e a t i v i t y of l i f e . Just as theoria may be considered 
as a continuation of the l i n g u i s t i c act, so praxis, T i l l i c h points 
out, may be thought of as a continuation of the technical act, i n that 
i t uses 'means f o r ends', or tools. I t s tools are things l i k e economy, 
medicine, administration, education, and so on, each of which, of 
course, are i n themselves complex functions of the s p i r i t . 
The aim of a l l c u l t u r a l c r e a t i v i t y i n the sphere of praxis i s 
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the achievement of the 'good1, which f o r T i l l i c h means 'the essential 
nature of a thing and the f u l f i l m e n t of the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s implied i n 
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it'» Various concepts refer to the achievement of the 'good' i n 
d i f f e r e n t spheres of l i f e . I n the social sphere, f o r example, we are 
concerned with the concept of j u s t i c e , which i s the legitimate 'aim 
of a l l c u l t u r a l actions which are directed towards, the transformation 
of society'. As f a r as the i n d i v i d u a l i s concerned, T i l l i c h suggests 
that we use the concept of 'humanity', a word which conveys the o r i g i n a l 
meaning of the word ' v i r t u e 1 , which has tended to become rather debased 
i n contemporary usage, which points to the actualisation of essential 
human p o t e n t i a l i t i e s i n the l i f e of individual man, by which he achieves 
the 'good' f o r himself. Admittedly, says T i l l i c h , there are snags i n 
using the word 'humanity', but i t i s a good word to convey the sense 
of 'the f u l f i l m e n t of man's inner aim with respect .to himself and his 
personal r e l a t i o n s ' . So the inner aim of praxis as f a r as the group 
i s concerned i s j u s t i c e , as f a r as individual man i s concerned humanity. 
Ambiguity i n praxis stems from the gap which l i e s on the one hand 
between the existing human subject and the object f o r which he striv e s 
(that i s , essential humanity), and on the other hand between the e x i s t i n g 
social order and the object towards which i t strives ( t h a t i s , essential 
j u s t i c e ) . This r e f l e c t s the p a r a l l e l gap i n theoria, which exists 
between the knowing subject and the object to be known. The subject-
object scheme therefore, becomes not only an epistemological problem but 
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also an ethical one, and thus one which must be resolved i n a new, 
unambiguous l i f e such as i s created by the divine S p i r i t . 
T i l l i c h discusses the ambiguities of the c u l t u r a l act more com-
plet e l y under three separate heads: those present i n the l i n g u i s t i c , 
cognitive and aesthetic self-creations of l i f e , those of technical and 
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personal transformation, and those of communal transformation* I n 
the f i r s t place, as we have seen, language, the f i r s t act of s e l f -
c r e a t i v i t y , permeates every other c u l t u r a l act and therefore every 
function of the s p i r i t . Nevertheless i t has a special r e l a t i o n to the 
functions of theoria i n the same way as the technical act has a special 
r e l a t i o n to the functions of praxis* So T i l l i c h prefers to discuss 
more f u l l y the ambiguities of language along with those of t r u t h and 
expressiveness, and the ambiguities of the technical act along with 
those of humanity and j u s t i c e * 
We have already seen how language creates 'a universe of meanings' 
i n so f a r as every word i s i t s e l f 'the bearer of meaning'. The ambi-
guity of language l i e s i n the fact that although language has t h i s 
•meaning-creating power', i t also inevitably separates the meaning 
from the r e a l i t y to which i t r e f e r s , so that an unavoidable gap i s 
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opened up between mind on the one hand and r e a l i t y on the other* 
Because of t h i s ambiguity language i s open to confusion, d i s t o r t i o n 
and contradiction, and i t i s only i n the ultimate unity of word and 
power i n the l i f e of God, i t s h i s t o r i c a l manifestation i n the Christ, and 
i t s ecstatic transformation i n the S p i r i t , that t h i s ambiguity i s 
overcome, f o r here the word does not encounter r e a l i t y , but i s i t s e l f 
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grasped by ' r e a l i t y beyond the s p l i t between subject and object'* 
The same sort of ambiguity can be observed i n the cognitive act, and 
examples of i t abound. There i s the 'ambiguity of observation', i n 
that the r e a l i t y we observe and encounter can never be anything more 
than encountered r e a l i t y , which i s always to some extent distorted. 
There i s the 'ambiguity of abstraction', i n that the cognitive act 
t r i e s to reach the essence of the object by abstracting i t s essence 
from the particulars associated with i t s manifestation, such as one 
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finds i n the phenoraenological method* an obviously impossible task. 
There i s the 'ambiguity of t r u t h as a whole', i n the creation of large 
conceptual patterns, the question as to whether these patterns have 
any foundation i n r e a l i t y , and the fact that i n such a creation the 
cognitive act can change the encountered r e a l i t y so that i t becomes 
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v i r t u a l l y unrecognisable* There i s the 'ambiguity of argumentation*, 
where a chain of arguments i s used i n an attempt to conceptualise 
r e a l i t y but where unnoticed assumptions nevertheless always play a 
determining ro l e * I t i s obvious then that there i s no way of bridging 
th i s subject-object gap, no method of resolving the ambiguity, and t h i s 
i s why there are those who seek to discover t r u t h i n some sort of 
mystical u n i t y , which claims to transcend the s p l i t i n the power of 
immediacy* Others, however, believe that such a reunion of theoria 
with r e a l i t y i s possible i n a r t i s t i c i n t u i t i o n and i t s images. Their 
optimism i s il l - f o u n d e d , f o r each a r t i s t i c s t y l e interprets the r e a l i t y 
i t encounters i n a d i f f e r e n t way, and ambiguity stems from the variety 
of approach* I n naturalism, f o r example, the subject matter w i l l tend 
to overpower expression; i n idealism, there i s always the attempt to 
get beyond the encounter to essential r e a l i t y i t s e l f * I n neither case 
can ambiguity be avoided, and the subject-object gap i s s t i l l unbridged* 
The only solution i s that achieved under the impact of the S p i r i t , as we 
sh a l l see. 
Secondly, whereas i n the self-creation of l i f e i n the functions of 
theoria i t i s the subject-element which causes the ambiguity i n that 
the subject i s not able to achieve unity with the object, i n the 
functions of praxis, including the technical sphere, i t i s the reverse* 
Here i t i s the object that causes the ambiguity, f o r i t i s with the 
transformation of the object that we are now concerned* As f a r as 
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technology i s concerned, f o r example, 'the t o o l which liberates man', 
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remarks T i l l i c h , 'also subjects him to the rules of i t s making'. I n 
order to produce t o o l s , one must understand the inner structure of the 
materials used and t h e i r behaviour under ce r t a i n conditions, and then 
comply with these. I n technical production T i l l i c h perceives that 
this leads to three ambiguities: that of 'freedom and l i m i t a t i o n ' , i n 
which man i s free to make t o o l s , but i s l i m i t e d by t h e i r destructive 
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character; that of 'means and ends', i n that the superior purpose of 
production i s often hidden or i l l - d e f i n e d , so that the production of 
means becomes an end i n i t s e l f ; and that of 'self and thi n g ' , i n that 
a technical product i s not a ' s e l f but a 'thing', and i n thi s techno-
l o g i c a l context there i s always the tendency f o r man himself to become 
'a thing among things', a mere cog i n a machine. So the. l i b e r a t i o n 
afforded man by technology can re s u l t i n his own bondage, and t h i s 
i s seen nowhere more cl e a r l y than i n modern society. None of these 
ambiguities can be resolved, of course, by getting r i d of technology. 
Rather do they lead to 'the quest f o r unambiguous relations of means 
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and ends, that i s , f o r the Kingdom of God', the New Being which the 
divine S p i r i t brings* 
Ambiguity i s no less present i n the practical means by which men. 
seek to act upon and transform either themselves or each other i n the 
f i e l d of human rela t i o n s . Whether i t be the case of man s t r i v i n g for 
his own humanity, or whether i t be the case of one helping the other 
to reach the same goal, i n each case there i s an ambiguity, an ambi-
guity which consists of 'the r e l a t i o n of the one who determines and the 
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one who i s determined** I n the case of self-determination, i t i s 
the ambiguity between the s e l f as determining and the s e l f as being 
determined. The determining s e l f can only determine ' i n the power of 
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what i t essentially i s 1 , yet under the conditions of existence, i t i s 
separated from what i t essentially i s . This means that self-determin-
ation i n t o f u l f i l l e d humanity i s impossible, - impossible, but neverthe-
less necessary, 'because a se l f determined completely from outside would 
cease to be a s e l f . Herein l i e s the ambiguity of self-determination, 
which i n every responsible person results i n despair. I n the case of 
other-determination, there i s ambiguity i n the sense that working towards 
the growth of a person does at the same time run the r i s k of working 
towards h i s depersonalisation. 'Trying to enhance a subject as subject 
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makes i t i n t o an object'. We see t h i s , T i l l i c h reminds us, i n the 
f i e l d of education, where a l l sorts of extremes, from indoctrination 
to l a i s s e z - f a i r e , are p o t e n t i a l l y present. The same thing can be 
seen where any guiding a c t i v i t y i s present, from psychotherapy to 
family l i f e , where the factor of transference can be so easily at work. 
I n f a c t , contemporary psychotherapeutic practice i s constantly seeking 
ways of overcoming t h i s sort of problem. The same t r u t h underlies 
i t a l l j 'unambiguous l i f e i s impossible wherever the subject-object 
scheme i s unbroken'.^ 
In the f i e l d of human relations ambiguity i s s i m i l a r l y found i n 
the realm of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . T i l l i c h reminds us that every act of 
par t i c i p a t i o n o s c i l l a t e s between a t o t a l holding back of oneself i n 
self-seclusion, and a t o t a l giving of oneself i n self-surrender. Some-
times t h i s may be f o r psychological reasons. On the one hand, there 
may be times when one draws back from the other person because the 
knowledge one has of him i s r e a l l y no more than a knowledge of an 
image one has projected on to him. On the other hand, there are times 
when the other person deliberately creates the wrong sort of image of 
himself such as w i l l appeal t o others and make them give themselves 
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wholeheartedly and unreservedly. I n either case, the ambiguity of 
personal p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the other s e l f i s underlined, and the conse-
quences that may often follow. This i s true whether one i s thinking of 
cognitive or emotional p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and i t i s t h i s sort of s i t u a t i o n 
that i s responsible f o r 'the inexhaustible creative-destructive situations 
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i n the r e l a t i o n of person to person'. 
There are also ambiguities i n the realm of communal transforma-
t i o n . As we have seen, the aim to which a l l c u l t u r a l actions are 
directed i n the transformation of society i s enshrined i n the concept 
of j u s t i c e . We must therefore consider the ambiguities of the pr i n c i p l e 
of j u s t i c e . Or as T i l l i o n puts i t , 'What are social groups intended to 
be by t h e i r essential nature, and what ambiguities appear i n the actual 
processes of t h e i r self-creation?' T i l l i c h r i g h t l y distinguishes 
between social organisms and the organisational forms which special 
human a c t i v i t i e s create i n order to help them achieve social j u s t i c e . 
Social organisms, such as the family or the local community, have 
grown up natural l y w i t h i n the self-creative process of l i f e , whereas 
organisational forms are created with special i n t e n t i o n . Nevertheless, 
as he makes p l a i n , the social organism i s inherent within any organi-
sational form and makes i t s own contribution to i t , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
the way i t practices j u s t i c e i n i t s own community. For t h i s reason, 
the form of the social group, the 'organisational form 1, i s determined 
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by an understanding of j u s t i c e that i s already e f f e c t i v e i n the group. 
Wherever j u s t i c e i s so demanded and actualised, however, i t s ambigui-
t i e s appear,', and these ambiguities can re s u l t i n t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t 
a t t i t u d e s , e i t h e r despairing resignation that j u s t i c e i s ever possible, 
or else Utopian expectation which inevitably leads to f r u s t r a t i o n and 
disillusionment. 
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T i l l i c h l i s t s four important ambiguities i n the sphere of 
j u s t i c e . I n the f i r s t place, there i s that of 'inclusiveness and 
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exclusion*• A l l social groups include certain kinds of people and 
exclude others. rSocial cohesion*, T i l l i c h points out, *i s impossible 
without social exclusion', and i f cohesion i s to be strengthened t h i s 
w i l l necessitate expelling or r e j e c t i n g certain groups or individuals 
who stand on the boundary l i n e , who may weaken the group as a whole 
i f they are retained. Thus there i s ambiguity i n the f a c t that 
'justice does not demand unambiguous acceptance of those who would 
possibly disturb or destroy group cohesion, though at the same time 
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i t 'certainly does not permit t h e i r unambiguous r e j e c t i o n " . I n the 
second place, there i s the ambiguity of 'competition and equality'. I n -
equality i n the power of being i s not a matter of s t a t i c difference, 
but of continuous dynamic decisions, i n which i n the encounter of 
being with being there i s either pushing ahead or withdrawal, a 
'continuous a l t e r a t i o n between victory and defeat'. This happens i n 
a l l dimensions, but under the dimension of s p i r i t t h i s competitiveness 
stands under the p r i n c i p l e of j u s t i c e . The question we have to ask i s , 
'In what respect does ju s t i c e include equality?' I n so f a r as every 
person i s a person there i s , of course, an unambiguous equality. 
'There i s ultimate equality between a l l men i n the view of God and his 
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j u s t i c e i s equally offered' to them a l l • ' But i n the concrete a p p l i -
cation of t h i s p r i n c i p l e to specific situations, ambiguity arises. The 
necessity of competition works continuously f o r inequality, manifesting 
i t s e l f i n such things as the class system and p o l i t i c a l hierarchies, and 
the consequences of t h i s can sometimes result i n the almost t o t a l 
destruction of j u s t i c e i n the l i f e of society, the corruption of 
power and the eclipse of freedom, things which we have Been i n depth 
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i n the contemporary period. To aspire to a state of unambiguous 
ju s t i c e i n t h i s sense therefore i s to cry f o r the moonJ 
A t h i r d ambiguity i n the f i e l d of j u s t i c e i s that of leadership. 
'Leadership', says T i l l i c h , 'is the social analogy to centredness', 
f o r without the centredness provided by the leader, neither s e l f -
integration nor s e l f - c r e a t i v i t y i n the group would be possible. Yet 
leadership i s open to severe ambiguities, such as the u l t e r i o r motives 
of the leader himself or the attempts to transform leadership i n t o 
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'mass-management' backed up by subtle enforcement or overt coercion. 
Yet to remove the structure of leadership as i s sometimes attempted 
would result i n anarchy, which i n turn breeds dictatorship, so that 
nothing i s resolved by so doing. A fur t h e r ambiguity l i e s i n the 
confusion of leadership with authority. There are authorities i n 
a l l realms of cult u r e , which stem from the 'division of experience', 
and which are necessary because of every individual's l i m i t e d range 
of knowledge and a b i l i t y . I t i s when t h i s authority becomes bound 
up with p a r t i c u l a r social positioning, as f o r example i n the case of 
kings and pri e s t s , that the real meaning of authority i s distorted 
and ambiguity occurs. Yet again, t h i s i s no ground f o r r e j e c t i n g 
established authority, and to do so would be to undermine the whole 
social structure of l i f e . At the same time, we cannot f u l l y surrender 
to authority, f o r t h i s would i n turn belie i t s very, purpose, which i s 
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to serve 'the personal self and i t s claim f o r j u s t i c e ' . 
The fourth ambiguity of ju s t i c e according to T i l l i c h i s that of 
'legal form'. We have already seen the ambiguity that i s present i n the 
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moral law. The ambiguities of legal forms are similar to th i s i n 
that though t h e i r purpose i s to establish j u s t i c e , i n actual f a c t 
they give r i s e to both j u s t i c e and i n j u s t i c e . T i l l i c h c i t e s two reasons 
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fo r t h i s . The one i s external, aris i n g from the r e l a t i o n between the 
legal form and the powers that execute and i n t e r p r e t i t . Power can 
manipulate and create legal forms to serve i t s own in t e r e s t s , so that 
the legal form i t s e l f r e f l e c t s the ambiguities of leadership. Yet 
power without any v a l i d legal form would destroy i t s e l f , so the concept 
of legal form cannot be rejected. The other reason f o r ambiguity i s 
i n t e r n a l , f o r l i k e the moral law, legal form i s abstract, and there-
fore inadequate to every concrete s i t u a t i o n . And whilst i t i s true 
that most legal systems t r y to safeguard against t h i s , the d i f f i c u l t y 
can never be completely removed* 
I n his analysis of culture, T i l l i c h turns f i n a l l y t o one important 
question which he feels has fundamental significance: 'What i s the 
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meaning of the creation of a universe of meaning?', which i s the 
ultimate aim of a l l c u l t u r a l c r e a t i v i t y . He perceives that there are 
two sides to the answer to t h i s question. The f i r s t , which he c a l l s 
•macrocosmic', i s to say that the universe of meaning i s 'the f u l f i l -
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ment of the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of the universe of being'. This means 
that a l l the u n f u l f i l l e d p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of every dimension become 
actualised under the dimension of s p i r i t , not precisely i n the way i n 
which they would have been f u l f i l l e d i n t h e i r own dimensions, but i n 
the way i n which those dimensions are appropriately actualised under 
the dimension of the s p i r i t which we observe i n man. But such a 
f u l f i l m e n t of the universe as a whole must clearl y await the coming 
of a s i t u a t i o n where unambiguous l i f e i s possible, where the l i m i t a -
tions of f i n i t u d e are removed, such as one finds referred to i n the 
symbol 'eternal l i f e ' , and to which the concept of self-transcendence 
points. The second answer to the question i s more relevant to our 
present discussion. T i l l i c h c a l l s i t 'microcosmic': man i s seen as 
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the point at which and the instrument through which a universe of 
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meaning i s created . I n him the universe 'reaches up to an a n t i -
cipatory and fragmentary f u l f i l m e n t ' . I n him, and his capacity f o r 
s e l f - c r e a t i v i t y , one can see something of what the universe means, 
something of the f u l f i l m e n t towards which i t s t r i v e s . T i l l i c h 
observes that t h i s idea was already present i n certain Renaissance 
scholars who contended that i n everything f i n i t e the i n f i n i t e was 
present: 'Every human being, they f e l t , i s a microcosm, a small 
universe i n whom the large universe i s mirrored. As a mirror of 
the universe and i t s divine ground, the i n d i v i d u a l i s unique, incompar-
able, i n f i n i t e l y s i g n i f i c a n t , able to develop i n freedom his given 
endowment This, he says, forms the basis of what genuine 'humanism' 
r e a l l y means, f o r the dignity of the humanistic idea l i e s i n the b e l i e f 
that the aim of a l l human s e l f - c r e a t i v i t y , a l l culture, i s to lead 
upwards to t h i s f u l f i l m e n t . I n man, the universe discovers i t s e l f , 
and i n his c u l t u r a l acts, i t discovers i t s own meaning and significance. 
Thus i f man i s to real i s e his true significance as man, the whole of 
his l i f e must be geared towards th i s aim. 
I n t h i s quest, however, man i s necessarily confronted with the 
ambiguities of a l l c u l t u r a l self-creation, and he must therefore reach 
the stage when, because of his own f i n i t e l i m i t a t i o n s , he asks the 
question of unambiguous l i f e . The chief ambiguity arises from the 
humanistic tendency to absolutise the self-creative function and d i s -
regard the self-transcending function, that function by which man 
seeks to go beyond himself i n the dir e c t i o n of the i n f i n i t e . I n 
t h i s sort of s i t u a t i o n , r e l i g i o n i t s e l f , which points to the need f o r 
and the p o s s i b i l i t y of self-transcendence, becomes nothing more than 
a c u l t u r a l act. A fu r t h e r f i e l d i n which the ambiguities of humanism 
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are predominant i s that of education* The humanist ideal would claim 
that the aim of a l l education i s to actualise a l l the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s 
available to man* However, because of human f i n i t u d e , i t has to 
modify t h i s claim r e a l i s t i c a l l y by saying that the purpose of educa-
t i o n i s to actualise those human p o t e n t i a l i t i e s which are possible 
w i t h i n the framework of the h i s t o r i c a l destiny of the i n d i v i d u a l * 
But i n so doing, i t has already hedged around i t s claim that the s e l f -
creative function i s i t s e l f absolute with f a t a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s * I n 
any case the vast majority of men are always excluded from the 'higher 
grades of c u l t u r a l form and educational depth', so that the ' i n t r i n s i c 
exclusiveness of the humanist ideal prevents i t from being the f i n a l 
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aim of human c u l t u r e 1 * A l l t h i s leads T i l l i c h to the conclusion 
that only a humanism which i s self-transcending, which points beyond 
i t s e l f , can answer the question of the real significance of culture 
and how i t can be f u l f i l l e d . Unless humanism i s able to transcend 
i t s e l f i n t h i s way, then 'the demand of humanist f u l f i l m e n t becomes 
a law and f a l l s under the ambiguities of the law. Humanism i t s e l f 
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leads to the question of culture transcending i t s e l f . As we s h a l l 
see, t h i s i t can only do under the impact of the divine S p i r i t . 
Evaluation 
I n his painstaking analysis of s e l f - c r e a t i v i t y and culture, 
T i l l i c h has provided us with many valuable insights and penetrating 
comments. P a r t i c u l a r l y h e l p f u l i s his demonstration of the i n e v i t a b i l i t y 
of ambiguity which arises i n every sphere of c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t y , though 
one could perhaps say that i n his desire to systematise he has tended 
to f i t things together a l i t t l e too neatly. The various aspects and 
types of c u l t u r a l act overlap and intermingle much more than such a 
precise analysis would suggest. However, one realises that i f analysis 
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I s to be made, there must be some order of procedure and scheme of 
work* There are undoubtedly many cri t i c i s m s that one could make 
regarding the details of t h i s analysis, which are not a l l e n t i r e l y 
relevant or essential to the doctrine of the S p i r i t which he sees as 
providing the answer to the ambiguities of culture. However, there 
are several important points which he discusses which afford some 
insight i n t o his philosophical method, and i t i s important to under-
stand these i f one i s to place his teaching on the S p i r i t i n perspective. 
I t seems to me that when T i l l i c h describes culture as the s e l f -
creative function under the dimension of s p i r i t , he i s using the 
expression Jself-creative' i n two rather d i f f e r e n t ways, which though 
they are indeed connected, do nevertheless need to be distinguished. 
F i r s t l y , he i s using i t to point to the f a c t that whenever any c u l t u r a l 
act occurs, the essential i n i t i a t i v e i n that act l i e s with the self 
rather than i n the environment which the se l f encounters, so that 
whatever i s created may legitimately be called a creation of that s e l f . 
But there seems to be a more profound sense i n which he i s using the 
expression, and one which t i e s i n very neatly with his concept of 
the multidimensional unity of a l l l i f e . I n so f a r as every dimension 
of l i f e i s present i n the dimension of s p i r i t , t h i s means that every 
dimension i s actually p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the creative act through the 
medium of man. A l l dimensions present i n him come to act upon thera-
'selves wherever through him they encounter themselves withi n the world. 
I n other words, i n acting upon the encountered r e a l i t y i n a creative 
way l i f e , which includes every dimension, acts upon i t s e l f . I t i s 
being self-creative i n a re f l e x i v e sense. Out of the substance of i t s 
own being i t produces something new, a 'universe of meaning', which 
i n i t s e l f mirrors and through which i t comes to understand the universe 
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of being, which i s i t s own l i f e a The same point i s made when T i l l i c h 
says that man i s a microcosm of the universe of being through whom a 
universe of meaning i s created and i n whom i t i s fragmentarily f u l -
f i l l e d . This i s why i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y appropriate f o r T i l l i c h to 
r e f e r to the function by which the self actualises i t s own creative 
thought and power i n i t s i n t e r a c t i o n with i t s environment 1 s e l f -
c r e a t i v i t y ' • I t i s not j u s t that man i n i t i a t e s the process, i t i s also 
that i n him the whole of l i f e acts upon i t s e l f to create something 
that i s new* 
I t i s obvious that T i l l i c h ' s d e f i n i t i o n of culture as s e l f -
c r e a t i v i t y d i f f e r s from the usual d e f i n i t i o n s of culture to which one 
has become accustomed through sociological and anthropological study. 
The sociologist begins his analysis of culture with an investigation 
of specific cultures and then proceeds to deduce his remarks about 
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culture i n general from the results of his investigations. As a 
r u l e , he defines i t i n terms of behaviour: culture, he says, i s 
concerned i n the main with the way men behave i n community, and the 
patterns which emerge from t h i s , whether these patterns are techno-
l o g i c a l , s o c i a l , educational or moral. Such patterns of behaviour 
determine the nature of the culture, so that culture becomes the 
product of behaviour patterns, and therefore i n some sense dependent 
on and secondary to them. T i l l i c h , however, starts as i t were from the 
other end. For him, culture i s an a p r i o r i rather than an a poste-
r i o r i r e a l i t y . I t i s no end product shaped by patterns of behaviour, 
but rather the very principle at work w i t h i n man i n society that 
produces ways of behaviour. I t i s the function of s e l f - c r e a t i v i t y 
which works on everything man encounters, so that i n his response to 
that which he encounters, whether i t be i n the world of things or the 
I l l 
world of human relationships, something new i s born) some new pattern 
of l i f e emerges, some way of behaving i n community i s evolved. The 
resultant pattern may be termed 'a c u l t u r e 1 , but 'culture* i n i t s e l f 
i s much more than the amorphous term used by the sociologist, an 
all-embracing term f o r behaviour patterns, but rather the very principle 
of and urge towards c r e a t i v i t y inherent i n man which causes him to 
behave i n certain ways i n r e l a t i o n to his world* The sociologist's 
d e f i n i t i o n of culture i s empirical, deductive and s c i e n t i f i c i T i l l i c h ' s 
d e f i n i t i o n i s a p r i o r i t purposive and ontological. So T i l l i c h ' s def-
i n i t i o n of culture i s a challenge to the s c i e n t i f i c d e f i n i t i o n , f o r 
not being content with a purely empirical analysis, he i s concerned 
with the deeper question, 'Why should there be culture at a l l ? ' And 
his answer i s that the roots of culture are to be found i n the roots of 
being i t s e l f , i n the very capacity f o r s e l f - c r e a t i v i t y that i s found 
i n a l l l i f e , and which comes to a head i n man* I n t h i s he has given 
to the whole concept of culture a new dimension of depth and d i g n i t y 
which prepares the ground f o r a theology of culture i n which the S p i r i t 
has a central place* 
The phrase 'a universe of meaning' needs a word of explanation* 
Though T i l l i c h does not always use t h i s phrase c l e a r l y , i t i s obvious 
that he i s strongly influenced by both i d e a l i s t and pbenoraenological 
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schools of thought* His exposition of the cognitive function 
of theoria confirms t h i s indebtedness* By exercising such a function, 
we are able to develop, f o r example, from our observation of p a r t i -
cular trees the concept of treehood i t s e l f * But f o r T i l l i c h such 
a concept i s f a r more than a mental image - i t i s the expression 
of the essence of treehood which underlies every p a r t i c u l a r tree* 
The concept discloses the r e a l i t y * That which belongs to the sphere 
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of meaning r e f l e c t s and reveals a universal essence* Thus man 
creates a whole world of meanings which open up the essential r e a l i -
t i e s i n which they p a r t i c i p a t e * And i n so f a r as the capacity f o r 
language and knowledge, the power to think i n universale, l i e s behind 
every c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t y , culture as a whole shares i n the creation 
of a universe of meaning. What we must question here i s T i l l i e n ' s 
assumption that the concept of a universal corresponds to a universal 
essence which underlies every similar concrete occurrence, that the 
'universe of meaning* created by the power of language i s paralleled 
by a 'universe of being 1 which gives i t i t s v a l i d i t y * There are 
surely no grounds f o r making t h i s sort of assertion* To move from 
a mental concept to an extra-mental r e a l i t y i s completely unwarran-
table* Surely i t i s not that the tree opens up the meaning of some 
hidden r e a l i t y called treehood, but rather that the l i n g u i s t i c concept 
of treehood i s a convenient abstraction used to summarise those 
qual i t i e s and properties which a l l trees have i n common* And the same 
must be true of a l l c u l t u r a l c r e a t i v i t y * I n a variety of ways man 
acts upon his world to develop forms of d i f f e r i n g characteristics, 
giving meaning and expression to his world, but we cannot assume that 
behind those forms there are essential r e a l i t i e s waiting to be actua-
l i s e d * We can cer t a i n l y accept T i l l i c h ' s contention that culture i s 
a mirror of the divine a c t i v i t y i n that the c r e a t i v i t y of man r e f l e c t s 
the c r e a t i v i t y of God* But t h i s statement does not need t o be j u s t i -
f i e d by an i d e a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of r e a l i t y or understood i n t h i s 
way at a l l * So also we can speak of a 'universe of meaning', but 
such a phrase can be meaningful without f i l l i n g i t . o u t with the sort 
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of ontological speculation which T i l l i c h affirms* 
For T i l l i c h , one of the advantages of thinking i n terms of 
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essences i s that every essence overcomes the e x i s t e n t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n 
between subject and object, a d i s t i n c t i o n which f o r him i s the occasion 
of a l l c u l t u r a l , as indeed every other form of, ambiguity. I f then 
man could overcome the subject-object order of his existence and 
escape i n t o some essential realm i n which there was no such d i s t i n c t i o n , 
his problems would be solved* But one may ask whether to say t h i s 
r e a l l y solves anything at a l l ? Some words of Kierkegaard which we 
have already quoted may well be adapted here: that i n an abstract 
realm which i s unknown to us i n any way save through our own theorising, 
an i d e a l i s t i c world which bears the stamp of unrea l i t y , how can 
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there be any ambiguity seeing that abstraction has removed i t a l l ? 
Now one would not wish to deny that a l l ambiguities are resolved i n 
the presence of God, but whatever that means, i t does not mean that 
the presence of God i s to be characterised by some state of being i n 
which no d i s t i n c t i o n between subject and object remains. Furthermore, 
i t i s by no means the case that every ambiguity of l i f e arises from 
the 'subject-object' d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . Many do, but others equally do 
not, as a theological understanding of the nature of s i n would a f f i r m . 
Nevertheless, i t i s important to see that f o r T i l l i c h only i n the 
framework of t h i s type of understanding of r e a l i t y can any ambiguities 
be resolved at a l l . And i t i s i n t h i s sort of context which, as we 
shall see, the doctrine of the S p i r i t , as he who transcends the 
subject-object order of r e a l i t y and enables us to participate i n 
essential r e a l i t y unambiguously, w i l l be developed. 
We have pointed out the meticulous nature of T i l l i c h ' s analysis 
of the ambiguities of culture. We are certa i n l y confronted with such 
a sea of ambiguities that one wonders how e x i s t e n t i a l man can possibly 
avoid drowning! Nevertheless, these ambiguities are with us f o r what 
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they are and there i s no way of avoiding them. Each ambiguity i s a 
vast problem i n i t s e l f . Several w i l l stand out as of more pressing 
concern than others. Modern man w i l l perhaps be not so concerned with 
the ambiguities i n the cognitive and aesthetic acts as those of tech-
nology which constantly press i n upon him. S i m i l a r l y , the ambiguities 
of personal i d e n t i t y and development, of j u s t i c e and leadership, are 
a l l sources of deep-seated problems and anxieties i n the complex world 
of the twentieth century. Perhaps never before has man f e l t so much 
i n the need of a solution. One feels that i n t h i s discussion despite 
the questionable nature of T i l l i c h ' s philosophical presuppositions, 
which may sometimes seem to throw us back into the classical world, 
here at any rate i s a genuine attempt to make his theology s t r i k i n g l y 
relevant, and whether the answers he proposes i n his development of 
the doctrine of the S p i r i t are altogether viable or not, at least the 
issues he raises are very much to the point. 
C. The Self-transcendence of L i f e 
The t h i r d function of l i f e i n T i l l i c h ' s analysis i s self-transcen-
dence, made possible by the ontological p o l a r i t y of freedom and 
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destiny. I n varying degrees, as l i f e becomes free from a complete 
bondage to i t s own f i n i t u d e , i t strives v e r t i c a l l y towards ultimate 
and i n f i n i t e being, which i s i t s destiny, thereby transcending 'both 
the c i r c u l a r l i n e of centredness and the horizontal l i n e of growth'• 
Such a move towards transcendence i s expressed i n both b i b l i c a l and 
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classical thought: Paul, f o r example, i n his l e t t e r to the Romans, 
says that the whole creation longs to be set free from subjection to 
f u t i l i t y , and A r i s t o t l e speaks of a l l things being moved by t h e i r eros 
towards the unmoved Mover. We must ask therefore how t h i s s e l f -
transcendence manifests i t s e l f . This cannot be answered i n empirical 
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terms, because self-transcendence i s something that man becomes conscious 
of inwardly rather than empirically. Nevertheless, i n t h i s inward 
awareness of transcendence, he acts as a sort of 'mirror i n which the 
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r e l a t i o n of everything f i n i t e to the i n f i n i t e becomes conscious 1. 
Indeed, whenever t h i s relationship between the f i n i t e and the i n f i n i t e 
i s denied, the real meaning of l i f e i s profaned, and t h i s struggle 
between the elements of self-transcendence and profanisation i s one 
which has been found throughout history, p a r t i c u l a r l y at those times 
when there has been ' c o n f l i c t between the affirmation and the denial 
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of the holiness of l i f e ' . This d i s t i n c t i o n between the transcendent 
and the profane i s reflected i n the contemporary tension between the 
sacred and the secular, though T i l l i c h feels that the word 'profanity* 
expresses more sharply the contrast between these two elements than 
does the word 'secular'. I n any case, as we have i t today, the word 
'secular' does not have the same demonic overtones as the word 'profane' 
has. Thus i n every act of self-transcendence, the profane i s p o t e n t i a l l y 
present, and i t i s t h i s that results i n the ambiguity of l i f e i n i t s 
self-transcendent functions. 
I n the mirror of man's consciousness, then, l i f e appears as having 
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both greatness and d i g n i t y . I t s greatness l i e s i n the f a c t that 
i t shows a power of being and meaning that makes i t representative of 
ultimate being and meaning, and i t s dignity l i e s i n i t s nature as such 
and i t s power of representation. Yet greatness also implies the r i s k 
of tragedy, f o r i n r e a l i s i n g i t s greatness there may always be the 
temptation for l i f e to overreach i t s f i n i t u d e and seek i d e n t i t y with 
the i n f i n i t e only to f e e l t r a g i c a l l y rejected, often with b i t t e r con-
sequences. Indeed, although the greatness and the tragedy of l i f e i s 
to be found i n a l l of l i f e ' s dimensions, nowhere i s i t seen more f u l l y 
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than i n the l i f e of man, where greatness and tragedy are not only 
present but also f o r the f i r s t time consciously and r e f l e c t i v e l y exper-
ienced, since only man i s aware of his capacity f o r self-transcendence* 
This experience of greatness tempered by tragedy i s universal, a f a c t 
which confirms the universality of man's estrangement, so that great-
ness i s never found without some kind of hubris, the desire to reach 
up to the divine* Man w i l l alxrays tend to d i s t o r t his nature i n t h i s 
way, and this can have disastrous consequences* Even so, man cannot 
escape t h i s dilemma by seeking to avoid his greatness, f o r that i n 
i t s e l f would be tr a g i c . He must accept i t , together with the r i s k 
that goes with i t . Even those who stand f o r the holy i t s e l f i n the 
presence of men must accept such a r i s k : they also w i l l become f u l l y 
involved i n the tragic element of l i f e , and nowhere does t h i s stand 
out more c l e a r l y than i n the l i f e of Christ, who experienced to the 
f u l l the consequences of man's estrangement from the divine* 
The purpose of r e l i g i o n i n the l i f e of man, says T i l l i c h , i s to 
point s p e c i f i c a l l y t o the function of self-transcendence, but before 
turning to a consideration of r e l i g i o n i t s e l f , we need f i r s t t o 
summarise what he says about the r e l a t i o n of r e l i g i o n to morality and 
culture. According to t h e i r essential nature, morality, culture and 
r e l i g i o n interpenetrate, together c o n s t i t u t i n g the unity of the s p i r i t * 
I n t h i s u n i t y , though these elements cannot be separated as such, 
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nevertheless they can be distinguished* Morality, 'the constitution 
of the person as person i n the encounter with other persons', i s 
essentially related to culture, i n the sense that culture provides i t 
with content i n the form of specific ideals of personality and 
community i n legal and ethical codes; and i t i s related to r e l i g i o n , 
i n the sense that r e l i g i o n provides i t with the unconditional character 
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of the moral imperative, the p o s s i b i l i t y of reunion of the separated 
i n agape» and the motivating power of grace* Culture, 'the creation 
of a universe of meaning', i s essentially related to morality i n the 
sense that the v a l i d i t y of every c u l t u r a l act i s based on personal 
encounter, which checks the tendency to arbitrariness, and without 
which no demand f o r any o u l t u r a l creation could be f e l t * I t i s related 
to r e l i g i o n i n the sense that the r e l i g i o u s element i n culture i s the 
ultimate depth of every true creation, the 'substance' or 'ground' 
from which i t l i v e s , the element of ultimacy to which a l l culture points, 
even though i t lacks i t i n i t s e l f * Religion, 'the self-transcendence 
of l i f e under the dimension of s p i r i t ' , i s essentially related to 
morality i n so f a r as there could be no self-transcendence without the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n of the moral s e l f by the unconditional imperative, and 
to culture inasmuch as self-transcendence could take no form except 
w i t h i n the framework of a universe of meaning such as i s created i n 
the c u l t u r a l act* The operative word i n t h i s discussion i s of course 
'essential's we have here a picture of the essential r e l a t i o n of the 
three functions of s p i r i t , a picture to which T i l l i c h gives two t i t l e s : 
' t r a n s h i s t o r i c a l remembrance', by which he means the "looking back t o " 
a condition of 'dreaming innocence 1 p r i o r to existence, and 1Utopian 
a n t i c i p a t i o n ' , a looking forward to the ultimate triumph of the 
essential over the e x i s t e n t i a l * This i s a picture which stands i n 
judgment over against t h e i r actual relations under e x i s t e n t i a l con-
d i t i o n s , though perhaps i t i s more than that, f o r the picture i s i t s e l f 
to some extent actual i n that l i f e i t s e l f i s a mixture of both essential 
and e x i s t e n t i a l elements, and therefore i n l i f e as we know i t the u n i t y 
of the three functions must be as e f f e c t i v e as t h e i r separation* This 
i s why i t i s v a l i d to apply the picture as a c r i t e r i o n * But the fact 
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that both essential and e x i s t e n t i a l elements are present i n the 'here 
and now' means that there are ambiguities i n the relations between the 
various functions of l i f e under the dimension of s p i r i t * 
There are two things, suggests T i l l i c h , which arise from the 
d e f i n i t i o n of r e l i g i o n as 'the self-transcendence of l i f e under the 
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dimension of s p i r i t ' . F i r s t l y , such a d e f i n i t i o n makes possible the 
image of the essential unity of r e l i g i o n with morality and culture, i n 
the sense that both morality and culture point beyond themselves, the 
one to the unconditional imperative, the other to the ultimate ground 
of meaning i n the creative act* They are united i n t h e i r self-transcen-
dence. I n addition to t h i s , i t also underlines the three functions i n 
t h e i r separation, f o r insofar as they are separate, neither morality nor 
culture are able to reach self-transcendence, and i n fa c t r e s i s t i t 
and become secularised* However, i n the second place, t h i s d e f i n i t i o n 
of r e l i g i o n as self-transcendence also implies that self-transcendence 
i s not so much an independent function i n i t s e l f as a quality of both 
morality and culture, of s e l f - i n t e g r a t i o n and s e l f - c r e a t i v i t y . And 
i n a sense t h i s i s true, f o r i f self-transcendence were j u s t another 
function alongside the other two, then i t would i t s e l f need to be 
transcended also* As he puts i t , 'Life cannot genuinely transcend 
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i t s e l f i n one of i t s own functions'* Nevertheless, i t i s a f a c t 
that i n l i f e r e l i g i o n does exist as an independent r e a l i t y beside 
morality and culture, as wel l as a qua l i t y w i t h i n them* And the obvious 
reason f o r t h i s i s that l e f t to t h e i r own devioes, morality and culture 
would i n f a c t forget a l l about self-transcendence and allow themselves 
to become completely secularised, profaning t h e i r real significance* 
Morality would become merely a form of a c t i v i t y between f i n i t e possi-
b i l i t i e s and culture an increasingly empty form. This i s why r e l i g i o n 
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must arise as a special function of the s p i r i t * Religious a c t i v i t i e s 
and concepts are born because 'the self-transcendence of l i f e under 
the dimension of s p i r i t cannot become alive without f i n i t e r e a l i t i e s 
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which are transcended*. This gives r i s e , however, to what T i l l i c h 
c a l l s a d i a l e c t i c a l problem, ' i n that something i s transcended and at 
the same time not transcended'• There must be a concrete existence 
to transcend, yet at the same time that existence must be negated i n 
the act of being transcended. This, says T i l l i c h , i s the dilemma facing 
a l l r e l i g i o n s . 'Religion as the self-transcendence of l i f e needs the 
religions and needs to deny them.' 
T i l l i c h points out that the self-transcendence of l i f e i n r e l i g i o n 
shows a double ambiguity. We have already referred to the f i r s t of 
these, that of greatness and profanity, and the f a c t that i n order to 
r e s i s t the tendency to profanisation self-transcendence needs to be 
asserted i n a special r e l i g i o u s function. But the very character of 
r e l i g i o n leads to a fu r t h e r ambiguity. For i n i t s very claim to solve 
the ambiguities of l i f e , r e l i g i o n i t s e l f can ' f a l l i n t o even profounder 
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tensions, c o n f l i c t s and ambiguities'. I n i t s very representation of 
the greatness of the holy, i t can come to the stage where i t so i d e n t i -
f i e s i t s e l f with the holy, that i t begins to despise the secular realm, 
and i n i t s attempt to set i t s e l f up as the holy, i t drags the holy 
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i t s e l f down i n an act of profanisation. Every honest assessment of 
r e l i g i o n must take t h i s f a c t i n t o account and reckon with i t . So, 
on the one hand, genuine self-transcendence must f i g h t against the 
profane secularisation of l i f e , and on the other hand, i t must f i g h t 
against the tendency of r e l i g i o n i t s e l f to make absolute the very forms 
i t uses.. I f the one process can be called profanisation, the other, 
says T i l l i c h , may e f f e c t i v e l y be labelled demonisation. Let us see, 
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therefore, what he has to say about them both i n t h e i r s p e c i f i c a l l y 
religious context* 
( i ) I n r e l i g i o n , he says, the 'great' i s called 'the holy', 
and a l l r e l i g i o n i s based on 'the manifestation of the holy i t s e l f , the 
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divine ground of being*. The greatness and dignity of r e l i g i o n l i e s 
i n i t s character as the receptive response to t h i s manifestation i n 
i t s various revelatory phenomena* So when the adjective 'holy' i s 
applied to a pa r t i c u l a r thing or person, i t means that i t points beyond 
i t s e l f to that response i n a specific experience or event* I t i s 
'8elf-transcendent', or looking at i t from the side of the holy, 
'translucent*. I n other words, the holiness of a thing l i e s not i n 
any p a r t i c u l a r quality that i t has, but rather i n i t s power to point 
beyond i t s e l f * ' I t i s not the personal q u a l i t y that decides the degree 
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of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , but the power of self-transcendence'• 
The profanisation of the holy, says T i l l i c h , can take place i n 
two d i f f e r e n t ways. F i r s t l y , i t can take place i n an ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l * 
way. There can of course be no expression of the self-transcendent 
without some sort of form, but the danger i s that every i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
form of r e l i g i o n , instead of transcending the f i n i t e i n the d i r e c t i o n 
of the i n f i n i t e , w i l l become j u s t another f i n i t e r e a l i t y i t s e l f * The 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l structures, whether they are e c c l e s i a s t i c a l , l i t u r g i c a l 
or dogmatic, thus become subject to the sociological laws which govern 
a l l groups, and t h i s tends to blot out t h e i r self-transcendent character. 
Even i n the personal religious l i f e t h i s cannot be e n t i r e l y overcome, 
f o r the individual depends on the religious l i f e of the group f o r the 
content of his own r e l i g i o n , so that the ambiguities of i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
r e l i g i o n i n evitably brush o f f onto him. So there i s no point i n t r y i n g 
to remove organised r e l i g i o n i n an attempt to achieve pure self-transcen-
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dence, f o r some sort of i n s t i t u t i o n a l l s m i s inevitable, j u s t as the 
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ambiguity that arises from i t i s inevitable* This means that i n a l l 
forms of communal and personal r e l i g i o n , profanising elements w i l l be 
present and ef f e c t i v e * Yet despite t h i s , the element of holiness cannot 
be t o t a l l y o b l i t e r a t e d , and the t r i v i a l i t i e s of everyday r e l i g i o n 
cannot invalidate the greatness of r e l i g i o n i t s e l f , which l i e s i n i t s 
capacity to point beyond i t s e l f to the holy* 
The second way i n which the profanisation of the holy can take 
place i s i n a 'reductive' sense* Religion can be 'reduced1 to morality 
or culture* Religious symbols, f o r example, can become i n the eyes of 
men nothing more than cognitive concepts or aesthetic images. Myth 
becomes a combination of p r i m i t i v e science and poetry, and r e l i g i o u s 
i n s t i t u t i o n s or personalities are set alongside other forms and persons 
f o r sociological analysis. So f a r , says T i l l i c h , ' r e l i g i o n i s given a 
place i n the whole of man's c u l t u r a l c r e a t i v i t y , and i t s usefulness f o r 
moral s e l f - a c t u a l i s a t i o n i s not denied'* But there i s no reference t o 
i t s nature as self-transcendent* I n f a c t , eventually i t i s considered 
as nothing more than a psychological or sociological phenomenon, and 
not infrequently as an i l l u s i o n or an ideology. Or else i t becomes 
ju s t another department of secular l i f e , an agency to speak and work 
f o r the f u l f i l m e n t of man's secular needs. T i l l i c h f e e l s , i n f a c t , 
that t h i s sort of profanisation i s much more dangerous than that which 
stems from i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m . Yet again there i s no f i n a l answer to 
the problem, f o r r e l i g i o n must l i v e i n c u l t u r a l forms, even though t h i s 
may mean that i t becomes considered as j u s t another department of 
c u l t u r a l l i f e . I t s . dissolution i n t o secular forms i s a r i s k that i t 
must always take. 
Yet even so, T i l l i c h emphasises, reductive profanisation cannot 
\ 
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e n t i r e l y extinguish the re l i g i o u s q u a l i t y that i s present, however 
hidden, i n every function of l i f e . For there are occasions when i t w i l l 
break through to the surface as an unexpected and foroeful experience i n 
the midst of l i f e , perhaps i n the form of the moral imperative, perhaps 
i n the depth of culture* There i s no way of ann i h i l a t i n g i t altogether* 
( i i ) The second major ambiguity of r e l i g i o n i s that of the divine 
and the demonic* Whereas i n the profanisation of r e l i g i o n , self-transcen-
dence i s resisted, the essence of what T i l l i c h c a l l s demonisation i s , 
as we have seen, that i t seeks to i d e n t i f y i t s e l f w i t h the holy which 
i t represents: 'The claim of something f i n i t e to i n f i n i t y or to divine 
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greatness i s the characteristic of the demonic'. I n the history of 
r e l i g i o n one can see t h i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n polytheism, where f i n i t e 
r e a l i t i e s are raised to the level of the i n f i n i t e , but T i l l i c h points 
out that demonisation i s not confined to polytheism, f o r i t occurs i n 
every r e l i g i o n at some time or another, C h r i s t i a n i t y included* But 
there i s a difference between the demonic and the t r a g i c . I n the 
concept of tragedy, the subject does not actually claim d i v i n i t y f o r 
himself, but rather seeks to touch the sphere of the divine, f i n d i n g 
himself rejected i n the attempt. I n the concept of the demonic, however, 
the subject does claim d i v i n i t y , and i n so doing raises certain f i n i t e 
elements i n t o the realm of the i n f i n i t e at the expense of other elements 
which he rejec t s . I n the i n d i v i d u a l , t h i s can lead to a s p l i t i n the 
centred consciousness, a sort of reli g i o u s schizophrenia, with d i s -
astrous; res u l t s ; i n the group, i t can lead to a vast assortment of gods, 
a l l claiming ultimacy f o r themselves, i n so f a r as some are chosen by 
certain people, and others chosen by others, and t h i s i n e v i t a b l y leads 
to the disruption of society by demonic forces. Again, claims T i l l i c h , 
t h i s tendency can be observed i n C h r i s t i a n i t y as elsewhere* 
123 
Because demonisation i s the elevation of the f i n i t e into the 
realm of the i n f i n i t e , wherever i t occurs, even i n the moral and c u l t u r a l 
spheres, i t w i l l show r e l i g i o u s t r a i t s , and t h i s i s seen i n the f a c t 
that wherever man demands the unconditional allegiance of his fellows to 
that which he has elevated, there i s a pseudo-religious type of fana-
ticism present. But i n the more narrowly r e l i g i o u s sphere, claims 
T i l l i c h , the ambiguity i s even deeper, f o r there i s a strange irony 
present when that which claims to represent the divine should set up i t s 
own moral and c u l t u r a l expressions as possessing d i v i n i t y themselves* 
This i s why some theologians have rejected r e l i g i o n as a genuine ex-
pression of the divine, f o r they have f e l t that r e l i g i o n i s inevitably 
man's attempt to claim ultimacy f o r something that i s r e a l l y of his 
own creation* I n f a c t , some have gone so f a r as to say that here i s the 
fundamental difference between Chr i s t i a n i t y and other r e l i g i o n s , i n that 
the religions are nothing more than man's own attempt to g l o r i f y himself 
whereas C h r i s t i a n i t y i s based purely on God's own self-revelation* T i l l i c h 
feels that t h i s r e j e c t i o n i s based on a basic confusion i n the minds 
of such people between r e l i g i o n and demonised r e l i g i o n . I t also 
'ignores the fact that every r e l i g i o n i s based on revelation and that 
every revelation expresses i t s e l f i n a r e l i g i o n . I n so f a r as r e l i g i o n 
i s based on revelation i t i s unambiguous; i n so f a r as i t receives 
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revelation i t i s ambiguousf* I t i s therefore an oversimplification 
to say that r e l i g i o n i s revealed. But i t would be equally wrong to 
embrace the opposite point of view. The t r u t h of the matter i s that 
r e l i g i o n i s both the creation and the d i s t o r t i o n of revelation* 
I n f a c t , T i l l i c h continues, theology cannot avoid the idea of 
r e l i g i o n , even though i t w i l l always seek to examine i t c r i t i c a l l y . I n 
the study of the history of r e l i g i o n , the continual tension between 
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r e l i g i o n as the expression of unambiguous l i f e and the demonic d i s t o r t i o n 
of r e l i g i o n w i l l always be very much to the f o r e i a never-ending inner 
struggle against r e l i g i o n 'for the sake of the holy* i t s e l f . The 
Christian claim i s that there i s one event only i n which t h i s tension 
has been v i c t o r i o u s l y resolvedi i n the Cross of the Christ. Yet even 
t h i s claim i s threatened by d i s t o r t i o n i n the l i f e and structures of 
the churches, p a r t i c u l a r l y when they claim that such a v i c t o r y i s 
complete w i t h i n t h e i r own l i f e . I n f a c t , the church i t s e l f i s very 
much subjected to the ambiguities of r e l i g i o n which we have been describing, 
as can be c l e a r l y observed by anyone who examines i t s history throughout 
the years. 
One of the main problems i n the history of r e l i g i o n i s that i t 
frequently claims superiority f o r i t s own p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r a l forms 
over against a l l other c u l t u r a l forms. Though r e l i g i o n does i n f a c t 
exist to point to the need f o r the transcendence of a l l c u l t u r a l 
patterns, when i t claims superiority f o r i t s own p a r t i c u l a r forms of 
expression and l i f e , i t i s i n fact once more lapsing into a form of 
demonism. Quite often, f o r example, the r e l i g i o u s social group w i l l 
t r y to **rule the roost" so to speak over a l l other types of social group. 
I n extreme cases, i n the l i f e of a nation j u s t i c e i t s e l f can be over-
riden by r e l i g i o u s structures i n the name of the holy, and the history 
of r e l i g i o n shows j u s t how devastating t h i s type of divine-demonic 
ambiguity can be. Or i n the personal realm, i n the aspiration t o 
sainthood, r e l i g i o n can often suppress the individual's development of 
his own humanity i n the interests of holiness, and i t i s not infrequently 
the negative, ascetic aspects of sainthood which receive r e l i g i o u s 
blessing over against the more positive aspects of human development* 
Or-again, i n the cognitive sphere, there i s often an attempt by r e l i g i o n 
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to force doctrines and dogmas onto people, v i o l a t i n g t h e i r own i n t e l l e c t s 
and consciences i n the name of obedience to the t r u t h * The same pattern 
i s also at work i n the a t t i t u d e r e l i g i o n frequently adopts towards the 
ar t s , where i t consecrates certain styles and expects the a r t i s t to 
conform to them i n his r e l i g i o u s works. T i l l i c h points out that whereas 
self-transcendence does indeed reveal both cognitive t r u t h and aesthetic 
aut h e n t i c i t y , so that behind both religious doctrines and a r t i s t i c 
expressions l i e s the power of the holy, t h i s i s no ground f o r allowing 
t r a d i t i o n a l dogmas and forms of a r t to suppress any new expressions i n 
the name of the divine, f o r t h i s i s tantamount to demonic destruction* 
I n a l l of these examples, two things stand outt f i r s t l y , that because 
of the element of d i s t o r t i o n that i s always present, r e l i g i o n i t s e l f 
cannot be the answer to man's quest f o r unambiguous l i f e ; and secondly, 
that despite t h i s , because r e l i g i o n i s that which t e s t i f i e s to s e l f -
transcendence, the answer to man's quest can be received only through 
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r e l i g i o n , and through no other medium* We are therefore led to the 
quest f o r an unambiguous self-transcendence i n the function of r e l i g i o n , 
and the ground i s thus prepared f o r our consideration of the doctrine 
of the S p i r i t i n r e l a t i o n to l i f e ' s ambiguities* 
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T i l l i c h ' s concept of self-transcendence i s a most important pre-
paration f o r his doctrine of the S p i r i t , f o r not only i s i t the S p i r i t 
who makes the act of self-transcendence possible, but the nature of s e l f -
transcendence as T i l l i c h defines i t helps us to see the precise lines 
along which his doctrine of the S p i r i t i s to be interpreted. This w i l l 
become more apparent as we turn to examine his analysis of the work of 
the S p i r i t i n d e t a i l , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r e l a t i o n to the ambiguities of 
r e l i g i o n which are mentioned here. Nevertheless there are one or two 
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things which c a l l f o r comment at t h i s point. 
I t i s very true, f o r example, that the tragic element i n human 
l i f e , r e s u l t i n g from man's attempts to transcend himself and seek a f t e r 
a higher and deeper f u l f i l m e n t which seem continually to be thrown 
back i n t o his face, i s something with which the theologian must be 
concerned, especially when one realises the part t h i s theme plays not 
only i n classical l i t e r a t u r e , but also i n more recent w r i t i n g , whether 
Christian (as i n Dostoievski) or atheist (as i n Camus). The constant 
thwarting of man's desire i n t h i s way, by which he comes to f e e l that 
his feet are so f i r m l y t i e d to the ground that every time he seeks to 
r i s e to the demands and i n v i t a t i o n s of his greatness, even f o r unselfish 
ends, he is pulled back with a disastrous crash, inevitably results i n 
the depths of despair so characteristic of contemporary l i t e r a t u r e . Here 
i s a vast problem which seeks t o be resolved, and i f the doctrine of the 
S p i r i t has anything to say to us i t must cert a i n l y deal with such a theme. 
The way i s prepared therefore f o r a concept of the S p i r i t u a l Presence 
that w i l l l i f t man out of t h i s predicament and allow him to f i n d h i s 
true greatness i n conformity with God's purpose f o r the world. So 
T i l l i c h ' s assertion that the holy i t s e l f i s beyond tragedy must show 
i t s relevance p a r t i c u l a r l y on a human l e v e l , and those who assert i t 
must show the t r u t h of i t s application i n t h e i r own experience. 
T i l l i c h ' s comments on the essential unity of morality, culture 
and r e l i g i o n underline the d i f f i c u l t i e s already pointed out i n our 
evaluation of the concepts both of p o t e n t i a l i t y and essences. I n the 
state of mere p o t e n t i a l i t y or''dreaming innocence', made known to us 
through some sort of tr a n s - h i s t o r i c a l remembrance, T i l l i c h says, there 
i s no independent morality, culture and r e l i g i o n . Their disunity and 
apparent independence appear only when they are actualised i n t h e i r 
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e x i s t e n t i a l state. Now apart from the f a c t that i t i s extremely 
d i f f i c u l t to give any real meaning to what he c a l l s 'dreaming innocence'^ 
and how one can have a 'transhistorical remembrance1 of t h i s , i t i s even 
more d i f f i c u l t to understand what an essential unity of morality, culture 
and r e l i g i o n i s w i t h i n t h i s so-called t r a n s h i s t o r i c a l state* Yet the 
implication i s that there i s a p r i o r order of r e a l i t y i n which essential 
morality, essential culture and essential r e l i g i o n , whatever these 
things may be apart from t h e i r actual occurrence i n human experience, 
are one. We cannot accept t h i s way of thin k i n g , however. Surely one 
can a f f i r m the underlying unity of the various functions of l i f e without 
having to bring i n i d e a l i s t i c notions to warrant i t . To do so serves 
only to confuse. 
T i l l i c h ' s d e f i n i t i o n of holiness i n terms of self-transcendence and 
his understanding of holy things according to t h e i r capacity to transcend 
themselves i n the d i r e c t i o n of the divine, raises the problem by what 
c r i t e r i a we decide which things have t h i s capacity and which things do 
not. I t i s clear that no objective c r i t e r i a can be applied to answer 
th i s question, f o r we have no empirical knowledge of the divine by 
which to test the v a l i d i t y of holy things. But we have already seen 
that f o r T i l l i c h every genuine revelatory experience i s due to the ' i n -
s piring presence of the S p i r i t t . ^ 1 a n s w e r -to the question there-
fore of how we can know which things are holy i s that the S p i r i t makes 
us aware that t h i s i s so by grasping us and creating i n us through these 
things a sense of ecstasy which triggers o f f a response i n our own exper-
ience. This i s a theme v/hich T i l l i c h w i l l proceed to develop f u l l y at 
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a l a t e r stage, when he comes to t a l k about the meaning of ecstasy 
and i n s p i r a t i o n . We raise i t here because what he says at t h i s point 
does tend to presuppose what he says l a t e r . 
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One point i n T i l l i c h ' s analysis that i s of part i c u l a r i n t e r e s t 
i n that i t has an i n d i r e c t bearing on his understanding of the r e l a t i o n 
between the divine S p i r i t and the human s p i r i t , i s his defence of the 
word ' r e l i g i o n 1 against those who devalue such a concept as man-made 
i n favour of a Chri s t i a n i t y based on God's revelation i n Jesus as the 
Christ. There can be l i t t l e doubt from his comments i n Perspectives*^ 
that i t i s the Barthian school of theology that he has c h i e f l y i n mind. 
Apparently when T i l l i c h returned to Germany i n 1940> he was regaled f o r 
using the word ' r e l i g i o n * , because the current German view of r e l i g i o n 
had been strongly influenced by Barth's d e f i n i t i o n of r e l i g i o n as human 
arrogance. Every attempt of man to reach up to the divine i s , according 
to Barth, man-made and consequently u n b e l i e f . * ^ I n t h i s sense, Barth 
refused to apply the word ' r e l i g i o n ' to C h r i s t i a n i t y , grounded as i t 
i s i n God's revelation of God i n Jesus Christ. He was w i l l i n g to 
describe C h r i s t i a n i t y as 'true r e l i g i o n ' , but the implication of t h i s i s 
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that the religions as such, as d i s t i n c t from C h r i s t i a n i t y , are f a l s e . J 
T i l l i c h f e l t that Barth adopted t h i s point of view because he 'negated 
every point of i d e n t i t y between God and man, even i n the. doctrine of 
the S p i r i t who might be dwelling i n man,' and therefore f a i l e d to answer 
the question how God can appear to man at a l l i t i s precisely 
here where T i l l i c h feels himself to be t o t a l l y a t odds with Barth, 
emphasising that without some point of contact revelation i s impossible. 
I f God i s 'Wholly Other', as Barth maintains, and not also immanently 
present as the divine S p i r i t i n the l i f e of man i n the sense that there 
i s a common point of i d e n t i t y between the two, then according to T i l l i c h 
there can be no meeting point whatever. For T i l l i c h ' s claim that the 
divine power of being, and therefore the divine S p i r i t , i s present i n 
the whole l i f e of man, i s the very basis of his assertion that every 
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r e l i g i o n i s based on revelation, a response to the divine Presence i n 
human l i f e , and that t h i s i s as true of other r e l i g i o n s as i t i s of 
Ch r i s t i a n i t y o 
Now while T i l l i c h may w e l l be j u s t i f i e d i n his attack on Berth's 
position here, i t i s not at a l l clear what his own position i s * On 
the one hand, he i s c e r t a i n l y correct i n his assertion that without some 
point of contact between God and man there can be no revelation* But 
on the other hand, there i s no reason why t h i s point of contact has 
to be a 'point of i d e n t i t y 1 * I t does not follow that i f there i s no 
point of i d e n t i t y there can be no revelation* Revelation does not 
presuppose a point of i d e n t i t y * Nevertheless the concept of a point of 
i d e n t i t y between God and man i s one of the central doctrines i n T i l l i c h ' s 
theology. Yet at the same time i t i s a concept which needs considerable 
c l a r i f i c a t i o n * I t raises the problem which we have already noted of 
the precise r e l a t i o n between the f i n i t e and the i n f i n i t e , the, human and 
the divine, and more p a r t i c u l a r l y from our point of view the human s p i r i t 
and the divine S p i r i t * I f there i s a 'point of i d e n t i t y * does t h i s mean 
that man and God are ultimately one, wi t h no difference of genus? Are 
we to suppose that because there i s an immanence of the divine S p i r i t 
i n the human s p i r i t , that essentially the two are one and the same? I s 
T i l l i c h saying therefore that revelation i s possible precisely because 
i n the f i n a l analysis the s p i r i t of man and the S p i r i t of God are to 
be i d e n t i f i e d , an i d e n t i t y which at the moment i s hidden from us because 
of our e x i s t e n t i a l situation? An attempt to give some sort of answer to 
t h i s question must await f u r t h e r discussion* At the moment we note yet 
again the d i f f i c u l t y that such a concept raises, and the way i n which 
there may well be a deviation here i n T i l l i c h ' s thinking from orthodox 
Christian thought* The solution to the problem must inevitably influence 
our f i n a l judgment on his doctrine of the S p i r i t . 
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6. T i l l i c h also rejects other ways i n which ' s p i r i t * has been i n t e r -
preted. The most si g n i f i c a n t of these, he says, i s i t s use i n the 
sense of a ' s p i r i t u a l world', e i t h e r akin to Plato's world of 
essences and ideas, i n which sense the ' s p i r i t u a l world* i s the 
'universe of p o t e n t i a l i t i e s ' , which would tend to overemphasise 
only one type of being, whereas l i f e as s p i r i t includes both 
essential and e x i s t e n t i a l being; or else i n the sense of a ' s p i r i t 
realm' apart from l i f e as we know i t , a usage which can be subjected 
to the same sort of c r i t i c i s m . The only English word which he 
feels s t i l l retains something of the o r i g i n a l meaning of the word 
' s p i r i t * i s ' s p i r i t e d ' , which contains the idea of power, and i s 
very closely related to the Platonic v i r t u e of courage. He completes 
his semantic analysis by r e l a t i n g the term ' s p i r i t * to other terms 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y associated with the doctrine of man. ( i ) The word 
'soul' (psyche), he says, has suffered a similar f a t e to that of 
' s p i r i t ' , f o r the rej e c t i o n of the soul as an immortal substance 
has led to the rej e c t i o n of the world i t s e l f . Where the word has 
been preserved, as i n poetic language, i t designates the seat of 
the passions and emotions. ' S p i r i t ' , he fee l s , as the unity of 
power and meaning, can to some extent become a substitute f o r 'soul', 
though i t s range i s wider. But by and large T i l l i c h feels that the 
word 'soul' i t s e l f has l o s t any usefulness i n a theological under-
standing of man and his r e l a t i o n to the divine S p i r i t , ( i i ) I t i s 
necessary to see that although 'mind' cannot be used as an ef f e c t i v e 
substitute f o r ' s p i r i t ' i t i s an important word i n i t s own r i g h t . 
I t expresses the consciousness of a l i v i n g being i n r e l a t i o n to i t s 
surroundings and to i t s e l f , including perception, awareness and 
in t e n t i o n . I n the animal dimension i t appears as soon as s e l f -
awareness appears, and whether i n an elementary or developed form, 
includes i n t e l l i g e n c e , w i l l and directed action, and i n man i t 
becomes related to the universals i n both perception and int e n t i o n * 
( i i i ) F i n a l l y , 'mind1 i s s t r u c t u r a l l y determined by 'reason' (logos), 
'the p r i nciple of form by which r e a l i t y i n a l l i t s dimensions, and 
mind i n a l l i t s directions, i s structures'. (ST, I H , p. 25) But 
' s p i r i t ' as dimension includes f a r more than reason, though without 
the structure of reason i t could not express anything. Furthermore, 
reason, i n the sense of reasoning or technical reason, i s one of the 
p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of man's s p i r i t i n the sphere of knowledge, and i s 
thus the tool of s c i e n t i f i c analysis and the technical control of 
r e a l i t y . 
7. ST, I I I , p. 27. 
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8* I b i d . j p. 28* 
9. I b i d . , p. 2?. 
10. I b i d . , p. 31. 
11. One may note the rather d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of essential being 
given by Thomas Aquinas. F.C. Copieston comments, 'These ways of 
speaking are not meant to imply either that existence i s something 
apart from an essence or that an essence has an objective r e a l i t y 
apart from existence. The d i s t i n c t i o n between them i s a d i s t i n c t i o n 
w i t h i n a concrete f i n i t e being . . . Before the union of essence 
and existence to form a concrete and actual t h i n g there was no 
objective essence and no existence. 1 (F.C. Copleston, Aquinas, 
London, Penguin Books, 1955 > PP* 101f.). 
12. T i l l i c h ' s attempt to resolve the contradictions between the various 
dimensions by claiming that they are united i n t h e i r essential state 
f a l l s under the same c r i t i c i s m that Kierkegaard made of Hegel. The 
philosopher, he says, ' i s absolutely r i g h t i n saying that sub specie 
aeterni, i n the language of abstraction, i n pure thought and pure 
being, there i s no aut • . . aut. Confound i t i how could there be, 
seeing that language i t s e l f has removed a l l contradiction?' 
(S. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postcript, Princeton 
University Press, 1941» p. 270.). 
13* L.A. Birch, Nature and God, London, S.C.M. Press, 1965, p. 93. 
14. I t i s useful here to compare T i l l i c h with Teilhard de Chardin, who 
s i m i l a r l y emphasises the fundamental unity of l i f e i n a l l i t s 
dimensions, and to whose thought T i l l i c h pays t r i b u t e i n the i n t r o -
duction to Volume I I I of his Systematic Theology (p. 5)« Teilhard's 
phraseology, however, i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t , f o r whereas 
T i l l i c h speaks of p o t e n t i a l i t y and a c t u a l i t y , essence and existence, 
Teilhard speaks of the 'within* and the 'without' of things. And 
i t would be wrong to conclude that they mean precisely the same 
thin g . For whereas i n T i l l i c h the essential and the e x i s t e n t i a l 
are two d i s t i n c t orders of r e a l i t y , even though the e x i s t e n t i a l i s 
grounded i n the essential, i n Teilhard the 'within' and the 'without 1 
are fundamentally and o r i g i n a l l y one, two 'faces' of the same t h i n g . 
Both the 'within' and the 'ifithout' can be 'resolved backwards i n t o 
a dust of p a r t i c l e s ' , both have a common property of atomicity, so 
that there i s a basic i d e n t i t y of the w i t h i n and the without. The 
psychic and the physical are basically one. 'In these depths,' 
says Teilhard, 'the world's two aspects, external and i n t e r n a l , 
correspond point by point. So much so that one may pass from the 
one to the other' (The Phenomenon of Man, London, Fontana, 19&5» 
p. 64). The unity of l i f e , then, according to Teilhard, i s not 
found i n some abstract realm beyond existence, but i n the very s t u f f 
of l i f e i t s e l f , i n the ultimate i d e n t i t y of the w i t h i n and the 
without. The history of the 'within' i s the history of the i n t e r i o r 
face of r e a l i t y which i s found at every stage of the evolutionary 
process, from the primeval dust p a r t i c l e s of the cosmos to man 
himself, i n whom i t breaches i t s highest development i n human con-
sciousness. And i t i s here where Teilhard locates the unity of a l l 
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l i f e , i n the 'within' which i s l i k e a golden thread running through 
every level of r e a l i t y , u n t i l i t comes to understand i t s e l f i n the 
workings of the human mind, so that the whole of l i f e i s the story 
of genesis or becoming. And because l i f e i s one at t h i s deeper 
i n t e r i o r l e v e l , so also i t i s one i n i t s exterior aspect, despite 
i t s d i v e r s i t y , f o r ultimately the 'without* and the 'within' are one. 
Thus, although there i s a strong s i m i l a r i t y between T i l l i c h and 
Teilhard i n t h e i r t e l e o l o g i c a l approach to r e a l i t y , there i s at the 
heart of what they are saying a fundamental difference. For whereas 
i n T i l l i c h the potential i s p r i o r to the actual, the e x i s t e n t i a l a 
f a l l e n and ambiguous r e f l e c t i o n of the essential, the true r e a l i t y 
behind the phenomenal world, i n Teilhard the 'within* and the 
'without' are two faces of the same r e a l i t y , with no question of the 
one being p r i o r to the other: and i t would seem that at t h i s point 
Teilhard i s f a r nearer to Aquinas than T i l l i c h . Thus the unity of 
l i f e ' s dimensions must, f o r Teilhard, be found w i t h i n l i f e as we 
know i t , and not beyond i t i n some essential order which has the 
flavour of abstraction. May we possibly detect here the difference 
between r e a l i s t and i d e a l i s t metaphysics? 
15« See f o r example C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Fain, London, Bles, 1952, 
pp. 64f« 
16. Teilhard also refers to a 'leap' w i t h i n the process of evolution! 
'Hominisation can be accepted i n the f i r s t place as the ind i v i d u a l 
and instant leap from i n s t i n c t to thought, but i t i s also, i n a 
wider sense, the progressive phyletic s p i r i t u a l i s a t i o n i n human 
c i v i l i s a t i o n of a l l the forces contained w i t h i n the animal world. 1 
(op. c i t . , p. 200). 
17. ST, I I I , p. 32L. 
18. I b i d . , p. 33« 
19. I b i d . , p. 34. 
20. Morality and Beyond, London, Pontana Library, 19<>9> P» 
21. ST, i n , p. 43. 
22. I b i d . , P. 45. 
23. I b i d . , P« 46. 
24. I b i d . . pp, . 46f. 
25. I b i d . , P. 47. 
26. I b i d . , P. 48. 
27. I b i d . 
28. See also 'The Religious Source of Moral Demands', Ch. 2 of Morality 
and Beyond, pp. 25-41. 
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29. ST, I I I , p. 49* 
30. Theology of Culture, p. 142. 
31. ST, I I I , p. 53. 
32. Theology of Culture, p. 142. 
33. ST, I I I , p. 4«. 
34. I b i d . , p. 45. 
35. Luke 9'24. 
36. Paul Ramsey pinpoints the difference between the ontological type 
of ethic such as one finds i n T i l l i c h and the New Testament meaning 
of love i n his book Basic Christian Ethics (London, SiC.M. Press, 
1953). There are two main questions that are asked i n e t h i c s , he 
says: What i s the good? and, whose good s h a l l i t be when the choice 
i s made? The f i r s t question, he points out, i s by and large the 
concern of philosophical or ontological ethics, which arranges i t s 
answer along a v e r t i c a l l y ascending scale of values, but always 
with reference to the self's own f u l f i l m e n t , so that even our r e l a -
tionships with others s t i l l remain 'overtly or covertly w i t h i n the 
c i r c l e of s e l f . Thus love i n philosophical ethics becomes v i r t u a l l y 
a 'self-regarding concern f o r others' (pp. 114ff). The other 
question, 'Whose good?' he continues, f i s the main, perhaps the 
only concern of Christian ethics, which consequently finds i t s e l f i n 
opposition to philosophical ethics when the l a t t e r pretends to 
answer t h i s question i n terms of s e l f i s h enlightenment or by 
general, value-centred appeals t o the acquisitive aspirations of 
some poor love. Christian ethics answers the question, Whose good? 
by requirements which xrould move the agent on the horizontal plane 
where he happens to. stand more over to the side of his neighbour'. 
I n Ramsey's view, the difference between these two approaches i s 
fundamental. I t i s the difference 'between poor and plenteous love, 
between craving and giving, between desire and desire inverted, 
between acquisition and s e l f - s a c r i f i c e , between upward-reaching and 
giving over, between agape-love which seeks not i t s own and e r o t i c 
love which seeks i t s own on earth and i n heavenl He asks, 'Would i t 
not be f o o l i s h to t r y to demonstrate the value of such "neighbour-
regarding concern f o r others" i n satisfactions to the s e l f , even 
i n terms of the great s a t i s f a c t i o n of escaping from oneself?' So 
f o r Ramsey, the Christian ethic i s primarily 'de-ontological: 
'certainly i t i s no part of the meaning or i n t e n t i o n of neighbour 
love to be good for me but f o r me to prove good f o r my neighbour, 
though good may follow f o r me as a quite unintended by-product.' 
Now perhaps we cannot go a l l the way with Ramsey here. I t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to see, f o r example, just how the Christian ethic can set about 
determining Whose good? u n t i l i t has f i r s t decided what the good 
shall bei I t i s a f a l l a c y to say that Christian ethics i s not 
concerned with the nature of the good, even though i t be defined i n 
terms of love. The Christian ethic, therefore, i s not e n t i r e l y 
•de-ontological 1, Yet Ramsey's point i s important and i s a useful 
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corrective to T i l l i c h ' s primary understanding of love i n terms of 
se l f - i n t e g r a t i o n . The re a l nature of Christian agape, and 
therefore the Christian understanding of morality, i s not that of 
s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t , but a selfless, outgoing, caring concern f o r 
others* 
37. See ST, I I I , pp. 53ff. 
38. I b i d . , p. 61* 
39* I b i d . T i l l i c h ' s point i s that i n both the Genesis myth (Genesis 2) 
and Greek philosophy (see Plato, The Republic, trans, by Cornford, 
Oxford University Press, p. 109; see also p. v i i i ) , language and 
technology are held together; the former where God commands man 
to name the animals and to t i l l the s o i l , the l a t t e r where words 
are discussed i n t h e i r technical context* 
40. Theology of Culture 
41* ST, I I I , p. 62. 
42. Theology of Culture 
43. ST, I I I , pp. 65f. 
44. I b i d . , P. 66. 
45. I b i d . 
46. I b i d . . P. 67. 
47. I b i d . , P- 68. 
48. I b i d . 
49- I b i d . , P» 69-
50. I b i d . , P. 70. 
51. I b i d . , P« 71. 
52. I b i d . , P. 72. 
53. I b i d . , P^  73. 
54. I b i d . , ?• 74. 
55. I b i d . , P^  75. 
56. I b i d . , P. 77. 
57. I b i d . . P. 78. 
58. I b i d . , P» 79. 
59. I b i d . , P. 80. 
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60. I b i d . 
61. I b i d . , P« 81. 
62. I b i d . , P« 82* 
63. I b i d . , P. 83. 
64* I b i d . , P« 84. 
65- I b i d . 
66. I b i d . , P. 85-
67. Love. Power and Justice, New York, Oxford University Press, I96O, 
68. See i b i d . . p. 95. 
69. ST, I H , p. 88. 
70. See above, p. 86. 
71. ST, H I , p. 89. 
72. I b i d . , p. 90. 
73. I b i d . 
74. Theology of Culture, p. 147* 
75. sr> H I , p. 91. 
76. ST, I I I , p. 92. 
77. 'The term cu l t u r e , ' says Linton, 'refers to the t o t a l way of l i f e 
of any society . . . A culture i s the configuration of learned 
behaviour and results of behaviour whose component elements are 
shared and transmitted by members of a p a r t i c u l a r society'. The 
sociologist, he remarks, uses the teim to represent a 'generali-
sation based upon the observation and comparison of a series of 
cultures. I t bears much the same r e l a t i o n to these individual 
cultures that the "spider monkey" of a n a t u r a l i s t ' s description 
bears to the innumerable individual spider monkeys who together 
constitute the species.* (R. Linton, The Cultural Background of 
Personality, London, Routledge & Eegan Paul, 1964, pp. 20ff.) 
Similarly, Ogburn and Nimkoff speak of culture as orginating 
with 'the transmission of ways of behaviour by learning from the 
group', and s i g n i f i c a n t l y see i t as something which originates 
before the actuaj. a r r i v a l of man, i n the superorganic realm. 
(W.F. Ogburn and M.P. Nimkoff, A Handbook of Sociology, London 
RKP, 1950, p.. 22.) 
78. This i s affirmed i n a passage i n Perspectives, where he points out 
that the basic assumption of t h i s type of philosophy 'is that the 
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human mind has power to i n t u i t essences*' I n l o o k i n g 1 , f o r 
example, 'at a red object at t h i s moment, a red s h i r t or dress, 
the mind can experience the essence of redness* The essence 
of redness appears i n a p a r t i c u l a r object and can be grasped 
by the mind* This I c a l l i n t u i t i v e reason'* (p* 32). 
79* I f one drives the phrase, as T i l l i c h i n t e r p r e t s i t , t o i t s l o g i c a l 
conclusion, with a l l i t s overtones and implications of universal 
essences, one ends up with a l l sorts of ridiculous ideas. I n the 
realm of technology, f o r example, i f every object created has a 
universe of meaning which points to a corresponding universe of 
being, what i s to prevent us from postulating essential 'carhood' 
or essential 'food-mixer-hood1 and so ad infinitum? I t seems that 
whilst one may usefully abstract essential q u a l i t i e s of being i n 
some cases f o r the purposes of analysis and discussion, to do t h i s 
with every aspect of man's creative function would be exceedingly 
odd. 
80. See above, p. 79 n. 12 (p. 132). 
81. ST, I I I , pp. 92ff. 
82. Romans 8 i l 9 f f . 
83. A r i s t o t l e , Metaphysics, Book A, 1072fj also Book A, 984; and 
Physics 265.. 
84. ST, I I I , p. 92. Note the s i m i l a r i t y here with Schelling. See 
below, p. 452. 
85. I b i d . * p. 93. 
86. I b i d . The greatness and d i g n i t y of l i f e i n a l l dimensions i s 
discussed i n pp. 93-101. 
87. I b i d . . P. 101. 
88. I b i d . , P. 102. 
89. I b i d . , P. 103. 
90. I b i d . , P. 104. 
91* I b i d . 
92. Theology of Culture, p. 9. 
93. sr, i n , p. 105. 
94. I b i d . , p. 106. 
95* Note T i l l i o h ' s comments on Kierkegaard's c r i t i c i s m of organised 
r e l i g i o n t 'One can almost say that when Kierkegaard deals with 
the church or theology, the image which he presents i s more a 
caricature than a f a i r description. I n . p a r t i c u l a r the ecclesias-
t i c a l o f f i o e was an object of c r i t i c i s m . He attacked the f a c t 
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that the minister becomes an employee l i k e a l l other employees, 
with special duties and economic i n s e c u r i t i e s . This position of 
the minister, especially i t s bourgeois elements . . . while at the 
same time proclaiming the impossible p o s s i b i l i t y of the Christ i s 
f o r Kierkegaard involved i n a self-contradiction. But Kierkegaard 
does not indicate how t h i s c o n f l i c t might be solved. Certainly i t 
i s a r e a l i t y , and f o r Kierkegaard a r e a l i t y which contradicts the 
absoluteness of the essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y . One cannot take t h i s 
as an objectively v a l i d c r i t i c i s m , because i f one d i d , then one 
would have to abolish every church o f f i c e . I f the o f f i c e i s not 
abolished, i t i s inevitable that the laws of sociology w i l l make 
themselves f e l t and influence the form of the o f f i c e and those 
who hold i t ' . (Perspectives, p. 176). See S. Kierkegaard, 
Training i n C h r i s t i a n i t y (I85O). 
96. ST,. i n , p. 107. 
97. I b i d . , p. 109. 
98. I b i d . , p. 111. 
99. I b i d . , p. 113. 
100. See our comment on.the nature of p o t e n t i a l i t y and essential being, 
above, p. 78f. 
101. See above, p. 12. 
102. See below, p. 141ff • 
103. p. 241. 
104. See Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. I , Part 2, Parag 17:2,3. 
Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1956. 
105. For a discussion on t h i s theme, see H. Hartwell, The Theology 
of Karl Barth, London, Duckworth, 1964, pp. 87ff. 
106. Perspectives, p. 241. (femphqsis mine). 
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CHAPTER THREE THE SPIRITUAL PRESENCE 
I . THE CHARACTER OP THE MANIFESTATION OF THE SPIRIT 
I t i s important for us to see that for T i l l i o h no doctrine of 
the divine Spirit i s possible without f i r s t understanding the nature of 
s p i r i t as a dimension of l i f e i t s e l f . 1 The nature of ' s p i r i t ' with a 
small 'a* opens up for us something of the nature of 'Spirit* with a 
capital 8S', and in this way the human s p i r i t and the divine Spirit are 
correlated, and the human s p i r i t becomes an effective symbol of the 
divine S p i r i t . Man experiences i n his own l i f e the unity of power and 
meaning that i s characteristic of ' s p i r i t ' , and beoause he thus knows 
what ' s p i r i t ' i s , he i s able to speak effectively of God as 'Spirit', 
the unity of power and meaning that transcends and underlies a l l l i f e * 
In our analysis of T i l l i c h ' s theology so far i t has become obvious 
that the l i f e of God and the l i f e of the world, particularly as i t reaches 
i t s climax i n human l i f e , are intimately connected. God i s present 
within his world i n a relationship of mutual participation. The symbol 
of the Spiri t above a l l points to this intimate presence of God within 
his world. The Spirit of God, he says, 'is the presence of the Divine 
2 
Life within creatively l i f e . The Divine Spirit i s "God present 1". To 
give the symbol i t s f u l l significance therefore he prefers to speak more 
ful l y of 'the Spiritual Presence'. Or, as he puts i t elsewhere, 'This 
i s what the Divine Spirit meanst God present to our s p i r i t . Spirit i s 
not a mysterious substance; i t i s not a part of God* I t i s God him-
self) but not God as the creative ground of a l l things and not God 
directing history and manifesting himself i n i t s central event, but God 
as present in communities and personalities, grasping them, inspiring them, 
and transforming them'.^ 
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We may ask, of course, how i t i s that the S p i r i t u a l Presence, 
the Presence of the Divine L i f e , i s to be found i n the human s p i r i t , i n 
the midst of creaturely l i f e * T i l l i c h answers t h i s by using the concept 
of dimensions, which has formed the basis of his understanding of the 
unity of l i f e so f a r * We should not, of course, imagine that the 
S p i r i t u a l Presence i s a f u r t h e r dimension of l i f e existing alongside 
every other dimension as a constituent part of the unity of a l l dimen-
sions. When we apply the concept of dimension to the divine S p i r i t 
we are using the term i n a somewhat d i f f e r e n t sense* For the S p i r i t 
i s rather the ultimate dimension of l i f e , the 'dimension of depth',^ 
the ground of every other dimension and the 'aim toward which they are 
self-transcendent'. To refer to the S p i r i t u a l Presence as the dimen-
sion of depth means that i n t h i s dimension ' a l l dimensions are rooted 
and negated and affirmed'* So while i n the e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n , we 
need to correlate the human s p i r i t , including a l l other dimensions, with 
the divine S p i r i t , i t would be wrong to see t h i s as set t i n g them over 
against each other i n a d u a l i s t i c fashion, f o r essentially there i s a 
mutual immanence based on the f a c t that the S p i r i t u a l Presence i s the 
depth-dimension of Being-itself• The f i n i t e and the i n f i n i t e are 
essentially one, and i t i s only i n the world of separate existences 
that there appears a preliminary and transitory duality* The S p i r i t 
of God transcends t h i s d u a l i t y because i t penetrates the whole, the 
f i n i t e and the i n f i n i t e , i n ultimate depth* And 'he who knows about 
5 
depth,' says T i l l i c h , 'knows about God'. 
The question that follows on from t h i s i s where the S p i r i t u a l 
Presence manifests i t s e l f i n the s p i r i t of man, and what character t h i s 
manifestation has. T r a d i t i o n a l l y , T i l l i c h points out, t h i s question 
has been answered by saying that 'the divine S p i r i t dwells and works i n 
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the human s p i r i t ' , penetrating the 'innermost parts of our own s p i r i t s ' , 
so that 'our entire inner l i f e , our thoughts and desires, our feelings 
7 
and imaginations, are known to God'* The crucial word here i s the 
l i t t l e word 'in', for there i s a sense in which the 'in' of the divine 
Spirit involves an 'out' for the human spirits when the (Divine Spirit 
breaks into the human s p i r i t i t drives the human s p i r i t 'out of i t s e l f * 
By this T i l l i c h does not wish to imply that the human s p i r i t becomes 
something other than what i t i s , or loses i t s identity, but rather that 
i t i s able successfully to transcend i t s e l f because i t i s grasped by 
something ultimate and unconditioned* To this situation, man in a state 
of self-transcendence under the impact of the idivine Spirit, T i l l i c h 
8 
refers the clas s i c a l term 'ecstasy'* He realises that certain associa-
tions with this word make i t a difficult one to use, but he feels that i t 
i s a word which needs to be rescued from i t s contemporary distortions 
o 
and 'restored to a sober theologioal function*• Every revelatory and 
saving experience within the l i f e of man i s made possible by this state 
of ecstasy, when the human s p i r i t i s driven beyond i t s e l f by the Divine 
Spirit without i n any sense destroying i t s essential, rational structure* 
This dual capaoity of ecstasy both to transcend the human s p i r i t and 
yet at the same time not to violate i t s rational structure has already 
made i t possible for T i l l i c h to speak of ecstatic reason,^ the vehiole 
by which man is able to receive revelation* Ecstatic reason, he points 
out, remains reason, ' i t does not receive anything irrational or anti-
rational • • • but i t transcends the basic condition of fi n i t e ration-
a l i t y , the subject-object of structure', as a l l mystical experience w i l l 
testify*** Thus, though this experience of ecstasy does not destroy the 
essentially rational structure of the human s p i r i t , i t does do something 
whioh the human s p i r i t i t s e l f i s incapable of doings i t creates unam-
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biguous l i f e i a l i f e i n which the subject-objeot structure i s transcended* 
Man may reach for unambiguous l i f e , but he cannot grasp i t s he can only 
be grasped by i t , and the answers to the ambiguities of l i f e can only 
come through this creative act of the Spiritual Presence* This means 
that i t i s impossible for man to compel the divine S p i r i t to enter his 
own s p i r i t , and whenever he attempts to do so, the result w i l l be not 
the divine Spirit that 'descends', but rather a human counterfeit 'in 
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religious disguise*• The f i n i t e oannot foroe the i n f i n i t e } man 
cannot compel God'*^ Or, as he puts i t i n Perspectives« 'In listening 
and waiting we may experience the S p i r i t , but more than this cannot be 
said. There i s no valid method at a l l of forcing God upon us'*^ 
A l l this leads T i l l i c h to reject any idea that ecstasy is some 
sort of miracle i n which the Spiritual Presenoe invades and destroys the 
essential structure of the s p i r i t of man* Such an idea, he maintains, 
i s based on a complete misinterpretation of the relationship between 
the divine S p i r i t and the human s p i r i t * Yet within the history of 
religion there are many incidents which suggest that something like 
this does happen, when certain strange physical or psychological effects 
occur, and not a l l of them can be ascribed to man's attempt to foroe 
the divine Spirit down upon him* One need only think of speaking with 
tongues, or certain types of extra-sensory perception, or healings at a 
distance. But while this suggests that when man i s grasped by the 
Spiritual Presence extraordinary things may happen and "astonishing 
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events' may be experienced, J this may well be explained by the faot 
that the Spiritual Presence, i n grasping the s p i r i t of man, grasps at 
the same time every other dimension of l i f e present within human l i f e 
i n ways which we do not f u l l y understand^ with the result that 'spatial 
and temporal separation and bodily and psychological disorders and 
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limitations are overcome'. I t i s this to which the word 'miracle 1 
really points. I n fact, i t i s i n these moments of astonishment, when 
man i s forced, as i t were, to stand aside and become aware of the 
mysterious presence of the holy which has grasped him, that revelation 
becomes possibles But none of thi s , claims T i l l i c h , really undermines 
our assertion that when the divine S p i r i t grasps man i n a state of 
eostasy there i s no violation of the essential structure of human person-
a l i t y . 
Two terms have been traditionally used to express the way i n which 
the human s p i r i t receives the impact of the Spiritual Presence, and 
T i l l i c h subjects both of these to careful analysis. The f i r s t i s 
'inspiration', which denotes a 'breathing' into the s p i r i t of man. 
T i l l i c h oomments that this does not mean that man receives an'informa-
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tive lesson about God and divine matters', ' as certain schools of 
biblical interpretation would suggest, for i n his point of view the 
role of the Sp i r i t i s 'not that of a teacher but of a meaning-bearing 
power which grasps the human s p i r i t i n an ecstatic experience'. I t i s 
after this experience has occurred, he says, that the teaoher i s able to 
analyse and formulate i t s meaning, but by that time the experience i t s e l f 
has already passed, and i t i s to the experience i t s e l f that the: ecstasy 
of inspiration referee The other term i s 'infusion', which signifies 
a 'pouring* into the s p i r i t of man, a concept which was central both i n 
the early church and later on in>Catholicism, which spoke of an 
infusio f i d e i and an infusio amoris by which f a i t h and love respectively 
were derived from the infusio Spiritus Sancti. The inevitable tendency 
to distort this doctrine along magico-materialistic lines i n later 
Catholic thought wherein the Spirit became some sort of "matter" which 
was transmitted by the priest i n the performance of the sacraments, 
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caused Protestantism to become extremely suspicious of this concept. 
Instead the Protestant churches sought to emphasise the personality of 
the Spi r i t * Faith and love, for example, i n Protestant thought, vere 
considered not as infusions injected by the Spirit into the s p i r i t of 
man, but impacts of the Spirit upon man, effected by the Word, whether 
within or without a specifically sacramental context. For this reason, 
the Reformed churches have continued to be reluctant to use the conoept 
of infusion* However, this reluctance, feels T i l l i o h , oannot be entirely 
j u s t i f i e d , and i n faot there are times when even the Protestant i s 
prepared to speak of the 'outpouring of the S p i r i t * , as he does i n 
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his reading and interpretation of the Soriptures* And even i f he 
prefers the term 'inspiration', he i s s t i l l using a metaphor of substanoe, 
for 'breath' i s also a substance, which 'enters' him who receives the 
Spirit* T i l l i c h adds that i n our contemporary situation, the psycho-
logical rediscovery of the significance of the unconscious and the con-
sequent re-evaluation of symbols must inevitably lead to a re-assessment 
of the Protestant emphasis on the Word as the sole medium of the S p i r i t , 
and this must certainly bring the word 'infusion* back into play* 
T i l l i o h sees Paul's doctrine of the Spirit as the classical 
expression of the spiritual unity of ecstasy and structure* For him, 
Paul i s primarily a theologian of the S p i r i t , his Ghristology and 
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esohatology both depending on this 'central point i n his thinking', ' 
and he feels that Paul's dootrine of j u s t i f i c a t i o n by grace through 
f a i t h is an expression of the fact that with the appearanoe of the Christ 
a new state of things has come into being, which is the creation of the 
Spirit* He i s certainly not happy with the prevalent Protestant assertion 
that Paul was predominantly a theologian of j u s t i f i c a t i o n * That 
certainly i s not wrong,' he says* 'But this was a defensive doctrine 
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for Paul e o . i t was not the centre of his theology* At the centre 
was his experience and doctrine of the Spirit* Thus he is on the side 
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of those i n Protestant theology who stress inwardness1. In every 
experience of the S p i r i t , he continues, Paul emphasises the ecstatic 
element. Take, for instance, the example of prayer. Every prayer 
which achieves the real purpose of prayer, that i s , union with God, has 
for Paul the character of ecstasy. Such prayer is impossible for man 
under his own steam because of himself he does not know how to pray* 
But i t i s possible for the 3ivine Spirit to pray through a man, even i n 
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words that cannot be uttered. Another example is Paul's frequent use 
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of the term *in Christ', a formula which is not to be interpreted 
merely i n a psychological sense, but which points rather to an ecstatic 
participation i n the Christ who "is the S p i r i t " , by virtue of which a 
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man i s able to live 'in the sphere of this Spiritual power'• Yet a l l 
t h i s , T i l l i c h points out, does not mean that man's essential structure 
i s destroyed. I n fact, Paul strongly resists any such suggestion* For 
example, i n I Corinthians, when he speaks of spi r i t u a l g i f t s , he rejects 
both the ecstatic speaking with tongues wherever this leads to chaos 
and disruption, and also the emphasis on personal experiences of an 
ecstatic nature wherever they lead to hubris, i n addition to any other 
Spiritual g i f t that is not subjected to love, the 'greatest creation of 
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the Spiritual Presence*• In fact, i n the famous hymn to love, there 
i s a complete unity between the structure of the moral imperative and the 
25 
ecstasy of the S p i r i t * J Similarly, as the f i r s t three chapters of the 
same l e t t e r demonstrate, although the knowledge man receives through 
ecstasy is not received through his normal capacity to acquire and formu-
late knowledge, this knowledge received through revelation i n no way 
destroys the cognitive structures of man's mind* Thus both agape and 
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and gnosis refer to 'forms of morality and knowledge i n which ecstasy 
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and structure are united'o 
The dilemma that the ohuroh has always faced. T i l l i c h points out. 
i s that while i t must preserve structure by preventing the confusion of 
ecstasy with chaos, i t must also avoid both the institutional profani-
sation of the Sp i r i t such as one found i n early Catholicism with i t s 
tendency to replace the g i f t s of the Spirit with office, and the 
•secular profanisation' of contemporary Protestantism which oan so 
easily take place when ecstasy i s replaced with doctrinal or moral 
structures. Here he feels that Paul's criterion of the unity of structure 
and ecstasy must stand over against both types of profanisation. I t i s 
a duty for the ohurch constantly to apply this criterion, for whenever 
i t lives i n institutions and disregards the ecstatic side of the Spiritual 
Presence there follows an inevitable swing of the pendulum to chaotic 
and disrupting forms of ecstasy and then i n turn to the growth of 
seoularised reactions, even though one realises the inevitable r i s k that 
whenever the ohuroh takes ecstatic movements seriously there i s a 
tendency to confuse the impact of the Spiritual Presence with psychologi-
cal determined over-excitement. 
This leads us to the inevitable question of how we can distinguish 
between ecstasy and emotional intoxication. How can we differentiate 
between the genuine impact of the Spiritual Presence and psychologically 
determined over-excitement? I n answering this question, says T i l l i c h , 
we must realise that whenever the Spirit grasps a man he grasps the whole 
of him, and this means his psychological dimension as well as his 
spi r i t u a l dimension. When a man is held i n the power of the S p i r i t , his 
dimension of self-awareness i s not excluded, for as the doctrine of the 
multidimensional unity of l i f e teaches us, 'the dimension of s p i r i t 
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actualises i t s e l f within the dynamics of self-awareness and under i t s 
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biological conditions'* I t i s common, however* i n certain circles* 
both psychiatric and ecclesiastical, to try to reduce every s p i r i t u a l 
experience to a psychological state* This profanisation of the genuine 
ecstatic experience, asserts T i l l i o h , must be resisted at a l l costs* 
For ecstasy does not originate from within a man's psychological self, 
or else i t would not be able to set him free from the limitations of 
that self* For one of the marks of genuine ecstasy is that i t gives man 
a new awareness by which he i s able to overcame the subject-objeot 
structure of his normal l i f e , and become conscious of something higher 
and deeper than his day to day experiences. I n other words, i t raises 
man to a state of self-transcendence* 
One of the problems that arises i n this context i s that there are 
also certain psychological states which seem on the surface to. liberate 
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man from this bondage to the subject-object structure of r e a l i t y , y but 
there i s , T i l l i c h claims, an essential difference between the liberation 
afforded by genuine ecstasy and the so-oalled liberation effected by the 
psychological manipulation of the mind* For true ecstasy leads to some-
thing which i s more than the subject-object structure, whereas mere 
psychological over-excitement i n actual fact leads to something less* 
In the one, there is no attempt to ignore the re a l i t i e s of normal l i f e 
as i f they were not there; i n the other, there i s a deliberate attempt 
to obliterate those r e a l i t i e s * The way of ecstasy i s the way of self-
transcendence i n which the ambiguities of l i f e are retained but overcome; 
the way of intoxication i s the way of escapism by a retreat into mere 
subjectivity i n which the destruction of l i f e ' s ambiguities is sought 
after through temporary release* Yet this temporary release, he points 
out, only serves to heighten the tensions i t seeks to avoid - i t can 
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never resolve them, for i t has no creative power* I t lacks completely 
both 'spiritual productivity and Spiritual creativity**"^ And this i s 
precisely what a genuine ecstatic experience has. By a complete i n -
volvement of both subject and object i n so far as they are both trans-
cended i n the power of the S p i r i t , something new i s produced, something 
that i s richer i n content and i n power than was there before* So, for 
example, the preacher who i s genuinely grasped by the S p i r i t w i l l not 
only remain f u l l y aware of the social situation of his time, but also 
see that situation i n the l i g h t of eternity. The man who contemplates 
w i l l not only be aware Of the structure of the universe as he sees i t , 
but also understand that structure i n the l i g h t of the ground and aim 
of a l l being; and he who prays w i l l not only be f u l l y alive to his own 
or his neighbour's situation, but also see i t under the Spirit's influence 
and i n the context of the divine direction present i n the whole of l i f e * 
These experiences which T i l l i o h cites are a l l eostatic, and i n each of 
them there i s nothing objective that is reduced to mere subjectivity -
rather i s i t preserved and even increased* I t i s preserved not merely by 
an increase i n psychological awareness, but by a transcendent awareness 
i n which the independent existence of each i s overcome i n unity, 'a 
union of subject and objeot has taken place i n which the independent 
existence of each is overcome; new unity is created'*^ He uses prayer 
as a specifio i l l u s t r a t i o n of this. In every serious prayer, he says, 
though i n one sense i t may seem that God is an object for the one who 
prays, yet he is also subject, i n so far as 'we can only pray to the 
God who [himself]prays to himself through us'e Thus genuine prayer i s 
possible only i n so far as the subject-object structure i s overcome, 
but whenever this f a i l s to take place the true greatness of prayer 
i s profaned* I t is this transcendence of the subject-object scheme of 
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l i f e which makes possible i n every sphere a genuine creativity within 
the l i f e and experience of him who i s grasped by the S p i r i t of God. 
And i t i s this element of creativity, concludes T i l l i c h , that i s the 
necessary criterion 'which must be used to decide whether an extra-
ordinary state of mind i s ecstatic, created by the Spiritual Presence, 
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or subjective intoxication 1* I n the l a t t e r state there i s no element 
of creativity present, only the forces of destruction which aim to 
reduce the self to nothing more than a vaouum. So, he concludes, 'the 
use of this oriterion the church oan employ i n "judging" the S p i r i t ' * 
Evaluation 
Our f i r s t point of discussion is to do with T i l l i c h ' s use of the 
term 'dimension' i n describing the relation between the human s p i r i t and 
the Mvine Spi r i t . The expression which he uses to define this more 
precisely, 'the dimension of depth', i s a useful one, and one which has 
some valuable insights, particularly i n i t s emphasis on the presence of 
the S p irit i n the whole of l i f e , interpenetrating i t at every level* 
However, there are three points which must be raised by way of criticism. 
F i r s t l y , i t i s important to realise that the word 'depth' can have 
oonnotations other than what T i l l i o h intends, particularly i n contemporary 
psychological usage* T i l l i c h asserts that 'he who knows about depth 
knows about God'* But he may well know not about God, but about other 
things i n the depth of his own being which are far less i n v i t i n g . The 
examination of the unconscious through psychological analysis may reveal 
many dark things about l i f e which are both haunting and anxiety perpe-
tuating, and one feels that there i s profound psychological insight i n 
such symbols as h e l l , Sheol, the underworld, and so on, a l l of which are 
symbols of depth* Though Paul speaks of the Spirit searching out the 
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deep things of God, he also knows that i n the depths of his own being 
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there are things which give grave cause for oonoern, and any analysis of 
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Romans 7 w i l l show how deeply troubled he was about these things. There 
i s therefore an ambiguity i n this symbol which stems from i t s psycholo-
gical usage which should make us use i t with caution* I t may well be, 
of course, that the struggle i n the depths of man's being reflects a 
deeper ontologLcal struggle i n the l i f e of being-itself, and that the 
outcome of this struggle i s determined by the fact that the depth of 
God i s deeper than the destructive depths of non-being which threaten 
i t , but the psychological usage of the term is a reminder that i t i s an 
expression that has i t s limitations and disadvantages* Careful c l a r i -
fication i s essential* 
Secondly, there i s something impersonal about the word 'dimension1 
which should make us particularly careful when we use i t as a symbol of 
the divine Spirit* One would not wish to infer from this usage that 
the divine S p i r i t i s impersonal, for this would be to court a heresy 
which has constantly been rejected by the Christian church* As we shall 
35 
see later,• i t i s not entirely beyond possibility that T i l l i c h himself 
has fallen into "this trap* What needs to be emphasised therefore i s 
that this i s a symbol which has meaning provided i t i s kept within the 
limi t s of helping us to understand something of the relation between the 
divine Spirit and the human s p i r i t , and not used to point to the precise 
nature of the S p i r i t himself* 
Thirdly, having s&id t h i s , one must ask what the implications for 
Tillich'a thought are when he says that ultimately there i s no duality 
between the dimension of depth and the dimensions of f i n i t e r e a l i t y , 
between the Spiritual Presence and the f i n i t e world culminating i n the 
s p i r i t of man* The duality we experience, he says, i s merely prelim-
inary and transitory* Once again we are faced with this question! Does 
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this mean that ultimately there i s no distinction between the f i n i t e 
and the i n f i n i t e , between s p i r i t and Spirit? I f there i s no ultimate 
distinction, then surely we have reached a t o t a l l y monistic conception 
of the universe, i n which the two are ultimately identified* But i f a 
distinction does remain, i t would seem that at least we are l e f t with 
some sort of duality, even though we may not think of this i n terms of 
a s t r i c t metaphysical dualism* S p i r i t i s not opposed to s p i r i t , but 
neither are the two one and the same thing* As we have seen, this 
d i f f i c u l t y of interpretation is one which underlies the whole of T i l l i c h * s 
theology, and one whioh makes i t not at a l l easy to decide whether his 
ontologioal mode of thinking can really be reconciled with Christian 
thought or not* 
Turning next to the way i n which the Spiritual Presence grasps 
the human s p i r i t , several points need to be made* I t should be borne i n 
mind, for example, that T i l l i c h ' s use of the texm ecstasy i s rather 
different from the way i n whioh i t i s often used by scholars. Commenta-
tors on prophetic religion tend to describe the unusual behaviour or 
incomprehensible utteranoes attributed to certain groups of people as 
ecs t a t i c , ^ and this i s clearly not what T i l l i o h means, for he i s very 
careful to make a distinction between ecstasy and intoxication which i n 
other writers frequently tend to become blurred into one and the same 
thing. In faot, the point that T i l l i c h i s making i s tremendously 
importantt that when the S p i r i t enters a man he does not violate his 
personality i n any way* The man is not disrupted or destroyed by some 
potent foroe beyond his own control* He remains his true self, but his 
vision and his creative power are strengthened and enlarged* This i s a 
most important point i n any understanding of the work of the Spirit*. 
So T i l l i c h has provided us with a penetrating analysis of the 
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difference between ecstasy, as he defines i t , and intoxication, and his 
comments are extremely valuable i n an age when there i s a great desire 
on the part of many to seek to escape from the problems of modern l i v i n g 
i n experiences which purport to enlarge and widen the horizons of the 
mind* The c r i t e r i a which he l i s t s - spiritual creativity rather than 
destruotivity, a heightened sense of self-awareness i n the presence of 
the Spirit rather than i t s obliteration, a genuine response to the world 
around rather than a numbing of i t s challenge and i t s consequent deper-
sonalisation - are most useful for the church i n helping i t i n i t s 
discernment* However, there are one or two points whioh would have 
benefitted from further c l a r i f i c a t i o n * F i r s t l y , though the oriterion of 
spiritual creativity as a mark of genuine ecstasy i s v i t a l l y important, 
i t should be remembered that many ar t i s t s claim that much of their 
creative work i s done while under the influenoe of some sort of a r t i f i c i a l 
stimulant* That intoxioation of this type can act as a force which 
liberates oertain -types of creativity cannot be denied, and though the 
f u l l implications of this sort of ac t i v i t y are not easy to resolve, 
nevertheless i t i s sufficient to put us on our guard* Bearing this i n 
mind, one feels that T i l l i o h could have said something about the motive 
behind the creative act, the purpose to which i t i s put, and the various 
ways i n which this creativity manifests i t s e l f i n the l i f e of the 
community and human relationships, as some of the o r i t e r i a by which 
genuine ecstasy is to be judged* 
Secondly, the emphasis on the individual's awareness of transcending 
the subject-object order of re a l i t y i n the state of eostasy leads one 
to ask whether this type of experience always accompanies the impact of 
the Spirit. I t may well be that every genuine mystical experience of 
this nature is due to the Spirit's impact, but i t does not follow that 
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every experience of being grasped by the Sp i r i t must follow this 
pattern. For example, i n the l i f e of prayer, i t i s by no means true to 
say that a l l valid prayer has a mystical quality, for i f this were so 
i t would suggest that many prayers, offered i n a l l sincerity and i n an 
attitude of f a i t h yet without any element of mystioism, are not really 
prayers at a l l . There are many cases where a much more simple awareness 
of the divine Spirit i s the case* I t i s simply not true that mysticism 
i s the only form religious experience takes, and this i s something which 
T i l l i o h should have made more explicit i n the context of his discussion 
on ecstasy* 
There i s one other point which arises out of his oomments on 
prayer. His emphasis on the subjective role of God i n the l i f e of prayer, 
i n the sense that i t i s the Sp i r i t who i s the source of every genuine 
prayer man prays, i s indeed important* But surely this does not mean 
that i t i s mistaken to think of God as the object of our prayers* That 
God i s the objeot of our experience does not mean that we treat him as 
an objeot i n the sense of something to be used* That indeed would be 
culpable. But surely i t i s inevitable that we experience God as 
objeot i n our praying. I n every true * I - Thou' relationship the objecti-
v i t y of the 'Thou* i s truly retained, and this i s particularly true i n 
the relationship between man and God i n the l i f e of prayer* That God 
has a subjective role i n prayer i s not to be denied - but this does not 
mean that his objectivity i s any the less real* 
I I . THE MEDIA OF THE MANIFESTATION OF THE SPIRIT 
T i l l i c h now turns to the way i n which the Spirit manifests i t s e l f 
i n the world of human experiences What media does God use to reveal 
himself to men? The traditional answer to this question i s that God 
comes to man through Word and sacrament, but this needs to be seen i n a 
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wider context than the l i f e of the church* I n the f i r s t place* i t 
should be pointed out that the traditional Protestant dichotomy between 
Word and sacrament is false, for the concept, of the sacramental includes 
every type of communication, including that which is verbal* The silent 
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presence of an object preoedes any verbal significance given to i t , 
even though the Word i t s e l f i s impl i c i t within i t , waiting, as i t were, 
to be given expression by man i n the dimension of s p i r i t * The sacra-
mental object 'cannot be without the Word, even i f i t remains voiceless'* 
Though i n i t s widest sense the concept of the sacramental denotes 
everything i n which the Spiritual Presence has been experienced, i t has 
been narrowed down to refer more specifically to those particular objects 
and acts which are the media of Spiritual experience i n a particular 
community, and narrowed down most of a l l i n referring to the 'great' 
sacraments of the churoh* I t i s when the wider meaning of the word 
'sacramental1 i s forgotten, that there i s a tendenoy for the narrower 
sacramental activities to lose their significance and even the great 
sacraments to become robbed of their real meaning* There are two 
reasons for this: a current over-emphasis on the intellectual and v o l i -
tional aspects of man's nature, which results i n the belief that only 
words can communicate the S p i r i t ; and the much older association of the 
sacraments with magic, which was found i n pre-Reformation Catholicism, 
and which resulted i n the Protestant rejection of sacramental thought 
i n favour of i t s emphasis on f a i t h * This is why T i l l i c h feels that i t 
i s important to distinguish carefully between 'the impact of a sacra-
ment on the conscious through the unconscious s e l f 1 and 'magical techniques 
which influence the unconscious without the consent of the w i l l ' * I n 
the f i r s t case, one consciously shares i n the sacramental experience; i n 
the second, the unconscious i s influenced directly without one's w i l l i n g 
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participation. Although today there may be very l i t t l e 'magic1 used 
i n personal relations, there are nevertheless other ways i n vhioh 
unconscious influences are deliberately brought to bear, and when this 
'sort of tiling is found i n the l i f e of the church, i t means that the 
sacramental principle i s i n danger of becoming demonically distorted* 
However, i t i s not thereby invalidated, and contemporary psychological 
emphasis on the important role of the unconscious provides us with a 
welcome opportunity for a positive revaluation of sacramental l i f e * I t 
suggests to us particularly that to maintain that the Spirit can only be 
experienced through conscious elements alone i s far from the truth* For 
i f the Sp i r i t i s mediated to us no less through the unconscious part of 
our being than the in t e l l e c t or w i l l , then i t must be that the sacra-
mental medium has an essential place. I t points to the fact that when 
the Spirit of God grasps a man, i t grasps him i n the t o t a l i t y of his 
being* 
Our earlier exposition of T i l l i c h ' s ooncept of symbolism helps 
us to understand the precise relation between the sacramental and God, 
for a sacrament i s essentially a symbol of God's presence i n the world* 
Like every symbol, i t points to God and i t participates i n God, though 
i t i s certainly not to be elevated into the rank of the divine* A sacra-
ment, therefore, i n aocordanoe with the concept of the multidimensional 
unity of a l l l i f e , does not point to something foreign to i t s e l f ; i t 
i s rather 'intrinsically related' to what i t expresses, having qualities 
39 
which make i t completely adequate to i t s symbolic function* These 
qualities are not the material properties which i t possesses, but i t s 
capacity to express the l i f e of the Sp i r i t i n which i t participates, a 
capacity which becomes apparent when 'brought into sacramental union'*^ 
T i l l i c h points out that this understanding of the sacramental invalidates 
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both Catholic and Protestant extremism. On the one hand, for exampley 
i t exposes the fallacy i n the doctrine of transubstantiation, which by 
claiming that the particular symbol that i s used (bread and wine) i s 
transformed into a thing i n i t s e l f (the body and blood of Christ) which 
can be directly handled, thereby misses the whole point of what a sacra-
mental symbol really i s . And on the other hand, i t invalidates the 
attempt of certain types of Protestantism to reduce the sacramental 
symbol into a mere sign, for this would be to deny that i t participates 
i n the power of that to whioh i t points. So, says T i l l i o h , *a sacra-
mental symbol i s neither a thing nor a sign. I t participates i n the 
power of what i t symbolises, and therefore, i t oan be a medium of the 
S p i r i t ' . 4 1 
So much for sacraments i n general. Turning to specific sacraments, 
T i l l i o h reminds us that they grow up over long periods of time. Though 
any part of encountered r e a l i t y can become sacramental material, the 
actual selection w i l l depend on the specific need. Occasionally, 
a certain magical tradition w i l l be transformed into a religious one, as 
i n the case of the concept of 'sacramental food 1. Or a historical moment 
may be commemorated i n the form of a sacred legend, as i n the case of the 
Lord's Supper. Quite often sacraments become associated with important 
moments i n the l i f e cycle of the individual, or with climactic religious 
events (such as i n i t i a t i o n into the religious group), and not infrequently 
these are brought together into a single r i t u a l a c t i v i t y . 
But more than this needs to be said. For unless we are to return 
to a primitive magical sacramentalism, we must also assert 'that there 
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can be no sacramental object apart from the f a i t h that grasps i t * . 
I t can only become a bearer of sacramental power when i t is correlated 
with f a i t h , when i t points to an ultimate concern. For the Christian, 
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of course, this means that no object can become sacramental unless i t i s 
related to the events of the history of salvation, for i t i s through 
i t s relation to these events that nature i s liberated from i t s demonic 
elements and 'made eligible for a sacrament*• This i s why Christianity 
cannot recognise so-called 'sacraments of nature', not because nature has 
no in t r i n s i c power of being, but because i t i s ambiguous and open to 
distortion unless i t participates i n the history of salvation* This 
does not mean that every single natural object w i l l become a sacrament, 
for every single object does not directly participate i n the history of 
salvation, and i s therefore not adequate to become a sacrament* Never-
theless, claims T i l l i o h , the very capacity of certain objects to point 
beyond themselves, and become sacramental media, i s i t s e l f 'a representa-
tion of what essentially i s possible i n everything and i n every place'*^ 
In a word, when nature i t s e l f i s delivered from i t s demonic bondage and 
i n Christ brought into the unity of the history of salvation, i t becomes 
the bearer of sacramental power* 
One question that has always troubled the church i s whether the 
Spi r i t i s bound to specific sacraments* The answer to this question,says 
T i l l i c h , i s partly 'yes' and partly *no** I f we affirm that the 
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Spiritual Community actualises the New Being i n Jesus as the Christ, 
then i t i s clear that 'no sacramental act can take place i n i t which i s 
not subject to the criterion of that r e a l i t y on which the community i s 
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based', so that i n this sense the Spiritual Presence i s bound to 
certain specific medial the answer i s 'yes', and this answer would have 
the advantage of excluding a l l demonised and distorted sacramental acts* 
But the answer i s also partly 'no', i n the sense that the Spiritual 
Community must always be free 'to appropriate a l l symbols which are 
adequate' to this criterion 'and which possess symbolic power1* Thus 
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the question behind the argument as to the number of great sacraments, 
for example, i s not whether Jesus himself prescribed them, but whether 
i n f a c t 'they possess and are able to preserve t h e i r power of mediating 
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the S p i r i t u a l Presence'• And i f c e r t a i n sacramental acts lose t h e i r 
meaning and a b i l i t y to grasp large numbers of the S p i r i t u a l Community, 
however valued they are i n the t r a d i t i o n of that community, we must face 
the p o s s i b i l i t y that such aots have l o s t t h e i r sacramental power* Our 
answer then to the question as to whether the S p i r i t i s bound to d e f i n i t e 
media i s affirmative i n so f a r as a l l v a l i d media participate i n the 
New B e a l i t y to whioh they point, and negative i n so f a r as the S p i r i t u a l 
Community i s always free to appropriate any symbol which i s adequate 
and r e j e c t any other which has become inadequate* The 'yes* and 'no' 
are two sides of the same coin* 
T i l l i c h has quite a l o t to say i n h i s writings about symbols and 
sacraments i n general, but oddly enough there i s l i t t l e s p e c i f i c mention 
of the two sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper* What he does 
say i s confined to two small sections i n the essay on 'Nature and Sacra-
ment ', which appears i n The Protestant E r a * ^ The basic sacrament, that 
of baptismi contends T i l l i o h , i s the easier of the two to analyse* I t 
has one element only, the 'simple element' of water) i t i s through water 
that baptism becomes a sacrament, and without i t there would be no 
baptism* But Luther's statement that 'without the Word of God, the water 
>i ft 
i s simply water and no baptism', r a i s e s i n T i l l i o h ' s mind profound 
theological problems* 'What i s meant', he asks, 'by the phrase "simply 
to be 
water"? And i f water as such is/described as "simply water", why use 
water at a l l ? Why i s not the "Word of God" s u f f i c i e n t without water, 
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why need there be a sacrament? 1 T i l l i o h says -there are three possible 
answers to this question, which have appeared at various times i n history* 
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( i ) The f i r s t i s to interpret the act of baptism as a v i s i b l e represen-
tation of the idea of baptism* This T i l l i c h r e f e r s to as the 'symbolic-
metaphoric 1 approach* According to t h i s understanding, water i s a symbol 
'for p u r i f i c a t i o n or for drowning or for both together', and refers to 
•the dying of the old, the unclean* and the resurrection of the new, the 
pure'* The act of baptism, therefore, whether by sprinkling or by 
immersion, i s to set forth i n picture form that which i s expressed by 
the accompanying word* This i s perhaps the most commonly acoepted under-
standing of the sacrament* However, T i l l i o h maintains that i t i s quite 
obvious that water i s not the only p i c t o r i a l aotion that could be used 
to convey these ideas* Passing through the f i r e , or going down into the 
cave, symbols which are f a m i l i a r i n the mystery r e l i g i o n s , could do the 
job equally as well* We are l e f t with the conclusion that water i s 
preferred e i t h e r because of t r a d i t i o n or of convenience* But i t i s 
quite c l e a r , he concludes, that t h i s interpretation does not allow any 
(necessary, i n t r i n s i c relationship between water and baptism'• ( i i ) The 
second answer i s to asse r t that water i s used i n baptism solely because 
of the divine command* This i s what T i l l i c h c a l l s the ' r i t u a l i s t i c ' 
interpretation* Water acquires i t s sacramental significance, according 
to this point of view, when i t i s c o r r e c t l y used i n the sacramental r i t e * 
This approach to the sacrament, he notes, i s p a r t i c u l a r l y oommon i n 
Protestantism, where much i s made of i t s dependence on the b i b l i c a l 
account of Chr i s t ' s own i n s t i t u t i o n * But again, there i s no i n t r i n s i c 
relationship implied between the water and the act of baptism* ( i i i ) The 
third answer, which T i l l i c h f e e l s i s the only one that r e a l l y does j u s t i c e 
to the r e a l concept of what a sacrament i s , i s to maintain that there i s 
i n f a c t a necessary relationship between water and baptism, an i n t e r -
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pretation which T i l l i c h desoribes as ' r e a l i s t i c * . This viewpoint, 
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whilst repudiating the magical conception of the sacraments along with 
Luther, nevertheless questions his view that water i s "simply water". 
I n some way, affirms T i l l i o h , water has a 'power of i t s own', which makes 
i t completely adequate to *become the bearer of a s a c r a l power and thus 
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also to become a sacramental element*• There i s therefore a necessary 
relationship between water and baptism. This r e a l i s t i c understanding 
r e j e c t s any merely a r b i t r a r y connection between the two, and i s i n f a c t 
according to Til11oh the only conception adequate to the true nature of 
the sacrament. 
The interpretation of the Lord's Supper i s much more d i f f i c u l t , 
and T i l l i o h gives four reasons f or t h i s . F i r s t l y , there are two per-
ceptible elements rather than ones bread and wine. Secondly, both of 
these elements are a r t i f i c i a l , manufactured, rather than natural. Thirdly, 
the two together represent the Body of C h r i s t , the basic element of the 
Lord*8 Supper* And fourthly, though Ch r i s t ' s physical body as a body 
belongs to the natural order, yet h i s transcendent body i s 'beyond 
nature'• 
The Lord's Supper, according to T i l l i c h , i s the 'sacramental 
appropriation of the exalted body of C h r i s t ' . The eating of a re a l body 
i s , of course, out of the question, and i n any case the physical body of 
Jesus i s inaccessible to us. The exalted, transcendent body, the ' s p i r i t u a l * 
body of C h r i s t , on the other hand i s accessible to us, but i t i s not 
physically perceptible, and therefore lacks the natural element without 
which there can be no sacramental celebration. What happens therefore 
i s that tangible, organic substances that nourish the body are substituted 
for the transcendent body of C h r i s t , so that instead of the physical body 
i t s e l f , we have the elements that nourish the body. The 'body of C h r i s t ' 
under the form of bread and wine symbolises therefore the transcendent 
161 
body* Yet i t i s singularly appropriate that t h i s should be so, seeing 
that the transcendent body of Christ has elevated with i t s e l f every 
preceding natural dimension which was present within i t as a physical 
body. And because within the transcendent body every natural dimension 
i s thus present* t h i s means that natural r e a l i t y i t s e l f has been invested 
with a transcendent, divine meaning* T i l l i c h concludes from t h i s that 
i n the Eucharist *participation i n the divine power i s a pa r t i c i p a t i o n 
52 
also i n the divine power i n nature*. and he f e e l s that t h i s i s what 
Luther was hinting at when he propounded h i s strange theory of the 
ubiquity of the body of C h r i s t . 
A more d i f f i c u l t question confronts us, says T i l l i c h , when we seek 
to determine the precise significance of the secondary elements of bread 
and wine. The doctrine of transubstantiation, i n which the bread and 
wine are annulled and replaced by the actual body and blood of C h r i s t , i s 
i n one way the simplest answer to t h i s question, but i t f a i l s to recognise 
that these elements have an independent significance of t h e i r own. What 
then i s the reason for the choice of these p a r t i c u l a r elements? The 
r i t u a l i s t i c interpretation would see t h e i r adequacy stemming from the 
command of Jesus, which linked together the body of C h r i s t and the bread 
and wine almost as a h i s t o r i c a l accident. However, T i l l i c h f e e l s that 
the action of breaking bread and pouring wine has no symbolic r e l a t i o n 
to the transcendent C h r i s t , even though i t i s a f i t t i n g symbol f o r 
Calvary. The r i t u a l i s t i c interpretation therefore can go no further 
than the Cross* The r e a l i s t i c interpretation, however, i s able to go 
much further than t h i s * I t i s able to recognise the bread and the wine 
'as representing the natural powers that nourish the body and support 
i n the human body the highest p o s s i b i l i t y of nature'• So he concludes 
that the r e a l significance of the bread and the wine i s that 'they point 
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to the presence of the divine saving power i n the natural basis of 
a l l s p i r i t u a l l i f e as well as i n the s p i r i t u a l l i f e i t s e l f '.^ ThuB 
i n both oases T i l l i c h argues that p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Lord's Supper 
i s a participation i n the power of God which i s present both i n nature 
and i n the l i f e of the S p i r i t . 
I n Protestant thought, the Word of God has frequently been considered 
as the supreme sacrament, and i n turning his attention to t h i s , T i l l i c h 
affirms his Protestant heritage when he reminds us that i n addition to 
sacramental objects and a c t i v i t i e s , 'the word i s the S p i r i t ' s other and 
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ultimately more important medium. Whenever human words, no matter 
what the language may be, become bearers of the S p i r i t u a l Presence, and 
have the power to grasp the human s p i r i t on behalf of the Divine, then 
they can be c a l l e d the 'Word of God'* Thus i t may be said that the Word 
of God, as the word of revelation, i s language that has become trans-
parent to the S p i r i t u a l Presence* 'Something shines (more precisely, 
sounds) through ordinary language which i s the self-manifestation of the 
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depth of being and meaning*. This helps us to see, says T i l l i c h , what 
we mean when we c a l l the Bible the Word of God. We do not mean that the 
Bible consists of actual oracles or words which God has spoken, as Calvin 
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put i t , but rather that i t i s able i n a unique way to become the Word 
of God to us, the bearer of the S p i r i t to us, simply because i t i s the 
'document of the central revelation, with respect to both i t s giving and 
i t s reoeiving sides'* T i l l i c h f e e l s that the impact of the Bible on 
people both within and outside the church demonstrates that i t i s the 
S p i r i t ' s most effective medium within Western culture. But i t must also 
be emphasised that everything within the Bible i s not always a medium f o r 
the S p i r i t . I t i s a potential medium, but ' i t only becomes an actual 
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medium to the degree i n which i t grasps the s p i r i t of men'* No word, 
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not even the b i b l i c a l word, i s the Word of God unless i t i s the Word of 
God for someone, and unless i t i s a medium whereby the S p i r i t enters 
the s p i r i t of someone. This means that there i s no point i n proclaiming 
the Word j u s t l i k e that, without any attempt to correlate i t to the 
sit u a t i o n of those who are li s t e n i n g * As he puts i t elsewhere, 'No 
b i b l i c a l word i s the Word of God for us, so long as we have to give up 
our h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y i n order to understand i t . Not even the b i b l i c a l 
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word can reach us r e l i g i o u s l y i f i t does not beoome contemporaneous'. 
He continuesi 
I t i s the greatest emergency of the Protestant churches of 
today that they have not yet found a way of preaching i n 
which contemporaneity and self-transcending power are united. 
The e c c l e s i a s t i c a l , and to a great extent the b i b l i c a l , 
terminology i s removed from the r e a l i t y of our h i s t o r i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n . I f i t i s used, nevertheless, with that attitude 
of p r i e s t l y arrogance which repeats the b i b l i c a l word and 
leaves i t to the l i s t e n e r s to be grasped by i t or not, i t 
c e r t a i n l y ceases to be the "Word of God" and i s r i g h t l y 
ignored by Protestant people.59 
Then again, i t must be recognised that the Bible i s not the only 
medium of the S p i r i t s other words also can become the Word of God. 
Wherever words h i t the human mind i n such a way that an ultimate concern 
i s created, there i s the Word of God, mediating the S p i r i t , and t h i s can 
take place anywhere i n r e l i g i o u s and c u l t u r a l l i t e r a t u r e and even i n any 
part of ordinary conversation where circumstances work together towards 
th i s end. However, T i l l i c h affirms that the Word of God as revealed 
i n the Bible must necessarily remain the c r i t e r i o n of judgment as to 
what i s the Divine Word and what i s not, because i t i s i n the Bible 
alone that we see manifest the New Being as i t appears i n Jesus as the 
C h r i s t . 6 0 
So f a r T i l l i c h has related the working of the S p i r i t to media which 
have not only an internal impact on man, but also have an objective, 
external side. But the question has often a r i s e n i n the history of the 
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church, p a r t i c u l a r l y at the time of the Reformation, as to whether such 
media are r e a l l y necessary at a l l . I s i t not possible f o r the S p i r i t to 
work i n t e r n a l l y without the need for external media? I f God i s present 
i n the whole of l i f e , then surely he i s not bound to any manifestation 
or sacrament* Why then does the S p i r i t need such mediations at a l l ? 
The conclusion of a l l such Spirit-movements i s that God 'dwells i n the 
depth of the person and when he speaks through the "inner word" he who 
l i s t e n s to i t receives new and personal revelations^independent of the 
churches' revelatory t r a d i t i o n s ' * ^ 
T i l l i c h f e e l s a deep sympathy with t h i s point of view, and agrees 
with much of the c r i t i c i s m l e v e l l e d at established forms of r e l i g i o n i n 
Western society by the Spirit-movements, and t h e i r assertion that the 
i 
S p i r i t i s free from these forms* Yet he also f e e l s that there are 
several c r i t i c i s m s that must be made of t h i s point of view. I n the f i r s t 
place, he points out that the terminology "the inner word" i s not p a r t i -
c u l a r l y good. The reason for t h i s i s that the word "word" r e f e r s to 
a means of communication between two centred selves, and the implication 
of t h i s must be that the other s e l f i s e i t h e r the Logos or the Divine 
S p i r i t . Now t h i s i s f a i r enough, he says, i f we interpret i t symboli-
c a l l y to mean the "voice of God", such as one finds i n the Old Testament 
prophets. But i n saying t h i s we are also saying that the "inner word" 
i s not completely "inner", for what we have done i s simply to replace 
the other f i n i t e s e l f of ordinary communication with the divine " s e l f . " 
However, even though we have done i t symbolically, T i l l i c h questions 
whether we can i n f a c t r e a l l y apply the word " s e l f " to God at a l l * 
Certainly, there are aspects of the centred s e l f which we can apply to 
God symbolically, but " s e l f " i s a s t r u c t u r a l concept and therefore not 
r e a l l y adequate to symbolic material* I t would, i n faot, be better to 
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avoid the expression "the inner word" altogether and say that the 
S p i r i t u a l Presence grasps us from the "outside". And t h i s i s acceptable 
provided we remember that 'this "outside" i s above outside and inside* 
62 
i t transcends them'i f or i n f a c t , the 'categories "inner" and "outer" 
lose t h e i r meaning i n the r e l a t i o n of God and man'* 
In the second place, T i l l i c h affirms that we must deny the suggestion 
that God speaks to man without a medium, because man's l i f e under the 
dimension of s p i r i t i s determined by word, whether that word i s vocal or 
not* The medium of the word i s always present, and even when man thinks 
he thinks i n words. Even then he i s not communicating something new to 
himself. Rather i s he remembering 'what has been spoken to him since 
his l i f e ' s beginning', and 'organising i t into a meaningful whole'• 
When God spoke to the prophets, he did not give them new words, but put 
fac t s already known to them i n the l i g h t of t h e i r ultimate significance 
and commanded them to speak out of that s i t u a t i o n i n t h e i r own language* 
Si m i l a r l y , when the S p i r i t i s t s of the l a t e r Reformation era spoke of 
the "inner word" i t was r e a l l y the Word of the Bible, or t r a d i t i o n , or 
the Reformers, as.illuminated by t h e i r own experience of the S p i r i t * 
And i n t h i s way God's Word broke through afresh i n each age* Thus there 
can be no "cutting-off" of the S p i r i t ' s work from the revelatory t r a d i -
tion, not even i n those types of r e l i g i o n where re l i g i o u s experience i s 
considered to be the decisive principle* The concept of the "inner word" 
i s therefore misleading. For what r e a l l y happens i s a 'refocus^ing into 
contemporary relevance of the words from t r a d i t i o n s and former experiences', 
a refocus wing which occurs under the impact of the S p i r i t . But 'the 
medium of the word i s not excluded* ' ^ 
Thirdly, there i s danger that undue emphasis on the "inner word" 
may cause the ultimate c r i t e r i o n of a l l revelatory experiences, the New 
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Being i n Jesus as the C h r i s t , to be l o s t i n favour of the immediacy of 
the S p i r i t * The Reformers recognised t h i s danger, and so t i e d the S p i r i t 
firmly to the b i b l i c a l message of the Christ * But i n so doing, another 
danger appeared, for when the b i b l i c a l revelation became interpreted 
s o l e l y i n l i g h t of the doctrine of the j u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h , t h i s 
resulted i n the impact of the S p i r i t being replaced by an i n t e l l e c t u a l 
acceptance of the dootrine, with the sole work of the S p i r i t being to 
t e s t i f y to i t s truth* I t i s c e r t a i n l y part of the S p i r i t ' s work to 
affirm the B i b l i c a l message, but not to guarantee the l i t e r a l truth of 
forms of b i b l i c a l expression. I n f a c t , t h i s would have the e f f e c t of 
replacing genuine l i f e i n the S p i r i t by seeking security i n the Bible as 
an external authority. There must, says T i l l i c h , be a balance between 
the two. On the one hand, the c r i t e r i o n of Jesus as the C h r i s t as i t 
appears i n the b i b l i c a l message must remain to prevent the Word of God 
from being i d e n t i f i e d with any pious words that one may speak to oneself* 
On the other hand, the impact of the S p i r i t on the l i f e of man must not 
be subordinated to a l e g a l i s t i c biblicism, which would have the e f f e c t 
of placing severe limitations on the S p i r i t ' s work* 
Evaluation 
T i l l i o h has made a valuable contribution to a theology of the 
sacraments i n the contemporary period, a contribution which i s influenced 
both by his doctrine of symbolism and by his indebtedness to the i n s i g h t s 
of modern depth psychology, such as one finds i n the Jungian school of 
psychological interpretation* I t i s obvious that no doctrine of the 
sacraments w i l l be adequate for contemporary man which f a i l s to under-
stand the important role of the symbol i n human l i f e . I n t h i s connection 
one also values T i l l i c h ' s warning l e s t the sacraments, as symbolic media 
of the S p i r i t u a l Fresenoe, should become debased into the means of t r y i n g 
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to force the S p i r i t upon people through techniques and methods of 
persuasion whereby the unconscious part of a man i s h e l p l e s s l y brain-
washed into accepting something which under normal circumstances he 
would not accept, a warning which i s p a r t i c u l a r l y relevant i n an age 
when there i s increasing i n t e r e s t i n magical c u l t s and emotional ex-
pressions of worship* Nevertheless, t h i s i s a l l the more reason why a 
sober reassessment of the symbolic and the saoramental i s c a l l e d for, 
and T i l l i c h ' s evaluation of the sacramental i s profoundly s i g n i f i c a n t 
i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . I n addition to t h i s , i t i s good that T i l l i c h has 
emphasised that f o r the Chr i s t i a n the h i s t o r i c a l dimension i n the s i g n i -
ficance of the sacramental i s v i t a l l y necessary, for i t i s t h i s dimension 
above a l l that prevents a return to a merely superstitious or magical 
understanding of the sacraments, as well as providing the necessary 
l i n k with the s p e c i f i c a l l y human dimension of s p i r i t . For i t i s man 
who interprets the sacramental significance of natural things, and t h i s 
i s where f a i t h , as a response of the human s p i r i t to the action of the 
Divine S p i r i t i n the history of salvation, comes i n . I n this way, the 
gap between the two extremes of a 'magical sacrament 1 and a s t r i c t l y 
dominical interpretation i s narrowed. 
There are c e r t a i n themes, however, which one f e e l s T i l l i c h could 
have expanded a l i t t l e more f u l l y , p a r t i c u l a r l y the point about the 
adequacy of c e r t a i n objects or a c t i v i t i e s to become more s p e c i f i c a l l y 
sacramental than others. This need for expansion comes out e s p e c i a l l y 
i n his analysis of the two sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper. 
I n f a c t , h i s analysis of baptism i s not so much an a n a l y s i s as an i n t r o -
duction, which needs f i l l i n g out considerably i f i t i s to be more than 
t h i s . Yet even i f we concede that what he provides i s an outline of h i s 
understanding of the sacrament, i t i s an outline which i s f a r from c l e a r , 
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p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the conclusion to which he comes« Thus we are told that 
water has a s p e c i a l power of i t s own which s u i t s i t to become the bearer 
of s a c r a l power, but we are not told what t h i s s p e c i a l power i s and why 
i t i s not found, for example, i n the alt e r n a t i v e s T i l l i c h mentions* We 
are l e f t then wondering what the necessary r e l a t i o n between water and 
baptism p r e c i s e l y i s * I f we are to r e j e c t any arbitrary connection be-
tween the two, at l e a s t we must be given a legitimate reason f o r doing 
so; or e l s e we run the very r i s k of a t t r i b u t i n g 'magical' properties 
to water that T i l l i c h himself wishes to avoid* I n short, the discussion 
i s f a r from clear* 
His analysis of the Lord's Supper likewise needs elucidation at 
several points* I n the f i r s t place, h i s comment on substances that 
nourish the body being effeotive symbols for the body i t s e l f i s possibly 
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an extension of Calvin's thought on sacramental food, and thus provides 
a l i n k with the Reformers* Secondly, h i s interpretation of the partaking 
of the bread and wine as a symbol of pa r t i c i p a t i o n i n the s p i r i t u a l body 
of C h r i s t i s v a l i d enough, but there i s no reason why t h i s should r u l e out 
a so-called ' r i t u a l i s t i c ' interpretation of the Lord's Supper* T i l l i c h ' s 
assertion that such an interpretation goes no further than the Cross f a i l s 
to reckon with the f a c t that the bread that i s broken i s broken that a l l 
may share, and the wine that i s poured out i s poured out so that a l l may 
drink of i t . Here there i s no one-sided emphasis on the Cross, for the 
l i f e of C h r i s t cannot be shared u n t i l he i s r i s e n . I n the sacramental 
r i t e , the Cross and Resurrection are t r u l y held together* And t h i r d l y , 
he moves f a r too quickly over the point of the transcendent body of 
C h r i s t taking up into i t s e l f the whole of the natural dimensions that 
have culminated into hi3 physical form* Now t h i s seems to suggest that 
the natural dimensions themselves (to which bread and wine belong) i n 
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some way pa r t i c i p a t e i n the transcendent body of C h r i s t , that they do 
i n f a c t have a part i n his s p i r i t u a l body, which they can therefore 
appropriately represent i n the Eucharist* I f thiB i s so, then we seem to 
have reached some sort of mystical interpretation of the E u c h a r i s t i c 
Presence which goes f a r beyond New Testament teaching on the Lord's 
Supper, and which i s based on a point of view regarding the relationship 
between God and the world which i s rather a l i e n to b i b l i c a l theology* 
Neither would i t be f a i r to say that this i s what Luther means i n his 
doctrine of ubiquity, as T i l l i c h suggests* I t i s much more l i k e l y that 
Luther i s grounding h i s affirmation of the presence of C h r i s t i n the 
Eucharist on a doctrine of the r i s e n C h r i s t ' s omnipresence rather than on 
some concept of ontological participation between the S p i r i t of Christ 
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and the natural order* ' However, having made these comments, one must 
frankly admit the d i f f i c u l t i e s of expounding or assessing T i l l i c h ' s 
doctrine of the Lord's Supper with any degree of s a t i s f a c t i o n , i f only 
because the inadequacy of T i l l i c h * s own analysis does not permit us to do 
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F i n a l l y , although the analysis of the two sacraments which we have 
included here i s taken from The Protestant Era* a c o l l e c t i o n of essays 
not s p e c i f i c a l l y concerned with the S p i r i t as such, i t i s nevertheless 
unfortunate that he does not r e l a t e the nature of the sacraments more ex-
p l i c i t l y to the work of the S p i r i t i n the l i f e of the individual and the 
church* Whilst he i s j u s t l y concerned with the v a l i d i t y of the symbols, 
there i s a notable absence of any meaningful referenoe to the S p i r i t ' s 
work of regeneration and the corporate fellowship of the Body of C h r i s t 
with which the two sacraments respectively are intimately connected* For 
t h i s reason h i s analysis i s incomplete and needs to be linked with what he 
says l a t e r about these concepts i n h i s discussion on the ohurch* 
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Like h i s discussion on the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's 
Supper, T i l l i c h ' s analysis of the r e l a t i o n of the S p i r i t to the Word of 
God, p a r t i c u l a r l y as i t appears i n the B i b l e , i s f a r too b r i e f . There 
are suggestive i n s i g h t s which would c e r t a i n l y have benefitted from being 
followed through, such as h i s attack on propositional revelation and h i s 
suggestion that the b i b l i c a l word cannot be the Word of God i n objective 
i s o l a t i o n , though his implication that Calvin propounded an idea of 
propositional revelation i s hardly consistent with h i s own exposition 
i n Perspectives, where he says, 'For Calvin the Bible does not say any-
thing to anyone, either to theologians or to pious readers, without the 
Divine S p i r i t * The Divine S p i r i t i s the creative power i n which our own 
personal s p i r i t i s involved and transcended* The S p i r i t i s not a mecha-
nism for dictating material as i n some forms of the theory of i n s p i r a -
t i o n * * ^ This exposition, which i s much more f a i t h f u l to Calvin's own 
67 
position, shows that i n h i s Systematic Theology T i l l i c h i s being rather 
unfair to Calvin by suggesting that he held the view that the Bible consisted 
of the oracles of God without some q u a l i f i c a t i o n * Two further points may 
also be raised* F i r s t l y , i n h i s assertion that the Bible i s the most 
effe c t i v e medium of the S p i r i t i n Western culture, T i l l i c h seems to be 
implying that i n other cultures i t may not be so* Are we to i n f e r from 
t h i s that the most e f f e c t i v e medium of the S p i r i t i n India i s the 
Bhagavad Gita. or i n Arab lands the Koran? Now without i n the l e a s t 
denying that the Bhagavad Gita or the Koran or any other sacramental form 
of a written or spoken nature may be s p i r i t u a l l y effeotive, C h r i s t i a n 
theology could never plaoe them above or even on a par with the Bible* 
even i n the context of t h e i r own p a r t i c u l a r cultures. I n f a c t , the 
primary question i s not which i s the most e f f e c t i v e medium of the S p i r i t 
a t a l l , but where the revelation of God i n history supremely occurs* So 
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the Bible derives i t s unique e f f i c a c y from the f a c t that i t i s the record 
of the h i s t o r i c a l revelation of God i n C h r i s t , which the S p i r i t takes and 
makes r e a l i n the experience of men* Because of t h i s , i t i s e n t i r e l y mis-
leading to suggest that the Bible i s the most e f f e c t i v e medium of the 
S p i r i t i n Western culture alone* I t s effectiveness applies to a l l cultures, 
i n so f a r as God's revelation i n Ch r i s t i s the supreme revelation f o r a l l 
men* The other point that stems from T i l l i c h ' s analysis of the Bible as 
the Word of God i n r e l a t i o n to the S p i r i t i s the importance of h i s 
assertion that the message of the Bible must be relevantly correlated to 
the needs of men rather than j u s t spoken to them and l e f t at that* This 
i s an is s u e which has come very much to the fore i n the church's r e -
appraisal of i t s mission and message i n the contemporary world, and one 
which cannot be ignored i n the theology e i t h e r of communication or of the 
S p i r i t * 
T i l l i c h ' s discussion on the problems surrounding the concept of the 
"inner word" i s well balanced, bringing out the force of the arguments on 
both sides, and showing the dangers of both the doctrines of the immediacy 
of the S p i r i t and the work of the S p i r i t as primarily establishing the 
i n f a l l i b i l i t y of the Scriptures* The attempt to cut off the S p i r i t ' s 
work from the revelatory t r a d i t i o n i s as u n j u s t i f i e d as the attempt to 
Impose on the S p i r i t ' s work a s t r i c t l y b i b l i c a l pattern of reference* 
However, h i s c r i t i c i s m of the use of the expression the "inner .word" i s 
open to several objections* More generally, does i t have to imply that 
there are two separate selves communicating? For example, could not the 
expression i n c e r t a i n cases r e f e r to the s e l f talking to the s e l f ) which i s 
what happens i n much of our thinking, and even meditation? 'Talking to 
o n e s e l f i s a common occurrence, not reserved s o l e l y for the insane, and there 
i s no reason at a l l why the expression the "inner word" should not be used 
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i n t h i s way. So the implication that the other s e l f i s the Logos or the 
S p i r i t does not follow at a l l . But even were we to identify the other 
s e l f as the S p i r i t , are we f a l l i n g as foul of the ru l e s as T i l l i c h would 
suggest? His assertion that because s e l f i s a structural concept we 
cannot apply i t symbolically to God i s not e n t i r e l y convincing. I n 
f a c t , to refuse to do so would immediately imply that God i s somehow 
l e s s than t r u l y personal. Yet even i n T i l l i c h 1 s own theological milieu, 
mystical understanding has never shrunk back from r e f e r r i n g to the 
divine S e l f , so he has good precedence for i t s usage i n his own system. 
Again, i t seems to me that i f one r e j e c t s the expression the "inner 
word" because i t i s a symbolic application of the concept of the s e l f to 
God, then surely one must also r e j e c t the expression the "Word of God" 
for p r e c i s e l y the same reason, i n that t h i s expression also conveys the 
image of a divine S e l f trying to communicate. The truth i s that i f 
one i s to use any genuine symbol of communication, t h i s sort of image 
i s i n e v i t a b l e . Ultimately therefore, provided one bears i n mind T i l l i c h ' s 
v a l i d contention that there can be no private revelation outside the 
revelatory t r a d i t i o n of the S p i r i t culminating i n Jesus as the Word of 
God, one sees no reason why the expression the 'inner word' should not 
re f e r to the s i l e n t communication of the S p i r i t within the s p i r i t of man, 
t e s t i f y i n g to the Word of God as i t i s recorded i n the Scriptures and 
applying i t s message to the l i f e and experience of him who i s grasped by 
the S p i r i t of God* 
I I I . THE CONTENT OF THE MANIFESTATION OF THE SPIRIT 
We turn now to the s p e c i f i c content of the manifestation of the 
S p i r i t i n the l i f e of man. As we have already seen, the purpose of the 
S p i r i t ' s revelation i n human l i f e i s to make possible the creation of a 
l i f e that i s free from a l l those ambiguities which have been occasioned by 
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the s p l i t between the e s s e n t i a l and e x i s t e n t i a l elements of being i n 
the subject-object world. Such a l i f e i s characterised therefore by a 
reunion of essence and existence, subject and object, the divine S p i r i t and 
the human s p i r i t , which i s made possible not through any act of transcendence 
that, man i s able to achieve for himself, but only through the impact of 
the S p i r i t u a l Presence. An unambiguous l i f e of transcendent unity i s 
created by the S p i r i t which T i l l i c h c a l l s 'the transcendent unity of un-
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ambiguous l i f e ' * 
This transcendent unity of unambiguous l i f e , the creation of the 
S p i r i t , appears i n man both as f a i t h and as love, which are thus two 
aspects of the same thing. ' F a i t h 1 , says T i l l i o h , ' i s the state of being 
grasped by the transcendent unity of unambiguous l i f e - i t embodies love 
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as the state of being taken into that transcendent unity.' Though 
f a i t h l o g i c a l l y precedes love, neither can be present without the other, 
or e l s e they become distorted, f a i t h into l i t t l e else than 'an ambiguous 
act of r e l i g i o u s self-transcendence', love into 'an ambiguous reunion of 
the the 
the separated without the c r i t e r i o n and/power of/transcendent union 1, and 
therefore no r e a l reunion at a l l . E x i s t i n g apart, they are merely d i s -
tortions of the o r i g i n a l S p i r i t u a l creation. 
T i l l i c h deals f i r s t l y with the S p i r i t u a l Presence manifest as 
f a i t h . The word ' f a i t h ' , he points out, i s d i f f i c u l t , because of centuries 
of misinterpretation and confusion. Today i t i s commonly confused with 
b e l i e f i n something for which there i s l i t t l e or no evidence, often quite 
absurd and rid i c u l o u s , and such confusion opens up C h r i s t i a n i t y to attack 
by c r i t i c s who have f a l l e n into the error of believing that t h i s i s what 
f a i t h i s meant to be. So f a i t h i s a concept that needs to be defined 
c a r e f u l l y and c o r r e c t l y . T i l l i c h d i f f e r e n t i a t e s between f a i t h as defined 
formally and f a i t h as defined materially. The formal d e f i n i t i o n of f a i t h , 
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he says, i s v a l i d f o r f a i t h i n any type of r e l i g i o n and culture* I t i s , 
i n f a c t , 'the s t a t e of being grasped by that toward which self-transcen-
dence as p i r e s , the ultimate i n being and meaning', or to put i t more 
succinctly, 'the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern', or quite 
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simply the 'state of being ultimately concerned'• This state of ultimate 
concern has two aspects, one subjective, the other objectivei 'somebody 
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i s concerned about something he considers of concern'* I n t r a d i t i o n a l 
theology, T i l l i c h points out that the subjective aspect of ultimate 
concern corresponds to the f a i t h through which one believes ( f i d e s qua 
o r e d i t u r ) , the objective aspect to the f a i t h which i s believed (fides quae 
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c r e d i t u r ) * So f a i t h i s both the concern of a person towards that which 
i s ultimate and i n f i n i t e , and also the expression of the ultimate which i s 
the object of that concern* T i l l i c h maintains that i n t h i s formal sense 
of f a i t h as ultimate oonoern, everyone has f a i t h * 'Nobody oan escape 
the e s s e n t i a l r e l a t i o n of the conditional s p i r i t to something unconditional* 
Even though the objective, concrete expression of that f a i t h may be un-
worthy, the concern i s s t i l l there and cannot be completely extinguished* 
I n h i s 'Dialogues with Students' he affirms t 
I f people t e l l you, " I have no ultimate ooncern," • • • 
then ask them, " I s there r e a l l y nothing at a l l that you 
take with unconditional seriousness? What, f o r instance, 
would you be ready to s u f f e r or even to die f o r ? " Then 
you w i l l discover that even the cynic takes his cynicism 
with ultimate seriousness, not to speak of others, who 
may be n a t u r a l i s t s , m a t e r i a l i s t s , Communists, or whatever* 
They c e r t a i n l y take something with ultimate seriousness*74 
So everyone i s concerned about something, even though that which they 
may oonsider t h e i r ultimate concern i s i n f a c t 'preliminary, f i n i t e and 
conditioned', invested i n th e i r own minds with the dignity of the ultimate, 
i n f i n i t e and unconditional* But at l e a s t , some sort of f a i t h i s there, 
and to recognise t h i s i s to refute the idea that the world of man i s 
175 
somehow the b a t t l e f i e l d between f a i t h and 'ion-faith', as C h r i s t i a n 
assessments of history have sometimes maintained* 
I n Dynamics of F a i t h , T i l l i c h says that t h i s formal expression of 
f a i t h as ultimate concern, i s an act which involves the whole persona-
l i t y * ' I t happens i n the centre of the personal l i f e and includes a l l 
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i t s elements'. Because i t shares i n the dynamics of l i f e , including 
i t s p o l a r i t i e s , i t i s ihus capable of uniting the various elements of 
the personality by i t s power to transcend them and the e x i s t e n t i a l s p l i t 
between them* So genuine f a i t h i s self-transcendent, e c s t a t i c * The t e s t 
of f a i t h , therefore, as ultimate concern i s whether i t makes t h i s s e l f -
transcendent, e c s t a t i c union possible* Any f a i t h which makes a preliminary 
concern ultimate f a i l s to do t h i s * I t i s not self-transcendent, and 
therefore leads to the disruption of the centredness of l i f e , as well as 
d i s t o r t i n g the ultimate* Such f a i t h , says T i l l i c h , though i t contains 
the formal element of what f a i t h should be, i s nevertheless idolatrous* 
And the struggle between genuine and idolatrous f a i t h i s one which has 
gone on throughout history, a struggle 'waged between a f a i t h directed 
to ultimate r e a l i t y and a f a i t h directed toward preliminary r e a l i t i e s 
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claiming ultimacy' for themselves* 
This leads us to consider f a i t h i n i t s material aspect, for i t i s 
that which gives content to the formal framework of f a i t h that determines 
whether i i s concern i s ultimate or not. So the d e f i n i t i o n of f a i t h as 
being grasped by an ultimate concern, i s now f i l l e d out with the statement 
that f a i t h ' i s the state of being grasped by the S p i r i t u a l Presence and 
opened to the transcendent unity of unambiguous l i f e ' , which for C h r i s t i a n 
theology means more precisely that f a i t h ' i s the state of being grasped 
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by the New Being as i t i s manifest i n Jesus as the C h r i s t ' . 1 1 I n such 
a d e f i n i t i o n , the formal and universal d e f i n i t i o n of f a i t h becomes material 
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and p a r t i c u l a r * This does not mean, says T i l l i c h , that the C h r i s t i a n 
f a i t h excludes a l l other f a i t h s , but rather f u l f i l s them. The C h r i s t i a n 
assertion f i l l s out with meaning the formal structure of f a i t h as ultimate 
concern, and i n t h i s sense, i t becomes the c r i t e r i o n for distinguishing 
between those forms of f a i t h which are genuine and those which are 
idolatrous* 
T i l l i c h admits that h is understanding of f a i t h i n terms of ultimate 
concern i s f a r from t r a d i t i o n a l definitions i n terms of i n t e l l e c t , w i l l or 
f e e l i n g , which are distortions of what f a i t h r e a l l y i s * The i n t e l l e c t u a l 
d i s t o r t i o n stems from the idea that f a i t h i s an act of knowledge with a 
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low degree of evidence* This l i e s open to several c r i t i c i s m s * I n the 
f i r s t place, i t reduces f a i t h to b e l i e f , and i n t h i s way r a i s e s the 
problem of the authority on which something i s to be believed* And secondly, 
i t confuses f a i t h with knowledge* And t h i s i n i t s e l f r a i s e s d i f f i c u l t i e s , 
f o r the certitude that stems from knowledge, however i t i s received, i s 
always i n danger of being undercut by new discoveries or methods* But 
the certitude that stems from f a i t h , T i l l i c h points out, i s dif f e r e n t * I t 
i s the " e x i s t e n t i a l 1 1 type of certitude, involving the whole l i f e of man 
i n response to the question "to be or not to be"* As such, the certitude 
of f a i t h cannot be subjected to any empirical means of v e r i f i c a t i o n and 
therefore 'nothing i s more undignified than to make f a i t h do duty for 
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evidence which i s lacking*. 
The v o l u n t a r i s t i c d i s t o r t i o n of f a i t h stems from the attempt to 
es t a b l i s h a more intimate relationship between f a i t h and moral decision, 
a need which a r i s e s from over-emphasis on an i n t e l l e c t u a l interpretation* 
T i l l i c h points out that i n the sc h o l a s t i c t r a d i t i o n , f a i t h becomes 'the 
w i l l to believe', i n that that which cannot be ascertained by evidence i s 
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made up by an act of w i l l * But t h i s leads us to ask what i t i s we are 
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'willed to believe', which i n i t s turn presupposes some authority for 
b e l i e f , and t h i s re-establishes the i n t e l l e c t u a l understanding of f a i t h * 
S i m i l a r l y i n the Protestant t r a d i t i o n , f a i t h i s often defined as 'obedience 1, 
i n the sense of 'the obedience of f a i t h ' * Now t h i s term can legitimately 
r e f e r to the act of commitment that i s i m p l i c i t i n the state of ultimate 
concern, but more generally i t has meant subjeotion to the command to 
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believe through the medium of preaching* We are l e f t with the same 
question, 'Obedience to whom?1 Where does t h i s command to believe come 
from, and wherein l i e s i t s authority? So the i n t e l l e c t u a l understanding 
of f a i t h i s again re-established. And i f the answer i s given that the 
authority l i e s i n the Word of God, then one i s l e f t with a c i r c u l a r 
s i t u a t i o n where such an authority can only be accepted 'by one already 
i n the s t a t e of f a i t h who acknowledges the word heard to (be) the Word 
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of God'* So 'no command to believe and no w i l l to believe can create 
f a i t h 1 * F a i t h must precede them both* 
The third type of d i s t o r t i o n to which T i l l i c h refers i s emotional-
i s t i o . He points out that the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of f a i t h with f e e l i n g i s 
not only the most common misrepresentation, but i t i s also the one most 
readi l y accepted by those who would r e j e c t any r e l i g i o u s claim to truth 
and yet cannot deny i t s great psychological and sociological power* I t 
means that they can put r e l i g i o n neatly and safely away 'into a corner 
of subjective f e e l i n g s ' , so that i t becomes emasculated and unable to 
influence man's c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s . I n t h i s case, r e l i g i o n i s l e f t 
unscathed u n t i l i t breaks out of these l i m i t s imposed upon i t and t r e s -
passes on 'the s o l i d land of knowledge and action*. But once i t does 
t h i s i t i s vehemently attacked* There are those who f e e l that t h i s mis-
interpretation of f a i t h originated with Schleiermacher, but T i l l i c h points 
out that this i s r e a l l y a travesty of what Schleiermacher said* For 
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Schleiermacher f a i t h i n faot was much more than a mere subjective feeling* 
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i t was rather the f e e l i n g of 'unconditional dependence', a phrase which 
T i l l i c h f e e l s i s not f a r removed from h i s own 'ultimate concern'* The 
common conception of r e l i g i o n as 'feeling' that one finds today, however, 
i s rather different from t h i s . When people normally identify f a i t h with 
f e e l i n g , they are saying that f a i t h i s a matter of merely subjective 
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emotion, which has no p a r t i c u l a r content or demand. I n r e j e c t i n g thiB 
one i s not saying that feeling has no part i n f a i t h , as Schleiermaoher 
saw so c l e a r l y , for 'emotion always expresses the involvement of the 
whole personality i n an act of l i f e of s p i r i t ' , but one i s affirming* 
and r i g h t l y so, that emotion i s not i t s source. 
I n f a c t , f a i t h draws every element of l i f e into i t s e l f * I t grasps 
the t o t a l personality and every part of l i f e becomes e c s t a t i c a l l y opened 
towards the S p i r i t u a l Presence* This means that the i n t e l l e c t u a l , v o l i -
t i o n a l and emotional elements of l i f e are a l l included* There i s assent 
to f a i t h , a cognitive acceptance of the truth which concerns our r e l a t i o n 
to the ultimate and the. symbols which point to i t ; there i s obedience i n 
f a i t h , an obedienoe not of submission but of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , of keeping 
oneself open to the S p i r i t ; there i s an emotional element i n the state of 
him who i s grasped by the S p i r i t , which i s not an i n d e f i n i t e f e e l i n g but 
an e c s t a t i c courage which overoomes the anxieties of f i n i t u d e by taking 
into i t s e l f the power of the transcendent unity, thereby creating unam-
biguous l i f e * But none of these things create f a i t h * I t i s rather that 
the ultimate 'grasps a l l of these functions and r a i s e s them beyond them-
selves by the creation of f a i t h ' , a creation achieved by God alone* This 
does not mean, of course, that f a i t h i s not i n man* I t i s i n man, though 
not from him. Within himself man i s aware of h i s being grasped by the 
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S p i r i t s i t i s not j u s t a case of blindly believing what he believes* 
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And though there i s no self-assurance about being i n the state of f a i t h , 
man i s nevertheless conscious of the S p i r i t of God working i n him, even 
though that work stems from a r a d i c a l transcendence of divine a o t i v i t y * 
F i n a l l y , T i l l i c h delineates three elements within the material 
concept of f a i t h i f i r s t l y , that of being opened up by the S p i r i t , f a i t h 
i n i t s 'receptive character, i t s mere p a s s i v i t y i n r e l a t i o n to the divine 
S p i r i t ' ; secondly, that of accepting t h i s i n s p i t e of the i n f i n i t e gap 
between the divine S p i r i t and the human s p i r i t , f a i t h i n i t s 'paradoxical 
character, i t s courageous standing i n the S p i r i t u a l Presence'; and t h i r d l y , 
that of expecting f i n a l p a r ticipation i n the transcendent unity of unam-
biguous l i f e , f a i t h i n i t s 'anticipatory character, i t s quality as hope 
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f o r the f u l f i l l i n g o r e a t i v i t y of the divine S p i r i t ' • 7 These three 
elements, he points out, do not follow on one a f t e r the other* They 
are a l l mutually present within each other wherever f a i t h occurs* I n 
C h r i s t i a n thought, they correspond to the characterisation of the New 
Being i n terms of regeneration, j u s t i f i c a t i o n and s a n c t i f i c a t i o n , great 
theological themes which w i l l be analysed more f u l l y when we come to 
discuss with T i l l i c h the S p i r i t ' s conquest of l i f e ' s ambiguities. 
Whereas f a i t h , according to T i l l i c h , i s the state of being grasped 
by the transcendent unity of unambiguous l i f e , love i s the state of being 
taken in t o that transcendent unity by the S p i r i t u a l Presence* T i l l i o h 
points out that i n t h i s way love i s r i g h t l y spoken of as a l o g i c a l conse-
quence of f a i t h , f o r one cannot be taken into the unity of unambiguous 
l i f e u n t i l one i s f i r s t grasped by i t * However, love i s much more than a 
mere consequence of f a i t h * ' i t i s one side of the e c s t a t i c state of being 
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of which f a i t h i s the other', and any attempt to set them over against 
each other leads to distortion* Both together are the work of the S p i r i t * 
T i l l i c h points out that love, l i k e f a i t h , has suffered from a variety 
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of misinterpretations* This can be seen p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the common 
def i n i t i o n of love i n emotional terms* But while love does have a genuine 
emotional element, i t i s f a r more than mere emotion* I n f a c t , i t i s 
actual i n every function of the human personality and i t s roots are to 
be found i n the very core of l i f e i t s e l f , so much so that i t may be c a l l e d 
91 
the 'moving power of l i f e ' , a t r u l y ontological r e a l i t y . I n the state 
of e x i s t e n t i a l estrangement, t h i s power i s directed s p e c i f i c a l l y towards 
overcoming t h i s estrangement. But i t can only do t h i s beoause those things 
which are separated i n existence are e s s e n t i a l l y ones 'estrangement 
always implies a fundamental belongingness, and therefore an inner drive 
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towards reunion'. So love i s e f f e c t i v e i n each of l i f e ' s processesi 
' i t unites i n a centre, i t creates the new, i t drives beyond everything 
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given to i t s ground and i t s aim'* I t i s because i t i s thus at work 
within the whole of l i f e that i t takes on many different expressions, 
yet each expression i s the context i n which an attempt i s made to bring the 
estranged elements of l i f e together* Each attempt to create unity, however, 
i s subject to ambiguity, which can be seen i n every person-to-person 
encounter. Such an impasse poses the question of how an unambiguous 
reunion can be achieved. I t cannot, says T i l l i c h , be achieved by man 
himself, i t can only be achieved by part i c i p a t i n g i n the transcendent 
unity of unambiguous l i f e , by which i t i s possible to overcome every 
b a r r i e r and participate f u l l y i n the l i f e of the other s e l f * This 
creation of unambiguous love i s the work of the S p i r i t * I t i s t h i s love 
to which the New Testament r e f e r s as agape* 
Two questions a r i s e here. The f i r s t , says T i l l i c h , i s concerned 
with the r e l a t i o n between love i t s e l f , as ontologically defined i n terms 
of agape*, and the various functions of the mind i n whioh i t appears* We 
have already noted the common confusion of love with emotion, and have 
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pointed out that though t h i s confusion must be exposed, we should not go 
to the other extreme and allow no part i n love for the emotions a t a l l * 
How then are we to define love i n r e l a t i o n to the emotions? T i l l i c h 1 s 
answer begins with the assertion that 'the emotional element i n love 
i s • • * the par t i c i p a t i o n of the centred whole of a being i n the process 
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of reunion, whether i t i s i n anticipation or/fulfilment*• Whenever 
a person anticipates reunion or experiences i t the emotions are involved, 
but t h i s i s rather different from saying that the emotions are the driving 
power i n love* The drive towards reunion belongs rather to the 'essential 
structure of l i f e and, consequently, i s experienced as pleasure, joy, or 
blessedness, according to the different dimensions'* The emotional 
element then does not come f i r s t , i t i s rather that the anticipation and 
experience of reunion as f a r as man i s concerned expresses i t s e l f i n 
emotional ways* 
Love also includes a strong v o l i t i o n a l element, which i s necessitated 
by the f a c t that i n l i f e as we know i t there i s always a fundamental 
resistance to complete unity. The Great Commandment to love r e f e r s above 
a l l to t h i s v o l i t i o n a l element, f o r without i t , i t would be impossible f or 
love ever to 'penetrate to the other person' a t a l l * S i m i l a r l y there i s 
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an important relationship between love and the i n t e l l e c t . T i l l i c h 
points out that t h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l appreciation of love, which stems from 
the c l a s s i c a l t r a d i t i o n s i s found i n the early C h r i s t i a n vocabulary where 
the word gnosis stood equally for knowledge, sexual union or mystical 
participation* So love must include knowledge of that which i s loved: 
not a s c i e n t i f i c type of knowledge, bu$ a 'participating knowledge which 
changes both the knower and the known i n the very act of loving knowledge'* 
Thus we see that love, l i k e f a i t h , includes the whole person* emotion, 
w i l l , i n t e l l e c t ; ' a l l functions of the human mind are a l i v e i n every 
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act of l o v e ' * ^ 
The second question that a r i s e s i s the r e l a t i o n between agape and 
the other kinds of loves p h i l i a , the love of friendship, eros, 'the 
s t r i v i n g towards a union with that which i s the bearer of values because 
of the values i t embodies', and epithymia or l i b i d o , the desire for v i t a l 
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s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t * Unlike c e r t a i n contemporary theologians, T i l l i c h 
maintains that there i s no e s s e n t i a l disunity between agape and these 
other kinds of lovei 'agape, as the self-transcending element of love, 
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i s not separated from the other elements','7 since they each 'drive 
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toward the reunion of the separated'. This i s why i t i s better to speak 
of d i f f e r e n t 'qualities of love' rather than different 'types': 'there 
are not types, but q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of love, since the different q u a l i t i e s 
are present, by e f f i c i e n c y or deficiency, i n every act of l o v e ' * * ^ The 
attempt to make a fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n between them has i n f a c t , 
maintains T i l l i o h , led to two unfortunate r e s u l t s . I t has led to agape 
being reduced to a moral concept, both i n r e l a t i o n to man and i n r e l a t i o n 
to God, and i t has v i r t u a l l y given eros a s o l e l y sexual orientation which 
has resulted i n i t s profanisation, thereby denying i t any part i n unam-
biguous l i f e * 1 0 1 What act u a l l y distinguishes agape from the other q u a l i t i e s 
of love i s i t s character as an e c s t a t i c manifestation of the S p i r i t u a l 
Presence, which i s possible only i n unity with f a i t h * I n t h i s sense i t 
i s independent of the other q u a l i t i e s of love, but i t i s also able to 
unite with them, judging them and transforming them, and i n t h i s way con-
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quering t h e i r ambiguities. 
As a creation of the S p i r i t , love, l i k e f a i t h , has the basic structure 
of the New Being, i n i t s receptive, paradoxical and anticipatory character-
i s t i c s * I t s receptive character i s seen i n i t s t o t a l l y unrestricted 
acceptance of the object of i t s love, i t s paradoxical character i n i t s 
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holding onto t h i s acceptance despite the estranged condition of i t s 
object, i t s anticipatory character i n i t s looking forward to the r e -
establishment of the 'holiness, greatness and dignity' of i t s object 
because of i t s acceptance of him. I n these ways i t 'takes i t s object 
into the transcendent unity of unambiguous l i f e ' . ^ ^ I n i t i a l l y , of course, 
agape i s God's own love 'toward the creature and through the creature 
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toward h i m s e l f * This i s why t h i s threefold character of agape must 
always speak f i r s t l y about God's relationship to us, and only then of 
our relationship to each other* Thia does not mean that we cannot speak 
of agape when we speak of man's love towards God, es p e c i a l l y i f we define 
i t as the drive towards the reunion of the separated* But such a love i s 
only possible i n the act of f a i t h , i n which the S p i r i t grasps man's being. 
Yet i n that same act man i s drawn into the transcendent unity of unambi-
guous l i f e whereby h i s love for God i s f u l f i l l e d * I n t h i s way the d i s -
t i n c t i o n between f a i t h and love disappears* 
Evaluation 
Our approach to what T i l l i c h has to say about the work of the S p i r i t 
i n creating f a i t h and love must bear i n mind the s p e c i f i c connotations of 
the d i f f i c u l t phrase 'the transcendent unity of unambiguous l i f e ' * We 
must wait u n t i l the end of our study before attempting a detailed a n a l y s i s 
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and evaluation of t h i s expression, but three points have ar i s e n i n our 
discussion so f a r which are relevant to our assessment of T i l l i c h ' s 
concept of f a i t h and love* F i r s t l y , the state of transcendent unity which 
characterises unambiguous l i f e i s a state i n which the estranged e s s e n t i a l 
and e x i s t e n t i a l elements of l i f e are reunited, so that each e x i s t e n t i a l 
form i s reunited with i t s e s s e n t i a l r e a l i t y * Secondly, i t i s a state i n 
which the d i v i s i o n between subject and object i n e x i s t e n t i a l l i f e i s over-
come, so that mutual participation of the one i n the other i s possible* 
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Thirdly* i t i s a unity which i s characterised above a l l by the p a r t i c i -
pation of man i n h i s divine Ground, made possible by the impact of the 
divine S p i r i t on the human s p i r i t * I t i s because t h i s fundamental unity 
has been effected that the two previous expressions of unity are possible* 
What must be emphasised p a r t i c u l a r l y i s that for T i l l i c h t h i s transcendent 
unity i s a unity of being, an ontological unity, so that the p a r t i c i p a -
tion of which he speaks i s more than an 'empathetic' or 'psychological' 
participations i t i s a to t a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n of being i n being, which 
involves a mutual immanence between essence and existence, subject and 
object, f i n i t e r e a l i t y and ultimate Ground* As we s h a l l see i n our f i n a l 
evaluation, a l l these things must be borne i n mind when we come to ask j u s t 
what T i l l i c h does mean when he speaks of the transcendent unity of unam-
biguous l i f e . However, although at t h i s stage i t would be premature to 
make such an evaluation, enough has been said to show that i t i s very much 
open to question as to whether the New Testament envisages the work of the 
S p i r i t i n t h i s way at a l l * Certainly the S p i r i t i s the bearer of new 
l i f e to men, but whether the b i b l i c a l message thinks of t h i s l i f e i n terms 
of a transcendent, ontological unity, i n which there i s t o t a l Immanence 
between subject and object,is doubtful. 
These considerations are bound to influence our judgment on 
T i l l i c h ' s d e f i n i t i o n of f a i t h i n terms of 'ultimate concern', since i t 
i s c l e a r that for T i l l i c h being grasped by an ultimate concern, and 
being grasped by the transcendent unity of unambiguous l i f e , are one 
and the same thing. The expression 'ultimate concern' therefore i s t i e d 
to and f i l l e d out with a more precise ontological meaning, so that he who 
becomes concerned for the ultimate i s also concerned for transcendent 
unity, i n which the subject-object scheme which makes h i s own individual 
existence possible i s transcended* The implication here i s that anyone 
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who does not express h i s ultimate concern i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r way has a 
concern that i s l e s s than ultimate, and therefore defective* Now t h i s i s 
surely to presuppose that the ontologist alone i s able accurately to 
define what an ultimate concern r e a l l y i s * Kenneth Hamilton's comment here 
i s very pertinent* 'Not for one moment', he says, 'does T i l l i o h consider 
the p o s s i b i l i t y that the believer may not agree with the ontologist 
concerning what makes an ultimate concern ultimate, but instead he proceeds 
to define true ultimacy i n ontological t e r r a s ' * * ^ This alone should make 
us suspicious of T i l l i c h ' s d e f i n i t i o n of f a i t h a s 'being grasped by an 
ultimate concern'• But the expression 'ultimate concern' not only gives r i s e 
to problems regarding the precise connotation of the word 'ultimacy 1; i t 
also r a i s e s the question as to whether the concept of 'concern' i s a 
v a l i d interpretation of f a i t h a t a l l . There are oertainly no grounds 
i n the New Testament for saying that f a i t h and concern, or being grasped 
by concern, are one and the same thing. I f one considers the more formal 
aspect of f a i t h i n the Scriptures, one i s more i n the realm of a r e l a t i o n -
ship based on t r u s t , commitment, obedience, response, or even b e l i e f , 
than concern. This i s not to say that these concepts exhaust the meaning 
of f a i t h , nor i s i t to say that concern has no part i n i t . But i t i s to 
say that concern for the ultimate i s not the essence of b i b l i c a l f a i t h * 
I n f a c t , t h i s 'concern' of which T i l l i o h speaks i n some ways seems much 
more akin to 'seeking a f t e r God' or 'man's quest for the divine*. Now 
such a quest i n i t s e l f i s important, and something which indeed i s a work 
of the S p i r i t . But seeking i s not finding, and there i s a vast difference 
between searching for God and responding to h i s i n v i t a t i o n i n trusting 
commitment. 
Nevertheless, even though we cannot agree with T i l l i c h ' s d e f i n i t i o n 
of f a i t h , his d i s t i n c t i o n between the formal and material aspects of f a i t h 
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i s tremendously important,for the attitude of f a i t h i s common not only 
to the C h r i s t i a n churches, but also to v i r t u a l l y a l l r e l i g i o n s , philo-
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sophies and ideologies, despite t h e i r differences i n content* This 
d i s t i n c t i o n i s a useful corrective to those Christians who would maintain 
that they alone have f a i t h and that a l l other f a i t h i s counterfeit* Yet 
for C h r i s t i a n theology i t i s ultimately the material content of f a i t h 
that i s a l l important, and f o r this reason one must view the work of the 
S p i r i t not only as bringing a l l f a i t h s to t h e i r fulfilment i n C h r i s t , but 
as d i r e c t l y challenging men to abandon a l l preliminary expressions of f a i t h 
which may well prevent the s p e c i f i c a l l y C h r i s t i a n content of f a i t h from 
being acknowledged* On t h i s point T i l l i c h could have been much more 
emphatic* 
Several points a r i s e from T i l l i c h ' s analysis of the distortions of 
f a i t h * I n the f i r s t place, although he i s completely j u s t i f i e d i n r e j e c t i n g 
the equation of f a i t h with b e l i e f , he does tend to underestimate the part 
b e l i e f plays* At some stage every act of f a i t h must become a leap of 
commitment, and i n every act of commitment there must be some element of 
b e l i e f present, some ground on which the commitment i s made* I t cannot 
be wholly i r r a t i o n a l , not a complete shot i n the dark* Seoondly, although 
he c l e a r l y brings out the ambiguity i n the expression 'the obedience of 
f a i t h ' , because he gives i n s u f f i c i e n t consideration to f a i t h as an act of 
commitment, he tends to over-emphasise the d i s c i p l i n a r y implications of 
t h i s expression* The f a c t that f a i t h l o g i c a l l y precedes obedience should 
not blind us to the f a c t that i n the Scriptures obedience i s the necessary 
complement to f a i t h , the sign of true commitment* A third point i s that 
although he r i g h t l y draws a d i s t i n c t i o n between the certitude that stems 
from epistemological knowledge and that which stems from f a i t h , i t would 
have helped i f he had introduced another word here which would have em-
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phasised that d i s t i n c t i o n , and one ventures to suggest the word 'assurance' 
i n t h i s context, a word which has been frequently used i n the theology of 
experience to r e f e r to the certainty that f a i t h creates i n the l i f e of 
him who has been grasped by the S p i r i t * Nevertheless, T i l l i c h ' s analysis 
i s a helpful one, and one welcomes p a r t i c u l a r l y h is re-assessment of 
Schleiermacher i n h i s discussion on the r e l a t i o n between f a i t h and feeling* 
The ontological implications of the concept of the transcendent 
unity of unambiguous l i f e are also p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t for an under-
standing of T i l l i c h ' s interpretation of love as being taken by the S p i r i t 
into the sphere of transcendent union. For i t i s c l e a r that T i l l i c h i s 
going beyond what the psychologist or pastoral theologian means when he 
talks about entering into unity with the other person and the need for 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n the act of love* I f i t were empathy i n i t s deepest 
sense to which T i l l i c h i s r e f e r r i n g , must of what he says would be very 
relevant to t h i s breaking down of the b a r r i e r s of separation which prevent 
true understanding and concern between man and man* However, T i l l i c h ' s 
meaning of the reunion which characterises love i s rather different from 
empathetic i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s i t i s an ontological participation i n which 
one share3 f u l l y i n the l i f e of the other person by way of the transcendent 
unity* I n f a c t , one cannot help f e e l i n g on reading T i l l i c h ' s exposition 
of love, that i t s r e a l concern i s not so much for the other person as 
such as the desire for ontological unity as an end i n i t s e l f * I t i s i n 
fulfilment of t h i s desire that the S p i r i t takes one into the transcendent 
unity, i n the context of which a t r u l y ontological unity with the other 
s e l f i s made possible. I t may be said, therefore, that i n a sense T i l l i c h ' s 
d e f i n i t i o n of love as being taken into transcendent unity i s too s e l f -
centred, i n that i t i s above a l l the fulfilment of one's own desire* 
T i l l i c h has, of course, f a l l e n into the trap into which a l l C h r i s t i a n 
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philosophers of the c l a s s i c a l - i d e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n have f a l l e n , of accepting 
the t r a d i t i o n a l ontological d e f i n i t i o n of love, i n terms of union, and 
then interpreting agape i n t h i s l i g h t * This w i l l not do* The c l a s s i c a l 
interpretation of love i s b a s i c a l l y that of eros, and the primary purpose 
of using agape as the word to describe C h r i s t i a n love was to distinguish 
i t from t h i s c l a s s i c a l understanding* Eros i s always the love which seeks 
and drives towards a complete unity. But agape has a different stance 
altogether* I t s purpose as f a r as the s e l f i s concerned i s disinterestedt 
i t s t o t a l concern i s with the other person as a person, and i t i s developed 
'i n r e l a t i o n to' rather than ' i n union with'. I n f a c t , there may well 
be cases where agape w i l l r e s u l t i n something rather different from unity 
altogether. To quote Macquarriei 
Love i s letting-be even where t h i s may demand the 
loosening of the bonds that bind the beloved person to oneself; 
t h i s might well be the most costly of demands, and i t i s i n the 
l i g h t of t h i s kind of love that a drive toward union may seem 
egocentric • • .. I t i s not impossible to v i s u a l i s e a case 
where r e a l l y to love a person might mean that one has to renounce 
the treasured contact and association with that person, i f only 
so can that person r e a l i s e what there i s i n him to be**09 
To define Christian love i n terms which derive from eros, therefore, 
would seem to f a i l to take into account the very thing that sets C h r i s t i a n 
love aparti i t s s e l f l e s s , outgoing concern for the other person, which 
i s the very heart of agape, whether t h i s leads to unity or not* 
One must come to the conclusion, therefore, that T i l l i c h f a i l s to 
bring out the d i s t i n c t i o n between agape and eros c l e a r l y enough f o r t h i s 
very reason* This d i f f i c u l t y meets us p a r t i c u l a r l y when we are trying to 
evaluate h i s assertion that eros, along with every other quality of love, 
has a r i g h t f u l part i n agape. I f one accepts T i l l i c h ' s d e f i n i t i o n of 
agape i n terms of transcendent unity, i t i s obvious that i t does. However, 
i f one adheres more firmly to a New Testament conception of agape as a 
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s e l f l e s s concern for the other person, can one s t i l l affirm that eros 
i s compatible with i t ? The answer to t h i s question i s both affirmative 
and negative* I t i s negative as long as the aim of eros i s to unite 
i t s e l f with the other person either at the other person's expense or out 
of sheer g r a t i f i c a t i o n of desire* But i t i s affirmative i n so f a r as the 
natural affections of man f o r h i s fellows are not to be rooted out as i f 
they were e v i l i n themselves* This means that eros, when brought into 
unity with agape, w i l l be purged of i t s purely self-centred demands* I n 
the school of agape i t w i l l learn the a r t of s e l f - d e n i a l , and i n t h i s way 
i t w i l l be ennobled and confirmed* So we can say i n the words of Berdyaev, 
that 'the love which ascendB, rapturous love, may be side by side with the 
love which descends, with compassionate love'.**^ I t i s for t h i s reason 
that one cannot agree wholeheartedly with Nygren when he sets agape and 
eros t o t a l l y apart. 1** Yet having said t h i s , two r i d e r s must be added. 
The f i r s t i s to say that here we are stripping eros of the precise onto-
l o g i c a l implications that i t has i n T i l l i c h ' s theology, so that we are 
thinking not of a t o t a l union of being, but rather a unity of together-
ness which maintains the i n d i v i d u a l i t y of both him who desires and him 
who i s desired. And the second i s to point out that i n saying that eros 
needs to be brought to agape so that i t may be purged of any w i l f u l l y 
s e l f i s h element, and i n thus affirming that agape and not eros i s the 
true frame of referenoe f o r Christian love, we are underlining the f a c t 
that i t i s tremendously important that the d i s t i n c t i o n between them should 
be maintained, and not blurred, as T i l l i c h seems to do* 
I n conclusion, we would agree with T i l l i c h i n h i s assertion that 
f a i t h and love characterise the content of the S p i r i t ' s presence i n the 
l i f e of man, and that whenever man i s grasped by the S p i r i t f a i t h and 
love are created. But because of the way i n which these two concepts are 
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interpreted w i t h i n the context of the ontological doctrine of the trans-
cendent unity of unambiguous l i f e , we cannot accept the more precise 
d e f i n i t i o n s of these expressions, and do not f e e l that h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of either f a i t h or love are i n accordance with b i b l i c a l teaching* 
IV. THE MANIFESTATION OF THE SPIRIT IN THE HISTORY OF MAN 
I f the S p i r i t i s to manifest i t s e l f to man, then i t must do so w i t h i n 
the context of human hi s t o r y , and t h i s raises the question as to where and 
i n what ways t h i s revelation has taken place* T i l l i c h says that there 
are two marks which demonstrate the presence of the S p i r i t i n h i s t o r i c a l 
groups» specific symbols which point to the openness of the group to the 
impact of the S p i r i t , and the r i s e of movements or persons which protest 
against the d i s t o r t i o n of these symbols, r e c a l l i n g the group to a true 
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understanding of the S p i r i t ' s work w i t h i n i t s midst* These two marks, 
he points out, are found w i t h i n every re l i g i o u s group, and they belong 
together* However, although both marks are facets of the work of the same 
S p i r i t , there i s frequently tension between them, and sometimes t h i s can 
go so f a r as a t o t a l r e j e c t i o n of the reforming agency by the o r i g i n a l 
group, with the res u l t that new groups are formed, suoh as one found at 
the Reformation* Occasionally, however, the work of reformation achieves 
i t s desired end, and the o r i g i n a l religious group, together w i t h i t s 
symbols, becomes transformed i n t o a more e f f e c t i v e vehicle of the S p i r i t * 
I n one way or the other, therefore, the S p i r i t i s constantly breaking 
through i n t o the l i v e s of men, sometimes i n the great moments of r e l i g i o u s 
h i s t o r y (the ' h i s t o r i c a l k a l r o i 1 ) t more often perhaps i n man's everyday 
experience, but always to make him conscious of the presence of an unam-
biguous l i f e which i s the nature of the New Being* So wherever t h i s new 
creation i s found, whether i n the o r i g i n a l r e l i g i o u s group or the work of 
Reformation, there the S p i r i t i s actively present* 
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Nevertheless, T i l l i c h points out, the presence of the New Being i n 
history can never be t o t a l i i t can only be fragmentary, f o r the ' f u l -
f i l l e d transcendent union i s an eschatological c o n c e p t ' a n d therefore 
something that can only be complete when the f i n i t e l i m i t a t i o n s of human 
history are f i n a l l y overcome. I n other words, the fragmentary presence 
of the New Being, created by the S p i r i t i n the l i v e s of men, i s an a n t i -
cipation of what i s to come<> This does not mean that i t i s ambiguous, 
f o r fragmentation i s not the same thing as ambiguity, and a true anticipa-
t i o n of the New Being, l i k e the New Being i t s e l f , must be unambiguous* 
So 'Paul speaks of the fragmentary and anticipatory possession of the divine 
S p i r i t , of the t r u t h , of the v i s i o n of God, and so on'. Thus, wherever 
a group i s grasped by and accepts the S p i r i t , even though that acceptance 
and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s only fragmentary and anticipatory, yet nevertheless 
i n the moment of i t s acceptance i t i s created i n t o a holy community, 
because of the unambiguity of the New Being i n which i t shares. Although 
i t i s surrounded by and indeed dependent on the ambiguous forms of l i f e 
f o r i t s concrete existence, at i t s heart there i s a genuine experience of 
unambiguous l i f e which guarantees i t s character'as a community of the 
S p i r i t . To be aware of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , affirms T i l l i c h , i s 'the decisive 
c r i t e r i o n f o r r e l i g i o u s m a t u r i t y ' . ^ ^ This means that the actualisation 
of the New Being i n history i s subject to the same c r i t e r i a by which i t 
judges every ambiguity of l i f e , yet a t the same time at that point where 
the New Being i t s e l f appears, even though fragmentarily, the ambiguities 
of l i f e are conquered* 
The most obvious place to look f o r the manifestations of the S p i r i t 
i n history i s i n the history of the r e l i g i o n s , and i t i s t o t h i s that 
T i l l i c h now turns. Bather than examine the various r e l i g i o n s i n d e t a i l , 
he discusses some of t h e i r most characteristic expressions of the S p i r i t u a l 
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Presence* But f i r s t of a l l he warns us that 'the only authentic way1 of 
understanding anything about other r e l i g i o n s i s 'through actual p a r t i c i -
pation 'o I n a t o t a l sense t h i s i s impossible) but because there are ce r t a i n 
common elements i n a l l r e l i g i o n s which arise from the i d e n t i t y of s p i r i t 
i n every s p i r i t u a l being, some degree of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s not altogether 
out of the question* There i s a mystical element, f o r example* that i s 
found i n both Asian r e l i g i o n and C h r i s t i a n i t y , so that i t becomes possible 
f o r us to understand something of Eastern r e l i g i o n by p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n 
Christian mysticism* Even so, one must proceed with caution, f o r the 
f a c t that mysticism i s dominant i n Asian r e l i g i o n but only secondary i n 
Ch r i s t i a n i t y means that the way i n which these r e l i g i o n s are structured 
w i l l be d i f f e r e n t , f o r the shape of any rel i g i o u s f a i t h i s largely deter-
mined by i t s dominant element* This means that though some degree of 
understanding i s possible through common elements, even t h i s l i m i t e d way 
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of p a r t i c i p a t i o n can be deceptive • ' 
T i l l i c h looks at several types of r e l i g i o n * The f i r s t i s animism. 
Here the emphasis on the i n v i s i b l e and mysterious power i n a l l things, 
which characterised the o r i g i n a l mana r e l i g i o n , i s a recognition of the 
S p i r i t u a l Presence 'in the "depth" of everything that i s 1 , 1 1 6 and t h i s 
early i n s i g h t i n t o the universal presence of the divine S p i r i t forms the 
basis of most forms of sacramental thinking, even i n the higher re l i g i o n s 
l i k e C h r i s t i a n i t y * Secondly, i n the great mythological r e l i g i o n s , 
although they presuppose a d u a l i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of r e a l i t y , the presence 
of the S p i r i t i n the world i s underlined by the concrete manifestations of 
the divine powers i n human experience* Any true understanding of these 
religions depends on the a b i l i t y to uncover the real significance of the 
symbols which they use without destroying the symbols themselves, a task 
which i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important because of the way i n which these mytholo-
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g i c a l ways of thinking and expression have influenced l a t e r r e l i g i o u s forms. 
The continual danger, T i l l i c h reminds us, i n the history of these religions 
was that t h e i r symbols could so easily become profaned, and i t was against 
t h i s sort of d i s t o r t i o n i n the form of a vast number of divine forms and 
figures that r e l i g i o n s l i k e the mystery c u l t s arose, which sought to r e -
emphasise the element of mystery, embodying i t i n the specific f i g u r e of 
the mystery-god* This l a t t e r type of reli g i o u s expression, with i t s 
emphasis on ecstatic p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the divine l i f e , i n T i l l i c h ' s opinion 
provided the pattern f o r C h r i s t i a n i t y , where through Christ man participates 
i n the l i f e of God through an ecstatic experience of the S p i r i t u a l Presence* 
Another such protest was against the demonic d i s t o r t i o n of the divine 
presence that was common i n po l y t h e i s t i c r e l i g i o n s , and t h i s led to d u a l i s t i c 
forms such as Zoroastrianism, which sought to prevent the demonisation 
of the S p i r i t by concentrating a l l e v i l p o t e n t i a l i t y i n one pa r t i c u l a r 
f i g u r e . T i l l i c h notes that t h i s type of thinking also has influenced 
C h r i s t i a n i t y , not only i n i t s h e r e t i c a l forms, but also i n the persistent 
personification of e v i l i n the foim of Satan* 
But the two most important experiences of the S p i r i t u a l Presence, 
asserts T i l l i c h , are those found i n mysticism and monotheism. Mysticism, 
he declares, i s an advance on mythological r e l i g i o n i n that i t 'experiences 
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the S p i r i t u a l Presence as above i t s concrete vehicles'* 1 For the mystic 
a l l divine figures are 'grades on a S p i r i t u a l stairway to the ultimate', 
but they are grades which must be l e f t behind i f the presence of the divine 
S p i r i t i s to be f u l l y experienced* So mysticism seeks to transcend every 
divine figure as i t also seeks to transcend the subject-object scheme of 
man's f i n i t u d e , even though i n doing t h i s , i t runs the r i s k of an n i h i l a t i n g 
the very s e l f which receives the ecstatic experience of the S p i r i t . I t i s 
at this very point, confesses T i l l i c h , that understanding between Eastern 
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and Western religious thought i s so d i f f i c u l t , f o r whereas the aim of 
l l 8 
Eastern mysticism i s to achieve a 'formless s e l f , the aim of Western 
monotheism i s to preserve the s e l f i n the ecstatic experience both i n 
terms of personality and community. I n Hebrew monotheism, even i n the 
heights of prophetic ecstasy, the centred s e l f was never eliminated, and 
t h i s meant that i n prophetic r e l i g i o n , concepts l i k e s i n and forgiveness, 
which expressed the relationship between man and God i n d i s t i n c t l y personal 
terms, had to be taken seriously. So f o r Old Testament r e l i g i o n the 
S p i r i t u a l Presence implied humanity and j u s t i c e , which took personal 
problems and relationships w i t h the utmost concern, asserting that any 
neglect of these issues was a travesty of the l i f e of the S p i r i t . E l i j a h 
was e c s t a t i c a l l y grasped by the S p i r i t , but his experience i n no way 
destroyed his centred s e l f , but only served to heighten his sense of j u s t i c e 
and humanity, and i t i s t h i s same characteristic of S p i r i t u a l experience 
that was continued and so f o r c e f u l l y emphasised both i n the monotheistic 
r e l i g i o n of the New Testament and i n the genuine reformation movements 
i n the history of the church* 
The climax to a l l these forms of r e l i g i o u s experience i n the l i f e 
of man i s the revelation of the S p i r i t i n Jesus as the Christ. So T i l l i c h 
turns his attention more s p e c i f i c a l l y to the nature of the S p i r i t u a l 
Presenoe i n the l i f e of Jesus. He defines the r e l a t i o n between the S p i r i t 
and the Christ i n t h i s ways the S p i r i t u a l Presence i s that which creates 
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the New Being, whereas Jesus as the Christ i s he who bears the New Being. ' 
The New Being, we r e c a l l , i s f o r T i l l i c h 'essential being under the con-
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ditions of existence', so that Jesus as the Christ i s the one who f o r 
man reveals the nature of essential being under e x i s t e n t i a l conditions, 
f r e e l y and unambiguously. Nevertheless, though he i s the bearer of the New 
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Being, he does not create i t i only the S p i r i t can do that* So Jesus 
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as the Christ i s the one who i s completely taken over by the S p i r i t u a l 
Presence, whose own human s p i r i t , even though subjected to i n d i v i d u a l and 
social conditions, i s e c s t a t i c a l l y 'possessed* by the S p i r i t of God* And 
i t i s t h i s alone that makes him the Christ, 'the decisive embodiment of 
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the New Being f o r h i s t o r i c a l mankind'* And because the divine S p i r i t 
i s present i n him without d i s t o r t i o n , then he becomes the c r i t e r i o n of 
a l l other S p i r i t u a l experiences, whether i n the past or i n the future* 
A l l t h i s , says T i l l i c h , i s underlined i n the New Testament* I n 
f a o t , as the e a r l i e s t Synoptic t r a d i t i o n s show, the very f i r s t type of 
Christology to appear was a Spirit-Christology which emphasised the 
presence of the divine S p i r i t i n the l i f e o f Jesus* The f i r s t s i g n i f i -
cant event was the moment of baptism, when Jesus was grasped by the 
S p i r i t , confirming his eleotion as the Son of God* T i l l i c h expresses 
the primary importance of the event i n t h i s ways 
I believe that a truer i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t s s i g n i -
ficance i s given by the voice that comes down to John or 
Jesus * . • i n the scene of the baptiami "Thou a r t my 
beloved Son. Today I have chosen thee*" These words have 
nothing to do with a metaphysical or mythological form of 
son* I f we s t r i p away the mythology, and read simply what 
the gospel stories have to say, we have a picture of a man 
who i s driven by the divine S p i r i t to his function, to his 
message, to his work as Messiah, and who anticipates the 
coming of the Kingdom of God i n his message* 
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From the moment of baptism onwards, the divine S p i r i t was the dominant 
force i n Jesus' l i f e , and the S p i r i t ' s work can be traced r i g h t through 
the Gospel story* The early church's conviction of t h i s led them to ask 
how i t was possible f o r a person to be so completely the vehicle of the 
S p i r i t , and i t was i n answer to t h i s question that the story of the 
V i r g i n B i r t h appeared, i n which Jesus i s procreated by the S p i r i t of God* 
Though t h i s story runs the obvious danger of undermining the f u l l human-
i t y of Jesus, T i l l i c h feels that i t has two important points i n i t s favour* 
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I n the f i r s t place, i t emphasises that i t was the whole of Jesus - body 
as well as mind - that was grasped by the S p i r i t , and i n the second 
place, i t points to the f a c t that there 'must have been a teleol o g i c a l 
predisposition i n Jesus to become the bearer of the S p i r i t without l i m i t ' * ' 
Today we may reject the story i t s e l f , but we cannot rejeot these two 
important assertions about the relationship between Jesus and the S p i r i t 
of God. 
We have already seen that wherever the divine S p i r i t i s manifest, 
f a i t h and love are to be found. Now as f a r as love i s concerned, there 
i s no problem with regard to the l i f e of Jesus. The love of Christ, a 
love which led to his own s e l f - s a c r i f i c e , i s central both i n the Gospels 
and i n the apostolic preaching; one sees i n him the principle of agape 
embodied, 'radiating from him i n t o a world i n which agape was and i s known 
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only i n ambiguous expressions', J I n Christ we see the perfect expression 
of love i n human form. But i t i s not so easy, T i l l i c h f e e l s , t o apply 
the concept of f a i t h to the l i f e of the Christ, f o r i t i s not a word 
that i s generally used i n r e l a t i o n to Jesus either i n the New Testament 
or i n theology. Possibly the reason f o r th i s i s that i n view of the 
faot of human estrangement, f a i t h , as i t has normally been understood, 
always includes an element of 'inspite o f , an implication which could 
c e r t a i n l y not be applied to one who was i n unbroken fellowship with God, 
'the Word made f l e s h 1 . Even more recent d e f i n i t i o n s of f a i t h , as 'a 
leap, as an act of courage, as a r i s k , as embracing i t s e l f and the doubt 
about i t s e l f , hardly make the problem any easier, f o r none of these can 
be applied to one who claims unity with the Father* But perhaps the 
main reason why Protestant theology has been reluctant to speak of the 
f a i t h of Christ i s that i n Protestantism such a concept has almost univer-
s a l l y been a l l i e d to the doctrine of j u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h i n which f a i t h 
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i s the means through which the unjust are paradoxically accepted by 
God and t h e i r s i n forgiven* Clearly t h i s cannot be applied to Jesus as 
the Christ. Nevertheless, T i l l i c h points out, we cannot refuse to apply 
the concept of f a i t h i n some way to the l i f e of Jesus, f o r i f we do 
refuse we run the r i s k of denying him a real humanity. But we can speak 
meaningfully of the f a i t h of Christ, i f we define i t as 'the state of 
being grasped by the S p i r i t u a l Presence and through i t by the transcendent 
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union of unambiguous l i f e ' . I t i s when we understand f a i t h i n t h i s 
sense, as a S p i r i t u a l r e a l i t y over and above i t s actualisation i n those 
who possess i t , that i t becomes d i r e c t l y applicable to Christ, f o r he i s 
the one who i s t o t a l l y grasped by the divine S p i r i t . I t i s true that i n 
the l i f e of Jesus we see struggle, exhaustion, and despair, the testing 
of his f a i t h on every side, and i n t h i s sense we do not see a complete 
f u l f i l m e n t of the New Being i n him, but we do see i n him a true fragment, 
a genuine a n t i c i p a t i o n , of what i t means to be f u l l y grasped by the divine 
S p i r i t , f o r throughout a l l these experiences the S p i r i t never deserts 
him. So i n t h i s sense, when we look at Christ we can see i n f a c t what 
f a i t h r e a l l y i s . 
There are two furt h e r important implications of the Sp i r i t - C h r i s t o -
logy of the Synoptics which T i l l i o h mentions. The f i r s t i s that ' i t i s 
not the s p i r i t of the man Jesus of Nazareth that makes him the Christ', 
but 'the S p i r i t u a l Presence, God i n him, that possesses and drives his 
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in d i v i d u a l s p i r i t 1 * 1 This guards against the sort of theology which 
makes Jesus as a man the object of Christian f a i t h , which f o r T i l l i c h 
d i s t o r t s the basic Christian message that ' i t i s Jesus as the Christ i n 
whom the New Being has appeared', and disregards Paul's statement that 
'the Lord i s the S p i r i t ' , which means that we know the Lord not 
(flesh) 
'according to his h i s t o r i c a l existence/but only as the S p i r i t who i s a l i v e 
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and present'• 7 I n f a c t , once th i s t r u t h has been grasped, the Christian 
w i l l realise that he i s not t i e d to the specific words of one man, Jesus 
of Nazareth, but that the Christ, who i s the S p i r i t , w i l l provide him 
with a freedom that transcends every concrete expression of the New Being 
i n time and space. 'Christ i s the S p i r i t , , not Law', and 'where the 
S p i r i t of. the Lord i s , there i s freedom'.^ 0 
The second implication of Spirit-Christology i s that Jesus as the 
Christ 'is. the keystone i n the arch of S p i r i t u a l manifestations i n 
history'•^'^ T i l l i c h points out that he i s no isolated event, but i s 
to be seen i n the context of 'a whole history of revelation and salvation 
before and a f t e r his appearance'• 
The event "Jesus as the Christ" i s unique but not isolated; 
i t i s dependent on past and fu t u r e , as they are dependent on 
i t . I t i s the q u a l i t a t i v e centre i n a process which proceeds 
from [an i n d e f i n i t e past , to] an i n d e f i n i t e f u t u r e , which we c a l l , 
symbolically, the beginning and the end of history»132 
This recognition of the ' S p i r i t u a l Presence i n the Christ' as the centre 
of history helps us to understand the manifestation of the S p i r i t 
throughout the whole of h i s t o r y , f o r as the New Testament affirms i t i s 
the same S p i r i t who i s present i n b o t h * " ^ A l l manifestations of the 
S p i r i t therefore must be consonant wi t h him, whether they are 'before' 
him or 'after* him. However, T i l l i c h i s not using these prepositions 
i n a purely temporal sense, but rather i n r e l a t i o n to an e x i s t e n t i a l 
encounter w i t h Jesus as the Christ, 'before' and 'afte r ' a personal con-
f r o n t a t i o n with the New Being as i t appears to him. So i t was possible 
f o r men who l i v e d before Jesus to have an e x i s t e n t i a l encounter with 
the Christ even though a h i s t o r i c a l encounter was as yet impossible, 
because the S p i r i t who grasped them was the same S p i r i t who became his 
S p i r i t . This f o r T i l l i c h i s the real t r u t h behind the paradigm of 
prophecy and f u l f i l m e n t , that 'the S p i r i t who created the Christ w i t h i n 
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Jesus i s the same S p i r i t who prepared and continues to prepare mankind 
f o r the encounter with the New Being i n him 
T i l l i c h notes that since b i b l i c a l times there has been serious d i s -
cussion regarding the r e l a t i o n of the S p i r i t of Jesus as the Christ and 
the S p i r i t at work among his followers. He feels that such a question 
was inevitable once the early Spirit-Christology had been replaced by 
the Logos-Christology of John's Gospel. The answer the early church gave 
was to say that a f t e r the incarnate Word's return to the Father, the 
S p i r i t was given to take his place. So i t i s true to say that i n 'the 
divine economy1, i n the history of salvation, 'the S p i r i t follows the Son*. 
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Yet i t i s also true that ' i n the essence, the Son i s the S p i r i t ' . J This 
means that the S p i r i t t e s t i f i e s to the Son, he 'does not himself originate 
what he reveals', and f o r t h i s reason 'every new manifestation of the 
S p i r i t u a l Presence stands under the c r i t e r i o n of his manifestation i n 
Jesus as the Christ'• I n continuing to a f f i r m t h i s , the church has stood 
f i r m against those 'Spirit-theologies * that have arisen during the course 
of i t s h i s t o r y , 'which teach that the revelatory work of the S p i r i t 
q u a l i t a t i v e l y transcends that of the C h r i s t ' • " ^ Yet t h i s cannot be so, 
f o r to claim that there i s more than one ultimate manifestation of the 
S p i r i t would destroy the ultimacy of the Christ-event. The early church 
therefore was r i g h t i n making the manifestation of the S p i r i t i n Jesus 
as the Christ the essential c r i t e r i o n f o r any theology of the S p i r i t or 
assessment of S p i r i t u a l experience. 
One of the most notorious controversies i n the church's h i s t o r y , the 
argument over the procession of the S p i r i t , also arose oyer t h i s issue of 
the S p i r i t ' s r e l a t i o n to the Son. The Orthodox church claimed that the 
S p i r i t proceeds from the Father alone, whereas the L a t i n church asserted 
that he proceeds from both Father and Son, giving r i s e to the famous 
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f i l i o q u e clause. . T i l l i c h points out that though the classical expression 
of t h i s argument was rather pointless, there was nevertheless a real 
issue at stake. For i n claiming that the S p i r i t proceeds from the Father 
alone, the Orthodox church opened the way f o r a 'direct, theocentric 
mysticism', even though i t was baptised into Christ, whereas the Western 
church more f i r m l y adhered to the application of the Christocentric 
c r i t e r i o n to a l l S p i r i t u a l experience. Unfortunately i n the West, the 
Pope became more and more the sole authority f o r applying t h i s c r i t e r i o n , 
with the r e s u l t that i t beoame distorted i n t o a r i g i d legalism which 
sought to l i m i t the S p i r i t ' s freedom. Though placing himself i n the 
Western l i n e of t r a d i t i o n , T i l l i o h feels that i n t h i s Papal tendency was 
a flagrant d i s t o r t i o n of the Johannine doctrine that the S p i r i t would be 
given to a l l Christ's followers."^*** 
Evaluation 
T i l l i c h ' s remarks on fragment and a n t i c i p a t i o n would have been 
strengthened by some reference to Paul's concept of the S p i r i t as the 
arrabon, the earnest which i s given to the man of f a i t h as a foretaste 
of that which i s to oome. Says Paul, ' I am prepared f o r t h i s change, by 
137 
God, who has given me the S p i r i t as i t s pledge and i t s instalment'.* 
The divine S p i r i t i s here regarded as a g i f t i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of f i n a l 
salvation, a pledge that those who have the S p i r i t s h a l l i n the end 
receive the fulness of new l i f e which God o f f e r s . I n t h i s sense, Paul 
breaks down any concept of eschatology that i s completely f u t u r i s t i c . The 
new l i f e which the S p i r i t brings i s something which can be experienced 
here and now, and not something which i s postponed u n t i l some future date* 
As Hendrikus Berkhof puts i t , 'The whole work of the S p i r i t • • • i s an 
1^8 
a n t i c i p a t i o n of the consummation'• T i l l i o h * s concept of fragmentary 
a n t i c i p a t i o n i s saying much the same sort of t h i n g . 
201 
I n his. discussion on the r e l i g i o n s , T i l l i o h has r i g h t l y recog-
nised the importance of distinguishing the genuine core of every S p i r i t u a l 
experience from the ambiguous nature of a l l attempts to convey and express 
i t i n human forms* What we are not so happy about i s his persistent 
tendency to read a genuine experience of the S p i r i t i n terms of an aware-
ness of the transcendent u n i t y , w i t h a l l that t h i s implies* I t i s one 
thing to say that at the heart of a l l r e l i g i o u s forms l i e s a real aware-
ness of the S p i r i t u a l Presence which i s a true anticipation of the l i f e of 
the New Being. I t i s another thing altogether to assume that t h i s exper-
ience i s to be understood i n terms of an ontologioal union which transcends 
every s p l i t occasioned by the e x i s t e n t i a l world* We must r e - i t e r a t e what 
we have already said, that a mystical experience of transcendent union 
i s not the only form re l i g i o u s experience takes* There are other forms 
of r e l i g i o u s experience which oan also be a genuine a n t i c i p a t i o n of l i f e 
i n the S p i r i t , as Hebrew and Christian monotheism t e s t i f y * I n f a c t , one 
senses i n T i l l i c h ' s analysis a ce r t a i n tension i n his own thinking between 
mysticism and monotheism. We have,of course, already observed t h i s tension 
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i n our comments on b i b l i c a l personalism and ontology, where i t was 
pointed out that T i l l i c h emphasises that the idea of a personal God i s 
symbolic of the ultimate r e a l i t y , but no more than symbolic. But the 
tension i s now confirmed here i n two additional ways* 
I n the f i r s t place, T i l l i c h points out that as f a r as mystioism i s 
concerned, a l l divine figures have value i n that they represent grades 
on a S p i r i t u a l stairway to the ultimate, but that they are grades which must 
be l e f t behind i f the S p i r i t u a l Presence i s to be experienced f u l l y * I n 
view of what T i l l i c h has already said about Jesus as the Christ as the 
Bearer of the New B e i n g , i n which the person of Jesus i s c l e a r l y sub-
ordinated to the New Being which he brings to men, one might be j u s t i f i e d 
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i n asking whether the Christ himself i s nothing more than a grade on the 
S p i r i t u a l ei&irway leading to the ultimate, the highest grade perhaps, but 
s t i l l a grade; and i n t h i s sense one who can be dispensed with once the 
New Being i s realised, the f i n a l rung of a ladder that can be kicked away 
once the ultimate i s reached and the S p i r i t u a l Presence experienced. 
Despite a l l his protestations about applying the c r i t e r i o n of Jesus as the 
Christ to a l l forms of religious experience, one feels that i n the end 
what he does i n f a c t i s t o rei n t e r p r e t the Christian f a i t h i n terms of 
mystical presuppositions, placing less than ultimate value on Jesus as 
the Christ i n the process. This.seems to be confirmed by T i l l i o h by what 
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he wrote i n an a r t i c l e soon a f t e r his v i s i t to Japan* C h r i s t i a n i t y , 
he says, needs to r i d i t s e l f of ' a l l elements of a Jesu-logical* theology, 
f o r i n so doing i t w i l l commend i t s e l f more f u l l y to the Eastern world* 
For T i l l i c h , then, i t i s obvious that despite the c e n t r a l i t y of the 
h i s t o r i c a l event of Jesus Christ i n Christian f a i t h and experience, 
the essential basis f o r a l l r e l i g i o n , C h r i s t i a n i t y included, i s an under-
l y i n g mysticism which transcends a l l forms of concrete expression, and to 
which a l l forms of r e l i g i o n therefore must aspire* 
Secondly, the tension between mysticism and monotheism i n T i l l i c h ' s 
thought i s underlined here i n his observation that whereas Eastern 
mysticism leads to the 'formless s e l f , i n which the individual i s absorbed 
i n t o unity w i t h the di v i n e , Western monotheism safeguards the centred 
self i n the ecstatic experience. Now obviously we have here two i n -
compatible types of r e l i g i o n , one which sacrif i c e s the centred s e l f , the 
other which preserves i t . But t h i s raises the inevitable question as to 
which of these two types of r e l i g i o n i s nearer to T i l l i c h ' s conception 
of man's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the transcendent un i t y of unambiguous l i f e , 
which i s the l i f e of the S p i r i t . Despite what he says about the importance 
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of r e t a i n i n g the centred s e l f , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how the s e l f can 
have any place i n a t o t a l l y transcendent unity any more than a personal 
God, f o r to r e t a i n either would be to perpetuate the subject-object 
scheme of r e a l i t y which he wishes to avoid. Yet even though his onto-
l o g i c a l presuppositions push him towards mysticism as the highest expression 
of religious experience, he i s unwill i n g to throw a monotheistic form of 
r e l i g i o n away completely. The tension so f a r i s unresolved. 
There i s an in t e r e s t i n g passage i n his 'Dialogues with Students', 
however, where he returns to t h i s theme, and where the tension again 
reveals i t s e l f . Here he i s d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between the 'mysticism of 
dissolution* such as one finds i n the Eastern r e l i g i o n s , and the 
'mysticism of love* such as one finds i n Christian monotheism! 
One can say, i n sum, that there i s a mysticism of 
dissolution of the individual and a mysticism of love. I t 
i s i n t e r e s t i n g that when Bernard of Clairvaux speaks of the 
l a s t stage i n mystical development (not to be reached on 
earth), he describes i t as l i k e a drop of wine poured i n t o 
a cup of wine. The drop i s s t i l l there, but no longer 
independent; i t i s now i d e n t i c a l with the whole. The f a c t 
that i t i s not l o s t i s decisive, of course. But i t i s no 
longer self-centred. I t has as i t s centre, so to speak, 
the cup of wine as a whole, which i s not i t s own. And I 
believe we must face t h i s f a c t . Our religious language i s 
unable to resolve the difference between Buddhist - or, l e t 
us say, Hindu - and high Christian mysticism. But I know 
from two seminars which I led for-a whole year on Christian 
mysticism that one can d e f i n i t e l y say that Christian mysti-
cism i s always a mysticism of love. 
How love presupposes a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between the 
subject and object of love. Even i n imagining eternal l i f e 
or eternal f u l f i l m e n t , t h i s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n remains. What 
that actually means cannot be fur t h e r pursued. We can only 
state i t . When we use a word l i k e "communion" instead of 
"love", a l l the elements of separation which are presupposed 
i n the concept of communion come i n t o the picture. And i n 
the classical phrase of Flotinus "the meeting of the one with 
the one", i s s t i l l v a l i d , you can hardly escape i t . But i n 
the concept of the Eternal One, the Divine One, which i s a l l 
embracing - including the in d i v i d u a l which reunites with the 
Divine One - the concept of un i t y i s adequate. For t h i s 
reason I would perhaps accept the two mysticisms: that of 
dissolution and that of love. And i f someone asks,• "What 
i s the difference?" we cannot say more than this.142 
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Yet the answer T i l l i c h gives here i s r e a l l y unsatisfactory, f o r 
one f a i l s to see how ultimately the two mysticisms are compatible. One 
i s driven to the conclusion that he i s unable to resolve t h i s basic incon-
sistency i n his thought* We s h a l l return more f u l l y to t h i s problem when 
we come to assess the precise meaning of the transcendent unity of unam-
biguous l i f e . For the moment we must be content with s t a t i n g once again 
t h i s dilemmai i s the unambiguous l i f e which the S p i r i t creates a l i f e i n 
which no ultimate d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between subject and object, in d i v i d u a l 
s e l f and divine S p i r i t , remains; or i s i t a l i f e of communion w i t h God, 
i n which man and God are eternally d i s t i n c t (though not opposed), as 
Christian monotheism has always affirmed? 
There are two minor points i n T i l l i c h f s discussion on the r e l i g i o n s 
that should perhaps be mentioned. The f i r s t i s that he accepts too u n c r i t i -
c a l l y the assumption that animism i s the o r i g i n a l form of r e l i g i o n . This 
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i s a theory that has long been viewed with suspicion, and i t i s strange 
that T i l l i c h should s t i l l c l i n g to an outmoded idea of evolutionary devel-
opment i n r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f that begins with animism and works i t s way 
'upward* t o more sophisticated forms. The other point i s to question 
T i l l i c h * s bland assumption that the mystery religions provided a pattern 
which was carried over into C h r i s t i a n i t y . He accepts f a r too r e a d i l y the 
view that the mystery r e l i g i o n s were largely i n f l u e n t i a l i n the formation 
of early Christian theology, an opinion which has by no means gone un-
challenged i n contemporary b i b l i c a l studies, despite the connection 
that older New Testament scholars l i k e Bultmann see between C h r i s t i a n i t y 
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and the mysteries* A much more balanced judgment i s put forward by 
R. McWilson, when he saysi 
I t must be admitted that the church i n l a t e r ages 
absorbed i n t o i t s beli e f and practice those elements which 
i t could take over without doing violence to i t s own essential 
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f a i t h , but t h i s i s a vastly d i f f e r e n t matter from the view 
that these c u l t s exercised a formative influence upon 
C h r i s t i a n i t y i n i t s e a r l i e r stages.!45 
This may seem a f i n e d i s t i n c t i o n , but i t i s an important one, and one 
which T i l l i c h ought to have brought out. For while the early church 
quite r i g h t l y sought to express i t s message i n forms with which i t s own 
generation was f a m i l i a r , t h i s i s very d i f f e r e n t from saying that the 
S p i r i t was at work wi t h i n the strange r i t u a l s and doctrines of the secret 
mysteries with the express purpose of providing a pattern according to 
which the Christian revelation could best be understood. 
But having said these things by way of c r i t i c i s m , we must also 
point out that the positive value of T i l l i c h ' s analysis of the ro l e of 
the S p i r i t i n the r e l i g i o n s must not be minimised. His affirmation that 
God i s at work i n those r e l i g i o n s outside the Hebrew-Christian revelation 
i s important, not only because of i t s pragmatic significance i n making a 
genuine dialogue between religions possible, but also because of i t s 
theological i n s i g h t . One does not need to accept T i l l i c h ' s ontological 
assertions to recognise that the S p i r i t i s at work i n the t o t a l r e l i g i o u s 
dimension of human experience. To a f f i r m t h i s i s to underline the f a c t 
that God i s always seeking to make himself known to man, and i s every-
where preparing the way f o r his supreme revelation i n Jesus Christ* 
There are several points which arise from T i l l i c h ' s analysis of 
the r e l a t i o n between Jesus as the Christ and the divine S p i r i t . The f i r s t 
i s to ask whether Jesus actually thought of his l i f e and ministry i n the 
way i n which T i l l i c h understands i t , that i s , as the bearer of a New 
Reality, created by the S p i r i t , i n which the transcendent unity of unam-
biguous l i f e fragmentarily appears under the conditions of existence. He 
was, of course, v i v i d l y conscious of a deep and profound relationship with 
God, a relationship to which the story of his baptism i n the S p i r i t points, 
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but there i s nothing i n the Scriptures to suggest that t h i s relationship 
was understood i n terms of a transcendent u n i t y , with a l l that t h i s phrase 
implieso The Synoptic Gospels ce r t a i n l y do hot give the impression that 
Jesus was primarily some sort of mystic who constantly sought to realise 
his ontological unity with God. Even i n John's Gospel, where the picture 
i s rather d i f f e r e n t , and where Jesus speaks of his unity with the 
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Father, we cannot legi t i m a t e l y read i n t o his words the implications 
which T i l l i c h seems to place upon them, f o r we have no grounds f o r doing 
so* The same i s true of his message* When the Johannine Christ speaks to 
Nicodemus, or the woman at the w e l l , or the disciples i n the upper room, 
about the g i f t of the S p i r i t and the new l i f e the S p i r i t creates, there 
i s nothing to suggest that t h i s i s a l i f e i n which ultimately every existen-
t i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s transcended. Even though i n his l a s t discourse 
he speaks of a mutual indwelling between the Father and the Son, and 
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between the Son and the d i s c i p l e s , ^' i t i s an indwelling i n which the 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n remains* I t i s not t o t a l l y transcended* And t h i s must 
c e r t a i n l y be set alongside the message of the Synoptic Jesus, where the 
concepts of forgiveness, love and re c o n c i l i a t i o n a l l take man's ultimate 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y quite seriously* There i s l i t t l e evidence i n the Gospels 
therefore to lead us to i n t e r p r e t Jesus' understanding either of his own 
l i f e i n the S p i r i t or of his message of a new l i f e created by the S p i r i t 
i n the way i n which T i l l i o h would have us do* 
Secondly, there i s a certain tension between adoptionism and incarn-
ationism i n T i l l i c h ' s Spirit-Christology that i s not easy to resolve* 
I t i s c e r t a i n l y true that he does not intend his emphasis on what he con-
siders to be a perfectly v a l i d adopt!onist theology to undermine the 
doctrine of the Incarnation* The f a c t that 'Jesus was grasped by the 
S p i r i t at the moment of his baptism 1 must be seen alongside the equally 
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true assertion that 'there must have been a teleological predisposition i n 
Jesus to become the bearer of the S p i r i t without l i m i t ' • So f o r T i l l i c h 
adoptionism at least implies incarnationism. What T i l l i c h has not done, 
however, has been t o show the relationship between these two concepts 
c l e a r l y enough, and especially i n the context of the doctrine of the 
S p i r i t . One must point out p a r t i c u l a r l y the inadequacy of his statement 
that the story of the Virgin B i r t h arose as an answer to the early church's 
question as to how i t was possible f o r Jesus to be so completely grasped 
by the S p i r i t . C.K. Barrett, i n a penetrating study of the relevant 
passages, sees the o r i g i n of the b i r t h stories rather d i f f e r e n t l y i n the 
bel i e f that j u s t as the S p i r i t was present at the beginning of the old 
creation, so he must be present at the beginning of the New* 'Just as 
the S p i r i t of God was active at the foundation of the world, so that 
S p i r i t was to be expected also at i t s renewal • • . The fundamental 
thought involved i n the conception stories i n t h e i r bearing upon the work 
of the Holy S p i r i t i s legit i m a t e l y derived from Old-Testament thoughts 
the S p i r i t i s Creator Spiritus i n both c r e a t i o n s ' . 1 ^ I n the l i g h t of 
t h i s statement, as T i l l i c h ' s treatment stands i t tends to misrepresent 
the function of the S p i r i t i n t h i s context, whose role i s rather more pro-
found than T i l l i c h would suggest. I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that Barrett sees 
the same motive behind the baptism story. 'The work of the S p i r i t i s to 
c a l l i n t o being part of the New Creation of the Messianic days, namely, to 
inaugurate the ministry of the Messiah, . . . Here, as i n the b i r t h narra-
t i v e s , the S p i r i t i s the creative a c t i v i t y of God which c a l l s i n t o being 
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the conditions of the Messianic era'* ' I n other words, the l i n k between 
the two storieB i s the creative a c t i v i t y of the divine S p i r i t , to which 
both the concepts of adoption and incarnation point i n t h e i r own p a r t i -
cular way. T i l l i c h ' s discussion would have been considerably strengthened 
by emphasising t h i s point* 
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A t h i r d point arises out of the discussion on the r e l a t i o n between 
the S p i r i t of Jesus as the Christ and the S p i r i t at work among his 
followers. One accepts the main point of T i l l i c h ' s argument, that the 
early church, i n emphasising that the S p i r i t was given i n order to take 
the place of end t e s t i f y to the Word, thereby guaranteed that every 
S p i r i t u a l experience i n the l i v e s of Christians should be subjected 
to the c r i t e r i o n of the S p i r i t ' s revelation i n Jesus as the Christ. How-
ever, his statement i n t h i s context that ' i n the essence, the Son i s the 
S p i r i t ' , i s rather misleading. As a statement i n i t s e l f , one would 
naturally assume that what T i l l i c h means i s that i n essence there i s no 
difference between the Son and the S p i r i t , that the two are ultimately 
one and the same, a statement which i s obviously irreconcilable with 
t r a d i t i o n a l t r i n i t a r i a n theology. But i n t h i s context, t h i s cannot 
possibly be what T i l l i c h means. What he does seem to mean i s that as f a r 
as human experience i s concerned, the l i f e of the Son i n Jesus as the 
Christ and the unambiguous manifestation of the S p i r i t i n the l i f e of man 
completely coincide, so that whenever the S p i r i t manifests himself i n the 
experience of the followers of Christ, he does so according to that 
c r i t e r i o n , and not according to some other c r i t e r i o n which i s separate 
from him. This i s a perfectly v a l i d assertion: i t i s a p i t y that 
T i l l i c h confused the issue by making a statement which i s open to mis-
understanding, and which taken out of context would mean something rather 
d i f f e r e n t altogether. So what T i l l i c h i s r e a l l y saying here does not 
d i f f e r much i n actual meaning from his comment on Paul's statement, 'the 
Lord i s the S p i r i t ' , that we know the Lord not 'according to his h i s t o r i c a l 
existence but only as the S p i r i t who i s a l i v e and present'. Or as Barclay 
puts i t , 
When Paul wrote t h a t , he was not thinking i n terms of the 
doctrine of the T r i n i t y and the persons i n the Godhead; he 
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was not thinking theologically at a l l ; he was speaking 
from experience, and his experience was that to possess 
the S p i r i t was nothing less than to possess Jesus Christ. 
F i n a l l y , T i l l i c h has r i g h t l y drawn att e n t i o n to the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
i n speaking of the f a i t h of Jesus, but his own solution i s not without i t s 
problems. For to say that f a i t h i s a r e a l i t y over and above i t s a c t u a l i -
sation i n those who possess i t , a r e a l i t y that i s created as such by 
the S p i r i t i s to give the impression that f a i t h i s a pre-existent, 
essential, r e a l i t y , waiting to take form as i t were i n concrete human 
expression, and i n Jesus the Christ f i n d i n g i t s most perfect opportunity 
to do so. This sort of language i s rather foreign to the New Testament. 
I t would be much more meaningful to say that the f a i t h that the S p i r i t 
creates i s a new relationship established between man and God. I n t h i s 
sense, one can indeed speak of the f a i t h of Jesus, f o r i n the l i f e of 
Jesus as the Christ, as indeed i n the l i f e of any person who i s grasped 
by the S p i r i t , there i s a relationship with God established, a r e l a t i o n -
ship which i s characterised i n the New Testament by obedience, commitment 
and t r u s t . I n the l i f e of estranged man, the element of j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
i s present as the factor that makes such a relationship possible. But 
i n the case of Jesus as the.Christ, there i s no need f o r t h i s j u s t i f y i n g 
element. His acceptance by God i s there from the beginning, f o r with 
him there i s no estrangement, and the f u l l and uninhibited work of the 
S p i r i t w i t h i n him gives testimony to t h i s f a c t * 
V. THE SPIRITUAL COMMUNITY 
We saw, i n our introductory chapter, that f o r T i l l i c h revelation 
only t r u l y becomes revelation when there are those who can receive i t ; 
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i n other words that revelation and reception must go together. J S i m i l a r l y , 
f o r T i l l i c h the Christ i s not t r u l y the Christ unless there are those who 
receive him as the Christt 'he could not have brought the new r e a l i t y 
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without those who have accepted the new r e a l i t y i n him and from him'. 
Those who accept this new r e a l i t y i n Christ are created by the S p i r i t i n t o 
a S p i r i t u a l Community, and T i l l i c h l i s t s t h i s as a t h i r d creative work of 
the S p i r i t i n the l i f e of mant f i r s t l y , f a i t h ; then, love; and now, the 
S p i r i t u a l Community. T i l l i c h prefers the expression ' S p i r i t u a l Community' 
to the word 'church' because of the ambiguous religious associations 
which the l a t t e r has. Whereas terms such as the ' S p i r i t u a l Community', 
or the 'body of Christ', or the 'assembly of God* can express the unambi-
guous l i f e of the S p i r i t unambiguously, the word 'church' i s so t i e d up 
with the ambiguous l i f e of organised r e l i g i o n that i t i s d i f f i c u l t to 
use i t unambiguously i n t h i s way. 
We need to examine a l i t t l e more closely what T i l l i c h means by 
t h i s phrase 'the S p i r i t u a l Community'* I t i s , he says, a community that 
i s S p i r i t u a l i n two ways. F i r s t l y , i t i s S p i r i t u a l i n the sense that i t 
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i s created by the S p i r i t u a l Presence. This means that i t i s unambi-
guous. But because i t appears under f i n i t e conditions, i t i s also f r a g -
mentary, l i k e every creation of the S p i r i t and manifestation of the New 
Being i n the l i f e of man, including the Christ himself. Despite t h i s , i t 
i s able to conquer both estrangement and ambiguity. Secondly, the 
S p i r i t u a l Community i s S p i r i t u a l i n Luther's sense of ' i n v i s i b l e ' , 
'hidden', 'open to f a i t h alone', terms which are not intended to undermine 
i t s r e a l i t y , but which point to the face that i t s true nature as the 
creation of the S p i r i t i s not recognisable except to those who themselves 
have been grasped by the S p i r i t . This does not mean, as i t has sometimes 
been taken to mean, that i t i s an i n v i s i b l e church e x i s t i n g alongside the 
v i s i b l e church, but that i t i s the inward, divine essence that determines 
the nature of the v i s i b l e church. 'The S p i r i t u a l Community,' he says, 
'does not exist as an e n t i t y beside the churches, but i t i s t h e i r 
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S p i r i t u a l essence, e f f e c t i v e i n them through i t s power, i t s structure, 
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and i t s f i g h t against t h e i r ambiguities'. ^ Furthermore, the S p i r i t u a l 
Community i s active i n other communities as we l l as the churches. I t 
i s the power and structure inherent and e f f e c t i v e i n a l l r e l i g i o u s groups, 
whether Christian or not. I t i s when these groups 'are consciously 
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based on the appearance of the New Being i n Jesus as the Christ', J J that 
they are called churches. But whenever the nature of a group i s determined 
by an ultimate concern, the S p i r i t u a l Community i s present and e f f e c t i v e 
w i t h i n i t . 
Logically and ontologically, says T i l l i c h , the S p i r i t u a l Community 
may be defined as 'essentiality determining existence and being resisted 
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by existence'. But there are two possible errors here which must be 
avoided. The f i r s t i s to envisage the S p i r i t u a l Community as an ideal 
which exists over and above the r e a l i t y of the churches, an ideal that 
i s 'constructed from the positive elements i n the ambiguities of r e l i g i o n 
and projected onto the screen of transcendence'• I n t h i s sense the 
S p i r i t u a l Community i s seen as a state to which the churches must contin-
ually aspire, a picture which they must persistently attempt to emulate, 
an expectation which they.must always seek to f u l f i l . But T i l l i c h asks, 
'What j u s t i f i e s such an expectation? Or more concretely, Where do the 
churches get the power of establishing and actualizing such an ideal?' 
The usual answer i s to say that the power i s given by the S p i r i t who i s 
already at work w i t h i n the church, helping i t to f u l f i l i t s expectations. 
However, i t i s important to see that the S p i r i t i s present i n the church, 
not as something separate from the power i t imparts, but as none other than 
the essential power i t s e l f - the power w i t h i n the Word and sacraments that 
makes them e f f e c t i v e media of i t s work, the power of f a i t h that creates 
f a i t h , the power of love which gives r i s e to love, and the power of the 
212 
S p i r i t u a l Community which precedes any actualisation of the S p i r i t u a l 
Community i n the l i f e of the churches. So the S p i r i t u a l Community, as 
the creation of the S p i r i t u a l Presence, i s 'the New Creation' which i s 
the very essence of the church's l i f e , 'into which the ind i v i d u a l Christian 
and the p a r t i c u l a r church i s taken', and not some ideal that i s set over 
against i t . T i l l i c h confesses that t h i s sort of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may be 
rather strange to contemporary man, but i t i s both soundly b i b l i c a l and 
theologically necessary f o r any church that confesses Jesus as the 
Christ, the bearer of the New Reality. 
The second error T i l l i c h feels we need to avoid i n our aff i r m a t i o n 
regarding the nature of the S p i r i t u a l Community i s the tendency to see i t 
as an 'assembly of so-called S p i r i t u a l beings', constituted of both the 
heavenly congregation and the elect gathered i n from a l l mankind. I n 
t h i s sense the S p i r i t u a l Community i s interpreted as the 'supranaturalistic' 
counterpart,in the Platonic sense, of the church m i l i t a n t . But whatever 
the symbolic value of this may be, i t i s a piece of 'mythological l i t e r a -
lism', and can i n no sense provide the c r i t e r i o n which makes the church 
the church. The church can only t r u l y be constituted by i t s i n v i s i b l e , 
essential S p i r i t u a l i t y , not by any heavenly ideal of which i t i s but an 
earthly r e f l e c t i o n . 
What we need i n f a c t , claims T i l l i o h , i s a new category i n i n t e r -
preting r e a l i t y which i s neither r e a l i s t i c , i d e a l i s t i c nor supranaturalis-
t i c , but rather 'essentialistic - a category pointing to the power of 
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the essential behind and w i t h i n the e x i s t e n t i a l ' * And i t i s i n t h i s 
way that we must i n t e r p r e t the S p i r i t u a l Community - as the essential 
behind and wi t h i n the church, i t s inner d r i v i n g foroe or telos which i s 
the source of a l l that constitutes the church. This analysis, of course, 
not only applies to the relationship between the S p i r i t u a l Community and 
213 
the church; i t applies, as we have seen, to a l l of l i f e ' s processes: 
'everywhere, the essential i s one of the determining powers'* I n a sense 
i t i s t e l e o l o g i c a l , inasmuch as i t directs the shape of existence and 
drives towards f u l f i l m e n t , but T i l l i c h feels that i t i s better to avoid 
the word ' t e l e o l o g i c a l 1 because of i t s t r a d i t i o n a l associations with 
causality, and i n i t s stead use the word 'essential'* We are i n e v i t a b l y 
reminded here of his d e f i n i t i o n of ' s p i r i t ' as the 'unity of the onto-
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l o g i c a l elements and the telos of l i f e ' , that inner, essential aim 
which enables a being to f u l f i l i t s own nature* So the S p i r i t u a l 
Community i s the inner telos of the church whereby the S p i r i t i s able to 
l i f t i t i n t o the transcendent unity of unambiguous l i f e i n which i t finds 
i t s true f u l f i l m e n t * 
We must now ask what relationship T i l l i c h envisages between the 
New Being present i n the S p i r i t u a l Community and the New Being as i t 
appears i n the Christ* To explain t h i s relationship, he looks at two 
New Testament passages* The f i r s t i s the story of Peter's confession at 
Caesarea F h i l i p p i , i n which he declares that Jesus i s the Christ, and 
Jesus i n return replies that his insight i s not the r e s u l t of any ordinary 
deduction, but the work of the S p i r i t w i t h i n him. This story f o r T i l l i c h 
i s of tremendous importances. i t constitutes 'the central scene i n the 
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whole synoptic t r a d i t i o n ' * ' I t i s the S p i r i t grasping Peter that 
enables his s p i r i t to recognise the S p i r i t i n Jesus which makes him the 
Christ', he says, and t h i s recognition forms the basis of the S p i r i t u a l 
Community which Peter and the disciples represent* So T i l l i o h concludes 
from t h i s storyt 'As the Christ i s not the Christ without those who 
receive him as the Christ, so the S p i r i t u a l Community i s not S p i r i t u a l 
unless i t i s founded on the New Being as i t has appeared i n the Christ 
The authenticity of the S p i r i t u a l Community l i e s i n i t s being founded on 
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the confession that Jesus i s the Christ, the bearer of the New Being* 
The second s i g n i f i c a n t passage from Hie New Testament i s the 
Pentecost story, which, says T i l l i c h , powerfully emphasises the character 
of the S p i r i t u a l Community* Though the story i t s e l f presents certain 
d i f f i c u l t i e s , i n that i t i s a combination of h i s t o r i c a l , legendary and 
mythological elements, i t s overall symbolic meaning i s v i t a l l y important* 
T i l l i c h brings out f i v e elements i n the story* The f i r s t i s the ecstatic 
character of the creation of the S p i r i t u a l Community* The nature of the 
S p i r i t always manifests the unity of ecstasy and structure and t h i s i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y so i n the story of Pentecost* The second element i s that of 
f a i t h , 'a f a i t h which was threatened and almost destroyed by the c r u c i -
f i x i o n of him who was supposed to be the bearer of the New Being' 
That which happened at Pentecost released the disciples from t h e i r uncer-
t a i n t y and re-established t h e i r f a i t h * They were grasped e c s t a t i c a l l y by 
the S p i r i t and t h e i r newly found certainty overcame t h e i r doubt* Without 
the certainty of f a i t h , says T i l l i c h , there can be no S p i r i t u a l Community* 
The t h i r d element of the character of the S p i r i t u a l Community i s that of 
love, a self-surrendering love which expresses i t s e l f i n service, p a r t i -
c u l a r l y towards those who are i n need* The fourth element i s that of 
unity, symbolised by the ecstatic glossolalia and the bringing together 
of a l l sorts of men around the sacramental table, and there can be no 
Sp i r i t u a l Community apart from the ultimate reunion of a l l who are 
estranged. F i n a l l y , there i s the element of u n i v e r s a l i t y , which i s seen 
i n the early move towards mission which i s so v i v i d i n the Pentecost 
account. The New Being would not be the New Being, says T i l l i c h , unless 
'mankind as a whole and even the universe i t s e l f were included i n i t * 
Without t h i s openness the S p i r i t u a l Community cannot e x i s t . 
T i l l i c h declares that these same .five elements must be present 
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wherever the S p i r i t u a l Community i s found, and though the predominant 
characteristic w i l l always be ecstasy, i t w i l l be 'an ecstasy united with 
f a i t h , love, unity and unive r s a l i t y ' * As a community of f a i t h , i t 
must overcome the tension between the individual's personal f a i t h and that 
of the community as a whole, and by u n i t i n g the man who i s grasped by the 
S p i r i t i n the act of f a i t h with the God who works through every expression 
of f a i t h without r e s t r i c t i o n , the S p i r i t transcends every d i s t i n c t i o n 
between d i f f e r e n t types and conditions of f a i t h i n the l i f e of the 
S p i r i t u a l Community. For the true character of f a i t h , T i l l i c h reminds us, 
l i e s not i n forms or expressions of b e l i e f , but i n i t s a b i l i t y , to over-
come 'the i n f i n i t e gap between the i n f i n i t e and the f i n i t e ' , a n d i t 
i s only when t h i s becomes the c r i t e r i o n f o r the f a i t h of the churches 
that they are able to conquer t h e i r ambiguous expressions. This character 
of the S p i r i t u a l Community as a community of f a i t h leads also to i t s u n i t y , 
which holds together the various expressions of f a i t h i n a common bond, 
enabling the community to withstand a l l vicissitudes that arise from i t s 
structure, or i t s h i s t o r i c a l development, or the variety of preferences 
regarding symbols, r i t u a l s and doctrines. Si m i l a r l y , as a community of 
love the S p i r i t u a l Community contains w i t h i n i t s e l f the tension between 
the variety of love relations that are possible and agape. the love 
'which unites being with being', since i t i s w i t h i n the power of agape 
to overcome t h i s variety of love relations by u n i t i n g the separated 
centres from which these various forms of love spring. This power of 
love i n the S p i r i t u a l Community i s affirmed by i t s u n i v e r s a l i t y , by which 
i t includes w i t h i n i t s e l f not only the variety of love r e l a t i o n s , but also 
a l l sorts and conditions of men, irrespective of sex and age, race and 
nation, t r a d i t i o n and character, making i t possible f o r a l l to participate 
i n i t s l i f e . This i s not merely a question of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n with God as 
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'children of the same father', but also of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n with each 
other, i n spite of e x i s t e n t i a l estrangement by p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the trans-
cendent unity of unambiguous l i f e * 
Although because of the l i m i t s of f i n i t u d e , these q u a l i t i e s of 
f a i t h and love, unity and u n i v e r s a l i t y , can i n each case only be f r a g -
men t a r i l y realised, yet because they each anticipate the ultimate f u l f i l -
ment of the Kingdom of God, they do form the essential c r i t e r i a of a l l 
moves towards unambiguous l i f e i n the ambiguous l i f e of the churches. 
I t i s t h i s unambiguous nature of the S p i r i t u a l Community that enables us 
to c a l l i t 'holy', f o r i t shares i n the holiness of the l i f e of God.^^ 
So T i l l i c h refers to holiness, or p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the divine l i f e , as 
the ' i n v i s i b l e S p i r i t u a l essence', both of the S p i r i t u a l Community i t s e l f 
and of the churches which express i t . To conclude on the one hand, the 
marks of f a i t h and love, of unity and u n i v e r s a l i t y , i n the l i f e of the 
churches, point to t h e i r ecstatic p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the l i f e of God. 
Whereas on the other hand t h i s unambiguous p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the divine l i f e , 
which i s what holiness implies, becomes the ultimate c r i t e r i o n f o r the 
meaning of these q u a l i t i e s i n the l i f e of any re l i g i o u s group. 
Because the S p i r i t u a l Community, as the essence of the churches, i s 
not i d e n t i c a l with them, and because the S p i r i t u a l Presence also manifests 
i t s e l f elsewhere as well as i n Jesus as the Christ, we must ask what the 
S p i r i t u a l Community's r e l a t i o n i s 'to the manifold religious communities 
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i n the history of r e l i g i o n ? 1 . J I t i s clear that f o r T i l l i c h wherever 
the S p i r i t makes i t s impact on mankind, there the S p i r i t u a l Community i s 
created. This means that the S p i r i t u a l Community does indeed appear i n 
the preparatory period before Christ, but because Christ himself has not 
yet appeared, i t s appearance w i l l d i f f e r from i t s l a t e r manifestations i n 
those periods when Christ i s both known and received. I n order to d i f f e r -
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entiate between these two types of S p i r i t u a l Community. T i l l i c h proposes 
to use the terms 'latent' and 'manifest 1, the 'latent' S p i r i t u a l Community 
r e f e r r i n g to the S p i r i t u a l Community 'before' an encounter with the 
S p i r i t ' s central revelation i n Jesus as the Christ, the 'manifest' 
S p i r i t u a l Community r e f e r r i n g to the S p i r i t u a l Community 'after' such an 
encounter. But i n t h i s context he i s using the terms 'before* and 'after' 
not j u s t i n r e l a t i o n t o the h i s t o r i c a l event of the coming of Christ i n t o . 
the world at a pa r t i c u l a r time and place, the basic kairos, but also 
more s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n r e l a t i o n t o every derivative kairos, every e x i s t e n t i a l 
encounter which a r e l i g i o u s or c u l t u r a l group may have. I t i s i n t h i s 
sense of 'before' and 'a f t e r ' an encounter with Christ that one i s able 
to distinguish between the la t e n t and manifest S p i r i t u a l Community. 
T i l l i c h defines latency as 'the state of being p a r t l y actual, p a r t l y 
p o t e n t i a l i , ^ ^ and i t i s t h i s state that characterises the latent S p i r i t u a l 
Community. The impact of the S p i r i t i n f a i t h and love i s present, but 
the ultimate c r i t e r i o n of that f a i t h and love as manifest i n the Christ 
i s lacking. I t i s t h i s negative aspect that makes the latent S p i r i t u a l 
Community such easy prey to the processes of profanisation and demonisation, 
f o r i t has no ultimate p r i n c i p l e of resistance, and here the S p i r i t u a l 
Community i n i t s manifestation as the church i s at an advantage, i n that 
i t has the pri n c i p l e of resistance to these processes i n i t s own l i f e , 
a resistance which comes out clearl y i n the prophetic and Reformation 
movements, where the church judges i t s e l f according to the c r i t e r i o n of 
Christ. 
The l a t e n t S p i r i t u a l Community i s to be found f i r s t l y i n every 
religious and c u l t u r a l movement of history* i n the Hebrew community of 
the Old Testament as well as i n modern Judaism, i n the great religious 
movements of Islam, i n the mythological c u l t s of the ancient world, i n 
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the great mystic rel i g i o n s of the East* But secondly, i t i s to be found 
also i n those non-religious groups outside the church which represent the 
S p i r i t u a l Community i n i t s secular latency* Often these groups may be 
di f f e r e n t from or even h o s t i l e to s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l i g i o u s expressions: 
generally they have some other object as t h e i r central concern - education, 
ar t or p o l i t i c a l issues, to name but a few* Frequently the impact of the 
S p i r i t u a l Presence i s also to be found i n the l i v e s of individuals who 
are connected with neither the church nor any other group* But the f a c t 
that these groups or individuals do not belong to a church does not 
exclude them from the S p i r i t u a l Community* I f the church i t s e l f claims 
to be part of the S p i r i t u a l Community i n the face of those instances of 
profanisation and demonisation which occur i n i t s own l i f e , s t i l l less can 
i t exclude those so-called 'secular opponents' who show the impact of the 
S p i r i t on themselves i n an undeniable way* 
Yet i n both types of group, whether religious or secular, the 
emphasis must s t i l l l i e on the word 'latent', f o r the ultimate c r i t e r i o n 
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of the S p i r i t u a l Community 'has not yet appeared 1* I t i s , says 
T i l l i c h , owing to the lack of t h i s c r i t e r i o n that such groups are not 
able to actualise either the 'radical self-negation' or the ' s e l f -
transformation' that one sees i n the Cross of Christ, a fa c t that causes 
them at times to r e j e c t the preaching and a c t i v i t y of the churches* 
However, because they are 'unconsciously driven toward the Christ', 
they quickly notice those occasions of ambiguity that arise i n the church, 
and t h i s i n i t s e l f can cause them to r e j e c t i t , becoming ' c r i t i c s of 
the churches i n the name of the S p i r i t u a l Community** T i l l i c h points 
out that there are times when even openly anti-Christian movements can 
act i n t h i s r o l e * 'Not even communism could l i v e i f i t were devoid of 
a l l elements of the S p i r i t u a l Community': even th i s i s related 'teleolo-
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g i c a l l y ' to the work of the S p i r i t i n human l i f e * T i l l i c h believes 
that a l l these considerations, have bearing on the ministry and mission 
of the Christian church, i n regard to those both w i t h i n and outside 
Christian culture* For i t means that we need no longer t r e a t non-Christians 
as complete strangers, to be 'invi t e d ' i n t o the S p i r i t u a l Community from 
the outside, but rather that we approach them as those who are already 
members of the S p i r i t u a l Community i n i t s l a t e n t stage* I f t h i s were 
realised more f u l l y , T i l l i c h i s certain that much of the ecclesiastical 
arrogance which so frequently dogs the steps of the Christian mission 
would be overcome* 
F i n a l l y T i l l i c h turns to the relationship, of the S p i r i t u a l Community 
to the work of the S p i r i t i n the unity of the three functions of l i f e , 
morality, culture and r e l i g i o n . 'The transcendent union of unambiguous 
l i f e i n which the S p i r i t u a l Community participates', he says, 'includes 
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the unity of the three functions of l i f e under the dimension o f / s p i r i t ' , 
f o r the unity of l i f e i n i t s essential nature, disrupted under the conditions 
of existence, i s recreated by the S p i r i t a t work wi t h i n the S p i r i t u a l 
Community 'as i t struggles with the ambiguities of l i f e i n religious and 
secular groups'. 
We must begin, says T i l l i c h , by pointing out that r e l i g i o n i t s e l f 
i s not to be thought of as a special function of the S p i r i t u a l Community, 
as the more narrow connotations of the word ' r e l i g i o n ' imply. Rather 
i s r e l i g i o n concerned with the whole of l i f e , not j u s t a part, and t h i s 
means that when the S p i r i t u a l Presence grasps a man, i t grasps him i n 
every dimension of his experience. So 'the universe i s God's sanctuary. 
Every work day i s a day of the Lord, every supper a Lord's supper, every 
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work a f u l f i l m e n t of a divine task, every joy a joy i n God'* So i n 
creating the S p i r i t u a l Community the S p i r i t does not need to create a 
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specific organisms to reoeive and express i t t instead i t 'grasps a l l 
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r e a l i t y , every function, every s i t u a t i o n ' . I t exists i n the 'depth* 
of every c u l t u r a l creation, f o r every act of c u l t u r a l c r e a t i v i t y p a r t i -
cipates i n the divine l i f e as i t s ultimate ground and aim. This i s why 
i n the S p i r i t u a l Community, as d i s t i n c t from the church, there are no 
s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l i g i o u s symbols and acts, f o r encountered r e a l i t y i t s e l f 
becomes completely symbolic of the S p i r i t u a l Presence and every c u l t u r a l 
act becomes one of self-transcendence. Essentially, then, i n the 
S p i r i t u a l Community, the r e l a t i o n between r e l i g i o n and culture, that 
'culture i s the form of r e l i g i o n and r e l i g i o n the substance of culture', 
i s realised. However, because of man's f i n i t e l i m i t a t i o n s , t h i s s i t u a -
t i o n can never be realised more than fragmentarily i n actual l i f e . At 
d i f f e r e n t times one or the other w i l l predominate, though they need 
not always be separated. I t i s when they do exclude each other e n t i r e l y 
that an occasion f o r both r e l i g i o u s and c u l t u r a l ambiguity occurs most 
pointedly, a s i t u a t i o n that the S p i r i t u a l Presence w i l l r e s i s t , applying 
as a c r i t e r i o n the unambiguous union of r e l i g i o n and culture which i s 
found i n the S p i r i t u a l Community hidden i n t h e i r midst. 
I n essence, T i l l i c h continues, r e l i g i o n i s also one with morality, 
and i n the S p i r i t u a l Community t h i s unambiguous union i s manifest. Those 
c o n f l i c t s which do occur between r e l i g i o n and morality arise from the 
narrower concept of r e l i g i o n , from which morality claims i t s independence, 
and against which claim r e l i g i o n i n the narrower sense reacts. But 
because i n the S p i r i t u a l Community the S p i r i t grasps the whole of man, 
including his personal and communal r e l a t i o n s , there can be no c o n f l i c t 
between morality and r e l i g i o n as defined i n i t s broader sense. The New 
Being cannot appear i n a narrow r e l i g i o u s form set apart from society and 
then impose moral forms on i t from withouti i t must manifest i t s e l f 
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w i t h i n the essential framework of man. For t h i s reason the morality of 
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the S p i r i t u a l Community can be called 'theonomous1, which means that 
to be obedient to the moral imperative i s i n f a c t to a f f i r m what essentially 
one i s . I t also means that when a person i s grasped by the S p i r i t he be-
comes aware of his i n f i n i t e value as a participant i n the divine l i f e , 
and so seeks to a f f i r m his essential being rather than destroy i t . To 
be grasped by the S p i r i t u a l Presence, to r e a l i s e one's transcendent un i t y 
with the divine l i f e , and to accept the unconditional nature of the 
moral imperative are one and the same thing. So the motivating power of 
morality i s not law, but p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the divine l i f e which makes 
transcendent union with oneself, one's world and one's ground of being 
possible. T i l l i c h c a l l s t h i s S p i r i t u a l l y created transcendent union 
'grace', and i n th i s way affirms that grace alone can establish both the 
moral personality and the moral'community. 'The self-establishment 
of a person as person without grace leaves the person to the ambigu-
i t i e s of the law. Morality i n the S p i r i t u a l Community i s determined by 
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grace 1. Or as he puts i t elsewhere, what grace accomplishes 'is to 
create a state of reunion i n which the cleavage between our true and 
actual being i s fragmentarily overcome, and the rule of the commanding 
law i s broken'.^^ 
The ultimate unity of r e l i g i o n and morality, l i k e that of r e l i g i o n 
and culture, says T i l l i c h , can only be established fragmentarily because 
of the l i m i t a t i o n s of f i n i t u d e . I t cannot therefore embrace the whole 
f i e l d of human relations at once. I t can only be an an t i c i p a t i o n of f u l -
f i l l e d personality and community. Yet wherever t h i s unity i s observed, 
the S p i r i t u a l Community i s to be found, and the c r i t e r i o n thus perceived, 
which may be called 'the ethics of the Kingdom of God', i s the measure 
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of ethics i n both church and society. y 
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Finally, there is i n the Spiritual Community a unily of morality 
and culture* This, says T i l l i c h , can be demonstrated i n two ways. I n 
the f i r s t place, morality receives i t s content from culture. The uncon-
ditional moral imperative must be f i l l e d out with specific content, and 
this is provided by the culture i n the context of which the moral imper-
ative is received* This immediately introduces an element of r e l a t i v i t y 
into morality, which is inevitable* But the element of r e l a t i v i t y does 
no damage so long as i t i s conditioned by the love which affirms the 
other i n the act of reunion, for i n this love the moral imperative and 
the ethical content meet to constitute what T i l l i c h calls the 'theonomous 
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morals of the Spiritual Community*• This love w i l l , of course, show 
i t s e l f i n many different ways, but i t w i l l s t i l l remain love, and this 
is why i n the Spiritual Community there are no laws apart from the 
Spiritual Presence, since the S p i r i t creates a love appropriate to every 
situation. 'The "Spiritual Presence" opens man's eyes and ears to the 
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moral demand implicit i n the concrete situation'* This may well give 
rise to 'documents of the wisdom of love', but i t is a mistake to think 
of these as law books* Love must always remain free to '"listen" to 
the particular s i t u a t i o n ' * ^ ^ So while morality depends on culture f o r 
i t s content, i t is independent i n i t s imperative of love, which is the 
creation of the Spiritual Presence alone* Nevertheless, i n the Spiritual 
Community there is an essential unity of morality and culture, fragmentary 
because of the limitations of existence, which means that some moral 
decisions w i l l always have to exclude others, but s t i l l a true, unambi-
guous unity which is the criterion of every moral-cultural situation and 
the hidden power which constantly seeks to unite them i n their existential 
separation* 
In the second place, the essential unity of culture and morality 
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i s demonstrated by the fact that morality gives seriousness to culture* 
T i l l i c h points out that when a cultural creation i s divested of serious-
ness i t becomes merely a thing to be enjoyed rather than the object of a 
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genuine eros, a situation which Kierkegaard called 'aestheticism'* 
By 'seriousness* T i l l i c h means the force of the unconditional nature of 
the moral imperative which prevents cultural ofeativity becoming 'shallow 
and destructive'• I n the Spiritual Community, claims T i l l i c h , there i s 
no such 'aesthetic' detachment, but only 'the seriousness of those who 
seek to experience the ultimate i n being and meaning through every form 
ldO 
and task'. There i s therefore no conflict arising from an irrespon-
sible enjoyment of cultural forms and ac t i v i t i e s or from an attitude of 
moral superiority over culture* There w i l l be tension, because the unity 
is only fragmentary; yet the essential unity of moral seriousness and 
cultural 'openness' to the depth of being and meaning w i l l determine 
a l l true relationships between morality and culture i n every human group 
and w i l l constantly struggle against the ambiguities of separation* 
T i l l i c h concludes his analysis of the Spiritual Community by saying 
that i t i s clear that i n every instance of the Spiritual Community i n 
the l i f e of man, as i n every instance of the Spiritual Presence, i t s 
presence is both hidden and manifest* ' I t i s as manifest and as hidden 
as the central manifestation of the New Being i n Jesus as the Christ; 
i t i s as manifest and as hidden as the Spiritual Presence which creates 
the New Being i n the history of mankind, and indirectly, i n the universe 
as a whole*' I n a l l three instances, everything Spiritual i s manifest 
within i t s hiddenness, open only to the eyes of f a i t h , a f a i t h that is 
none other than being grasped by the Spiritual Presence* 'As we have 
l 8 l 
said before,' he declares, 'only Spirit discerns Spirit'* 
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Evaluation 
T i l l i c h has provided us with a most valuable and penetrating 
analysis of his concept of 'the Spiritual Community', an analysis which 
one cannot ignore i n working towards a contemporary doctrine either of 
the work of the Spirit or of the church. There are several points, 
however, which c a l l for c r i t i c a l attention. The f i r s t concerns his 
definition of the Spiritual Community i n essentialistic terms. From 
what he says i t is clear that the Spiritual Community i s , like a l l 
essential being, a reality i n i t s own right, prior to any actualisation 
i n existential forms. This comes out clearly i n his assertion that i t 
is the 'New Creation into which the individual Christian and the 
particular church is taken'• Yet at the same time, i n his definition 
of the Spiritual Community he goes further than his previous definitions 
of essentiality, for he is also claiming that i t i s a teleological force 
which not only directs the shape of existence, but also drives towards 
i t s fulfilment. I n other words, he i s not only including the essential 
ontological r e a l i t y , but the dynamic process of actualisation as well. 
I t is important for us to realise this i n our attempt to evaluate T i l l i c h 
doctrine of the Spiritual Community, for whilst we must immediately 
reject the idea that the Spiritual Community i s some sort of prior 
reality independent of i t s manifestation i n the l i f e of man, his further 
assertion that the Spiritual Community i s the inner telos of the church 
carries much more meaning. What we can certainly say. i s that the 
Spiritual Community i s the hidden, purposive principle by which the 
Spirit works within the community of men to create a genuine expression 
of partnership to which the New Testament gives the name koinonia, 'that 
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rare quality which makes the church f u l l y the body of Christ'• Perhap 
this would be seen more clearly, then, i f the definite article were 
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removed, and we spoke quite simply of 'Spiritual Community % and i n this 
case i t becomes a good and valuable term to use; 
The second point is to question T i l l i c h ' s assertion that the 
terms 'the Body of Christ' and 'the Assembly of God*, which he proposes 
as alternatives to 'the Spiritual Community') are themselves free from 
ambiguity* This i s just not true* In contemporary theology regarding 
the church, particularly i n more Catholic circles, the 'Body of Christ' 
has become so frequently al l i e d with the organised church with a l l i t s 
ambiguities, that the two have become v i r t u a l l y interchangeable* The 
other phrase, the 'Assembly of God', also carries an ambiguity, because 
of i t s almost exclusive use by Pentecostalist and other evangelical 
groupings to refer to the local congregation* One feels therefore that 
the expression 'Spiritual Community', without the definite a r t i c l e , i s 
preferable to either of these proposed alternatives* 
Several points may be made regarding the analysis of the Pentecost 
story* One would certainly wish to affirm with T i l l i c h the presence of 
the ecstatic element i n the events of the f i r s t Whitsunday, but i t should 
be pointed out that there i s no evidence that the disciples understood 
their experience of ecstasy as a transcending of the subjects-object order 
of r e a l i t y . To be grasped by the Spirit i s certainly indicative of 
Spiritual Community, but as we have pointed out before, this does not 
necessitate a mystical experience i n which one becomes aware of trans-
cendent unity* Having said t h i s , i t i s interesting to see that i n his 
description of f a i t h and love i n this particular context T i l l i c h i s much 
more Scriptural than i n his previous analysis of f a i t h and love i n terms 
of ultimate concern and the drive towards reunion* Here f a i t h i s 
seen much more i n terms of certainty and commitment, and love much more 
i n terms of a self-denying agape, though i t i s a great pity that when he 
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goes on to talk of these marks i n the l i f e of the Spiritual Community 
i n a more universal context, he again reverts to his former ontological 
understanding of the nature of love as the desire for the reunion of 
the separated* Finally, would i t not be more Scriptural to say that 
these elements i n the Pentecostal experience derive from the risen 
Presence of Christ i n the midst through the S p i r i t , rather than 'from 
the image of Jesus as the Christ and the New Being as i t appears i n him'? 
I t may. be true that they are seen most clearly i n the image of Jesus 
as the Christ, but to say that they are derived from this image i s signi-
ficantly weaker theologically than to affirm that i t i s the risen Lord 
in the midst through the power of his S p i r i t who produces within the 
l i f e of the Christian community the same marks of the Spiritual Presence 
as were seen i n him* T i l l i c h ' s phrase here suggests more of an 'imita-
tion of Christ' than 'Christ i n me'. 
T i l l i c h ' s discussion on the Spiritual Community i n i t s latent and 
manifest stages i s a valuable contribution to contemporary thinking 
about the church, particularly concerning i t s relationship with the world. 
I t is obvious when one examines the course of history that the work of 
the Spirit i n creating Spiritual Community i s neither confined to the 
Christian church nor identical with i t s a c t i v i t y . The forceful recog-
nition of this fact i n modern times, together with the increasing contact 
between Christians and non-Christians, necessitates a re-appraisal of 
the precise theological relationship between the institutional church 
and these other groups, and here the words 'manifest' and 'latent' 
provide a useful distinction. One feels that T i l l i c h could have 
differentiated more forcefully between non^Christian religious groups 
and secular groups, by pointing out that i n the case of the former the 
Spiritual dynamic i s overt and acknowledged, even though the Christ i s 
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not named, whereas i n the case of the l a t t e r the Spiritual dynamic i s 
hidden, to a great extent unacknowledged and even sometimes ex p l i c i t l y 
denied* But be that as i t may, his recognition that the Spirit's work 
is i n no way confined to the manifest church is important* 
Nevertheless, there have been mixed reactions to the concept of 
latency, for i n addition to those who see i t as a recognition of the 
world-wide act i v i t y of the S p i r i t i n working towards true community, 
there are those who see i t s disadvantages, pointing out that i t may well 
be used as a means of j u s t i f i c a t i o n for those who wish to cut themselves 
off from the church because of i t s ambiguities and failures. I t i s 
interesting here to contrast two writers on this theme* The f i r s t i s 
a Continental lay theologian, who says: 
When I was a child, I was taughti A Christian i s a 
person who goes to church* But as I grew up I noticed that 
Christ is not only to be found i n the church, because he 
lives and acts i n the world, as i t were, incognito, under 
oilier names; because he i s there where men liv e more genuinely 
and more freely than heretofore, and because he w i l l there 
be crucified where men are being k i l l e d - in this form he i s 
present always* We can no longer turn our eyes away from the 
presence of the "Greater Christ" i n the world i f we really 
desire to believe that Christ has died for a l l men* God 
has made us free i n Christ and thereby broken down the 
barriers so that the established church i s no longer the only 
place where one can ask for Christ and believe i n him* As 
a result of secularisation, i s there not a "Church outside the 
Church", a hidden, latent Church i n which Christ is present 
unknown as he was once at Enmaus?l84 
On the other hand, from the other point of view, a Bri t i s h theologian 
has this to says 
I f taken too seriously (the. notion of a latent church) 
can lead not only to romanticism, which sees particular his-
tori c a l movements * . • as heralds of the kingdom of God, but 
also to the most invidious and deadly form of self-righteous-
ness, that of the man who considers himself too righteous to 
belong to a corrupt church. This i s a form of self-deception 
greater than that which any ecclesiastic is l i k e l y to suffer 
i n these days, for i t allows a man to enjoy the glow of self-
satisfaction of the Pharisee, without either accepting his 
responsibilities or enduring the odium of being branded with 
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his name • . . Once those who are outside begin to 
f l a t t e r themselves that they belong to the 'latent' and, 
therefore, superior Church, they place themselves under a 
clearer judgement than even those who are unworthily 
joined to the visible Church deserve.^5 
The concept of a latent church or Spiritual Community, therefore, i s 
one which i t s e l f suffers from ambiguity, and for this reason must be 
used with care, despite the fact that i t i s a valid and a necessary 
concept i f one i s to affirm that the S p i r i t i s at work within the world 
as well as i n the church i t s e l f . Nevertheless i t is a doctrine that 
must inevitably c a l l the church to a re-appraisal of i t s own nature and 
function within the l i f e of man, a theme which T i l l i o h takes up later 
when he discusses more specifically the relationship between the church, 
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as the manifest community of the S p i r i t , and the world outside. 
One can agree with T i l l i c h that i n any group where Spiritual 
Community i s latently present, the marks of the Spirit's a c t i v i t y w i l l 
be found, even though they may appear i n slightly different ways. One 
question which does arise, however, i s i n what sense f a i t h appears i n 
the secular group i n which the S p i r i t i s at work. There is no p a r t i -
cular problem here i f one accepts T i l l i c h * s definition of f a i t h as 
ultimate concern, but this i s a definition which we have rejected. How 
is i t that f a i t h i n the New Testament sense can appear i n the secular 
group? The problem i s particularly acute i f the group describes i t s e l f 
as secular humanist, for i n this case, though there may well be a 
certain measure of agapeistic concern present, there w i l l be l i t t l e that 
we could c a l l f a i t h i n the Scriptural sense at a l l . Nevertheless, i t 
could well be argued that the formal marks of f a i t h are not entirely 
absent* For example, one could say that the humanist who i s f i l l e d with 
motives of concern for his fellow men does believe something after a l l -
he believes that i n a transient world man matters, and were he not to 
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believe this he could not act i n a humanitarian way. We can detect i n 
this belief the pattern of f a i t h , even though i t does not derive from 
any specifically religious convictions about the nature of man and his 
dignity as a child of God* Similarly, one could point out that the 
elements of response and commitment, both of which are important facets 
of f a i t h i n the New Testament, are both present i n the way of l i f e of 
the secular humanist, even though they are not developed i n relation 
to God. Despite t h i s , however, i t seems to me that i f one i s to be 
really honest one must say that i f any mark of the Spiritual Community 
is notably deficient i n secular latent groups, i t i s the element of 
f a i t h . The seeds of f a i t h may well be present, but i t is not always 
possible to uncover them* 
The chief d i f f i c u l t y with T i l l i c h 1 s discussion on the relation 
between the various functions of l i f e i n the Spiritual Community i s that 
he i s speaking of these functions i n their essential state and not as 
they actually are. I t is this that gives rise to a certain a r t i f i c i a l i t y 
i n what he says. We have already rejected his concept of essentiality 
as a prior r e a l i t y preceding actual existence, and this applies here* 
There i s no reason at a l l why one should not affizm the unity of l i f e 
without having to bring i n an abstract realm of essences to warrant i t * 
We can certainly say that the unity of morality, culture and religion, 
w i l l become more and more apparent i n human experience as the Spirit 
grasps man's l i f e and works within i t towards the creation of community 
i n which there is no basic contradiction between these various functions* 
But we can say this without T i l l i c h ' s ontological predilections* 
Similarly, one doubts whether Ti l l i c h ' s statement that i n the 
Spiritual Community, where religion and culture are essentially one, 
there i s no place for religious symbols can be substantiated. One could 
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legitimately say that i n any community f u l l y constituted by the S p i r i t , 
every act of human creativity, whether narrowly religious or not, would 
f u l f i l the religious function of pointing to the presence of the divine 
i n the midst of l i f e * Yet even were i t possible for such a community 
to exist, one would s t i l l question whether the need for specifically 
religious symbols would drop out altogether* I f T i l l i c h i s right then 
the necessity for symbolism would appear to be merely a cultural pheno-
menon rather than something implied by the transcendence of God* Yet 
i t i s surely significant that i n those communities where the Spiritual 
Community has been most f u l l y realised, the need for religious symbols 
has by no means been abandoned, but has rather been more deeply affirmed, 
i n accordance with the fact that the nearer one gets to God the more 
conscious one becomes of the distance which separates one from him* This 
is true even of those communities which on the surface do not seem to 
rely on any form of symbolism at a l l , such as the Quakers where silence 
i t s e l f i s nevertheless a religious symbol with a profound depth of meaning* 
We cannot agree then with T i l l i e h that i n the Spiritual Community there 
is no need for religious symbols as such, because wherever Spiritual 
Community has been most f u l l y realised i n the l i f e of man, the religious 
symbol seems to have become more significant than ever* 
We shall defer our comments on the concept of theonomous morality 
u n t i l later, when T i l l i c h discusses the relation of the Spirit to 
morality more specifically. But i t should be pointed out here that 
T i l l i c h ' s definition of morality i n terms of self-integration which has 
already given us cause for.concern should not lead us to rule out a 
concept of theonomous morality i n i t s e l f * We can affirm such a concept 
even i f we disagree with how T i l l i c h interprets morality, and even i f 
we cannot hold to the ontological presuppositions behind T i l l i c h ' s idea 
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of theonoaiy which w i l l become apparent i n our later discussions* What 
we can. affirm at this stage i s that any morality that is truly genuine 
is one which i s born as a result of the impact of the Spirit of God i n 
human l i f e * This i s t o t a l l y i n accord with New Testament teaching. One 
would also affirm the close relationship T i l l i c h detects between moral-
i t y and culture. Yet at the same time, however, one must question the 
assumption that i t i s morality alone that gives seriousness to culture, 
for religion as interpreted i n i t s wider sense of pointing man beyond 
himself to the God who gives to l i f e i t s ultimate significance, is surely 
that which makes us view every cultural activity with the utmost serious-
ness. Both morality and religion have a part to play here, and this 
underlines the interdependence of the various functions of l i f e , and the 
realisation of their unity i n the power of the Spirit* 
A further comment concerns the use of the word 'grace1• Like 
other theological expressions i n Ti l l i c h ' s system, this word i s inter-
preted along specific ontological lines, so that i t now becomes above 
a l l the g i f t of transcendent ontological union with the divine Life, 
i n the context of which man becomes both one with himself and one with 
his fellows, thus establishing a genuine moral 'integration'. Now we 
can affirm with T i l l i c h that grace i s a g i f t , we can also affirm that the 
l i f e of grace is a l i f e free from law, created by the S p i r i t , but we 
cannot affirm that the biblical concept of grace i s best understood as 
the g i f t of the transcendent unity of unambiguous l i f e * The biblical 
emphasis i s rather on the free and forgiving mercy of God which seeks 
man i n his need, reconciling him with himself, a reconciliation which 
is something rather different from the ontological union which T i l l i c h 
has i n mind. Here we have a further example of how T i l l i c h takes impor-
tant biblical words and gives them a subtle yet significant twist to 
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make them f i t i n with his scheme of ontological participation* 
Despite these various criticisms, i t i s important to emphasise 
Ti l l i c h ' s positive contribution towards an understanding of the unity of 
human l i f e and experience. The unity of i t s various functions -
morality, culture, and religion - which i s characteristic of Spiritual 
Community, i s something towards which man should constantly be working, 
for i t is when l i f e becomes divided into isolated departments that dis-
integration and loss of community occur. Here Ti l l i c h ' s discussion i s 
valuable i n that i t points beyond things as they are to things as they 
should be, and which through God's grace they can become. Finally, one 
must underline his concluding comment that only the Sp i r i t discerns 
Spirit as neatly summarising the New Testament attitude. His doctrine of 
the Spiritual Presence has emphasised that everywhere God is at work 
within the l i f e of man, but i t i s also true that such a work i s not 
always recognised, 'hidden' save to the man whose eyes have been opened 
through f a i t h , who himself has been grasped by the Spirit i n the depths 
of his being. As Paul puts i t , 'No one comprehends the thoughts of 
God except the Spirit of God. Now we have received not the s p i r i t of 
the world, but the Spirit which i s from God, that we might understand 
the g i f t s bestowed on us by God. And we impart this i n words not taught 
by human wisdom but taught by the S p i r i t , interpreting s p i r i t u a l truths 
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to those who possess the S p i r i t 1 * Like Paul, T i l l i c h recognises 
that apart from the Spirit's impact on man, there can be no discernment 
of God's presence i n the midst of l i f e , and no true anticipation of the 
l i f e that is to come. Though we may not agree with the ontological 
presuppositions behind much of what he has to say, his analysis of the 
Spiritual Presence so far has underlined this truth at every point* 
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CHAPTER FOUR THE SPIRIT AND THE AMBIGUITIES OF 
RELIGION* THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH 
I . THE MARKS OF THE SPIRITUAL COMMUNITY IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH 
There i s no real division i n T i l l i c h 1 s thought between pneuma-
tology and ecclesiology. Because the church i s the manifest expression 
of the Spiritual Community i n the l i f e of man, the doctrine of the 
church follows on quite naturally from the doctrine of the S p i r i t , and 
therefore oomes within the same area of theological concern. Bui l t on 
the experience of the New Being as i t has appeared i n Jesus as the 
Christ, and created by the Spiritual Presence 'through an existential 
encounter with the Christ, at i t s heart i t shows the marks of genuine 
Spj^gjual Community. Essentially, therefore, the church i s the community 
y 
of the S p i r i t . But i t i s only the man of f a i t h who has been grasped by 
the S p i r i t who recognises this. To the man who has not been grasped 
by the Spirit the church w i l l appear as just another organisation. These 
two points of view underline the paradox which lies at the centre of 
the church's l i f e i n the world. For while the church inwardly p a r t i -
cipates i n the unambiguous l i f e of the Spiritual Community, which i s 
fragmentarily realised i n i t s midst, outwardly i t shares i n the ambi-
guities of a l l l i f e because of the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of having an external 
form. T i l l i c h has already underlined this paradox by referring to 
the 'invisible' and 'visible* aspects of the churoh's nature, and by 
differentiating between the essential Spiritual Community and the 
ambiguous l i f e of the churches. Another way of approaching the paradox 
is to look at the church from theological and sociological standpoints, 
the l a t t e r emphasising the church as a visible, sociological phenomenon, 
the former i t s inner significance as the fragmentary actualisation of 
the Spiritual Community.''' 
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The value of a sociological study of the churoh is that i t points 
out and analyses the ambiguities that appear i n the ohurch's l i f e . But 
T i l l i o h points out that i t i s not easy for such a study to be under-
taken with complete objectivity. Not infrequently those who look 
at the church i n this way are motivated by subjective attitudes. For 
example, there are those who i n their analysis w i l l draw particular 
attention to the discrepancy between what the churches are and what 
they claim to be. They w i l l compare the 'miserable reality of the 
2 
concrete churches* with 'their claim to embody the Spiritual Community •• 
Perhaps this attitude arises because the enquirer expects far too much 
of the churoh i n the f i r s t plaoe and becomes cynioal because of his dis-
appointment at the church's so-called f a i l u r e . But whatever the explan-
ation> for such a person 'the church at the streetcorner hides the 
church Spiritual from view', and beoomes an obstacle rather than a means 
of revelation.^ On the other hand, there are those who value the churches 
for their social significance, their usefulness as an agency for goody or 
the way i n which they provide psychological security f o r those who need i t , 
affirming that i n this way the church i s playing an important role i n the 
l i f e of sooiety. Neither of these judgments i s tru l y objective, for i n the 
former case the enquirer i s In danger of engaging In mere polemic, and i n 
the l a t t e r the attempt to provide an apologetic for the church along the 
lines of i t s social value f a i l s to reckon with the fact that the church's 
raison d'etre claims to l i e i n other directions. Because of this element 
of subjectivity, there are few sociological conclusions regarding the 
nature of the church which would pass unchallenged* 
This means that one must recognise the inevitable limitations of a 
sociological approach to an understanding of the nature of the church. 
But this does not mean that such an approach is invalid, nor does i t follow 
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that the social characteristics of the church have no significance. The 
church i s not 'a sacred re a l i t y above the sociological ambiguities of past 
4 
and present', as Rome has frequently implied, neither does i t have a 
'sacred, unambiguous history' of i t s own, separate from the ordinary 
vicissitudes which affect a l l other historical groups* Because Rome has 
believed this i t has not been able to tolerate any criticism of i t s essential 
doctrines, ethics or hierarchical structure, for such an attack i n this 
case would be tantamount to an attaok on the Spiritual Community i t s e l f , 
and T i l l i c h feels that this i s one of the sources of the hierarchical 
arrogance which has so often characterised the Roman Catholic ohuroh. For 
by absorbing the sociological character of the church into i t s theological 
nature the Roman church has sought to turn a blind eye on the ambiguities 
of i t s l i f e * To do this i s to ignore that the relation between the two 
aspects i s paradoxical, a fact which cannot be overcome either by the 
elimination of one or by the subjection of one to the other* Both aspects 
must be held together* 
The sociological-theological paradox at the heart of the church's 
l i f e comes out clearly when one examines i t i n the l i g h t of the various marks 
of the Spiritual Community* The f i r s t mark i s that of holiness* 'The 
churches', says T i l l i c h , 'are holy because of the holiness of their found-
ation, the New Being, which is present i n them'* Their holiness is derived 
from no other source, neither institutions, doctrines, r i t e s and ceremonies, 
nor moral codes* One could say, of course, that the church i s holy because 
i t is made up of individuals who have been j u s t i f i e d through f a i t h by 
graoe and who are therefore accepted by God as 'holy i n spite of their actual 
uhholiness', but this i s just as true of the church as a whole as i t is of 
i t s individual members* For despite the ambiguities of religion which are 
part of i t s l i f e , and for which reason i t stands under the judgement of the 
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cross, the church Is holy, acoepted by God, precisely because the New 
Beings created by the S p i r i t , i s at work within i t . I t i s at this point, 
says T i l l i c h , that the gap between the Protestant and Roman Catholic 
doctrines of the church seems impossible to bridge. The Roman church v i l l i 
accept c r i t i c a l judgment of i t s members, even of the Pope himself, but i t 
refuses to accept judgment of i t s e l f as an ecclesiastical i n s t i t u t i o n , 
and claims to be in s t i t u t i o n a l l y perfect, a claim which cannot be 
questioned, despite the present movements towards reform within i t . The 
Protestant churches, on the other hand, cannot accept this understanding 
of holiness i n terms of institutional perfection. I t reoognises that the 
church i n every time and place i s both holy and distorted, and i n this way 
affirms the paradox at the heart of the church's l i f e . But what Roman 
Catholic and Protestant alike affirm, despite their difference i n inter-
pretation, i s that the mark of holiness which points to the presence of the 
New Being, means that the church has within i t s e l f the very power to fight 
against a l l attempts to betray i t s essential nature* 
The second mark of the churches which underlines their paradoxical 
character is that of unity, whioh i s again derived not from any organisa-
tional form, but from the unity of their foundation, the New Being, present 
within their l i f e . T i l l i c h maintains that for this reason the denomina-
tional structure of the churches i s no denial of their essential unity, 
which i s 'independent of these empirical rea l i t i e s and possibilities'*^ 
A l l local churches, despite their existential separation, participate i n 
this essential unity created by the S p i r i t , and in this way are united with 
each other. But here again we are faoed with a division of opinion between 
Roman Catholics and Protestants. The Roman claim to be the only true 
church v i r t u a l l y means that unity i s f u l l y actualised within i t s own 
structures. There i s no problem of disunity i f other Christian bodies are 
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outside the pa l e i This i s why Rome has i n the past refused to cooperate 
on religious matters with any other church, and T i l l i c h feels that i f 
any real progress i s to be made towards reunion, despite the present thaw 
in ecumenical relations,' Rome must give up this claim to be the one true 
church. Protestantism, on the other hand, has never made such a claims 
i t has always realised that because of the ambiguities of the religious 
situation, the rise of different denominations i s inevitable. At the same 
time i t has insisted that the apparent division between the churohes does 
not contradict their essential unity, recognising that such a unity i s 
something far deeper than external form. Yet despite the i n e v i t a b i l i t y 
of visible division, T i l l i c h maintains that the church must always fight 
against i t 'in the power of the Spiritual Community*, for the Spirit's 
impact on the l i f e of the churches w i l l always press towards that unambi-
guous unity to which the Spiritual Community belongs. 
This i s the important truth within the ecumenioal movement, and this 
i s why such a movement can be legitimately described as a work of the 
Sp i r i t . On the other hand, there w i l l be times when prophetic criticism 
w i l l be necessary i n the l i f e of the church, especially when the church 
stagnates i n an effort to preserve i t s own holiness, and this i n i t s e l f 
may cause further division, as history so clearly shows. Tet whenever 
this happens, such a division i s i t s e l f the result of the Spirit's work, 
made necessary because of the ambiguities of l i f e . The move towards unity 
and the prophetic protest which may ocoasion further disunity must be 
held i n tension, and this underlines the paradoxical nature of the church's 
unity, so that i t can significantly be said that ' i t i s the divided 
7 
ohurch which is the united churoh'. 
The t h i r d mark of the churches, universality, also stems from their 
foundation, for the New Being i s universal i n i t s concern. The universal 
249 
nature of the church appears i n two ways* F i r s t l y , i t appears i n an 
intensive, or q u a l i t a t i v e , way; i n the power and desire of the church to 
share i n l i f e as a whole. This inevitably creates a c o n f l i c t between 
the S p i r i t u a l Community and the ambiguities of l i f e which are encountered 
i n that p a r t i c i p a t i o n , yet despite t h i s danger the church must remain 
open to every part of l i f e . The Roman church has always sought to do t h i s , 
even though t h i s has resulted i n ambiguous elements being incorporated 
into i t s l i f e , and the danger of demonic features developing. Because of 
t h i s Protestantism has at times swung to the opposite extreme, not denying 
the p rinciple of un i v e r s a l i t y as such, but developing a 'poverty of 
sacred emptiness' i n which pa r t i c i p a t i o n i n the l i f e of the world i s 
r e s i s t e d at every point. There can be, says T i l l i c h , a 'universality of 
emptiness' j u s t as much as a 'universality of abundance'. The p r i n c i p l e 
of u n i v e r s a l i t y i s only r e a l l y denied when the church emphasises p a r t i c u l a r 
elements of l i f e a t the expense of others, an attitude which encourages 
the growth of secularism and the inevitable emergence of a secular catho-
l i c i t y , the church remaining a mere segment of l i f e rather than p a r t i c i -
pating i n l i f e as a whole. Nevertheless, such a sit u a t i o n i s quite 
unacceptable theologically, and despite the e x i s t e n t i a l impossibility of 
the church pa r t i c i p a t i n g i n a l l segments of l i f e simultaneously, i t must 
be affirmed that because l i f e i s one then by sharing i n ce r t a i n parts of 
l i f e the church i s expressing i t s desire to participate i n l i f e as a 
whole. I n t h i s way i t i s affirming that 'the u n i v e r s a l i t y of the churches 
Q 
i s paradoxically present i n t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r i t y ' • 
The other facet of the u n i v e r s a l i t y of the church i s quantitative, 
or 'intensive'; i t i s concerned with 'the v a l i d i t y of the church's found-
ation for a l l nations, s o c i a l groups, races, t r i b e s , and cultures'. Today, 
t h i s aspect so f o r c e f u l l y emphasised i n the New Testament, needs p a r t i -
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oular emphasis, i n view of the many divisions which separate man* But 
because of the inevitable particularity of time and space i n which the 
churches li v e * this universality must again be paradoxical, i n so far 
as the churches become tied to specific nations and cultures* So 
historical particularity tends to prevent the f u l l actualisation of 
true catholicity, and this oan be seen i n every branch of Christendom. 
This tendency to identify, the church with a particular cultural or 
racial expression must be resisted at a l l costs. As i n the case of 
qualitative universality, the church must show that i t s concern i s 
for every man and every expression of his l i f e , despite the fact 
of i t s own existential limitations, and the way i n which i t shows this 
concern, or f a i l s to show i t , w i l l be the measure of i t s own universa-
l i t y . In this way, T i l l i c h points out, 'the concept of universality' 
becomes paradoxically present i n the l i f e of the p a r t i c u l a r * 1 0 
Holiness, unity, universality! or, as the Apostles' Creed puts 
i t , 'one, holy Catholic ohurch'i these, as marks of the Spiritual 
Community, are also marks of the churches, even though ambiguously so. 
The individual Christian who confesses this creed i s often much more 
aware of this ambiguity than the theologian may care to think. Even 
though he may have no real understanding of what the Spiritual Community 
i s , he i s at least aware that the l i f e of the church i s one of paradox, 
for the paradox i s part of his own experience. The layman i s not 
deceived into«thinking that i n this present world the church w i l l 
become perfected. Even so, says T i l l i c h , he who expresses his belief 
i n the one, holy and catholic church oan only do so because he i s grasped 
by the power of the Spiritual Community, the unambiguous heart of the 
church's l i f e . 
The fact that there i s paradox i n the l i f e of the church means 
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that the ambiguities of religion are conquered by the S p i r i t 'in 
principle 1 rather than entirely eliminated* T i l l i c h defines 'in 
principle' as 'the power of beginning, which remains the controlling 
power i n a whole process',** and the principles which conquer the 
ambiguities of religion, he says, are the Spiritual Presence, the New 
Being and the Spiritual Community - they are the beginning and the con-
tinuation of any conquest of l i f e ' s ambiguities that takes place i n the 
l i f e of the churches* And although i t i s true that these ambiguities 
w i l l never be completely removed i n the framework of our present 
existence, yet they are recognised for what they are and e x p l i c i t l y 
rejected* In this way their 'self-destructive force is broken', and 
the ultimate power of their a b i l i t y to subvert i s overcome* A l l t h i s , 
says T i l l i c h , can be clearly seen i n the act of f a i t h , for nowhere 
i n the l i f e of the church can the ambiguities of religion be observed 
more clearly than i n this sphere, for when f a i t h becomes distorted i t 
opens up Hie way for destructive and demonic forces to get to work with-
i n the l i f e of the church* Yet at the same time there i s i n the l i f e of 
every church a power of resistance at work against the distortion of 
f a i t h , a power which i s i n fact no less than the divine Spirit embodied 
within the Spiritual Community* So we come to consider the mark of 
f a i t h i n the l i f e of the churches. 
The thing that one Immediately notices i n the f a i t h of the church 
is the tension, even sometimes a cleavage, between the f a i t h of the 
individual and the f a i t h of the community as a whole. This leads 
T i l l i c h to ask the question, 'What do we mean when we speak of the f a i t h 
12 
of the churches?' He points out that i n the days of the early church 
i t was far easier to answer this question than i t i s today. For the 
early Christians f a i t h was a l i v i n g response to Christ, an 'existential 
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decision', and those who joined the church frequently did so at their 
own risk* So the church was, i n a very real sense, the community of 
fa i t h * But later on, people entered the ohuroh f o r other reasonsi 
perhaps to obtain some form of security, or because the whole community 
to which they belonged had become Christian i n a wider sense* What 
did f a i t h mean to these people? I t i s obvious that an active f a i t h , 
'fides qua oreditur'i could not be taken for granted* What i n fact 
did remain was the credal foundation of the church, 'fides quae creditur', 
and the problem arose as to how to determine the relation between these 
two. interpretations of f a i t h * Here the tension between the f a i t h of 
the individual and the f a i t h of the church became most pronounced, as 
ambiguities arose regarding i t s meaning. In faot, says T i l l i c h , these 
ambiguities beoame and remain so pointed that one may wonder whether 
the concept of f a i t h i s a good one to use at a l l any longer* I n the 
second place, a further problem arose over the use of creeds. Many 
people f e l t that the creeds were a burden which they could not honestly 
accept, and this meant that when the church subordinated f a i t h to these 
doctrinal formularies, i t l e t loose within the l i f e of the church a 
potentially destructive force, which threatened to tear the church 
apart* A further d i f f i c u l t y stems from the presenoe of the church i n 
the seoular world, and the way i n which i t s members imbibe the c r i t i c a l 
attitude of secular society to the concept of f a i t h * A l l these consider-
ations, says T i l l i c h , mean that we must ask ourselves again, 'What 
does "community of f a i t h " mean, i f the community, as well as the person-
13 
a l i t i e s of the individual members,is disrupted by criticism and doubt?' 
The very fact that such.a question has to be posed, he suggests, shows 
the power that the ambiguities of religion have i n the l i f e of the 
churches, and how d i f f i c u l t i t i s for f a i t h to resist them* 
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T i l l i c h begins his answer to the question 'What does f a i t h mean 
i n the l i f e of the churches?* by saying that whatever else i t may mean 
i t means f i r s t and foremost the acceptance by the churoh that Jesus i s 
the Christ, the Bearer of the Hew Being* The church cannot avoid this 
confession, for i t i s based upon i t , and i f i t rejects i t , i t ceases 
to be the church* So one oan define the church as 'a community of those 
who affirm that Jesus is the Christ'* 1^ In T i l l i c h * s understanding 
this means for the individual a decision 'not as to whether he, person-
the assertion 
a l l y , can accept/that Jesus is the Christ, but . . . as to whether he 
wishes to belong or not to belong to a oommunity which asserts that 
Jesus is the Christ'* In f a c t , there are many who opt out of the l i f e 
of the church on these grounds alone* But there are also those i n the 
church who have personal doubts about Jesus as the Christ, yet who at 
the same time would not wish to break away from i t , people who 'belong 
15 
to the church, but doubt whether they belong'* J T i l l i c h maintains 
that such people do i n faot belong to the church beoause of their 
desire to participate i n the l i f e of a community which accepts Jesus 
as the Christ* This means that there are many who though they are unhappy 
with the external forms and expressions of the church can s t i l l l e g i t i -
mately and unhesitatingly belong to i t * Such people need to 'be 
assured that they f u l l y belong to the church, and through i t to the 
Spiritual Community, and/confidently l i v e i n i t and work for i t ' * 1 ^ The 
only reservation T i l l i c h has about this conclusion i s with regard to 
the church's ministers and leaders, for no one who leads the churoh 
can honestly do so i f he denies the basis and aim of i t s particular 
function, namely to confess that Jesus i s the Christ* 
Another question that arises i s more complex* How is the oommunity 
of f a i t h to be related to i t s expressions of belief? The answer to th i s , 
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T i l l i o h i n s i s t s , must be given *in concrete decisions of the concrete 
church - i d e a l l y by the church universal, a c t u a l l y by the manifold 
centres between i t and the looal church 1• I t i s these decisions, he 
points out, that have resulted i n the creeds* But creeds should never 
be regarded as they are i n the Soman church, as unconditionally v a l i d 
statements of b e l i e f , for i f they are, every deviation from them, no 
matter how small, w i l l be regarded as h e r e t i c a l and'schismatic* I f 
i t i s r e a l i s e d that a l l r e l i g i o n i s ambiguous, and that no r e l i g i o u s 
group can possibly be i d e n t i f i e d with the S p i r i t u a l Community, suoh a 
mistake would be avoided* Here, says T i l l i c h , the Protestant churches 
are on firmer ground* Yet i t i s s t i l l necessary f o r them to formulate 
and defend t h e i r own credal b a s i s , even though i n doing so they run 
the inevitable r i s k of encouraging potentially destructive elements to 
a r i s e s 'the churoh cannot avoid f i g h t i n g for the community of f a i t h , . . . 
but i n doing so [ i t ] may f a l l into disintegrating, destructive, or even 
17 
demonic errors'* 1 But any church that wishes to remain true to i t s 
foundation i n the Cross of C h r i s t , or stand within the t r a d i t i o n of 
prophetic o r i t i c i s m , must be w i l l i n g to accept t h i s r i s k as part of i t s 
l i f e . 
A l l t h i s r a i s e s the question of heresy, a term which o r i g i n a l l y 
stood f o r any deviation from o f f i c i a l l y acoepted doctrine, but which 
l a t e r on, as doctrinal or oanon law of the churoh became part and 
parcel of s t a t e law, became a f a r more serious offence, often leading 
to the persecution and liquidation of h e r e t i c s * I t i s because of these 
l a t e r associations that T i l l i c h f e e l s that the ooncept of heresy must 
be abandoned* He therefore prefers the more straightforward expression 
^deviation'* However, i t i s important, he points out, to distinguish 
c a r e f u l l y between a t o t a l rejeotion of the foundation of the church, the 
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New Being i n Jesus as the C h r i s t , and deviations oocurring within the 
church's l i f e which a r i s e from the attempt to formulate t h i s basic 
assertion i n conceptual terms* The former i s nothing l e s s than a t o t a l 
separation from the churcht i t i s the l a t t e r vhioh constitutes the 
problem of so-oalled 'heresy*• The Protestant, i n the l i g h t of the 
Protestant priuoiple of *the i n f i n i t e distance between the divine and 
the human', would answer the question of deviation by asserting that 
no doctrinal expression can ever be absolute* I n f a c t , ' i t belongs 
to the essence of the community of f a i t h i n Protestantism that a 
Protestant church oan receive into i t s thinking and acting every ex-
pression of thought and l i f e created by the S p i r i t u a l Presence anywhere 
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i n the history of mankind'* Unfortunately t h i s has not been the oase 
with the fioman church, and t h i s i s one reason why i t has l o s t the pro-
phetic freedom f o r e s s e n t i a l s e l f - c r i t i c i s m . But i f the true s p i r i t 
of Protestantism i s to remain a t the heart of the church's l i f e , i t 
must continue to allow that the capacity for deviation i s both inevitable 
and permissible* And i n t h i s way i t w i l l t e s t i f y to the two r e a l i t i e s 
i n which i t participates - 'the S p i r i t u a l Community, which i s i t s dynamic 
19 
essence, and i t s existence within the ambiguities of r e l i g i o n ' * * 
The remaining mark of the S p i r i t u a l Community i n the l i f e of the 
churches i s that of love* 'Asthecommunity of love*, T i l l i c h points 
out, 'the church a c t u a l i s e s the S p i r i t u a l Community, which i s i t s 
20 
dynamic essence*• I n t h i s operation T i l l i o h observes three principles 
at work* F i r s t l y , there i s the principle of acceptance, i n which 
people are united i n t h e i r affirmation of each other i n the deepest 
levels of t h e i r being* There i s an acceptance i n the church which trans-
cends a l l a r b i t r a r y d i v i s i o n s of race, c l a s s or temperament, though t h i s 
does not mean that such d i s t i n c t i o n s can be ignored as i f they did not 
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e x i s t , i n favour of some communistic i d e a l , which the early church t r i e d 
unsuccessfully to put into e f f e c t . I t i s true that these sociological 
ambiguities hide the church*s theological significance as a community 
of love, and t h i s i s why the churches cannot be put forward as communi-
t i e s where perfect equality and j u s t i c e are to be found. Despite t h i s , 
the church w i l l constantly be prepared to r e s i s t a l l fonns of inequality 
and i n j u s t i o e wherever they are to be found, and t h i s means beginning 
with i t s own l i f e p a r t i c u l a r l y . I t w i l l also continually seek to 
minister to those who suffe r because of s o c i a l i n j u s t i c e s , although 
i t must beware of substituting acts of charity f or the deeper obligation 
of genuine personal encounter with those who are i n need* Neither w i l l 
E 
i t subscribe to the sort of thinking which perpetuates i n j u s t i c e so 
that love may abound, f o r true ajqape w i l l be more concerned with creating 
those conditions where men may know the creative experience of loving 
for themselves, and i n working f or these conditions the church w i l l 
be engaged i n much more positive works of healing* 
The second principle operative i n the aotualising of love i n the 
church's l i f e i s that of judgment. The church must consistently judge 
those things which deny love, whether i n i t s e l f or i n the world, even 
though t h i s means that i t becomes involved i n the ambiguities of judging* 
Sometimes i t s judgment may become severe and harsh', precisely because 
i t seeks to judge i n the name of the S p i r i t u a l Community, and i n order 
to prevent t h i s the presence of the S p i r i t within the church w i l l 
constantly stand i n judgment over the judgments of the church i t s e l f * 
The tools of judgment that i t w i l l use as f a r as i t s own l i f e i s con-
cerned are c h i e f l y the Word and the sacraments, together with other 
functions which the church may care to use, such as p a r t i c u l a r means 
of d i s c i p l i n e * Protestantism, however, has never been r e a l l y happy 
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with formal express!one of d i s c i p l i n e ) and t h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y time of 
excommunication| which i s automatically ruled out by the Protestant 
principle that 'no r e l i g i o u s group has the right to put i t s e l f between 
21 
God and man, ei t h e r to unite man with God or to out him off from God1* 
In faot, Protestant d i s c i p l i n e i s i n the main a much more informal 
business, much more concerned with seeking to restore the person concerned 
to the fellowship of the church through counselling) than ef f e c t i n g h i s 
separation from the l i f e of the church* Here the pri n c i p l e of judgment 
becomes one with the princip l e of reunion, the third element i n the 
act u a l i s a t i o n of love, and T i l l i c h i n s i s t s that the two must always be 
held together i n the C h r i s t i a n community* 'Even a temporary cutting 
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off makes a wound which can probably never be healed'* T i l l i c h points 
out that when t h i s has occurred i n Protestantism i t has frequently led 
to the s o c i a l o s t r a c i s a t i o n of the backslider by the church, p a r t i c u -
l a r l y by i t s more i n f l u e n t i a l groups, and i t i s often because of these 
groups that the r e a l prophetic ministry of the ohurch, which would 
condemn such action, i s s t i f l e d * When the church becomes s o c i o l o g i c a l l y 
determined i n t h i s sort of way the r e a l purpose of judgment i s suppressed, 
the element of reunion i s denied, and the consequent s i t u a t i o n i s f a r 
more damaging to the church than any so-called heresy i n i t s ranks* So, 
while the principles of acceptance and judgment are both important f o r 
the pastoral l i f e of the churches, the presence of the S p i r i t i s perhaps 
nowhere more c l e a r l y observed than i n the act of reunion which implies 
the message and act of forgiveness* And i t i s only when genuine f o r -
giveness i s present that reunion i n love becomes possible* 
Perhaps the ambiguities of r e l i g i o n i n the sphere of love are 
most pronounced i n the relations between p a r t i c u l a r ohurches on the one 
hand and between the church and non-ecclesiastical communities on the 
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other* I t i s here where the element of acceptance i s put f u l l y to the 
t e s t * For example, i t would be easy, says T i l l i o h , f or the individual 
who comes into the church from the outside to be met with an insistence 
on conversion* But such an ins i s t e n c e must be qualified* I n the f i r s t 
place, one must ask precisely what i t i s the p a r t i c u l a r church desires 
the individual to be converted to; and i n the second place, i t i s quite 
possible that the individual concerned i s already a member of the 'latent 
S p i r i t u a l Community', and therefore i n a sense a potential member of 
the church* T i l l i c h suggests that bearing these things i n mind, several 
answers should be acceptable to the church. Ei t h e r the person ooncerned 
may become a f u l l member of the church i n question, by assenting to 
i t s s p e c i f i c b e l i e f s and practices. Or i f he i s already a member of 
another church (by which T i l l i c h presumably means a lapsed member) he 
may choose to r e t a i n that membership and yet beoome a ' f u l l y accepted 
guest' i n the other* Or e l s e he may choose to stay f i r s t and foremost 
i n h i s own p a r t i c u l a r seoular group which shows signs of the l a t e n t 
S p i r i t u a l Community, and yet at the same time participate i n the l i f e of 
the church as a v i s i t o r or friend* But the decisive c r i t e r i o n i n each 
case should be 'the desire to participate i n a group whose foundation 
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i s the acceptance of Jesus as the C h r i s t ' , rather than the acceptance 
of a p a r t i c u l a r oreed, and t h i s w i l l open the door 'into the community 
of love without reservation on the side of the church'• s 
The r e l a t i o n between p a r t i c u l a r churches i s one which i s very 
much to the fore i n the present ecumenical climate* There i s unfortun-
ately a t r a d i t i o n a l antagonism between the various churches, sometimes 
r e s u l t i n g from sociological causes, sometimes as a r e s u l t of S p i r i t u a l 
resistance to the forces of profanisation and demonisation which one 
church fears may happen i f i t participates i n the l i f e of another* F r e -
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quently t h i s anxiety, bolstered up as i t i s by the need for security, 
can lead to fanaticism and suspicion* and i n c e r t a i n cases persecution 
and hate* I t i s pointless ignoring such a f e a r merely by minimising 
differences and preaching tolerance* I t can only be conquered by the 
S p i r i t i t s e l f , which i s at work i n every church, even i n those where 
profanising and demonising forces are at t h e i r most conspicuous* Only 
by r e a l i s i n g that the p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s of each church are affirmed and 
judged by the S p i r i t u a l Community which i s the 'dynamio essence' of 
every church, can 'one church • • • recognise the community of love with 
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another 1* Such a conclusion reinforces the paradoxical nature of the 
unity of the church* 
The S p i r i t u a l Community, therefore, as the dynamic essence of the 
church created by the S p i r i t , marks out the ohurch i n holiness, unity 
and u n i v e r s a l i t y , i n f a i t h and love, even though because of the ambi-
gu i t i e s of r e l i g i o n each of these marks w i l l only appear paradoxically* 
I t i s beoause these marks are present that the church i s the bearer 
of the New Being* As T i l l i c h sums i t up: 
The Church i s the Community of the New Being* Again 
and again, people say, " I do not l i k e organised r e l i g i o n " * 
The Church i s not organised r e l i g i o n * I t i s not h i e r a r c h i c a l 
authority. I t i s not a s o c i a l organisation* I t i s a l l t h i s , 
of course, but i t i s primarily a group of people who express 
a new r e a l i t y by which they have been grasped* Only t h i s 
i s what the Church r e a l l y means* I t i s the place where the 
power of the New Reality which i s C h r i s t , and which was pre-
pared i n a l l history and'especially Old Testament history, 
moves into us and i s continued by us • . • The Church i s the 
place where the New Being i s r e a l , and the place where we 
oan go to introduce the New Being into r e a l i t y * 25 
Evaluation 
A preliminary comment of a more general nature regarding T i l l i c h ' s 
doctrine of the church i n r e l a t i o n to the S p i r i t i s that there i s a 
c e r t a i n tension between ontological and dynamic emphases which consider-
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ably weakens what he has to say* Thus he speaks of the theological 
understanding of the church r e a l i s i n g i t s inner significance as the 
fragmentary a c t u a l i s a t i o n of the S p i r i t u a l Community, or the holiness 
of the churoh being derived from the holiness of i t s foundation, the 
New Being present within i t , or the unity of the church stemming from 
the unambiguous unity to which the S p i r i t u a l Community belongs, and i n 
using t h i s sort of language immediately creates the impression of some-
thing rather l i f e l e s s and impersonal. Having opted, quite r i g h t l y , to 
set h i s doctrine of the churoh firmly within the context of the doctrine 
of the S p i r i t , T i l l i c h should have demonstrated the v i t a l i t y of th i s 
r e lationship i n a muoh more dynamic way. The ove r - a l l impression one 
gets of the S p i r i t ' s work here i s not of the God who i s personally 
l i v i n g and active i n the l i f e of the church, but of an e s s e n t i a l , onto-
l o g i c a l r e a l i t y - whatever one c a l l s i t , whether the New Being or the 
S p i r i t u a l Community - created by the S p i r i t 'behind the scenes', moving 
slowly towards i t s goal i n the midst of a vast host of e x i s t e n t i a l am-
bi g u i t i e s . For t h i s reason, the d i r e c t , personal, l i v i n g relationship 
between the S p i r i t and the church, which i s the foundation of the 
S p i r i t ' s a c t i v i t y , does not stand out c l e a r l y enough* Though we s h a l l 
not r e i t e r a t e t h i s c r i t i c i s m , i t i s one that applies throughout T i l l i c h ' s 
a n a l y s is of the ohuroh, and to h i s study of the work of the S p i r i t i n 
the realms of culture and morality* 
What T i l l i o h says about the holiness of the churoh i s rather 
inadequate* His statement that the church i s holy because i t s founda-
ti o n , the New Being, i s holy, may be acceptable as f a r as i t goes, but 
i t hardly t e l l s us what holiness means i n the l i f e of the churches* Here 
T i l l i c h could have made more of his previous d e f i n i t i o n of holiness i n 
terms of transparency towards the divine, and t h i s could have profitably 
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been expanded i n r e l a t i o n to the church and the implications for i t s l i f e * 
There i s another element, however, i n the New Testament concept of 
holiness which T i l l i c h does not mention. When Paul, f o r example, writes 
to the young church at Corinth, he r e f e r s to i t s members as k l e t o i s 
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hagiois, those who are c a l l e d to be consecrated, set apart. So 
the concept of holiness also involves separation from the world, and 
t h i s r a i s e s important questions as to what i t means f o r the church to 
be set apart from the world and for what purpose* Certainly the church 
i s separated from the world so that i t may become transparent to the 
divine nature, but i t i s also set apart that i t may become the appointed 
agency through which the S p i r i t works within the world to f u l f i l the 
divine mission. Thus both i t s openness to God and i t s preparedness to 
proclaim the Gospel are marks of the church's holiness* T i l l i c h ' s 
a nalysis would have been strengthened by pointing t h i s out* 
Many tomes have been written on the unity of the church, and i n 
a sense one can hardly expect T i l l i c h to do j u s t i c e to such a complex 
theme i n a few paragraphs. For T i l l i c h , of course, the word 'unity' 
i s a loaded term, as we have seen already, and t h i s inevitably colours 
what he has to say about the unity of the church* Our problem i s that 
i t i s d i f f i c u l t to conceive of the es s e n t i a l unity of the S p i r i t u a l 
Community as some sort of prior r e a l i t y , which the church i s to a c t u a l i s e 
fragaientarily i n the l i f e of the world* I t would surely be more meaning-
f u l to say that the unity of the church i s found i n i t s common allegiance 
to and fellowship i n C h r i s t , made possible through the work of the S p i r i t * 
Such a statement bases the r e a l i t y of the church's unity on i t s 
relationship with Christ through the S p i r i t who indwells the church 
rather than on any prior ontological state as T i l l i c h suggests. Never-
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theless, despite t h i s c r i t i c i s m , T i l l i o h ' s comments on the implica-
tions of unity and the ambiguities which thwart i t and create d i v i s i o n 
provide a sound note of realism, p a r t i c u l a r l y when seen against the 
glossy picture sometimes painted i n ecumenical c i r c l e s . His emphasis 
on the r o l e of the S p i r i t i n the movements of prophetic protest are 
e s p e c i a l l y relevant here, for there has sometimes been a tendency i n 
the contemporary churoh to think that the work of the S p i r i t i n r e l a t i o n 
to the unity of the churoh i s i n one d i r e c t i o n only. The unity of the 
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S p i r i t to which Paul r e f e r s , 1 and which he encourages the church to 
preserve, must be s e t against John's statement that the S p i r i t i s the 
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S p i r i t of truth, and when truth i s betrayed i n the l i f e of the church 
the S p i r i t ' s f i r s t task w i l l be to r e c a l l i t to the C h r i s t who i s the 
truth. There can be no r e a l unity outside the C h r i s t to whom the S p i r i t 
t e s t i f i e s and i n t o fellowship with whom he purposes to bring a l l men* 
T i l l i c h ' s emphasis on the q u a l i t a t i v e aspect of the church's 
u n i v e r s a l i t y i s important, i n so f a r as t h i s p a r t i c u l a r understanding of 
c a t h o l i c i t y has been frequently overlooked* The church's neglect of cer-
t a i n aspeots of l i f e i s indeed one which has frequently led to i t s a l i e n -
ation from the world. The church, i n the words of O.S. Tomkins, must 
indeed work towards 
that unity of a l l human l i v i n g , a balanced wholeness of 
work, craftsmanship, family l i f e and community l i f e , 
scholarship, games, a r t , bound together i n a l i v i n g and 
joyful s a p r i f i c e before God i n worship, by union with the 
Word made f l e s h and i n the power of the Holy S p i r i t * 
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And as Robert Nelson comments, 
A l l t h i s i s encompassed by the saving work of C h r i s t , and 
can become actualised i n the common l i f e of the church.™ 
I t i s true that h i s t o r i c a l l y t h i s sort of c a t h o l i c i t y has been much more 
common within the Roman communion* On the other hand, i t i s questionable 
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whether c e r t a i n Protestant churches have ever r e a l l y achieved the 'uni-
v e r s a l i t y of emptiness 1 to which T i l l i c h r e f e r s * Admittedly, there have 
been c e r t a i n types of Protestantism, notably the Puritans and P i e t i s t s , 
and more p a r t i c u l a r l y the Quakers, where the desire to s t r i p away the 
vestige of 'worldly things', p a r t i c u l a r l y things of aesthetic beauty, 
has been prevalent* However, i f one i s to accept the more 'religious' 
aspects of the l i f e of these communities, such as preaching and prayer, 
as a v a l i d part of human experience, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how they can 
be said to have achieved a t o t a l u n i v e r s a l i t y of emptiness, despite t h e i r 
aspirations* To give but one example: i f they had done so t h e i r attitude 
towards the world would presumably be devoid of any moral content, that 
i s , i t would be amoral, whereas i n actual f a c t many extreme Protestants 
have sought a genuine expression of morality i n t h e i r relationships i n 
the world as well as within the church* Though Protestantism has c e r t a i n l y 
been gu i l t y of neglecting c e r t a i n aspects of the l i f e of man, i t has never 
achieved the u n i v e r s a l i t y of emptiness to which T i l l i c h r e f e r s * 
T i l l i c h gives us a useful summary of the ambiguities of f a i t h i n 
the l i f e of the churches* The faot that these ambiguities are said to 
be conquered 'in p r i n c i p l e 1 rather than i n faot should not, however, 
blind us to the truth that the more the churches r e a l i s e the koinonia 
i n t h e i r midst the more these ambiguities w i l l be overcome i n r e a l i t y * 
I t i s surely t h i s deepening of fellowship, with i t s greater measure of 
understanding, that provides the environment i n which the tensions between 
the 'dogmatic' f a i t h of the ohurch and the personal f a i t h of the individual 
C h r i s t i a n can be resolved, as the S p i r i t of love tempers the ruthlessness 
often associated with dogmatism* A more controversial topic i s the 
relationship between f a i t h and doubt i n the l i f e of the individual as a 
member of the church* That Christians do doubt, even while remaining 
264 
l o y a l members of a confessing church, i s undeniable, and i t i s indeed 
important to affirm that t h i s does not and should not exclude them from 
the churoh* Expulsion from the church, as T i l l i c h points out, would 
only r e s u l t i n t o t a l l o s s of opportunity f o r the individual to share i n 
a fellowship i n which h i s doubts may be resolved. But i t seems to me 
that there i s a difference between unresolved doubt and outright r e -
j e c t i o n of the church's basic f a i t h i n Jesus as the C h r i s t which T i l l i c h 
does not bring out f o r c e f u l l y enough* This comes out p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
h i s assertion that the decision f o r the individual i s not whether he has 
a personal f a i t h i n Jesus C h r i s t , but whether he wishes to belong to a 
community which confesses t h i s f a i t h * I t i s here where a d i s t i n c t i o n 
needs to be drawn between doubt and unbelief* The doubter i s one who 
has not made up h i s mind about Jesus C h r i s t , or maybe finds that he cannot 
express h i s personal f a i t h i n him i n the precise way i n which the church 
formulates i t . At l e a s t he i s concerned with the question regarding 
Ch r i s t and for him he means something, though he may not know what* His 
f a i t h i s incomplete, but the seeds of i t are there* This person must 
and should have a place within the church, for i t w i l l normally be h i s 
desire to belong to that community where f a i t h resides. And the church 
which recognises t h i s can have no set requirement for church membership* 
But i t i s different with the unbeliever. I n h i s case, h i s doubt has 
been confirmed i n unbelief* He oannot accept that Jesus i s the Christ 
not j u s t because he has doubt about the credal expressions of the church, 
but because he e x p l i c i t l y rejeots Jesus as the C h r i s t i n h i s own exper-
ience* For him, there oan be no question of joining the ohurch because 
he wishes to belong to a community of f a i t h , for to belong to such a 
community would be to contradict h i s own lack of f a i t h confirmed i n un-
b e l i e f . I t i s also d i f f i c u l t to see how the church could accept him into 
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membership on these terms. This i s not to say that i t would alienate 
i t s e l f from him, and i t would c e r t a i n l y seek to enter into dialogue with 
him. But the d i s t i n c t i o n does need to be made between him who doubts 
and him who disbelieves e n t i r e l y . There i s place for the one i n the 
membership of the churchi there seems to be l i t t l e point i n making out 
any oase f o r the other. I n view of t h i s , i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g that i n h i s 
ensuing discussion on heresy, T i l l i o h plaoes muoh more emphasis on the 
difference between him who t o t a l l y r e j e c t s the foundation of the church's 
f a i t h and him who deviates from i t s t r a d i t i o n a l formulations i n h i s 
understanding of that foundation, pointing out that whilst there i s 
plaoe for the l a t t e r i n the church (sometimes with an important role to 
f u l f i l ) , the former has separated himself e n t i r e l y . 
I n the discussion on love i n the l i f e of the ohurches, T i l l i c h 
r a i s e s many points of v i t a l pastoral concern, and i n t h i s context h i s 
comments are remarkably free from the more abstract de f i n i t i o n s he has 
used so often* One values p a r t i c u l a r l y his analysis of the meaning of 
judgment and d i s c i p l i n e i n the fellowship of the church. There are 
j u s t two points that need comment. F i r s t l y , one f e e l s that T i l l i o h has 
not taken the Implications of the element of acceptance i n love seriously 
enough, and i s perhaps too prone to accept u n c r i t i c a l l y the s o c i a l 
b arriers that e x i s t within the church. Although the communistic i d e a l 
i s something which may be both impractical and undesirable, there i s a 
sense i n which love must work towards a greater a c t u a l i s a t i o n of mutual 
acceptance i n the l i v e s of the members of the church i n the removal of 
these b a r r i e r s . I t i s easy to t a l k about the transcending power of love, 
and s t i l l maintain segregation, whether s o c i a l or r a c i a l , within the 
church, and when t h i s happens the implications of the impact of the 
S p i r i t are considerably weakened by surrender to the ambiguities of l i f e . 
266 
I t i s in t e r e s t i n g that T i l l i c h ' s i n t e r e s t i n t h i s sort of problem seems 
to have abated since his e a r l i e r days and his a c t i v i t y i n the f i e l d of 
rel i g i o u s s o c i a l i s m . ^ 
Secondly, the question raised by T i l l i c h regarding the grounds 
on which members of other groups are accepted as members of the l o c a l 
church r a i s e s a s i m i l a r point to that which we have already discussed 
under the heading of f a i t h , and i n t h i s context we must ask whether the 
desire to become part of the community of love i s a s u f f i c i e n t c r i t e r i o n . 
There i s every case for the church encouraging others to share with i t 
i n i t s redemptive work of love, but for f u l l participation i n the member-
ship of the church f a i t h and love must go together. I f the tendency of 
the church i n the past has been to over-emphasise the credal aspect of 
membership at the expense of love, i t must not now swing to the other 
extreme of accepting as the c r i t e r i o n f o r church membership a humanitarian 
concern or the desire for friendship at the expense of leading others 
to share i n the f a i t h of Christ i n the power of the S p i r i t . 
F i n a l l y , there are two minor points which may be made. I n the 
f i r s t place, since T i l l i c h wrote h i s Systematic Theology there have 
been s i g n i f i c a n t changes i n the Roman church which have led to a r e -
appraisal of the nature of the church and the meaning of i t s unity. 
There i s f a r l e s s readiness to accept either an interpretation of i t s 
holiness i n terms of i n s t i t u t i o n a l perfection or the assertion that the 
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Roman church i s the only true church to the exclusion of a l l others. 
Here the thaw which T i l l i c h f e e l s i s so important for ecumenical r e l a t i o n s 
has already set i n , though i t remains to be seen how f a r i t w i l l go. 
Secondly, though one appreciates the valuable d i s t i n c t i o n T i l l i c h has 
made between the theological and soci o l o g i c a l understanding of the 
church, one wonders whether he i s e n t i r e l y f a i r to sociological enquiry. 
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Admittedly there may be socio l o g i s t s who approach the study of the church 
with some i n b u i l t bias, possibly polemic, possibly apologetic. But 
when sociological analysis beoomes influenced i n t h i s sort of way i t i s 
i n danger of becoming u n s c i e n t i f i c , and for t h i s reason the majority 
of socio l o g i s t s would take great care to be s t r i c t l y impartial i n t h e i r 
enquiry* S i g n i f i c a n t l y , i t i s Hiis sort of enquiry that i s ultimately 
the most helpful to the church i n i t s reappraisal of i t s l i f e and i t s 
r e l a t i o n to society, and which w i l l therefore a s s i s t i t i n becoming a 
more e f f e c t i v e agency of the divine S p i r i t i n the sphere of human l i f e * 
I I . THE SPIRITUAL COMMUNITY AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CHURCH 
We turn now to the various functions of the church, functions 
which must be present wherever the church appears, even though the forms 
they take may vary. T i l l i c h distinguishes three such functions* 
( i ) the functions of constitution, which are related to the grounding of 
the churches i n the S p i r i t u a l Community; ( i i ) the functions of expansion, 
which stem from the claim of the S p i r i t u a l Community to u n i v e r s a l i t y ; 
and, ( i l l ) the functions of construction, which a r i s e from the a c t u a l i s i n g 
of the S p i r i t u a l potentialias of the churches* The p r i n c i p l e s which 
govern these various functions i n the l i f e of the church, he says, a l l 
share i n the paradox of r e l i g i o n , and t h i s means that they are performed 
not only 'in the name of the S p i r i t u a l Community', but also by the 
ohurohes as 'sociological groups' and t h e i r members as 'their represen-
t a t i v e s ' * So they share i n the ambiguities of l i f e even though they 
seek to overcome them i n the power of the S p i r i t * Furthermore, beoause 
the functions of the churoh are part of i t s very nature, they w i l l 
always be present wherever the church i s found,, even though i t may not 
be i n aft organisational form. A p a r t i c u l a r function of the church does 
not nece s s a r i l y need an i n s t i t u t i o n through which to express i t s e l f * 
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The i n s t i t u t i o n a l form a r i s e s , claims T i l l i c h , when 'the nature of the 
church requires that a p a r t i c u l a r function make i t s e l f f e l t i n S p i r i t u a l 
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experiences and consequent actions'* Most i n s t i t u t i o n s therefore 
a r i s e quite spontaneously, which means that none should be considered 
as permanent. The freedom of the S p i r i t should guarantee that when an 
i n s t i t u t i o n f a i l s to f u l f i l i t s purpose then other ways of exercising 
the same function may a r i s e and replace i t . I n t h i s way the church i s 
set f r e e from 'any kind of r i t u a l legalism, i n the power of the 
S p i r i t u a l Community'• To maintain that an i n s t i t u t i o n derives necessarily 
from the nature of the church i s to confuse the terms ' i n s t i t u t i o n * and 
'function', and this i s true even of those i n s t i t u t i o n s which are deemed 
es s e n t i a l to the church's l i f e , such as the priesthood or the sacraments. 
Corresponding to these three functions, there are three p o l a r i t i e s 
of p r i n c i p l e s * Says T i l l i c h , 
The functions of constitution stand under the po l a r i t y of 
t r a d i t i o n and reformation, the functions of expansion under 
the polarity of v e r i t y and adaption, the functions of construc-
tion under the polarity of form-transcendence and form- affirm-
a t i o n * ^ 
The ambiguities inherent i n these p o l a r i t i e s are c l e a n 
The danger of t r a d i t i o n i s demonic hubris; the danger of 
reformation i s emptying c r i t i c i s m * The danger of v e r i t y 
i s demonic absolutism; the danger of adaption i s emptying 
r e l a t i v i z a t i o n * The danger of form-transcendence i s 
demonic repression; the danger of form-affirmation i s 
f o r m a l i s t i c emptiness*3° 
We s h a l l consider each of these p o l a r i t i e s together with t h e i r ambiguities 
i n connection with the appropriate function of the church to which they 
are related* 
a. The Constitutional Functions of the Churoh 
The constitutional functions of the church move between the 
p o l a r i t i e s of t r a d i t i o n and reformation. When we speak of t r a d i t i o n , 
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we are, i n T i l l i o h ' s view, not merely recognising that the c u l t u r a l 
forms of each new age grow out of those of a preceding age, we are 
also affirming that there i s a v i t a l l i n k between the foundation of 
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the church i n Jesus as the Ch r i s t and eaoh successive generation. The 
idea of t r a d i t i o n , he contends, states that a l l generations are 'ideally 
present' i n every function of the church because the same S p i r i t u a l 
Community i s present within them a l l , and for t h i s reason the concept 
of t r a d i t i o n i t s e l f transcends any pa r t i c u l a r t r a d i t i o n * So the 
pri n c i p l e of t r a d i t i o n i s an expression of the unity of h i s t o r i c a l man-
kind, a t the centre of which i s the Christ* T i l l i c h i s aware that the 
idea of t r a d i t i o n has per s i s t e n t l y been misrepresented throughout the 
hietory of the church, and t h i s i s why he f e e l s i t i s d i f f i c u l t to use 
the word today without giving wrong impressions. Protestants p a r t i -
c u l a r l y are suspicious of i t because of the way i n which i t i s used i n 
the Orthodox and Roman churches, the one holding that the church i t s e l f 
constitutes the l i v i n g t r a d i t i o n , the other maintaining that t r a d i t i o n 
can be l e g a l l y defined and papally determined* Nevertheless, T i l l i c h 
points out, t r a d i t i o n i s an element i n the l i f e of a l l churches, and 
even the Protestant protest i t s e l f was only possible because i t accepted 
c e r t a i n parts of the Roman t r a d i t i o n , such as the Bible, which i t used 
as i t s tools for reformation* ' I t i s a general c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of pro-
phetic c r i t i c i s m of a r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n that i t does not oome from 
outside but from the centre of the t r a d i t i o n i t s e l f , f i g h t i n g i t s 
distortions i n the name of i t s true meaning', and i n t h i s sense i t i s 
true to say that t r a d i t i o n i s an e s s e n t i a l prerequisite for reformation* 
The principle of reformation i s the means by which the S p i r i t 
f i g h t s against the ambiguities of r e l i g i o n i n the l i f e of the church* 
At the time of the Reformation i n the sixteenth century, f o r example, 
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the church had so suppressed this principle that the S p i r i t needed to 
break through at every level of the church's l i f e * Though i t has 
generally been assumed that i n this principle of reformation) the Bible 
i s the objective criterion, T i l l i c h insists that this is not really 
so. The only true criterion is the awareness of Spiritual freedom, 
which admittedly means a ri s k , yet i t i s nevertheless a risk encouraged 
by the prophetic presence of the Spiritual Community within the church* 
Generally speaking, Protestantism, unlike Orthodoxy and Roman Catho-
licism, has been w i l l i n g to admit such a risk, even though this has 
endangered from time to time the l i f e of particular churches* ' I t takes 
the risk i n the certainty that the Spiritual Community, the dynamic 
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essence of a church, cannot be destroyed'• ' 
The inevitable tension between tradition and reformation, says 
T i l l i c h , creates a struggle between the divine Spirit and the ambiguities 
of religion* Every church i s tempted to invest i t s own traditions with 
absolute va l i d i t y and to suppress any undermining of them* So any move 
towards reformation i s resisted i n the tradition-dominated church 
because there is the fear that things which have been held sacred 
should now become profaned, and possibly the whole structure disinte-
grate* Nevertheless, i t is because tradition is so frequently raised 
to this absolute level,, suppressing the freedom of the S p i r i t , that the 
principle of reformation i s necessary as a corrective* So on the one 
hand the danger of tradition i s that i t may lead to demonic suppression, 
and on the other hand the danger of reformation i s that i t may lead to 
disintegration* Yet both principles are essentially united i n the 
* Af\ 
Spiritual Community* 'They are i n tension but not i n conflict', and 
the degree i n which the churches participate i n the power of the Spiritual 
Community determines to what extent the possibility of conflict i s 
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'transformed into a l i v i n g tension* that has dynamic effect* 
The constitutional| or constitutive, function of the church i s 
seen f i r s t , says T i l l i c h , i n the element of receiving* The church must 
receive because i t depends on the New Being as i t i s manifest i n Jesus 
as the Christ and present i n the Spiritual Community for i t s l i f e * But 
this receptive function of the church applies not merely to individuals 
who belong to i t , but also to the church as a whole, and i f the church 
ever ceases to receive i t becomes fossilised i n i t s own structures*^ But 
the function of receiving does not stop there, for the church receives 
that i t may also mediatei the function of reception includes the 'simul-
taneous function of mediation', both of which can be seen, for example, 
i n the Word and sacraments. So 'he who receives mediates, and, on the 
other hand, he has received only because the process of mediation i s 
going on continuously'* When reception and mediation are seen to be 
part of each other i n this way, the sort of hierarchical structure that 
would separate the l a i t y as those who receive from the priesthood as 
those who mediate i s seen to be invalid. Both share i n each function 
as recipient and mediator* So the church i s 'priest and prophet to 
i t s e l f 1 1 'he who preaches preaches to himself and listener, and he who 
listens is a potential preacher'* 
Mediation, according to T i l l i c h , takes place sometimes within the 
context of corporate worship, at other times i n the meeting of priest 
and layman. I n the l a t t e r case, i t is primarily 'the priest who mediates 
and the l a i t y who respond'* But what we have just said applies here, 
and the minister, who has the cure of souls, should see himself also as 
standing i n need of the Spirit's healing, and i f he realises t h i s , i t 
w i l l help him not to treat the person who seeks his help merely as an 
object to be counselled. I t i s v i t a l therefore for the work of mediation 
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to be in i t i a t e d and guided throughout by the S p i r i t , the counsellor 
himself submitting to the Spirit's impact on his own l i f e i n the same 
way as he would encourage him whom he counsels to submit* Only he 
who is healed by the Spirit can offer healing to others; only he who 
i s grasped by the S p i r i t can lead another to that point where the Spirit 
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can grasp him also* 
The response of the church and i t s members to that whioh i s 
received and mediated takes place i n affirmation and worship* Affirma-
tion refers primarily to a 'confession of f a i t h * , but T i l l i c h points 
out that such a confession need not take the form of a credal statement* 
I t can equally be made through the medium of li t e r a r y a r t , or symbols) 
or hymns. What the credal statement does i t to concentrate this affirm-
ation within i t s e l f and thus i t becomes the essential basis for later 
theological developments* And even a church which rejeots any credal 
formulation at a l l w i l l s t i l l need to make i t s affirmation i n other 
ways, i n i t s type of worship or i t s specific practices. T i l l i c h defines 
worship as the means whereby the church 'turns to the ultimate ground 
of i t s being 1, to God who i s S p i r i t , 'the source of the Spiritual Presence 
and the creator of the Spiritual Community' *^ This turning to God i s 
possible only because God has f i r s t grasped those who experience him, 
so that the i n i t i a t i v e i n worship l i e s with God, and worship i s thus 
correctly interpreted as a response to the Spirit's impact on mant 'the 
responding elevation of the church to the ultimate ground of i t s being'* 
T i l l i o h detects three main features i n worships adoration, prayer and 
contemplation* Adoration he defines as the 'ecstatic acknowledgment of 
the divine holiness and the i n f i n i t e distance of Him. who at the same 
time, i s present i n the Spiritual Presence'*^ In every act of praise 
and thanksgiving this means that two elements are brought togethert 'the com-
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plete contrast between the creaturely smallness of man and the i n f i n i t e 
greatness of the creator 1} and 'the elevation into the sphere of the 
divine glory'* To praise God therefore is also to share fragmentarily 
i n God's glory* In every aot of adoration these two elements of p a r t i -
cipation i n the l i f e of God and our i n f i n i t e distance from God must be 
held together i n paradoxical unity. I f the element of distance is over-
emphasised) then i t becomes distorted) leading to a perverted doctrine 
of man as a miserable creature with no real dignity and a demonic God 
who stands over against him, a distortion which the Sp i r i t always 
resists by grasping the one who adores and enabling him to share i n 
the divine environment* On the other handy i f the element of p a r t i c i -
pation i s over-emphasised, the act of adoration can easily beoome man's 
own self-magnification, which i s i n the end self-defeating, i n that i t 
never reaches God at a l l * 
I n his discussion on prayer* and i t s role i n worship, T i l l i c h 
distinguishes between the superficial and the deeper levels of prayer* 
The real force of prayer, he contends, lies not i n any specific content 
which i t may happen to have, but rather i n i t s 'hidden content', the 
essence of which is the 'surrender of a fragment of existence to God'* 
and i t i s this hidden surrender that makes God's work i n answer to 
prayer possible* Thus genuine prayer does not seek to interfere with 
the existential situation, but rather to transform i t * 'God i s asked 
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to direct the given situation toward fulfilment* y i n terms of the 
divine creativity* So i t can be said that 'every serious prayer produces 
somelhing new',^ thi3 something being 'the Spiritual act of elevating 
the content of one's wishes and hopes into the Spiritual Presence', 
even though on occasions the specific content of one's hopes and wishes 
i n i t s e l f may be denied* So the prayer of intercession not only i n i t i a t e s 
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a new relationship to those f o r whom i t i s made* i t also introduces 
* a change i n the relation to the ultimate of the subjects and objects 
of intercession*• Because of this more profound understanding of 
petition and intercession, T i l l i c h finds i t impossible to accept Ritschl's 
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contention that the only legitimate type of prayer i s thanksgiving* 1 
He can understand Ritschl's desire to rescue prayer from i t s popular 
distortions i n superstitious and magical terms, but he claims that his 
rejection of certain types of prayer i s completely unjustified from a 
theological point of view* To forbid supplicatory prayers would be 
not only to create 'a completely unrealistic relation to God', but 
would also deny prayer i t s b i b l i c a l paradox as the 'wrestling of the 
human s p i r i t with the divine S p i r i t • • Such a paradox asserts that 
whereas i t i s impossible for man himself to pray aright, the Sp i r i t 
Aft 
of God represents him before God without any 'objectifying language', 
getting behind our inadequate words and taking and transforming our 
prayerful desires* This means that there i s a deep and profound mystery 
at the heart of a l l true prayer* ' I t i s the Spirit which speaks to the 
Spi r i t , as i t i s the Sp i r i t which discerns and experiences the S p i r i t ' , 
and i n this very process the subject-object structure of our normal 
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conversationary communication i s transcended* 
Truly Spiritual prayer, says T i l l i c h , leads inevitably to contem-
plation, an aspect of worship traditionally, though unfortunately, 
neglected by Protestants, despite the renewed emphasis on silence i n 
church services* T i l l i c h describes contemplation as 'participation i n 
that which transcends the subject-object scheme, with i t s objectifying 
(and subjectifying) words, and therefore the ambiguity of language as 
well (including the voiceless language of speaking to o n e s e l f ) 1 * ^ He 
feels that Protestant neglect of this element i n prayer i s due to i t s 
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personalistic interpretation of the S p i r i t , which f a i l s to appreciate 
that the Spiritual Presence transcends personality i n an ecstatic 
manner* So any response to the Spirit's impact must i t s e l f be Spiritual* 
which means that i t must i t s e l f transcend ecstatically the subject-
objeot scheme of ordinary experience, and i n the contemplative act 
more than any other this paradoxical nature of prayer i s made clear i n 
'the identity and non-identity of him who prays and Him who is prayed 
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tot God as Sp i r i t ' * But this i s not mysticism i n diBguise, for 
whereas the usual mystic idea i s that contemplation i s a state which 
can only be reached by degrees, l i t t l e by l i t t l e , approaching God as i f 
he were a 'besieged fortress' u n t i l he yields himself to him who prays, 
i n Protestant thinking true prayer always begins with God's surrender, i n 
the sense that i t i s God himself who has overcome the estrangement between 
himself and man i n the act of grace* So contemplation should not be 
thought of as a higher degree i n the l i f e of prayer, but rather as a 
quality of prayer, the essence of which i s the awareness that 'prayer i s 
directed to Him who creates the right prayer i n us', and i n this quality 
of prayer above a l l others does the spi r i t u a l unity of man and God shine 
through* 
b* The Expansive Functions of the Church 
The expanding functions of the churches, says T i l l i o h , arise from 
the universality of the Spiritual Community and i t s message concerning 
Jesus as the Christ* As we have seen, these functions occasion a 
further polarity of principles, of verity (or truth) and adaption* 
T i l l i c h notes that the tension between these two principles can be ob-
served again and again i n the mission of the church from the f i r s t cen-
tury u n t i l the present moment, so that the history of mission becomes 
the record of the church's successive attempts to adapt i t s message to 
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particular ages and cultures without sacrificing i t s essential truth 
for the sake of mere accommodation* There i s , of course, a d i f f i c u l t 
problem here* I f on the one hand the principle of verity i s affirmed 
without recognising the need f o r adaption, this can lead to a 'demonic 
absolutism', which 'throws the truth l i k e stones at the heads of the 
can 52 people, not oaring whether they/accept i t or not', i n which case 
the divine offence of the Christian mission becomes transmuted into 
the demonic offence of a totalitarian church* The church must recognise 
that i t s members are conditioned by their cultural environment and can 
only understand the truth of the Gospel i n the categories of that environ-
ment* Yet at the same time, the church must beware lest i n seeking to 
make i t s message understood i t loses the essential truth of that message, 
thus paving the way for secularism and a reactionary totalitarianism* 
A 'missionary accommodation which surrenders the principle of verity 
does not conquer the demonic powers, whether they are religious or profane'* 
Verity and adaption must go together* 
T i l l i c h differentiates between three specific functions of expan-
sions missions, education and evangelism, though he recognises the 
inevitable overlap between them* The f i r s t funotion of expansion, 
that of mission, which began with Jesus sending out his disoiples, 
has been both 'successful' and 'unsuccessful' throughout the course of 
i t s history* Though there are those who would point to the faot that 
after two thousand years of missionary work the majority of men and 
women are s t i l l not Christians, there are few plaoes which have not been 
influenced i n some way or other by the effect of Christian culture* But 
the real purpose of mission, according to T i l l i c h , i s not to impose i t s 
own forms of culture onto cultures which are not Christian, s t i l l less 
to achieve some sort of syncretism; nor i s i t s purpose to save individual 
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souls from damnation,, I t is rather to actualise the Spiritual Community 
within concrete churches throughout the world* I n spite of this* the 
danger of identifying the Christian mission with the culture i t has 
i t s e l f created i s always present, and i t i s notoriously d i f f i c u l t to 
separate the twos 'in a sense, i t i s impossible, because there i s no 
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abstract Christian message'* So the church has no alternative but to 
speak through these traditional cultural categories* But i t must do so 
in such a way that i t s underlying message i s unmistakeably clear, and i t 
can only do this when the power of the S p i r i t , present within i t s l i f e , 
enables i t to transcend these categories* On the other hand, every 
attempt should be made at a genuine participation i n the oulture with 
which the missionary i s involved, whether i t be the great Oriental 
cultures or even the working class cultures of Western Europe* 'Communi-
cation,' he points out, 'is a matter of participation* Where there i s 
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no participation, there is no communication1, and where communication 
is impossible, the function of mission is impotent* I t i s through the 
Spi r i t alone that both participation and communication are made possible* 
The function of education, says T i l l i c h , 'is based on the desire 
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of the churches to continue their l i f e from generation to generation', 
and goes back to the days when the f i r s t family received into a church 
was faced with the task of communicating the f a i t h to i t s children. The 
present turmoil about Christian education does not escape Ti l l i c h ' s 
attention* He sees i t s origin f i r s t l y i n the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the educa-
tional process i t s e l f , and secondly i n the doubts that parents themselves 
have about Jesus as the Christ. The f i r s t of these problems, he points 
out, can only be solved through new understandings i n educational 
psychology and new educational methods* The second can only be resolved 
i n the context of the Spiritual Community i t s e l f , as the Spirit gives 
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i t s members the courage 'to affirm the Christian assertion and to 
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communicate i t to the new generation 1. T i l l i c h sees the main task of 
Christian education to introduce each new generation into the r e a l i t y 
of the Spiritual Community, into i t s f a i t h and love, and this i s done 
through participation i n the church's l i f e according to differing degrees 
of maturity, and through interpretation according to growth i n under-
standing. So the true emphasis of Christian eduoation i s hot to be 
found i n passing on information about churoh history or doctrine to the 
potential church member, nor awakening a subjective piety at the moment 
of conversion, but rather i n this twofold process of participation i n 
and understanding of the church's l i f e . Both are essentials 'there 
i s no understanding of a church's l i f e without participation; but 
without understanding the participation beoomes mechanical and compul-
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sory 
T i l l i c h distinguishes between mission, as the expansion of the 
churches throughout the world, and evangelism, which he defines as 
'missions toward the non-Christians within a Christian culture*• The 
two evangelistic activities he specifically mentions are practical 
apologetics and evangelistic preaching. Practical apologetics he defines 
as 'the practical application of the apologetic element i n every 
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theology'. There i s a sense i n which the church must always be en-
gaged i n such a task, for i t i s constantly being asked questions about 
i t s own nature. The most effective answer i t can give to these questions 
i s , of course^ i t s own example as a l i v i n g testimony to the reality of 
the New Being and the power of the Spiritual Community within i t s l i f e , 
a silent witness of f a i t h and love which i s far more effective than any 
argumentation. But arguments are needed, both to break down the walls 
of intellectual scepticism and to destroy the barriers of dogmatism 
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ereoted by the church i t s e l f . And these are walls and barriers which 
certainly need to be destroyed, for i t i s largely the result of a t t i -
tudes such as these that the church becomes more and more isolated from 
the world, reduced to 'a small, ineffective section within a dynamic 
ci v i l i s a t i o n ' • I n this task of breaking down the barriers, practical 
apologetics plays a v i t a l l y important part, and i t i s one of the f i r s t 
jobs of systematic theology to lay those foundations on which practical 
apologetics i s b u i l t , as Tillioh's own system sets out to do* At the 
same time, having acoepted i t s responsibility, i t must realise that 
there are inevitable psychological and sociological limitations to i t s 
task, a realisation which i n i t s e l f forms 'an element i n the apologetic 
function'* 
T i l l i c h ' s understanding of evangelistio preaching i s directed 
more specifically towards people who have belonged or s t i l l belong to 
a Christian culture but whose relationship to the church has become 
strained, maybe just indifferent, maybe downright hostile* Because 
of i t s charismatic nature, i t w i l l d i f f e r from the usual type of preach-
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ing, and w i l l have more impact on those who lis t e n * Such an impact 
is not merely psychological or emotional, although i t is true that 
the S p i r i t can use any psychological condition to grasp the personal 
self* But there i s a very real danger of reducing evangelistio preaching 
to a merely subjective impact. The tru l y Spiritual impact of evangelism 
lies i n i t s power to transcend any contrast between subjectivity and 
objectivity by transforming the subjectivity of the listener and actuali-
singr.the New Being within his own experience, i n the l i f e of the Spiritual 
Community* This can never be achieved by mere emotionalism, even i f i t 
results i n conversions according to set patterns, for i n this case 
'repentance, f a i t h , sanctity, and so on, are not what these words are 
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taken to mean1, their effect becomes momentary and transitory, and 
excitement becomes confused with ecstasy* Such ambiguities are inevi-
table, and i t would be wrong to reject evangelism because of them* But 
the real corrective and genuine criterion for a l l true evangelistic 
success i s the impact of the Sp i r i t i n the creation of a New Being* 
c* The Constructive Functions of the Church 
T i l l i c h defines those functions as constructive i n which the 
church 'builds i t s l i f e by using and transcending the functions of man's 
l i f e under the dimension o f / s p i r i t ' * ^ 0 This applies particularly to 
cultural creations* The church, as we have seen already, depends on 
forms which are essentially cultural to express i t s e l f t forms i n the 
realms of theoria, with i t s aesthetic and cognitive functions, and 
praxis, with i t s personal and communal functions* The big question i s 
the exact relationship between these aspeots of man's cultural l i f e as 
autonomous forms, and their function as material i n the construction 
of the churches* 'Does their functioning i n the service of the ecclesias-
t i c a l edifice distort the purity of their autonomous form?'^* Must 
expressiveness, truth, humanity and justice be bent i n order to be b u i l t 
into the l i f e of the churches? To ask and to answer such a question, 
of course, both reveals the possibility of ambiguity and raises the 
problem of how i t is to be avoided* I t raises i n other words, the 
issues of form-affirmation and form-transcendence, the polarities which 
stand i n tension i n a l l constructive functions. For the churches must 
use these forms i n such a way that they both affirm and transcend them* 
On the one hand, unless the churches transcend the forms they use, they 
cannot be true manifestations of the Spiritual Community, they would not 
point beyond themselves, and the work of the Spirit would not be seen 
within them. 'The churches do not act as churches when they act as a 
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p o l i t i c a l party or a lav court, as a school or a philosophical movement, 
as patrons of a r t i s t i c production or of psycho-therapeutic healing* The 
church shows i t s presence as church only i f the Spirit breaks into the 
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f i n i t e forms and drives them beyond themselves*. Without form-trans-
cendence there would be l i t t l e more than a meaningless formalism* But 
on the other hand, this does not mean that the principle of form-
i 
affirmation can be neglected, and i n no church function can i t be per-
mitted for the basic structure of a cultural creation to be violated* 
When form-transcendenoe i s emphasised over against form-affirmation, 
the churches become, i n Ti l l i c h ' s phrase, 'demonic-repressive'i they 
violate cultural integrity and repress structural necessity; they under-
mine scientific honesty and ultimately destroy personal humanity 'in the 
name of a demonically distorted fanatical f a i t h ' • The dangers of these 
two extremes can only be avoided when the power of the Spiritual Presence 
is such i n the l i f e of churches that the principles of form-transcendence 
and form-affirmation are one* * 
Turning to the constructing functions i n greater d e t a i l , T i l l i c h 
f i r s t examines the aesthetic function, which appears i n the l i f e of 
the churches i n the religious arts, whether visual, l i t e r a r y or musical* 
In these elements the church expresses the meaning of i t s l i f e by 
giving i t s religious symbols a r t i s t i c form, the style of which w i l l 
d i f f e r from period to period. T i l l i c h calls this process 'double symbol-
i s a t i o n ' . ^ He cites Grunewald's painting of the Crucifixion as an 
example of th i s . This painting i s not only a great masterpiece of 
a r t i s t i c expression i n i t s own rig h t , i t ±B also an expression of the 
Protestant s p i r i t with i t s emphasis on the Cross. I n other words i t 
i s a visual expression not only of the Cross i t s e l f , but also of the 
s p i r i t of the Reformation which placed the Cross at i t s centre* So i t 
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can be said that i t transforms what i t expresses, by giving i t a 
particular significance* I n the case of Grunewald's painting, i t conveys 
a different image of the Christ from that presented i n the Eastern and 
Roman churches, with their respective emphases on the Resurrection and 
the Incarnation* I n fact, every church to a greater or lesser extent 
seeks to guarantee that those religious works of art i t sponsors reflect 
i t s own teachings and emphases, and w i l l because of this do i t s utmost 
to influence the a r t i s t concerned - whether he i s a painter, a poet or 
a oomposer* So, says T i l l i c h , the significance of religious art i s not 
just i t s straightforward expressiveness, but that as a form of expression 
i t brings to l i f e that which i t expresses i n a particular and distinctive 
way. I t is a double symbolisation* 
But alL.this gives rise to a conflict between the churches' j u s t i -
fied request that religious art must express what they confess (the 
principle of consecration) and the a r t i s t s ' equally j u s t i f i e d demand 
that they should use the style which they feel personally impelled to 
use (the principle of honesty)* T i l l i c h sees the principle of conse-
cration as an application of the wider principle of form-transcendence 
to the realm of religious art and that of honesty as the application 
of the wider principle of form-affirmation* On the one hand, the 
principle of consecration 'is the power of expressing the holy i n the 
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concreteness of a special religious t r a d i t i o n 1 , and this'means that 
i t uses those religious symbols which characterise that particular 
tradition as well as those s t y l i s t i c qualities which distinguish r e l i -
gious from other forms of art* I n this way the Spirit can be present 
in the music and word of the l i t u r g y , i n architecture, i n the painting 
and sculpture of differing traditions* On the other hand, the prin-
ciple of honesty i s the l i m i t set by the a r t i s t to the demands made on 
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him i n the name of the principle of consecration* This principle i s 
particularly important i n any transitory period when old styles are on 
the wane and new ones are beginning to appear, and when there i s an 
inevitable s p l i t i n oultural consciousness between the two* In such 
periods, there tends to be a retreat to those older expressions which 
have links with traditional religious experiences, with the temptation 
to absolutise them i n the name of consecration, and so try to prevent 
the creation of new forms of expression* This undermines the artis t ' s 
desire to be honest i n his work, but T i l l i c h feels that in this sort 
of situation, i f the a r t i s t is. to be true to a genuine Spiritual 
expression, he must adamantly refuse to use any traditional forms which 
have ceased to have meaning* The churches also must be ready to confess 
the inadequacy of these forms, even though they may not yet be able to 
envisage what the new forms w i l l be* The principle of honesty demands 
that styles which once had 'great consecrative possibilities' should not 
be used i n a different situation where they can no longer express the 
religious experience* T i l l i c h feels that i t . was this mistake that lay 
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behind the failure of the neo-Grothic revival. *\ 
T i l l i c h suggests that those styles i n religious art which can best 
express the ecstatic character of the Spiritual Presence are those i n 
which some expressionistic element i s p r e s e n t f o r i t is this element 
above a l l others that points to the capacity of l i f e to transcend i t s e l f * 
The more predominant the expressionism, the more readily w i l l a style 
lend i t s e l f , but even i n styles where the expressionistic element i s 
secondary, such as i n idealism, works of religious art are s t i l l possible, 
though they w i l l not have the same impact. T i l l i c h feels that 
the rediscovery of the expressive element i n art since 
1900 i s a decisive event for the relation of religion and 
the visual arts* I t has made religious art again possible* • • 
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The predominance of the expressive style i n contemporary 
art i s a chance for the rebirth of religious art.67 
In the Protestant ohurches, T i l l i c h points out that there has 
been a great neglect of visual expressions of art i n favour of aural 
expressions i n music and hymns, reflecting the general cultural re-
orientation of later medieval times. Some Protestant movements even 
went so far as to reject the use of visual art altogether* The fear 
of idolatry which was responsible for this was to some degree under-
standable, for the visual arts are indeed much more prone to idolatrous 
demonisation than any form of aural expression* However, he maintains. 
the faot that the S p i r i t drives towards the unity of a l l l i f e must 
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validate visual expression as much as any other form. The nature 
of s p i r i t , then, demands that aesthetic expression should use every 
realm of human experience, and the lack of visual art i n Protestantism 
la, 'though historically understandable, systematically untenable and 
practically regrettable *• 
T i l l i o h insists that religion i t s e l f cannot force any style 
upon.the autonomous development of the arts, f or this would violate 
the principle of honesty* When a new style arises, i t i s not because 
of any Impact of religion, but i n the natural course of the self-
creativity of human l i f e and experience: i t i s created by 'the auto-
nomous act of the individual a r t i s t and, at the same time, by historical 
destiny*• Nevertheless, there are situations, where through the impact 
of the Spirit religion can have an indirect influence both on historical 
destiny and autonomous creativity, and this leads to the concept of 
69 
'oultural theonomy', to which T i l l i c h w i l l turn more f u l l y later* 
The cognitive function of cultural creativity appears i n the l i f e 
of the churches as theology, i n which the religious symbols are given 
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conceptual form, concepts which form the basis of a l l doctrine and 
dogma* To some extent we have already examined the relation between 
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theology and philosophy i n T i l l i c h ' s thought. I n the present context, 
T i l l i c h affirms that theology also, like each of the other constructive 
functions of the church, stands under the polarity of form-transcendence 
and form-affirmation, and this gives rise to two important elements i n 
theological study, the 'meditative' and the 'discursive', the former 
seeking to penetrate the. substance of the symbols of religion, the 
la t t e r analysing and describing the form i n which they can be grasped. 
In the former aspect, which i s rather similar i n some ways to contempla-
tion and is the direot concern of the divine S p i r i t , the knowing subject 
and i t s object, 'the mystery of the holy', are united, and T i l l i c h says 
that without this unity theology would be but an analysis of structures 
without substance* At the same time, the meditative act i t s e l f cannot 
produce a theology without the analysis of i t s contents and their con-
structive synthesis which the discursive act provides* 
No theology which plays down either of these two aspects of 
theological study can really be taken seriously. Yet frequently i n the 
history of the church there have been those who have rejeoted the second 
aspect, either because they have f e l t that i t would undermine the 
specific message of the church or else because they have been convinced 
that the substance of theology i s far too restrictive for conceptual 
expression. Yet T i l l i c h insists that theology must find ways and means 
of overcoming this dichotomy between meditation and disoourse. So the 
question arises 'whether there are forms of the conceptual encounter 
with reality i n which the meditative element i s predominant and effective 
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without suppressing the discursive strictness of thought 1* Such forms 
are possible, he answers, as long as the theological ingredient i s kept 
286 
I n place and does not seek to control the other elements i n discursive 
thought. But what about the contrary positions can theology use those 
types of discursive thought where the theological element i s absent? 
T i l l i c h doubts whether i n f a c t any type of discursive thought can r e a l l y 
exclude the theological element, f o r there i s a sense i n which a medita-
t i v e element i s automatically provided by the subject matter of every 
system, whatever the substance happens to be. I n t h i s sense even a 
m a t e r i a l i s t , he claims, can be a theologian. 1 Hence theology i s possible 
some 
on the basis of any philosophical t r a d i t i o n * Nevertheless,/philosophical 
t r a d i t i o n s w i l l lend themselves more easily than others, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
those where there i s already a strong meditative element present, such as 
one finds i n every type of existentialism that has appeared throughout 
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history* Where t h i s element i s not so prominent, as i n philosophies 
which deal with the structure of r e a l i t y rather than the predicament 
of e x i s t i n g , the discursive element comes more into play, and the 
philosophy can be s i g n i f i c a n t l y labelled ' e s s e n t i a l i s t 1 * ^ Yet even 
though the church w i l l prefer an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t mode f o r i t s theology, 
i t must not attanpt to enforce any pa r t i c u l a r way of thinking on i t s 
philosophers. ' I t i s , 1 says T i l l i c h , 'a matter of autonomous c r e a t i v i t y 
and h i s t o r i c a l destiny whether or not the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t element which 
75 
i s present i n a l l philosophies breaks out into the open*. But t h i s 
should not mean that the function of theology cannot proceed unless the 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t element does break out. I t can begin, contends T i l l i o h , 
quite le g i t i m a t e l y with e s s e n t i a l i s t descriptions of r e a l i t y , f o r i t w i l l 
need these as well i n the course of i t s study, and then prooeed t o d i s -
cover the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t presuppositions behind them, accepting or 
r e j e c t i n g them as the case may be. On the other hand, 'even the most 
radical e x i s t e n t i a l i s t , i f he wants to say something, necessarily f a l l s 
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back: to some ess e n t i a l i s t statements because without them he cannot 
even speak*.^ 
Having dealt with the functions of theoria i n the l i f e of the 
church, T i l l i c h now turns his attention t o those of praxis t the sphere 
i n which there i s interdependent growth of personality and community* 
He reminds us that the question which again faces us i s whether t h e i r 
functioning i n the l i f e of the churches d i s t o r t s t h e i r autonomous forms. 
Just as i n the realm of theoria t h i s involves a tension i n p o l a r i t y be-
tween consecration and honesty i n a r t , and between meditation and discur-
sive strictness i n theology, so i n the realm of personal-communal r e l a -
t i o n s , ' i t raises the question whether community can maintain j u s t i c e and 
whether personality can maintain humanity i f they are used f o r the s e l f -
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construction of the churches'* Can j u s t i c e and humanity be preserved 
vrhen employed i n the r e a l i s a t i o n of communal and personal holiness? I f 
the power of the S p i r i t i s able to conquer the ambiguities of r e l i g i o n 
the answer must be 'yes'* 
Because communal holiness w i t h i n the churches i s an expression 
of the S p i r i t u a l Community, T i l l i c h points out that the S p i r i t u a l 
Presence w i l l continually f i g h t against i t s d i s t o r t i o n . This d i s t o r t i o n 
can take place whenever a church permits i n j u s t i c e to occur i n the name 
of holiness, i n which case the necessary basis f o r communal relat i o n s , 
the p r i n c i p l e of j u s t i c e i t s e l f , i s flaunted* I n f a c t , as f a r as the 
leadership and hierarchical i n s t i t u t i o n s of the church are concerned, 
t h i s has not infrequently been the case. Justice i s suspended i n the 
name of sacramental a u t h o r i t y i Again, i t has not been uncommon f o r 
the church to tu r n a blind eye on the i n j u s t i c e s perpetrated by the c i v i l 
powers that be, p a r t i c u l a r l y when i t depends on those powers f o r i t s own 
standing i n society. Even i n modern times, on a more l o c a l l e v e l , there 
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i s always the danger that a parish minister w i l l be so dependent on 
those who are socially or economically i n f l u e n t i a l that he ignores the 
real needs of those who are exploited by others* This sort of thing, 
whenever i t happens, i s a flagrant d i s t o r t i o n of the holiness of the 
church, and when i t does ocour the churches are j u s t i f i a b l y repudiated. 
both by those on whom the church has turned i t s back and by those who 
are disgusted at the church's a t t i t u d e * 
The four ambiguities of communal l i f e which T i l l i c h has already 
discussed i n general he now examines i n the l i g h t of the question, 'In 
what sense are they overcome i n the community which claims p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
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i n the Holy Community and derived holiness f o r i t s e l f ? * The f i r s t 
ambiguity, that of indusivenose, i s overcome, he says, whenever the 
church claims to be a l l - i n c l u s i v e beyond any s o c i a l , r a c i a l or national 
l i m i t a t i o n s * Unfortunately t h i s claim i s conditioned by man's existen-
t i a l estrangement from his true being, consequently one observes t r e -
mendous social and r a c i a l problems present i n the l i f e of the churohes. 
A more specific example of the ambiguity of t h i s claim i s the very way 
i n which the churches exclude those of other creeds, which may to some 
extent be understandable, i n that no church, i f i t i s to r e t a i n i t s 
i d e n t i t y , can admit symbols which compete with i t s own symbolic expressions 
of the f a i t h . Nevertheless, the church i s often i n danger of i d o l i s i n g 
i t s own symbols* 'Therefore, whenever the S p i r i t u a l Presence makes 
i t s e l f f e l t , the s e l f - c r i t i c i s m of the churches i n the name of t h e i r 
own symbols s t a r t s 1 , and the willingness of the church to do t h i s , says 
T i l l i c h , i s evidence of i t s dependence on the S p i r i t u a l Community and 
of i t s own fragmentary character as well as i t s awareness that i t i s 
continually threatened by a lapse i n t o the very r e l i g i o u s ambiguities 
i t i s intended to f i g h t . 
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The second ambiguity of communal l i f e i s equality« which the 
79 church interprets primarily as 'the equality of everyone before God1. 
Though t h i s transcendent form of equality does not necessarily demand 
social and p o l i t i c a l equality, i t should nevertheless create a desire 
f o r equality i n the fellowship of the church* But somehow the church 
has always been rather uneasy about Jesus' statement that a l l men are 
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equally sinners and therefore equally forgiven. making a d i s t i n c t i o n 
between those whose sin i s s o c i a l l y condemned and those whose s i n i s 
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s o c i a l l y acceptable* To make such a d i s t i n c t i o n s t r i k e s at the very 
roots of the p r i n c i p l e of equality, both i n the l i f e of the churches 
and i n the l i f e of society. T i l l i c h warns that when the church f a l l s i n t o 
t h i s way of thinking, the S p i r i t may well have to use other means to 
aotualise equality i n the l i f e of man* 
Closely connected with the ambiguities of inclusiveness and 
equality i s that of leadership, f o r i t i s the leading groups prim a r i l y 
who choose either to condemn or condone the denial of these things* 
Leadership can lead to tyranny, which i s much more than a 'bad h i s t o r i c a l 
accident', but rather 'one of the great and inescapable ambiguities of 
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l i f e ' , to which r e l i g i o u s leadership i s prone as much as any other* 
The task of the S p i r i t i s to raise up men who w i l l expose any suggestion 
of tyrannical leadership i n the l i f e of the church. This sort of 
S p i r i t u a l judgment i s commonplace i n Protestantism! i n f a c t , some may 
consider i t as one of the weaknesses of the Protestant system; but 
at least i t i s preferable to the capacities f o r demonic leadership that 
one finds i n the papal system, f o r example, and what therefore may be 
termed weakness i n the Protestant churches i s i n actual f a c t t h e i r 
greatness and the evidence of the S p i r i t at work withi n them* 
The f o u r t h ambiguity i s that of legal form t which the church needs 
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no less than any other i n s t i t u t i o n . This does not mean that God pro-
vides i t with constitutional.forms that oannot be changed, even though 
the church and i t s functions stand under the d i r e c t i o n of the S p i r i t * 
As T i l l i c h points out, 'The S p i r i t does not give constitutional rules, 
but i t guides the churches toward a S p i r i t u a l use of sociologically 
adequate offices and i n s t i t u t i o n s ' * Nevertheless, the constitutional 
form a church adopts does r e f l e c t how i t i n t e r p r e t s the relationship 
between God and man* A monarchic church, f o r example, has a very 
d i f f e r e n t understanding of that relationship than the democratic 
churches. So i t i s true to say that constitutional problems are i n -
d i r e c t l y theological, and t h i s explains why many of the divisions i n 
the church are seemingly based on con s t i t u t i o n a l issues. The Protestant 
p r i n c i p l e of f a l l i b i l i t y and i t s protest against i n f a l l i b i l i t y , or the 
principle of the priesthood of a l l believers i n i t s protest against the 
divine-human hierarchical structure are i l l u s t r a t i o n s of t h i s . And 
the theological principles behind the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l forms are indeed 
'matters of ultimate concern', even though the organisations set up 
for t h e i r manifestation are secondary. T i l l i c h concludes, therefore, 
that those co n s t i t u t i o n a l forms are preferable which are the most 
expedient under, the c r i t e r i a of ultimate theological principles* 
T i l l i c h observes i n the ambiguities of the legal organisation of 
thetchurch an i n i t i a l reason f o r the widespread resentment against so-
called 'organised r e l i g i o n * . Yet i n spite of t h i s , some form of organ-
i s a t i o n i s sociologically i n e v i t a b l e , as the repeated f a i l u r e of small 
sects to l i v e without any organisation easily shows, and quite frequently 
the small sect oan develop an organisation more demanding than that of 
the orthodox churches themselvesJ But he recognises that there i s a 
second and f a r more subtle reason f o r the resentment against organised 
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r e l i g i o n I the idea that r e l i g i o n i s a personal thing* This i s a 
misconception, because man depends on community f o r the development of 
his personality, and t h i s i s as true i n the r e l i g i o u s sphere as any 
other* A man's rel i g i o u s experience would soon fade were i t not nourished 
by the f a i t h and love of the church* There i s , of course, a personal 
response to the re l i g i o u s community, a response which may have creative, 
revolutionary or even destructive impacts upon i t , and which i n turn 
can sometimes give b i r t h to a new type of oommunitys but t h i s i s rather 
d i f f e r e n t * I n f a c t , underlying the c r i t i c i s m against organised r e l i g i o n 
T i l l i c h detects a f a r more radical c r i t i c i s m which denies any attempt to 
channel the relationship between God and man i n t o specific channels* 
This o r i t i c i s m i n s t i n c t i v e l y recognises that no r e l i g i o n as such can 
achieve perfect unity with God* I n thi s sense, i t may leg i t i m a t e l y be 
called a 'religious c r i t i c i s m of every form of r e l i g i o n , whether i t i s 
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public or private'* But though t h i s i s very important, i t i s something 
f a r more embracing and s i g n i f i c a n t than the o r i t i c i s m of organised 
r e l i g i o n i t s e l f , f o r t h i s i s a complaint levelle d against r e l i g i o n i n 
a l l of i t s aspects, not just that of i t s constitutional forms* 
I f one f e e l s , says T i l l i c h , that the ambiguities of r e l i g i o n can 
be resolved by withdrawing from the communal l i f e of the church, one i s 
s t i l l faced with the ambiguities of personal r e l i g i o n , which are equally 
as great* These may be described as 'ambiguities i n the actualisation 
of humanity as the inner aim of the person', and they appear both i n a 
person's r e l a t i o n t o himself and i n his r e l a t i o n to others. Just as 
the holiness of a community must i n no way destroy i t s j u s t i c e , so also 
the saintliness of the individual w i t h i n t h i s community must not destroy 
the person's humanity, his own development towards maturity. The f i r s t 
question we must ask, therefore, says T i l l i c h , i s i n what way saintliness 
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and humanity are related under the Impact of the S p i r i t * 
T i l l i c h defines a saint as a person who i s transparent to the 
divine ground of being, which corresponds to his d e f i n i t i o n of holiness* 
The snag i s that h i s t o r i c a l l y the achievement of t h i s Btate has generally 
been held to depend on the denial of so many human p o s s i b i l i t i e s that 
i t stands i n inevitable tension with the ideal of humanity, and on 
occasions has led to outright c o n f l i c t * T i l l i c h distinguishes between 
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three types of self-denial or asceticism* I n the f i r s t place, there 
i s what he c a l l s 'ontological asceticism', the type on which Roman 
monasticism based i t s e l f , which aims at s p i r i t u a l achievement through a 
t o t a l renunciation of material things. This type of asceticism not only 
makes i t impossible f o r a person to f u l f i l h i s true humanity; i t i s also 
based on a false dichotomy between s p i r i t and matter* God i s creator 
of both, and because of t h i s Protestantism has been wise i n r e j e c t i n g 
t h i s type of ascetic practioe. The second type i s 'moral asceticism', 
which emphasises s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e * The danger that T i l l i c h perceives 
here i s that one threatens the telos of humanity by o v e r s t r i c t moral 
repression, such as one sees i n certain pu r i t a n i c a l attitudes to sex. 
This type of asceticism can therefore become equally as suffocating as 
i t s ontological counterpart* T i l l i c h perceives that one of the great 
advantages of modern psychology i s that i t has helped the church to get 
r i d of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r image of personal holiness* The t h i r d type of 
asceticism i s the genuine work of the S p i r i t i n the l i f e of a person, 
i n which he i s so united with the te l o s , the goal, of his own humanity, 
that he denies himself those things that would prevent t h i s f u l f i l m e n t * 
I t i s the same type of d i s c i p l i n e without which no creative work would 
be possible, the d i s c i p l i n e which p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the created object 
demands, i n t h i s case the creative work being the development of one's 
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own humanity, and the created object the goal i t s e l f * This type of 
asceticism, then, i s 'the conquest of a subjective s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n 
which prevents p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the ob j e c t 1 , the objeot of a f u l l 
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humanity* I n t h i s sainthood and humanity are one, f o r sainthood i s 
being so opened to the S p i r i t u a l Presence that the union of oneself with 
the objective of the f u l l development of one*s humanity i s now possible* 
The subject of d i s c i p l i n e raises an important issue which must 
be resolvedt the question of determination, f o r here there i s a r e a l 
ambiguity present* As f a r as self-determination i s concerned, the 
problem, says T i l l i c h , can be stated thus! 'How i s personal s e l f -
determination possible i f the determining s e l f needs determination as 
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much as the determined s e l f ? ' I n other words, how i s self-determina-
t i o n possible i f the s e l f as subject needs to be determined no less 
than the se l f as object? The answer l i e s i n the doctrine of the 
S p i r i t u a l Presence, which transcends any d i s t i n c t i o n between subjeot 
and object by helping the self to realise i t s essential humanity, and 
which thus gives the s e l f as subject the determination necessary to 
determine the self as object* This, claims T i l l i c h , i s part of what 
the Christian means by grace, the preceding a c t i v i t y of the S p i r i t , the 
'given', which makes i t possible to overcome the ambiguities of s e l f -
determination* With t h i s g i f t , of the S p i r i t u a l Presence, the s e l f i s 
able not only to understand what saintliness and humanity mean f o r his 
own l i f e , or i n other words to understand what one's essential being 
i s , but also to f u l f i l those ideals i n i t s own experience* This i s the 
only way, he says, of 'escaping the despair of the c o n f l i c t between the 
command of self-determination and the imp o s s i b i l i t y of determining oneself 
i n the d i r e c t i o n of what one essentially i s ' * 
I n the case of other-determination, i n the spheres of education 
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and guidance, T i l l i c h points out that the ambiguities which these 
functions e n t a i l , a r i s i n g from the separation of him who determines and 
him who i s determined, are as muoh present i n the r e l i g i o u s context as 
elsewhere* I n the power of the S p i r i t which transcends every subject-
object s p l i t , the church i s able to f i g h t against these ambiguities, f o r 
as subject and object both participate i n the S p i r i t , so they p a r t i c i -
pate i n each other through the S p i r i t , so that the subject also becomes 
object, and the object subject* This i s borne out by the f a c t that the 
nearer one gets to the telos of humanity, the more one realises j u s t 
how f a r one s t i l l has to go i n one's own l i f e , and t h i s means that any 
at t i t u d e of superiority towards or desire to control the other person 
i s overcome by the r e a l i s a t i o n that he who seeks to teach or guide i s 
himself i n need of teaching and guidance* Nevertheless, a fragmentary 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the telos of humanity, both one's own and that of the 
other person, i s possible, because the S p i r i t grasps one, as i t were, 
'out of the v e r t i c a l dimension 1, and t h i s means that teaching and guidance 
can be genuinely offered under the impact of the S p i r i t which i s something 
other than one's own ideas, and desires* I t i s true to say, concludes 
T i l l i c h , that 'the S p i r i t does not l e t the subject i n any human r e l a t i o n 
remain mere subject and the object mere object; the S p i r i t i s present 
wherever the conquest of the subject-object s p l i t i n man's existence 
, 88 occurs* • 
d. The Relating Functions of the Church 
T i l l i c h has dealt extensively with the in t e r n a l functions of the 
church* But these are not the only functions* For the church exists i n 
the world, and because of t h i s i t constantly encounters other social 
groups, 'acting upon them and receiving from them'* These relationships 
pose many problems which are of a practical nature, and which do not l i e 
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w i t h i n the proper realm of systematic theology* Nevertheless T i l l i c h 
feels that every theological system must seek to formulate ways i n 
which the churches r e l a t e themselves to other social groups* He c a l l s 
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these the 'relating functions of the churches'* ' 
There are three ways, says T i l l i c h , i n which the church relates 
i t s e l f t o other groups* The f i r s t i s the way of s i l e n t interpenetration, 
'the continuous radiation of the S p i r i t u a l essence of the churches 
90 
int o a l l groups of the society i n which they l i v e ' . I n t h i s way the 
church oan influence and change society by pouring i t s ' p r i e s t l y sub-
stance' i n t o the social structure to which i t belongs. Because of the 
accelerating secularisation of contemporary society, the force of t h i s 
s i l e n t presence of the church w i t h i n the world i s frequently unacknow-
ledged, yet were the church to be removed an empty space would soon 
appear as the power of i t s influenoe gradually faded away* So the church 
imperceptibly penetrates the world. But the movement i s reciprocated, 
for the world also penetrates the church with i t s developing and changing 
forms of culture and society, as new ways of understanding and expressions 
of experience are opened up by man* So there takes place a mutual ex-
change of substance and form between the church and the world, an 
interpenetration ' s i l e n t l y exercised at every moment's 'the churches 
s i l e n t l y give S p i r i t u a l substance to the society i n which they l i v e , and 
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the churches s i l e n t l y receive S p i r i t u a l forms from the same society'. 
The second way i n which the church relates to the world i s i n 
c r i t i c a l .judgment, again exercised reciprocally between religious and 
other social groups* I n t h i s way the church has often been able t o 
change the society i n which i t was placed, at times quite r a d i c a l l y * 
This open attack by the church on society i n the name of the S p i r i t u a l 
Presence, says T i l l i c h , oan be called 'prophetic', j u s t as i t s s i l e n t 
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penetration could be called ' p r i e s t l y * . Sometimes the church may not 
seem to be very successful i n i t s prophetic judgment, yet even i n these 
cases i t has at least put society into the position of having to react 
one way or the other i n the face of i t s message, so that no society can 
remain exaotly the same, even i f i t s reaction i s negative and i t becomes 
hardened i n i t s demonic t r a i t s . The church therefore w i l l encourage 
prophetic o r i t i c i s m , even i f t h i s e n t a i l s a measure of s e l f - s a c r i f i c e 
on i t s own part, and even though i t realises that i t can never f u l l y 
actualise true S p i r i t u a l Community w i t h i n the l i f e of society. So he 
writes i n one of his sermonst 
We must pray f o r the prophetic s p i r i t which has .been dead 
for so long i n the churches* And he who feels that he has 
been given the prophetic task must f u l f i l i t as Isaiah did* 
He must preach the message of a new j u s t i c e and of a new 
social order i n the name of God and his honour. But he must 
expeot to be opposed and persecuted not only by his enemies, 
but also by his fr i e n d s , party, class and nation. He must 
expeot to be persecuted to the degree to which his word i s 
the word of that God who alone i s holy, that God who alone 
i s able to create a holy people out of the remnant.of every 
nation.92 
He who i s grasped by the S p i r i t must be prepared fo r these things. 
Reciprocally, there are times when the world w i l l need to stand 
over i n judgment against the church, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n i t s exposure of any 
"'holy i n j u s t i c e " and " s a i n t l y inhumanity" w i t h i n the churches and i n 
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t h e i r r e l a t i o n to the society i n which they l i v e ' * T i l l i c h notes 
that t h i s sort of c r i t i c i s m has been p a r t i c u l a r l y prominent i n the con-
temporary era, and has provoked two rather d i f f e r e n t results* Negatively, 
i t has unfortunately led to an ever-widening gap between the church and 
those sections of the society where i n j u s t i c e i s most l i k e l y to have i t s 
e f f e c t , such as i n the world of industry and labour r e l a t i o n s * But 
p o s i t i v e l y , i t has led to an important reassessment by the churches of 
the meaning of j u s t i c e and humanity* T i l l i c h c a l l s t h i s c r i t i c i s m of the 
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church by the world a 'reverse prophetlsm', and interprets t h i s pro-
phet! o voioe outside the church i t s e l f as one of the evidences.of the 
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la t e n t S p i r i t u a l Community, to which we have already referred. So 
the S p i r i t uses voioes i n the world to c a l l the church back to i t s true 
function and mission* I t i s the duty of the church to l i s t e n to these 
voices* As he puts i t i n one of his essaysi 
I n i t s prophetic r o l e the Church i s the guardian who 
reveals dynamic structures i n society and undercuts t h e i r 
demonic power by revealing them, even w i t h i n the Church 
i t s e l f * I n so doing the Church l i s t e n s to voices outside 
i t s e l f , judging bo-Hi the culture and the Church i n so f a r 
as i t i s part of the culture • • • Most of (these voices) 
are not active members of the manifest Church* But perhaps 
one could c a l l them participants of a "latent Church", a 
Church i n which the ultimate concern which drives the 
manifest Church i s hidden under c u l t u r a l forms and deforma-
tions. Sometimes t h i s l a t e n t church comes into the open* 
Then the manifest Church should recognise i n these voices 
what i t s own s p i r i t should be and accept them even i f they 
appear h o s t i l e to the Church* 95 
F i n a l l y , says T i l l i c h , the church i s related to the world through 
p o l i t i c a l establishment* Because Christ i s king as well as pries t and 
prophet, 'every church has a p o l i t i c a l function, from the local up to 
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l ' * ^ ^ Indeed, part of t h i s function i s to influence 
the powers that be to acknowledge the church's p r i e s t l y and prophetic 
roles and enable i t to f u l f i l them* However, whenever the church does 
act p o l i t i c a l l y i t must never use methods of persuasion or coercion, 
although i t may frequently be tempted to do so* For the real power of 
the church does not l i e i n methods such as these, but arises from the 
presence of the S p i r i t w i t h i n i t s l i f e * T i l l i c h feels that the t r a d i -
t i o n a l Protestant reserve towards p o l i t i c a l involvement may have arisen 
as a reaction against the Roman use of persuasive and coercive techniques 
and the consequent misuse of i t s S p i r i t u a l power, but he also states 
quite f i r m l y that the Protestant cannot r e a l l y escape p o l i t i o a l respon-
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s i b i l i t y t i n f a c t , to attempt t o do so would be to betray the kingly 
o f f i c e of Christ and the church's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i t * But once again. 
there i s a r e c i p r o c i t y between the church and the world, and t h i s means 
that as long as the churches are i n the world they 'must be ready not 
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only to d i r e c t but also to be directed*. This applies p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
the relation'between church and state* But i t does not mean that the 
church should compromise i t s own natures indeed, i t must r e s i s t any 
form of p o l i t i c a l establishment -that would destroy i t s character as an 
expression of the S p i r i t u a l Community* I t must never kotow to the state 
or a government department l i k e an obedient slave, so that i t s humility 
becomes weakness, any more than attempt to control the whole of l i f e i n 
t o t a l i t a r i a n fashion* Both would be a denial of i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the 
S p i r i t of Christ. 
I n each of these three ways i n which the church i s related to the 
world, there ia a sense of mutual belonging* Both churoh and world have 
to face l i f e ' s ambiguities, and the f a c t that the church does belong to 
the world i n t h i s way prevents i t from making i t s paradoxical, f i n i t e 
holiness absolute* However, because the church i s the means by which 
the holiness of the divine S p i r i t i s manifest i n community, there are 
times when i t w i l l need to stand i n opposition to other groups, and t h i s 
i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true i n the contemporary period when so often the Btate 
has sought to usurp i t s p r i e s t l y and prophetic functions by introducing 
n a t i o n a l i s t i c sacraments and r i t e s and encouraging an outspoken national 
fanaticism, as well as rendering i t s royal function impotent by subjecting 
i t to or separating i t from the state* So alongside the principle of 
belonging there must also operate the p r i n c i p l e of opposition! 'the 
churoh i n the world' must be counterbalanced by 'the church against the 
world'. Yet i n order to keep t h i s t r u t h i n a proper perspective, T i l l i c h 
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reminds us that ' i t i s part and parcel of (the ambiguity of reli g i o u s 
l i f e ) that the world which i s opposed by the church i s not simply not-
church but has i n i t s e l f elements of the S p i r i t u a l Community i n i t s 
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latency which work towards a theonomous culture', a subject to which 
we shall turn l a t e r on* 
Evaluation 
T i l l i c h has provided us with an extremely useful and careful 
analysis of the various functions i n the l i f e of the church, and there 
i s a sense i n which any points of c r i t i c i s m w i l l be o f f s e t by points of 
commendation* This should be borne i n mind with reference to the 
c r i t i c a l comments which follow* 
I n his remarks on the p o l a r i t i e s of t r a d i t i o n and reformation i n 
the c o n s t i t u t i v e functions of the churches, T i l l i c h ' a d i s t i n c t i o n between 
the concept of t r a d i t i o n i t s e l f and the various t r a d i t i o n s of local 
churches i s a very important one, and one to which Protestantism has 
given f a r too l i t t l e a t tention* What needs to be emphasised i s that 
t r a d i t i o n is an important vehicle of the S p i r i t , establishing and main-
taining the continuity of his work throughout the ages* By standing 
i n the t r a d i t i o n of the S p i r i t and understanding how i t has developed 
throughout the centuries i n response to speci f i c needs, the contemporary 
church w i l l not only see the relevance of the Christ to whom the S p i r i t 
t e s t i f i e s f o r every generation, but w i l l also be able to determine 
more c a r e f u l l y what that relevance may mean and where the S p i r i t i s 
leading the church i n our own day* To ignore t r a d i t i o n and seek to begin 
a l l over again, as some would t r y to do, would be to deny the S p i r i t ' s 
work i n the past and therefore to take i t less than seriously i n the 
present* As Daniel Jenkins emphasises: 
Unless churches understand what t r a d i t i o n teaches them 
and how they themselves in e v i t a b l y help to form t r a d i t i o n , 
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they are l i k e l y to succumb to one of two dangers* 
Either they w i l l be g u i l t y of archaism i n reaching 
t h e i r judgements because they are i n h i b i t e d from 
recognising novelty, or else they cut themselves o f f 
from the r i c h treasury of wisdom about man's l i f e on 
t h i s earth which i s available to them from the Christian 
past.99 
Thus, 
Protestantism needs to see with new c l a r i t y that the 
church l i v e s always i n the dimension of the S p i r i t , 1 0 0 
a dimension to which the body of Christian t r a d i t i o n points and 
affirms. 
So the contemporary church must take with a l l seriousness T i l l i c h ' s 
i n s i g h t that genuine prophetic c r i t i c i s m of any t r a d i t i o n w i l l come not 
from outside but from inside the body of t r a d i t i o n i t s e l f , and that t h i s 
i s one of the principles and tests of true reformation* I t i s something 
that i s of especial importance i n an age when the church may wel l be 
facing the beginnings of a new reformation, triggered o f f i n the main 
by i t e increased contact with the secular world, and the seriousness 
with which the church takes the world's c r i t i c i s m of i t s e l f * I n the 
face of t h i s , what T i l l i c h i s saying i s that though the secular world 
has every r i g h t to o r i t i o i s e , and indeed may be the agent of the S p i r i t 
i n i t s c r i t i c i s m , yet there can be no attempt to impose a real reforma-
t i o n on the church from the outside* This can only come from w i t h i n , 
as the S p i r i t works from w i t h i n the body, creating new l i f e , and casting 
out the dead wood* Any such attempt to impose reformation from the 
outside would not be reformation at a l l , but something e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t 
i n content, determined by the world rather than by the S p i r i t of Christ* 
On the other hand, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see what T i l l i c h * s r e j e c t i o n 
of the Bible i n favour of an awareness of S p i r i t u a l freedom as the 
c r i t e r i o n f o r any genuine reformation r e a l l y achieves* This statement 
i s c l e a r l y unacceptable i f he i s implying that an awareness of S p i r i t u a l 
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freedom i s separate from the revelation of God i n Christ that i s 
recorded i n the Scriptures. One does not deny the element of S p i r i t u a l 
freedom i n any true movement towards reform - indeed i t must be present -
but there can be no freedom of the S p i r i t outside Christ, f o r the 
S p i r i t i s the S p i r i t of Christ. And we cannot know Christ apart from 
the Scriptures which speak of him. There i s then no S p i r i t u a l freedom 
that i s not i n accordance with the Word of God recorded i n the New 
Testament. I n f a c t , John himself offers the genuine c r i t e r i o n f o r 
reformation when he says, 'The Holy S p i r i t whom the Father w i l l send i n > 
my name, w i l l teach you everything and r e c a l l to you everything I have 
s a i d 1 . 1 0 1 Such a text emphasises the o e n t r a l i t y of the New Testament 
record i n the work of the S p i r i t . I t i s a p i t y T i l l i c h has not made 
thi s point, f o r i n i t s present c r i s i s the church needs to take i t more 
seriously than i t has done so f a r . There i s much t a l k of reformation, 
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even defined as a response to the divine S p i r i t , but how can the 
church determine what the S p i r i t i s saying and where he i s leading except 
i n the l i g h t of the Word? I t i s i n t h i s sort of s i t u a t i o n that the 
Bible, not only as the record of God's revelation, but also as the safe-
guard of the church's own t r a d i t i o n , i s the v i t a l yardstick against which 
any concept of reformation must be measured.*0^ I t i s t h i s alone that 
w i l l prevent any movement of reform i n the l i f e of the church from being 
misguided i n t o a f l u r r y of unchannelled zeal which would dissipate i t s 
l i f e i n preliminary concerns. 1 0^ As Nelson puts i t , The Body of Christ 
has not been l e f t i n the world without the proper d i r e c t i o n f o r i t s 
maintenance and growth . . . The task of the church therefore i s • • • i n 
a l l matters f a i t h f u l l y to serve the Word'.10-' I t seems to me that i f 
T i l l i c h i s to show himself a f a i t h f u l doctor of the Word, he should have 
been f a r more e x p l i c i t on t h i s point* There i s no way i n which i t would 
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contradict his doctrine of the S p i r i t : i t would only serve to c l a r i f y 
and strengthen i t * 
T i l l i c h ' s analysis of prayer presents us with several problems, 
most of which stem from the ontological framework of his theology* For 
example, the statement that the S p i r i t helps us i n our praying means that 
God i s praying t o himself through us i s confusing i n two ways* Not 
only does . T i l l i c h f a i l to preserve the t r i n i t a r i a n structure of prayer 
(that prayer i s to the Father through the Son i n the power of the S p i r i t ) 
but he does not delineate c l e a r l y enough between the place of the human 
s p i r i t and that of the divine S p i r i t i n the act of prayer* I n f a c t , 
his assertion that prayer i s not to be thought of i n tezms of conversa-
t i o n between man and God i n that every genuine prayer transcends the 
subject-object d i s t i n c t i o n (and therefore the d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
human s p i r i t and the divine S p i r i t ) , leads us to reply that one of the 
reasons why i t i s sound to think of prayer i n terms of conversation i s 
precisely because i t underlies the personal relationship between God and 
man i n which the distinctiveness of each i s preserved* I t i s p a r t l y 
beoause T i l i i c h cannot admit of any such personal relationship that he i s 
led to underestimate the importance of concrete intercession i n Christian 
prayer* Now i t i s c e r t a i n l y true that one of the purposes of i n t e r -
cession i s to bring one's desires - whether f o r oneself or f o r others -
into subjection to the divine w i l l , and i n that w i l l f i n d t h e i r true 
f u l f i l m e n t , and i n t h i s sense T i l l i c h i s agreeing with Kierkegaard's 
saying, that 'prayer does not change God, but changes him who offers 
i t 1 * ^ ^ But t h i s i s surely not the sole purpose of intercession* Behind 
the prayer of intercession l i e ' two important assumptions: f i r s t l y , that 
our human i n t e r e s t s , problems and desires are of the utmost concern to 
God - no matter how small or seemingly i n s i g n i f i c a n t they may be; and 
303 
secondly, that God i s able to order a l l things, not only f o r the accom-
plishment of his purposes, but also f o r the blessing of those who turn to 
him i n prayer* T i l l i c h does not r e a l l y make these points at a l l * For 
him, the specific prayers of the individual are of secondary importance* 
what r e a l l y matters i s that the S p i r i t should override these prayers and 
reorientate them away from t h e i r concrete concern to the more general 
concern of the ultimate f u l f i l m e n t of God's purposes as a whole* But to 
say t h i s must be to devalue the place of s p e c i f i c intercession, l e t alone 
to deny the efficacy of pa r t i c u l a r intercession i n the l i v e s of countless 
numbers of people throughout Christian h i s t o r y * And we are l e f t with the 
image, not of the personal God who i s intimately concerned with his 
people, seeking to f u l f i l the personal needs of those who place t h e i r t r u s t 
i n him, one to whom the individual can t u r n and know he xd.ll be heard; but 
of an impersonal divine purpose in t o which the speoific content of our 
prayers i s absorbed without any real significance having been accorded to 
i t . Such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of prayer would hardly have prompted the 
w r i t e r of Hebrews to say, 'Let us then with confidence draw near the 
throne of grace, that we may receive mercy and f i n d grace to help i n time 
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of need*, 1 s t i l l less the assurance with which Paul promised his 
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Philippian brothers, 'My God w i l l supply every need of yours*• 
I t i s l i t t l e wonder, then, that T i l l i c h has nothing to say about 
the role of f a i t h i n the act of prayer* The New Testament, on the other 
hand, strongly emphasises the place of f a i t h i n the prayer of intercession, 
a f a i t h that i s always d i r e c t l y ooncerned with the specific content of the 
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prayer being offered, a f a i t h related to a conscious need* For T i l l i c h , 
however, the r e a l nature of prayer i s nothing consciously expressed, but 
rather something hidden from us, incomprehensible, known only to the 
S p i r i t . What we must assert i s that any genuine understanding of prayer 
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must contain both of these elements. For the doctrine of the S p i r i t , 
t h i s means that the same S p i r i t who prays w i t h i n us with unutterable words 
also gives us boldness to approach God with our conscious intercessions 
i n the Icnowledge that they w i l l be heard* 1 1^ 
T i l l i c h i s completely j u s t i f i e d i n r e c a l l i n g Protestants to a r e -
appraisal of contemplation, and there i s much t r u t h i n his suggestion 
that t h i s neglect has been to t h e i r s p i r i t u a l disadvantage. But one f a i l s 
to see why contemplation necessitates an ecstatic transoendenoe of the 
subject-object order. This i s only so i f one accepts as the only v a l i d 
understanding of contemplation the in t e r p r e t a t i o n put forward by mystical 
schools of devotion which would emphasise the essential unity of the 
human s p i r i t with the divine S p i r i t at the expense of a t r u l y personal 
relationship. Hence T i l l i c h contends that the Protestant neglect of 
contemplation stems from i t s personalistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the divine 
S p i r i t . I t i s not true, however, that contemplation i n i t s e l f i s incom-
patible with a d e f i n i t i o n of the S p i r i t i n personal terms. One can 
oont em plate on the intensely personal nature of the love of God, or 
meditate on the r e a l i t y of the divine Presence, without subscribing to a 
b e l i e f i n transcendent union. The one does not depend on nor arise from 
the o t h e r . 1 1 1 
There i s l i t t l e comment of a c r i t i c a l nature that one can make about 
T i l l i c h ' s remarks on the expansive functions of the church. Much of what 
he says i s of a pract i c a l nature, and i n t h i s context i s useful. There 
are one or two assumptions i n his analysis of evangelism, however, which 
one would question. His in t e r p r e t a t i o n of 'evangelistic preaching 1, f o r 
example, seems too narrow, and there i s a sense i n which t h i s type of 
evangelism has become discredited precisely beoause of the sort of emotional 
abuse to which T i l l i c h r e f e r s . One f e e l s , therefore, that he could have 
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given some attention to other, more contemporary forms, of kerygmatic 
proclamation, such as communication through the mass media, or the role 
of personal evangelism* Secondly, one must question his assumption that 
a l l true evangelism creates a transcendence of subject and object* This 
i s one of those statements which seems to mean very l i t t l e , and i s 
cer t a i n l y not borne out by any evangelistic r e s u l t s . The ideas behind 
such a mode of expression would be completely foreign to the work of most 
evangelists. I t i s c e r t a i n l y true that the S p i r i t i s active i n genuine 
evangelistic work, and that the purpose of evangelism i s to reconcile 
men with God, but t h i s does not have to be interpreted i n the sense of 
creating ontological union. I n t h i s context, T i l l i c h ' s c r i t i c i s m that 
certain evangelists use the words l i k e 'repentance*,'faith 1 and so on, to 
mean other than what they are intended to mean, could equally j u s t i f i a b l y 
be levelled against himself* 
I n his discussion on the constructive functions of the churches, the 
general point that T i l l i c h makes about the r e l a t i o n between form-affirmation 
and form-transcendence i s an important one, and underlines the t r u t h that 
the S p i r i t uses the materials of ordinary l i f e and experience as the means 
by which he works w i t h i n the world* This emphasises the point that must 
be made again and again i n the development of the doctrine of the S p i r i t , 
that the divine S p i r i t neither violates nor bypasses human a c t i v i t y , but 
by using i t f o r his own purposes gives i t a new and profound significance* 
This i s c e r t a i n l y something T i l l i o h does not intend us to forget, and 
r i g h t l y so. His discussion on the aesthetic function and i t s place i n 
the l i f e of the church i s i n t e r e s t i n g , but i t would have greatly benefitted 
from more specific i l l u s t r a t i o n s * The tension between the principles of 
'consecration' and 'honesty' i s , f o r example, one of the primary concerns 
of contemporary l i t u r g i c a l renewal, whioh seeks to 'consecrate* the modern 
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emphasis on functLonalism, despite the resistance of t r a d i t i o n a l forces 
withi n the church. This can be seen p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the revolution i n 
church architecture, closely connected as i t i s with the l i t u r g i c a l 
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movement. This i s something which has c e r t a i n l y affeoted Protestantism, 
and i n some ways may have i l l u s t r a t e d the point T i l l i c h i s making more 
ef f e c t i v e l y than his analysis of r e l i g i o u s paintings. However, i t i s easy 
to be subjective i n one's preferences here: d i f f e r e n t forms of aesthetic 
expression make t h e i r appeal to d i f f e r e n t people. Hence the need f o r 
a variety of i l l u s t r a t i o n s i f the point i s to be made e f f e c t i v e l y . Never-
theless,- one can cert a i n l y a f f i r m with T i l l i c h that the S p i r i t i s not 
ti e d to pa r t i c u l a r a r t i s t i c styles and forms of expression, even though 
certain types w i l l lend themselves more to his revelatory a c t i v i t y than 
others. The 'openness1 to the S p i r i t which i s so essential to any 
genuine S p i r i t u a l a c t i v i t y c a l l s f o r an honesty of expression which i s 
incompatible with any demand f o r t r a d i t i o n a l conformity. 
With regard to his analysis of the cognitive function i n the l i f e 
of the churches, one cannot agree with T i l l i c h that theology i s possible 
on the basis of any philosophical t r a d i t i o n . Certainly there are important 
philosophical t r a d i t i o n s which can be used as an e f f e c t i v e framework f o r 
a theological system, but i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how a theology can be 
constructed on the foundation of a philosophy that denies the s p i r i t u a l 
dimension, as materialism and naturalism do. The most the m a t e r i a l i s t 
or the n a t u r a l i s t can do i s to o f f e r a c r i t i q u e of theology, or perhaps 
seek to o f f e r a re i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of theology along non-theological l i n e s . 
But this i s not theology. I t may be true that such philosophies contain 
a 'meditative element', but one would take issue with T i l l i c h that the 
meditative element alone i s the c r i t e r i o n f o r theological understanding* 
I t i s surely the way i n which one views the meditative element, and whether 
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one recognises w i t h i n i t the s p i r i t u a l dimension or not, that determines 
whether one's approach can be called theological. The very refusal to 
recognise a s p i r i t u a l dimension to l i f e , l e t alone the presence of the 
divine S p i r i t i n the midst of l i f e , would surely r u l e out m a t e r i a l i s t i c 
forms of philosophy as the framework f o r theological construction and 
understanding. 
I n dealing with the ambiguities of inclusiveness i n the l i f e of the 
churches, T i l l i c h pays pa r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n to the way i n which the need 
to protect the symbols of a p a r t i c u l a r denomination may cause i t to 
r e s i s t u n i t y with other denominations. Now whilst t h i s may c e r t a i n l y be 
true, i t i s surely necessary to draw a d i s t i n c t i o n between symbols which 
are of basic, fundamental importance and symbols which are of a secondary 
nature. For while the church i s frequently and perhaps muoh more generally 
divided over the l a t t e r , there are important primary symbols, such as the 
Word of God, the Christ and even the divine S p i r i t , which are much more 
the basis f o r unity than the cause f o r d i v i s i o n . One feels that through 
the present ecumenical contact between the churches, the various denomin-
ations w i l l become more aware of t h e i r v i t a l unity through these primary 
symbols of the f a i t h , as indeed they are doing. And having realised t h i s , 
i t may well be that each denomination w i l l become more aware of the s i g -
nificance of those secondary symbols which belong to another denomination, 
and also be led to a reappraisal of i t s own. I n t h i s case, the church 
may come to realise i t s inclusiveness amidst the variety of symbols 
used w i t h i n i t s l i f e rather than i n spite of i t . 
Two comments may be made with reference to the functions of leader-
ship and c o n s t i t u t i o n i n the l i f e of the church. I n the f i r s t place, 
whilst T i l l i o h i s quite r i g h t i n pointing out the demonic dangers i n the 
papal system, i t should be emphasised that democratic forms of leadership 
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are not exempt from such dangers on account of t h e i r democratic nature. 
There are times when under the guise of democratic leadership i n the 
Protestant churches, tyranny may well occur, as history shows, and t h i s 
i s something T i l l i c h should have shown much more cl e a r l y . The General 
Assembly or the Methodist Conference can v i o l a t e the principles of leader-
ship j u s t as much as the Pope of Borne, despite the f a c t that they work 
under the name of democracy. I t is only as democracy i s grasped by the 
S p i r i t that unambiguous leadership becomes possible. I n the second place, 
the statement that the S p i r i t guides the church into c e r t a i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
forms which are adequate to i t s functions suggests a pragmatism that i s 
not altogether consistent with the view that constitutional problems are 
i n d i r e c t l y theological. Once one has admitted that such issues are of 
a theological nature - whether d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y - one must surely 
relegate pragmatic considerations to a secondary place. One sees t h i s i n 
the debate as to whether episcopacy i s of the esse or the bene esse of 
the church. I f one i s convinced that the theological principles behind 
episcopal church government are sound, then presumably pragmatic consider-
ations are not s t r i c t l y relevant to the question of whether one accepts 
or rejects episcopacy at a l l . One accepts i t because i t i s a necessary, 
v a l i d symbol of the r e l a t i o n between God and man, not because i t i s 
expedient i n a p a r t i c u l a r time and place. There i s need f o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n 
i n T i l l i c h ' s argument here. 
Turning to the discussion of the personal functions i n the l i f e of 
the church, T i l l i c h ' s concept of genuine asceticism as that i n which those 
things are denied which hinder development towards the f u l f i l m e n t of one's 
own humanity i s i n danger of subordinating sainthood to humanity without 
s u f f i c i e n t q u a l i f i c a t i o n . One does not deny any connection between the 
two - indeed i n i t s use of the word t e l e i o s , the New Testament i t s e l f 
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suggests that a l l who aspire to sainthood must press on towards maturity 
i n the power of the S p i r i t * * * ^ But what T i l l i o h does not r e a l l y point 
out i s that this i s not a maturity that i s pursued regardless of agape 
towards one's fellows. I n f a c t , the New Testament i s quite e x p l i c i t that 
there are times when one must s p e c i f i c a l l y deny oneself f o r the sake 
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of those who stand i n need* I n f a c t , i t i s surely i n the very act of 
self-denying love, such as one sees supremely i n the Christ, that one 
shows a real transparency to the divine, which i s , on T i l l i c h ' s own 
d e f i n i t i o n , the essence of sainthood. One must beware therefore of 
in t e r p r e t i n g sainthood i n terms of the f u l f i l m e n t of one *s personal 
humanity, f o r there are times when i t can only be achieved at the expense 
of one's own f u l f i l m e n t . For th i s reason, one must conclude that T i l l i c h ' s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of sainthood i s somewhat defective. A f u r t h e r place where 
T i l l i c h i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y clear i s i n his comments on other-determination* 
I t i s not immediately apparent what he means when he t a l k s about the 
S p i r i t i n the function of other-determination transcending the subject-
object s p l i t , so that he who i s subject becomes object and he who i s 
object becomes subject. I f he means that i n any genuine act of sharing 
neither the one who teaches nor the one who learns i s to be viewed exclusively 
i n those roles, i n that both receive and both give, then we can h e a r t i l y 
agree* But i f i n addition to t h i s he also means that i n some way or 
other i n the S p i r i t u a l Presence the essential d i s t i n c t i o n between subject 
and objeot i s somehow obliterated i n a transcendent, ontological union, 
t h i s i s something rather foreign to Christian thought. We are faced 
again with the problem of the precise meaning of the transcendent u n i t y , 
to which we sh a l l return i n our f i n a l evaluation* 
F i n a l l y , the section on the r e l a t i n g functions of the church forms 
a useful introduction to any discussion on the involvement of the church 
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i n society, and i t i s because of the relevance of what T i l l i c h has to say 
on t h i s theme throughout the broad spectrum of his writings that he has 
been hailed by the theologians of involvement. His understanding of the 
church's mission as becoming active i n the l i f e of the world at every 
l e v e l , seeking to prepare the way f o r the impact of the S p i r i t i n every 
place, i s an important corrective to narrower, t r a d i t i o n a l interpretations 
which r e s t r i c t the church to a purely r e l i g i o u s r o l e , though i t needs 
to be added that the church's main function i s s t i l l to preach the Gospel 
of Christ. This emphasis on involvement i s timely, though T i l l i c h cannot 
be unaware of the f a c t that the state does not always encourage such i n -
volvement, and i n certain situations as i n the Communist East may f o r b i d 
i t . The need to participate p o l i t i c a l l y w i l l mean, therefore, that at 
times the church w i l l walk on a tightrope, and i t i s here where i t must 
remain very close to the S p i r i t who leads i t . Nevertheless, altogether 
one feels that T i l l i c h ' s comments here - as indeed i n the whole of t h i s 
section - are well worth careful study by the church and i t s members. 
I I I . THE SPIRITUAL COMMUNITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL CHRISTIAN 
The relationship of the individual both to the church and to the 
S p i r i t u a l Presence occupies a central position i n T i l l i c h ' s discussion 
on the work of the S p i r i t * Although t h i s i s a subject of fundamental 
importance i n a l l theological thinking, his way of dealing with i t i s f a r 
from t r a d i t i o n a l , and his main concern i s to r e i n t e r p r e t those conoepts 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y associated with i t i n the l i g h t of his basic assertion that 
the function of the divine S p i r i t i s to create a New Reality i n t o which 
the individual Christian, as well as the individual church, i s taken* 
T i l l i c h turns f i r s t l y to the problems of Christian i n i t i a t i o n and 
conversion. He sees the. individual, church member as a ' S p i r i t u a l person-
a l i t y ' , who i s constituted thus by his p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the S p i r i t u a l 
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Community which i s the essence of the church's l i f e . As a S p i r i t u a l 
personality! the church member i s a oreation of the S p i r i t , 'a saint 
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i n spite of his lack of saintliness'• J So j u s t as the S p i r i t u a l 
Community i s the dynamic essence of the church, the S p i r i t u a l personality 
which derives from i t i s the essence of every individual church member* 
So the thorny h i s t o r i c a l question as to which comes f i r s t o n t o l o g i c a l l y , 
the i n d i v i d u a l Christian or the church, i s resolved by going beyond the 
question i t s e l f and asserting that i n f a c t both are preceded by the 
S p i r i t u a l Community, and both depend on the S p i r i t u a l Community f o r t h e i r 
l i f e . 
H i s t o r i c a l l y , however, various attempts to answer t h i s question 
led to two d i f f e r e n t types of church, the one emphasising the p r i o r i t y 
of the church, the other that of the i n d i v i d u a l * T i l l i c h describes the 
f i r s t type of church as 'objective', the second type 'subjective'. The 
advantage of the f i r s t way of thinking was that i t did at least point 
to the church as the community of the New Being in t o which the individual 
enters* I t realised that the essential f a i t h of the S p i r i t u a l Community 
which l i e s at the heart of the church's l i f e , i s a r e a l i t y 'which precedes 
the ever becoming, ever changing, ever disappearing, and ever reappearing 
acts of personal f a i t h ' • " ^ This i s why such a church accepted infa n t 
baptism as i t s acknowledged form of Christian i n i t i a t i o n * For i n 
practising the baptism of i n f a n t s , i t placed the real emphasis on the 
f a i t h of the community i t s e l f , i n t o which the in d i v i d u a l i s taken and i n 
the context of which he becomes a S p i r i t u a l personality and so actualises 
f a i t h i n his own l i f e . By acknowledging that individual f a i t h i s something 
which grows and develops as one participates i n the S p i r i t u a l Community, 
the 'objective' church i s set free from having to determine at what stage 
a person has actual f a i t h or becomes s p i r i t u a l l y mature* For t h i s reason, 
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T i l l i c h f e e l s , Christian i n i t i a t i o n r i g h t l y takes place at the outset 
of l i f e , at the beginning of a person's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the S p i r i t u a l 
Community, and does not need to be postponed to a l a t e r date when some 
'quasi-sacramental' r i t e of confirmation occurs, based as i t so often 
i s on an enforced affirmation of commitment which i s both psychologically 
undesirable and theologically u n j u s t i f i a b l e * 
But the second type of church, the 'subjective', also leads one 
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to assert the p r i o r i t y of the S p i r i t u a l Community* 1 E x i s t e n t i a l l y , 
such a church arises from the decision of certain individuals who have 
been grasped by the S p i r i t to covenant together and with God, believing 
that they have been led to do so by the S p i r i t at work i n t h e i r l i v e s * 
Now suoh a decision may give the impression that the individual Christian 
i s p r i o r to the ohurch* But T i l l i o h points out that because such people 
could not make such a decision without the guidance of the S p i r i t , they 
are i n a very real sense already members of the S p i r i t u a l Community, 
which must therefore precede them* So the d i s t i n c t i o n between these 
two types of church begins to fade away when one acknowledges that the 
S p i r i t u a l Community i s p r i o r to . both, and the question as to which comes 
f i r s t , the individual or the church, i s transcended* 
The problem of conversion arises from the fact that the impossi-
b i l i t y of singling out a specific moment i n the l i f e of an indi v i d u a l 
as the beginning of his p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the S p i r i t u a l Community applies 
j u s t as much to those who have come int o the church from the outside as 
to those who have been brought up i n a church environment* Although 
t h i s may seem to contradict the b i b l i c a l doctrine of conversion, which 
emphasises the experience of conversion as the precise moment i n which a 
person enters the S p i r i t u a l Community, T i l l i c h reminds us that conversion 
i s not necessarily an instantaneous event: _ ' i t i s i n most cases a long 
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process which has been going on unconsciously long before i t breaks i n t o 
consciousness, giving the impression of a sudden, unexpected and over-
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whelming c r i s i s ' * But i t would be a mistake to think that the climax 
i t s e l f i s the essence of conversion, despite the fact that t h i s i s the 
pa r t i c u l a r part of the conversion process that receives most attention* 
I t i s indeed true that i n the process of conversion there comes a 
p a r t i c u l a r point at which, as the word i t s e l f suggests, one 'turns 
around on one's way1, a point at which one affirms the New Being i n the 
power of the S p i r i t , but t h i s time of decision has been prepared f o r 
through a whole series of past experiences and should not be isolated 
from them. Thus conversion, the act of entering i n t o the S p i r i t u a l 
Community, i s to be viewed as a process 'that becomes manifest i n an 
eostatic moment', a process without which the climactic decision i t s e l f 
would be nothing more than an emotional outburst with no l a s t i n g effects* 
T i l l i c h points out that there are many times when conversion 
'can have the character of a t r a n s i t i o n from the late n t stage of the 
S p i r i t u a l Community to i t s manifest stage*• I n such a s i t u a t i o n , neither 
repentance nor f a i t h are completely new, f o r the S p i r i t i s already at 
work wi t h i n the late n t S p i r i t u a l Community to which the person concerned 
has belonged. There i s 'no absolute conversion, but * . • a r e l a t i v e 
conversion before and a f t e r the central event of somebody's "repenting" 
and Vbelieving", of somebody's being grasped by the S p i r i t u a l Presence 
i n a . f e r t i l e moment, a k a i r o s 1 . This consideration i s bound to affe c t 
the church's approach to evangelism* I t w i l l no longer seek to convert 
people i n an absolute sense, but rather i n the r e l a t i v e sense of 
'transferring them from a l a t e n t to a manifest p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the 
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S p i r i t u a l Community1! ' i t w i l l not address men as , l o s t souls', 
without God, but rather speak to them as those who are already i n some 
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degree of latency, seeking t o actualise that latency i n a manifest 
experience* I n the same way, the ancient Greek philosophers would 
describe experiences analogous to conversion as 'experiences i n which 
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t h e i r eyes were opened', but t h i s did not imply that they were 
completely blind before* And T i l l i c h feels that t h i s analogy between 
philosophical and reli g i o u s conversion i s e n t i r e l y v a l i d i n so f a r as 
'the S p i r i t u a l Community i s related to oulture and morality as much as 
to r e l i g i o n ' and that wherever the S p i r i t i s at work fa moment of radical 
change i n the a t t i t u d e to the ultimate' becomes inevitable* 
By p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the l i f e of the S p i r i t u a l Community as a 
member of the church, the ind i v i d u a l experiences f o r himself the New 
Reality. I n l i n e with t r a d i t i o n a l theology, T i l l i c h distinguishes three 
elements i n t h i s experience! 'the experience of New Being as creating 
(regeneration), . . . as paradox ( j u s t i f i c a t i o n ) , . . . and as process 
( s a n e t i f i c a t i o n ) ' . He completely rejects a purely empiricist theology 
which would go no f u r t h e r than describe these elements from an objective 
standpoint of f a i t h , i n favour of a theology based on p a r t i c i p a t i o n , 
i n which the subjective experience becomes the ground f o r the certainty 
with which the statements of f a i t h are expressed. Thus, the basis f o r 
f a i t h i s not j u s t the a c t i v i t y of God i n Christ, but also the continuing 
work of the S p i r i t i n the experience of the individual i n the context 
of the S p i r i t u a l Community. 
T r a d i t i o n a l l y , Protestant theology has placed regeneration a f t e r 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n the scheme of salvation* This underlined the Reformed 
position that no man i s j u s t i f i e d on account of anything he i s i n himself, 
even on account of his new b i r t h * He i s j u s t i f i e d by God as he i s , i n 
spite o f his 'unacceptability*, purely on God'B own i n i t i a t i v e of grace* 
Therefore i n the Protestant scheme of theology, the new b i r t h follows 
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j u s t i f i c a t i o n , as the consequence of i t , rather than the reason f o r i t * 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that T i l l i c h reverses t h i s order i n his own scheme, 
making regeneration p r i o r to j u s t i f i c a t i o n * His reason f o r doing t h i s 
i s that he defines i t rather d i f f e r e n t l y from the Reformers. For whereas 
the Reformers interpreted regeneration i n the straightforward b i b l i c a l 
sense of the ind i v i d u a l experience of new b i r t h , T i l l i c h understands t h i s 
experience not i n the sense of a man becoming a new being i n himself 
but rather i n the sense of entering a new r e a l i t y i n the context of which 
he may become a new being* I n f a c t , to enter t h i s new r e a l i t y does not 
imply that one i s necessarily to become a new person at a l i i 'participa-
12! 
t i o n i n the New Being does not automatically guarantee that one i s new'*. 
Yet by entering i n t o i t , the experience of j u s t i f i c a t i o n now becomes 
possible, f o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s part of that new order of things brought 
by Christ. .Furthermore, no man can accept j u s t i f i c a t i o n without f a i t h , 
and there can be no f a i t h unless one i s f i r s t grasped by the S p i r i t who 
creates the New Reality and draws one int o i t . I n t h i s sense, regener-
atio n must precede j u s t i f i c a t i o n . So T i l l i c h says that 'participation 
i n the New Being, the creation of the S p i r i t , i s the f i r s t element i n 
the state of the individual i n the church i n so f a r as i t i s the a o t u a l i -
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sation of the S p i r i t u a l Community1. I n a theology based on pa r t i c i p a -
t i o n , regeneration comes f i r s t * 
The p r i o r i t y T i l l i c h accords to regeneration as being grasped 
by the New Reality also resolves the concern of those who f e e l that 
because of t h e i r lack of f a i t h they cannot be j u s t i f i e d . 
I f the S p i r i t u a l Presence must grasp me and create f a i t h 
i n me, what can I do i n order to reach such f a i t h ? I 
cannot force the S p i r i t upon myself; so what can I do but 
wait without acting?124 
The point i s that those who ask a question such as t h i s i n a l l seriousness 
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can only do so because they are already under the impact of the S p i r i t 
who i s the source of f a i t h . He who i s ultimately concerned about the 
state of his estrangement and about the p o s s i b i l i t y of reunion with the 
ground and aim of his being i s already'in the g r i p 1 o f the S p i r i t u a l 
Presence . His f a i t h may not yet have found expression, but the impor-
tant thing i s that he i s already grasped by the S p i r i t and therefore 
placed f i r m l y w i t h i n the context of S p i r i t u a l regeneration, the New 
Reality the S p i r i t creates. And t h i s i s the beginning of his j u s t i f i -
cation and the ground of his hope* 
This brings us to consider j u s t i f i c a t i o n , the second facet of the 
experience of the New Being i n the l i f e of the i n d i v i d u a l . As the central 
doctrine of the Reformation, the concept of j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s the ' f i r s t 
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and basic expression of the Protestant p r i n c i p l e i t s e l f , and emphasises 
the f a c t that i n the scheme of salvation God alone takes the i n i t i a t i v e . 
There are one or two semantic problems, however, that t h i s doctrine 
raises, and T i l l i c h looks at these f i r s t of a l l . The f i r s t i s concerned 
with the famous expression sola f i d e . Despite the t r a d i t i o n a l Protestant 
defence of t h i s phrase i n i t s controversy with Rome, T i l l i c h feels 
that i t i s not a good one. For i f one says ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s by f a i t h 
alone', then one gives the impression that f a i t h i t s e l f i s the cause of 
God's j u s t i f y i n g act, so that i t v i r t u a l l y becomes a 'work' i n i t s e l f . 
To avoid t h i s confusion i t i s better to reje c t the t r a d i t i o n a l expression 
' j u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h ' i n favour of the f u l l e r , though more accurate, 
expression ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n by grace through f a i t h ' , a formula which 
emphasises that the i n i t i a t i v e i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n l i e s with God alone. 
Secondly, the term ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' i s one which, because of i t s legal 
associations, creates d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r contemporary man. Today, we are 
not so much concerned w i t h the problem of how a man oan be l e g a l l y j u s t i -
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f l e d by God as i n Paul's day, and f o r t h i s reason T i l l i c h feels that 
the apologetic value of the expression has greatly diminished. We 
need a term that w i l l speak more f o r c e f u l l y to man i n his present 
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s i t u a t i o n , and T i l l i c h proposes the word 'acceptance', which points 
to the f a c t that we are accepted by God i n spite of our unacceptability, 
despite our estrangement from our essential being and from God himself* 
Such an expression would be doubly acceptable because of i t s e x i s t e n t i a l 
significance i n an environment i n which b i b l i c a l language i s r a p i d l y 
losing a l l meaning. A t h i r d problem arises from the expression 'the 
forgiveness of sins' which i s often used instead of ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' • 
T i l l i c h feels that t h i s phrase has severe l i m i t a t i o n s . I t s use i n 
the f i e l d of human r e l a t i o n s , f o r example, implies that the person 
who forgives also stands i n need of forgiveness himself, and t h i s 
obviously cannot be said of God. Si m i l a r l y , the p l u r a l 'sins', while 
quite v a l i d i n the realm of human r e l a t i o n s , does not point out c l e a r l y 
enough that what stands between man and God i s not so much pa r t i c u l a r 
sins as a state of separation and resistance to reunion w i t h him. I t 
has therefore concentrated man's mind on speci f i c sins and t h e i r moral 
quality rather than estrangement from God and i t s r e l i g i o u s q u a l i t y , 
even though i t i s true that p a r t i c u l a r sins can be powerful symptoms of 
the condition of s i n i t s e l f * 
The objective aspect of the doctrine of j u s t i f i c a t i o n properly belongs 
to the doctrine of the Atonement, 'God's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n man's existen-
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t i a l estrangement and vi c t o r y over i t 1 i n Christ, who thereby becomes 
the basis fo r forgiveness and equally the basis f o r the certainty that 
one i s forgiven. But i n the present context of the doctrine of the S p i r i t , 
T i l l i c h i s concerned with j u s t i f i c a t i o n as a subjective experience* As 
he puts i t , 
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How can man accept that he i s accepted; how can he 
reconcile his f e e l i n g of g u i l t and his desire f o r 
punishment with the prayer f o r forgiveness; and what 
gives him the certainty that he i s forgiven? 
The only v a l i d basis f o r t h i s certainty i s that God declares him who 
i s unjust to be j u s t , slmul Justus, simul peccator. This does not mean 
that God accepts a h a l f - s i n f u l , h a l f - j u s t man on account of his good 
h a l f , for God rejects any human claim to goodness* I n f a c t , there i s 
an important difference between human goodness, with i t s ambiguous 
demands f o r moral j u s t i c e and the punishment of s i n , and the goodness 
of God, which overcomes any demands f o r a s t r i c t j u s t i c e i n an a t t i t u d e 
of free acceptance, 'a j u s t i c e which makes him who i s unjust j u s t 1 . 
This does not mean that God negates human j u s t i c e , but rather that he 
f u l f i l s i t i n the sense that he destroys the very estrangement which 
makes reunion with himself impossible, a s i t u a t i o n which man would 
never be able.to aohieve under his own steam* The only way forward f o r 
man therefore i s to surrender himself completely to God, including his 
own goodness, and the courage to make t h i s surrender i s the 'central 
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element i n the courage of f a i t h * • Yet i n t h i s very act of surrender 
he experiences f o r himself the paradox of the New Reality, that he i s 
accepted by God i n spite of his unacceptability, as he i s grasped by 
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the unambiguous l i f e of God through the impact of the S p i r i t * y 
I n t h i s context T i l l i c h i s also concerned with the person who i s 
i n the s i t u a t i o n of rad i c a l doubt, ' e x i s t e n t i a l doubt concerning the 
meaning of l i f e i t s e l f * , 1 ^ 0 and i t s relationship to j u s t i f y i n g f a i t h * A 
person who finds himself i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n i s i n danger not only of 
re j e c t i n g r e l i g i o n i n i t s narrower sense, but also i n i t s wider sense 
of ultimate concern, and thus he cannot accept the message that God 
accepts the unacceptable because God has no meaning f o r him* Questions 
regarding acceptance or r e j e c t i o n by God are f o r him replaced by 
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questions regarding the discovery of meaning i n an apparently meaningless 
warIdo How can such a man as t h i s experience j u s t i f i c a t i o n ? F i r s t 
of a l l , says T i l l i c h , one must realise that God cannot be reached by 
any i n t e l l e c t u a l exercise any more than by moral works, and t h i s means 
that a man i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n cannot of himself overcome his doubt any 
more than another person can overcome his s i n * But having said that, 
T i l l i c h feels that the very search f o r meaning i n a 'meaningless world' 
which t h i s person i s engaged i n , i n i t s e l f means that he does presuppose 
a meaning, and that his ultimate concern l i e s i n th i s quest of t r u t h * 
Augustine affirms t h i s when he says that i n the s i t u a t i o n of doubt 
the t r u t h from which one feels separated i s already present inasmuch 
as i n every doubt the formal affirmation of t r u t h as t r u t h i s presupposed 
And t h i s means that God i s present incognito i n the ultimate honesty 
of doubt and the absolute seriousness of despair about meaning* I n 
these things, the impact of the S p i r i t i s at work within the l i f e of the 
so-oalled 'unbeliever*. This enables T i l l i o h to a f f i r m that contemporary 
questioning man, i s accepted by God because of his concern regarding 
the ultimate meaning of his l i f e , despite the f a c t that he i s unaccept-
able i n view of the doubt and meaninglessness which has taken hold of 
him* To those i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n T i l l i c h would say that ' i n the serious-
ness of t h e i r e x i s t e n t i a l despair, God i s present to them* To accept 
t h i s paradoxical acceptance i s the courage of t h e i r f a i t h * • 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that i n his analysis of the order of salvation, 
T i l l i c h gives more space to the theme of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n than to any 
other theme. This i s hardly surprising, seeing that h i s i s a theology 
of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , f o r s a n c t i f i c a t i o n above a l l others i s the theological 
expression which points to the experience and f r u i t of l i f e i n the 
S p i r i t . 'The impact of the S p i r i t u a l Presence on the i n d i v i d u a l , ' he 
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says, 'results i n a l i f e process based on the experience of regeneration! 
quali f i e d by the experience of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and developing as the 
132 
experience of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n ' • S a n c t i f i c a t i o n , then, i s fundamentally 
a process i n which the New Being i s experienced; an actual transform-
ation of l i f e under the impact of the S p i r i t * I n t h i s sense i t i s 
something completely d i f f e r e n t from j u s t i f i c a t i o n , though the two have 
often been confused i n the history of theology. This process of sancti-
f i c a t i o n has been desoribed d i f f e r e n t l y i n various t r a d i t i o n s * The 
v a r i a t i o n largely depended on the precise emphasis each t r a d i t i o n 
placed on the role of law, though every form of Protestantism rejected 
the Catholic idea that law i s the necessary basis f o r the Christian l i f e * 
Instead, the Reformers saw the function of law i n a rather d i f f e r e n t 
l i g h t * For both Luther and Calvin, i t had two main purposes! f i r s t l y , 
to d i r e c t the l i f e of the p o l i t i c a l group, and secondly, to act as a 
schoolmaster i n the sense of 'showing man what he essentially i s and 
therefore ought to be and the extent to which his actual state contradicts 
the image of his true being'* I t i s i n this second function, as T i l l i c h 
interprets i t , that law drives man to his quest f o r transcendent union, 
or more simply, leads him to Christ. But Calvin added a t h i r d function 
to the law, that of guiding the Christian i n his d a i l y l i v i n g , f o r 
although the Christian i s indeed grasped by the S p i r i t , he i s never-
theless not e n t i r e l y free from the power of negative thought and action* 
So i n Calvinism the law became a d i s c i p l i n a r y t o o l i n the process of 
s a n c t i f i c a t i o n * * ^ But t h i s was unacceptable to Luther, who believed 
that such guidance came more d i r e c t l y and immediately from the S p i r i t 
himself, who helped man to reach his decisions i n the l i g h t of agape 
alone, thus being freed from the l e t t e r of the l a w * 1 ^ T i l l i c h argues 
that whereas Calvin's solution may have seemed more r e a l i s t i c i n that 
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i t could support both an e t h i c a l theory and a disciplined l i f e of 
s a n c t i f i c a t i o n , and was therefore possibly more acceptable to many, 
Luther's solution was more 'ecstatic') more open to the impact of the 
S p i r i t ^ which although unable to form any ethical system was neverthe-
less f u l l of creative p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r the personal l i f e * The t h i r d 
t r a d i t i o n of Protestantism, the 'Evangelical-Hadical 1, or P i e t i s t , 
tended to follow Calvinism, but i n addition emphasised much more the 
concept of holiness* The P i e t i s t s maintained that perfection i s 
possible i n th i s l i f e , even i f only i n the case of cer t a i n individuals 
or groups i n whom the S p i r i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y present. But T i l l i c h feels 
that t h i s sort of thinking denies the s i g n i f i c a n t ' i n spite o f i n the 
process of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n . One of the obvious dangers of perfectionism 
was the tendency to confuse salvation with moral perfection, an obvious 
d i s t o r t i o n of the t r u l y paradoxical nature of holiness, and here 
Pietism crossed swords with Calvinism, which saw perfection as a goal 
to be aimed at rather than a state attainable i n this l i f e . 
T i l l i c h maintains that these three d i f f e r i n g attitudes have f a r -
reaching consequences regarding the Christian l i f e . We may describe 
the Calvinist understanding of progressive s a n c t i f i c a t i o n , assisted 
by the law as a guide and a means of d i s c i p l i n e , as a 'slowly- upward 
turning l i n e ' i n which f a i t h and love become actualised more and more. 
On the other hand, the Lutheran pattern i s more a series of o s c i l l a t i o n s 
between ecstasy and anxiety, 'of being grasped by agape and (then) 
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thrown back i n t o estrangement and ambiguity', J a pattern which i t s e l f 
may have been par t l y responsible f o r l a t e r devaluation of morality and 
pr a c t i c a l r e l i g i o n i n Lutheran c i r c l e s , and as a reaction against which 
Pietism may well have arisen. On balance, T i l l i c h i s in c l i n e d to favour 
Luther's understanding of ethics (as d i s t i n c t from l a t e r Lutheran 
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dis t o r t i o n s ) as being more true to actual experience, more i n keeping 
wi t h contemporary psychological thought regarding man, and more i n l i n e 
with his own reading of the doctrine of the S p i r i t and his ecstatic 
impact on human l i f e and action. 
What i s needed at the present moment of time i s a r e i n t e r p r s t a t i o n 
of the doctrine of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n bearing i n mind contemporary theolo-
g i c a l and psychological thought. T i l l i c h suggests four principles to 
aot as the necessary c r i t e r i a f o r such a r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i increasing 
awareness, increasing freedom, increasing relatedness, and increasing 
transcendence. These pri n c i p l e s , he says, unite both re l i g i o u s and 
secular t r a d i t i o n s , to create an ' i n d e f i n i t e but distinguishable image 
of "the Christian l i f e " ' . * ^ The increasing awareness which T i l l i c h 
names as the f i r s t p rinciple of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n i s an awareness of the 
ambiguous nature of the Christian l i f e and the continuous struggle 
between the divine and the demonic. The Christian i s not l i k e the 
Stoic who believes that once he has conquered his passions and desires 
no fu r t h e r ambiguity remains. Instead, as he proceeds i n Christian 
experience, he i s increasingly aware of the element of struggle to 
which the ambiguities of l i f e give r i s e . But he i s also aware of a 
power of affi r m a t i o n present i n his l i f e by whioh the S p i r i t makes 
him sensitive towards every challenge that confronts him, whether i t 
be i n r e l a t i o n to his own s p i r i t u a l growth or that of others. Such 
an awareness, says T i l l i c h , does not depend on c u l t u r a l eduoation or 
sophistication! i t i s nothing less than the g i f t of the S p i r i t . I t 
may well be that increased education w i l l help i n t h i s and i n t h i s 
sense there i s an overlap between psychological and s p i r i t u a l s e n s i t i -
v i t y , but i n any true development of awareness the presence of the 
S p i r i t i s the d i r e c t i n g f a c t o r . 
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By increasing freedom. T i l l i c h means an increasing l i b e r a t i o n 
from those things which hinder man's s p i r i t u a l growth* I n the f i r s t 
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place, i t i s a 'growth i n freedom from the law 1* For the law, 
as 'man's essential being confronting him i n the state of estrange-
ment 1, i s a hindrance to the s p i r i t u a l growth of man i n the sense that 
i t i s continually hounding him with laws of p r o h i b i t i o n and commandment 
which inevitably produce feelings of g u i l t and inadequacy* But as man 
experiences the impact of the S p i r i t on his l i f e more and more with a 
consequent growth i n the Christian l i f e , such a bondage i s eased and 
the more free he becomes* Increasing S p i r i t u a l reunion f i g h t s against 
estrangement* Secondly, t h i s growth i n freedom i s an increasing l i b e r -
a t i o n from the specific contents of the law* Particular laws are not 
only helpful but also oppressive, i n that they 'cannot meet the ever 
concrete, ever new, ever unique s i t u a t i o n ' , and to be free from them 
means that the process of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n w i l l give r i s e to a mature 
freedom which i s able to create new 'laws' or modify older ones to ijieet 
changing situations* Although there i s an obvious r i s k here that man 
may use t h i s newly found l i b e r t y to sanction his own desires, the f a c t 
that the S p i r i t i s e f f e c t i v e l y present w i l l mean that such a tendency 
w i l l be resisted* The freedom of the S p i r i t holds w i t h i n i t s e l f the 
power to combat every force that would seek to destroy i t , and t h i s 
applies equally both to i n t e r n a l and external pressures* This resistance 
on occasions may lead to self-denial - sometimes even to martyrdom -
and though these things do not i n themselves achieve s a n c t i f i c a t i o n , 
yet they do constitute a response to a demand to help preserve freedom 
i n a given s i t u a t i o n . And t h i r d l y , t h i s growth i n freedom from the law 
under the impact of the divine S p i r i t i s also a growth i n freedom 
from the fear and despair which stems from the f a i l u r e to f u l f i l the 
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law* As he puts i t i n one of his sermons, 
Where i t happens that man has gained freedom, "the s p i r i t 
of bondage to fear" i s overcome by "the s p i r i t of adoption"* 
When a chi l d has a moment that we could c a l l a moment of 
grace, he suddenly does the good f r e e l y , without command, 
and more than had been commanded; happiness glows i n his 
face* He i s balanced w i t h i n himself, without enmity, and 
i s f u l l of love. Bondage and fear have disappeared; 
obedience has ceased to be obedience and has become free 
i n c l i n a t i o n ; ego and super-ego are united* This i s the 
l i b e r t y of the children of God, l i b e r t y from the law, and 
because from the law, also from the condemnation to 
despair* 138 
The principle of increasing freedom i n the process of s a n c t i f i c a -
t i o n i s balanced by that of increasing relatedness, by which the Christian 
conquers any tendency to s e l f - i s o l a t i o n i n the reuniting power of love* 
This relatedness 'implies (both) the awareness of the other one and the 
freedom to relate to him by overcoming self-seclusion w i t h i n oneself 
w i t h i n 
and/the other one'* T i l l i c h confesses that such a process i s not 
easy, that there are many barriers to the creation of true r e l a t i o n -
ships with others, as psychology has shown* But the S p i r i t ' s ecstatic 
impact on the individual breaks down these barriers by helping him to 
r i s e above himself and ' f i n d ' the other person i n a very real sense, 
by creating a power of relationship w i t h i n him that pervades every 
concrete r e l a t i o n he experiences, so that he knows i n t u i t i v e l y when to 
withdraw and when to communicate, holding both of these aspects together 
i n perfect balance. I n t h i s way the process of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n enables 
a person successfully to overcome any tendency to introspection, not 
by encouraging him to become an extrovert, but by turning his personal 
centre towards the dimension of i t s depth and height. As he puts i t , 
'Relatedness needs the v e r t i c a l dimension i n order to actualise i t s e l f 
i n the horizontal dimension'•^'^ Or i n other words, true r e l a t i o n -
ships are possible only i n the context of the divine S p i r i t * 
325 
What i s true of one's relationships with others i s also true of 
one's relationships with oneself* I n t h i s sense, s a n c t i f i c a t i o n creates, 
'a mature self-relatedness i n which self-acceptance conquers both s e l f -
evaluation and self-contempt i n a process of reunion with one's s e l f 1 * 
But such a reunion i s possible only when the dichotomy between the s e l f 
as subject and the s e l f as object i s transcended* For as subject, the 
s e l f t r i e s to impose i t s e l f on the s e l f as object through self-control 
and s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e , whereas as object, i t r e s i s t s t h i s imposition 
i n s e l f - p i t y . Mature self-relatedness i s to reconcile the s e l f as 
subject with i t s e l f as object by spontaneously affirming one's essential 
being beyond t h i s s p l i t . As one becomes more mature i n the S p i r i t 
t h i s spontaneity increases and the individual i s more able to a f f i r m his 
true self without f a l l i n g i n t o the opposing p i t f a l l s of self-elevation 
and self-humiliation. This quest fo r self-relatedness, T i l l i c h points 
out, i s v i r t u a l l y the same as the psychologist's'search f o r i d e n t i t y 
whose aim i s not to preserve the 'accidental state of the e x i s t e n t i a l 
s e l f , but to drive towards a s e l f which transcends every stage of i t s 
development, yet which i s s t i l l essentially the same s e l f through every 
change i t undergoes* 
The f o u r t h p r i n c i p l e which T i l l i c h enumerates as determining the 
meaning of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n f o r contemporary man i s that of self-transcen-
dence, a principle which i s not so much on a par with the other three 
as that which makes the other three e x i s t e n t i a l l y possible, and without 
which any growth i n maturity would be out of the question. The act of 
self-transcendence i s , of course, i n the d i r e c t i o n of the ultimate, 
a 'participation i n the holy'* As such, i t i s the essence of the l i f e 
of prayer, although i t i s by no means confined to prayer. I n f a c t , the 
more mature a person beoomes i n the l i f e of the S p i r i t , the more w i l l 
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he realise the implications of self-transcendence i n every part of his 
l i f e * Yet despite t h i s , prayer w i l l nevertheless remain the model fo r 
a l l genuine self-transcendence and a l l acts which express i t * These 
acts w i l l be a l l those i n which the impact of the S p i r i t i s experienced} 
'i n prayer or meditation i n t o t a l privacy, i n the exchange of S p i r i t u a l 
experiences with others, i n communications on a secular basis, i n the 
experience of creative works of man's s p i r i t , i n the midst of labour 
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or r e s t 1 . To be i n such a state o f self-transcendence 'is l i k e the 
breathing-in of another a i r , an elevation above average existence', 
and as one becomes increasingly mature one becomes aware of t h i s exper-
ience more and more. T i l l i c h feels that the renewed emphasis on s e l f -
transcendence i n theology i n post-war years, coupled with the f a c t 
that there seems to be widespread desire f o r some such experience i n the 
contemporary world, has greatly diminished prejudices against r e l i g i o n , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n i t s claim to be the mediator of such an experience* He 
feels that i n the l i g h t of t h i s favourable s i t u a t i o n i t i s imperative 
that new symbols of transcendence should be found which w i l l assist 
people i n t h e i r quest and so help them i n t h e i r growth towards, maturity* 
So T i l l i c h summarises his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f s a n c t i f i c a t i o n i n t h i s 
way 2 
The Christian l i f e never reaches the state of perfection -
i t always remains an up-and-down course - but i n Bpite of 
i t s mutable; character i t contains a movement toward 
maturity, however fragmentary the mature state may be* 
I t i s manifest i n the r e l i g i o u s as well as the secular 
l i f e , and i t transcends both of them i n the power of the 
S p i r i t u a l Presence*143 
Just as there have been d i f f e r e n t ways of defining and working 
towards s a n c t i f i c a t i o n i n the various Christian t r a d i t i o n s , so also 
there have been differences i n opinion as to what constitutes a saint, 
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or as T i l l i c h puts i t , what constitutes a v a l i d image of perfection. ^ 
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One may leg i t i m a t e l y define a saint as one who i s transparent to the 
divine , but i n pre-Reformation times t h i s led to a transmoral superiority 
of the canonised saint over other people} so that he stood ahead not 
only from a moral point of view but also from other standpoints, such 
as the a b i l i t y to work miracles, demonstrating i n his own l i f e the divine 
power over nature* T i l l i c h points out that Protestantism f e l t that 
t h i s was a d i s t o r t i o n of the true b i b l i c a l concept of saintliness, 
which emphasises that every Christian i s a saint* Furthermore, the 
Reformed t r a d i t i o n could never be happy with any d i s t i n c t i o n which 
threatened the Protestant principle of the i n f i n i t e distance between 
man and God, a threat which the idea of transmoral perfection seemed to 
contain* But though Protestantism does not recognise 'saints', i t does 
recognise s a n c t i f i c a t i o n , and because of t h i s i t accepts personal repre-
sentations of the impact of the S p i r i t on man, which manifest to others 
the meaning of that impact and i t s implications f o r the ind i v i d u a l * Such 
representations are to be called 'saints' no more than any other members 
of the S p i r i t u a l Community; rather are they 'examples of the embodiment 
of the S p i r i t i n bearers of the personal s e l f and as such are of t r e -
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mendous importance f o r the l i f e of the churches'. J I n T i l l i c h ' 3 
view, such people may be found i n both the re l i g i o u s and the secular 
spheres of l i f e . They may be termed 'images of perfection', images 
which are 'patterned a f t e r the creations of the S p i r i t , f a i t h and love, 
and a f t e r the four principles determining the process of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n ' . 
Two problems arise i n t h i s connection, however; both of them 
connected with the idea of f a i t h and love as the foundation of perfection! 
the problem of doubt i n r e l a t i o n to the inorease i n f a i t h , and the 
problem of the r e l a t i o n between the eros quality of love to growth i n 
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i t s agape q u a l i t y . I n the f i r s t place, i t has generally been assumed 
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that perfection e n t a i l s the elimination of doubt* The acceptance of 
the church's authority i n matters of f a i t h and order as divine i n the 
Roman Catholic church necessitates the saint's unconditional acceptance 
of that authority* and a si m i l a r s i t u a t i o n i s often found i n c e r t a i n 
forms of Protestantism, p a r t i c u l a r l y where f a i t h has been distorted 
i n t o a l i t e r a l acceptance of the Bible and the Creeds* Thus one some-
times gets i n Protestantism the strange s i t u a t i o n where sin i s admitted 
as being inevitable i n the l i f e of the Christian (according to the 
princ i p l e of simul Justus et peccator) whereas doubt i s not allowed. 
T i l l i c h points out that to maintain t h i s Protestantism i s being incon-
si s t e n t . I f there i s , as Protestantism affirms, an i n f i n i t e gap between 
man and God, then i t must admit a certain agnosticism i n man's under-
standing of the divine. This means that some element of doubt w i l l 
remain, so that f a r from eliminating doubt, the process of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n 
w i l l take a l l honest doubt i n t o i t s e l f . So 'creative courage i s an 
element of f a i t h even i n the state of perfection, and where there i s 
courage there i s r i s k and the doubt implied i n r i s k 1 . 1 ^ I t i s t h i s 
element of doubt that r e a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e s between f a i t h and mystical 
union, and t h i s i s why T i l l i c h f eels that certain forms of Pietism, 
which emphasise the certainty that accompanies an immediate awareness 
of the presence of God, are r e a l l y t r y i n g to anticipate mystical union 
rather than a f f i r m the role of f a i t h * However, because a f u l l mystical 
union i s impossible within the e x i s t e n t i a l sphere, such certainty i s out 
of the questions 'doubt i s unavoidable as long as there i s separation 
of subject and object, and even the most immediate and intimate f e e l i n g 
of union with the divine . . . cannot bridge the i n f i n i t e distance 
between the f i n i t e and the i n f i n i t e by which i t i s grasped'* I n 
f a c t , the more s p i r i t u a l l y sensitive a man i s , the more advanced his 
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his s a n c t i f i c a t i o n , the deeper the impact of the S p i r i t upon his l i f e , 
the greater his awareness of the gap between himself and God, and conse-
quently the more profound his doubt* Thus doubt i s not only psycholo-
g i c a l l y probable, i t i s also more s i g n i f i c a n t l y theologically necessary*^ 
This raises the whole issue of the place of mysticism i n r e l a t i o n 
to s a n c t i f i c a t i o n * T i l l i c h points out that there have always been those 
i n Protestantism who, i n addition to the P i e t i s t s , have affirmed that 
the zenith of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n i s mystical union. On the other hand, 
more personalistic types of Protestant theology have tended to assert 
that the ultimate aim of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n i s to be seen i n terms of a 
perfect relationship rather than mystical union, that i n f a c t f a i t h 
should r e j e c t anything that savoured of mystical experience* But 
T i l l i c h cannot accept t h i s ; f o r him f a i t h and mystical experience are 
not alternative ways to God, they each complement the other* Indeed, 
because f a i t h i s no less than the divine S p i r i t grasping a man, then i n 
every state of f a i t h there i s 'an experience of the presence of the 
i n f i n i t e i n the f i n i t e ' , which can be called none other than mystical* 
'Every experience of the divine i s mystical because i t transcends the 
cleavage between subject and object, and wherever t h i s happens,the 
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mystical category i s given 1* J The mystical, then, i s an element i n 
f a i t h . But so also i s f a i t h a genuine element i n every mystical exper-
ience, inasmuch as every such experience i s a r e s u l t of being grasped 
by the divine S p i r i t * Faith and mystical experience, therefore, i n t e r -
penetrate each other, but they are not i d e n t i c a l , f o r whereas i n f a i t h 
there are elements of courage and r i s k present, elements which presuppose 
the cleavage between subject and object, i n mystical experience these 
elements are l e f t behind, even though only fragmentarily* T i l l i c h 
concludes that f a i t h and mystical union belong to each other i n the 
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process of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n * Such a r e a l i s a t i o n must ine v i t a b l y r e c a l l 
Protestantism to a reappraisal of the place of mysticism i n i t s own 
The second problem a r i s i n g from using f a i t h and love as patterns 
f o r perfection concerns the r e l a t i o n between the eros-quality of love 
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and the increase of i t s agape-quality i n the l i f e of the Christian* ^ 
This problem arises from the f a c t that i t has often been thought that 
agape excludes a l l other forms of love, an assumption which i n T i l l i c h ' s 
point of view i s mistaken* Contemporary psychology has demonstrated that 
even the highest functions of s p i r i t are rooted i n the most v i t a l trends 
of human nature, and T i l l i c h ' s own concept of the multidimensional u n i t y 
of l i f e would also r e j e c t any separation of human v i t a l i t y and s p i r i t u a l 
functions. This i s why, as we have seen already, an ascetic d i s c i p l i n e 
which pursues s a n c t i f i c a t i o n by ruthlessly repressing the v i t a l elements 
of human personality oan do untold damage. What i s needed i s a form of 
disci p l i n e supported by creative eros and wisdom which w i l l see to i t 
that each of these elements f u l f i l s i t s proper role i n the process of 
sa n c t i f i c a t i o n . This does not mean that the Christian i s at l i b e r t y , 
f o r example, to pursue every pleasure he may love i n a self-centred 
hedonism though we should not i n f e r from t h i s that so-called 'innocent 
pleasures' are permissible, whereas others are not* What i t does mean 
i s that under the impact of the S p i r i t , the Christian w i l l be led to 
discern the divine and the demonic p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n every pleasure, i n 
every form of love, and the true image of perfection i s therefore the 
one who i n the battle between the two prevails against the l a t t e r , 
even though fragmentarily. I n f a c t , t h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n ultimate 
v i c t o r y i s f o r T i l l i c h the distinguishing o r i t e r i o n between the Christian 
and the humanist images of perfection. But the Christian can only share 
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i n t h i s v i c t o r y over the forces of e v i l by affirming i n the f i r s t 
place that every part of human v i t a l i t y , every form of human love, has 
i t s legitimate place i n the process of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n . So agape does 
not deny the other elements of love as place i n the l i f e of him who i s 
grasped by the S p i r i t . Rather through S p i r i t u a l discernment does i t 
recognise what t h e i r role shall be. I t i s only when such a r o l e i s 
affirmed that the S p i r i t can demonstrate his conquest of every ambiguity 
of love. 
Evaluati on 
T i l l i c h has provided us with a valuable and penetrating study of 
the l i f e of the in d i v i d u a l Christian i n the church i n r e l a t i o n to the 
work of the S p i r i t . This p a r t i c u l a r aspect of the S p i r i t ' s a c t i v i t y has 
always been emphasised by Protestants, even though the accent has not 
always f a l l e n i n the same place. Often i t has been emphasised at the 
expense of any systematic doctrine of the church i t s e l f , and fo r th i s 
reason T i l l i c h ' s attempt to bring together the work of the S p i r i t i n 
the S p i r i t u a l Community and i n the l i f e of the individual i s important. 
The precise r e l a t i o n between the individual and the church from the points 
of view of 'Who i s a Christian?' or 'What i s a church member?' has always 
been a d i f f i c u l t one, and T i l l i c h i s aware of the s e n s i t i v i t y surrounding 
these questions. Nevertheless, his solutions to these problems would 
not be accepted by a l l . I n his discussion on conversion and church 
membership, f o r example, he places f a r too l i t t l e emphasis on the conscious 
and in d i v i d u a l response of f a i t h to the work of the S p i r i t . The argument 
that a church member i s essentially a creation of the S p i r i t because he 
i s a member of the church which i s i t s e l f essentially a creation of the 
S p i r i t only serves to .throw us back onto what one means by a church 
member and what i s the c r i t e r i o n of his membership. Does every church 
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member, simply because his name i s on the membership r o l l of the church, 
genuinely pa r t i c i p a t e i n the essence of the church's l i f e ? I n what way 
can i t possibly be considered that a purely nominal church member i s a 
creation of the S p i r i t , a S p i r i t u a l personality? Even were one to accept 
T i l l i c h ' s l a t e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of regeneration as entering i n t o the New 
Reality rather than being made new i n oneself, i t i s obvious that 
there are many formal members of the church who have never experienced 
that New Reality which i s at the heart of the church's l i f e * I n f a c t , 
i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how any church which i s consciously seeking to 
actualise true S p i r i t u a l Community can be content with a purely formal 
or automatic approach to church membership which f a i l s to emphasise the 
need f o r inward change, and though one would not wish to say that inward 
change i s "the c r i t e r i o n f o r church membership, yet any concept of church 
membership which does not include 'turning round i n one's way' i s surely 
defective from the New Testament point of view* T i l l i c h i s c e r t a i n l y 
r i g h t i n his r e j e c t i o n of any insistence on the church's part that he 
who wishes to become a church member must go through a set pattern of 
conversion. But what i s surely important i s that the S p i r i t operates 
w i t h i n the i n d i v i d u a l , creating w i t h i n him not only the desire to pa r t i - , 
cipate i n the l i f e of the church (which T i l l i c h . has already emphasised'^) 
but also the response t o the message of the Gospel which the church 
proclaims. This may well seem to c o n f l i c t with T i l l i c h ' s assertion that 
what matters fundamentally i s not the persona} f a i t h of the individual 
as such but the ongoing f a i t h of the church i n t o whioh context the i n d i -
vidual i s taken and may f i n d commitment, but i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how 
one can decide on a c r i t e r i o n of church membership without some reference 
to the work of the S p i r i t i n the l i f e of the individual with p a r t i c u l a r 
regard to the creation of a personal response to the message of the 
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Gospel and the f a i t h of the church, and t h i s i s true whether one accepts 
the v a l i d i t y of infant baptism or not* The f a c t that i t i s not always 
possible t o say when such a response i s made, does not mean that i t has 
no part t o play i n seeking to define such a c r i t e r i o n * Certainly 
T i l l i c h does not provide us with any compelling reason why one should 
re j e c t the r i t e of confirmation or i t s equivalent, despite i t s ambigui-
t i e s . I n f a c t , one would have thought that he would be the f i r s t to 
aff i r m that nothing i s invalidated because of the ambiguities to which 
i t may be subjected. At least such a r i t e underlines the importance of 
personal response and commitment whether i t actually coincides with i t or 
not. And i n seeking t o work towards a v a l i d c r i t e r i o n f o r church member-
ship t h i s p a r t i c u l a r work of the S p i r i t cannot be ignored. 
The analogy T i l l i c h draws between r e l i g i o u s and philosophical 
conversion i s , although v a l i d , l i m i t e d * I t i s true that both forms of 
conversion may be desoribed as 'having one's eyes opened', and i n t h i s 
sense both can lead to a fundamental change i n the l i f e of the i n d i v i d u a l . 
But t h i s i s the extent of the analogyi i t does not t e l l us anything 
about the nature and implications of reli g i o u s conversion, what the 
impact of the S p i r i t involves, neither does i t point to the fa c t that 
r e l i g i o u s conversion i n the New Testament i s much more ra d i c a l than 
conversion to a pa r t i c u l a r philosophical ideology. When the New Testament 
speaks of conversion i t has i n mind a renewal of the indi v i d u a l i n the 
very depths of his being as through the work of the S p i r i t he i s turned 
and reconciled to God. I n t h i s sense i t goes beyond what the Greek 
philosophers meant by 'having one's eyes opened'. 
Turning to the experience of the New Being i n the l i f e of the 
in d i v i d u a l , the f i r s t problem that confronts us i s T i l l i c h ' s d e f i n i t i o n 
of the subjective experience of regeneration as entering i n t o a new 
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r e a l i t y i n the context of which i t i s possible to become a new being; 
rather than the actual experience of becoming a new being oneself. I t 
i s important that we understand i n what way T i l l i c h i s using the term 
'subjective experience 1 here, p a r t i c u l a r l y as the phrase i s capable of 
several meanings. Clearly he i s not using i t to re f e r t o a purely 
subjective f e e l i n g which does not relate t o anything objective at a l l 
and which cannot be v e r i f i e d empirically* But the phrase suffers from 
a f u r t h e r ambiguity. Either i t could mean the personal witnessing of an 
objective r e a l i t y without that r e a l i t y becoming a part of oneself - the 
subjective experience of the onlooker who observes. Or else i t could 
mean the subjective appropriation of something, the impact that an 
objective r e a l i t y makes on one*3 l i f e i n such a way that i t becomes part 
of oneself. Now i t seems that when T i l l i c h defines the subjective exper-
ience of regeneration as entering i n t o a new r e a l i t y i n which context 
i t i s possible - though not necessary - to become new, he i s going no 
further than speaking of a subjective experience i n the former sense. 
The individual witnesses or observes the new r e a l i t y by 'entering i n t o 
i t ' without necessarily making i t a part of his own l i f e . On the other 
hand, New Testament usage seems to connote the actual experience of 
becoming a new being oneself, of being so opened up to the S p i r i t ' s 
impact that the new r e a l i t y brought by Christ effects a fundamental 
change i n one's innermost nature. This i s ce r t a i n l y the most s t r a i g h t -
forward i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of those passages which refer to the new b i r t h i n 
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the New Testament. J ' I f we have, as i t were, ' says Paul, 'shared 
the death of Christ, l e t us r i s e and l i v e our new l i v e s with him, even 
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as we ere raised to newness of l i f e i n him 1. J J 'For i f a man i s i n 
Christ he becomes a new person altogether - the past i s finished and 
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gone, everything has become fresh and new'. Paul says to the 
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Ephesiane, 'To you, who were s p i r i t u a l l y dead • . . to you Christ has 
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given us l i f e ' . And James says, 'By his own wish he made us his own 
sons through the Word of t r u t h , that we might be, so to speak, the f i r s t 
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specimens of his new creation*. J A l l these passages show that regen-
eration i s something which i s no less than a radical change i n the l i f e 
of those concerned, nothing less i n f a c t than the g i f t of a new l i f e , the 
b i r t h of a new being* I n addition to t h i s , i f one accepts T i l l i c h ' s 
d e f i n i t i o n of regeneration as 'entering i n t o the new r e a l i t y ' , i t makes 
the words of Jesus to Nicodemus i n John's Gospel meaningless* Jesus 
says to Nicodemus that unless he i s born anew he cannot even see, l e t 
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alone enter i n t o , the Kingdom of God* Now f o r T i l l i c h , the Kingdom 
of God, l i k e the S p i r i t u a l Community, points to the new r e a l i t y wrought 
i n Christ. One cannot enter t h i s new r e a l i t y , therefore, according to 
John's Gospel, unless one i s bom anew. But i f we accept T i l l i c h ' s 
d e f i n i t i o n of regeneration, or new b i r t h , as entering i n t o the new 
r e a l i t y , t h i s would mean that John 3 would be paraphrased thus: 'Unless 
you enter the new r e a l i t y , you cannot enter the new r e a l i t y 1 * The 
phrase therefore becomes tautological. On these grounds also one feels 
j u s t i f i e d i n r e j e c t i n g T i l l i c h ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of regeneration, f o r i t 
makes the Johannine text say v i r t u a l l y nothing at a l l . 
I n his analysis of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , despite his insistence on the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the objective act of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , 'the eternal 
act of God by which he accepts as not estranged those who are indeed 
estranged from him by g u i l t ' , a n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n as a subjective 
experience, 'the accepting that one i s accepted«t^^ 0ne feels that 
T i l l i c h does not maintain t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n c l e a r l y enough. I n one 
sense, his discussion on j u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h , the meaning of the term 
f o r today, and the doctrine of the forgiveness of sins, belongs much more 
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to the objective side of j u s t i f i c a t i o n rather than the subjective side, 
despite the f a c t that these problems have reference to the individual 
i n his relationship with God. On the other hand, his d e f i n i t i o n of the 
subjective experience of j u s t i f i c a t i o n as the acceptance of acceptance, 
discussed as i t i s i n r e l a t i o n to such questions as 'How can I accept 
that I am accepted?' and 'How can I be certain that I am forgiven?', 
suggests that what he i s thinking of here i s very s i m i l a r , i f not the 
same as, the doctrine of assurance* I f the two are indeed the same, t h i s 
would help us to understand why T i l l i c h places j u s t i f i c a t i o n a f t e r 
regeneration i n the scheme of salvation, f o r no man can accept that he i s 
accepted by God unless he i s f i r s t grasped by the S p i r i t i n the exper-
ience of regeneration* So i n his sermon on 'The Witness of the S p i r i t 
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to the S p i r i t 1 , he emphasises that the only source of our subjective 
acceptance that we have become children of God i s the divine S p i r i t 
himself 'who t e s t i f i e s with the human s p i r i t that we are born of God'*^ 
by grasping the human s p i r i t e c s t a t i c a l l y * One i s reminded of Wesley's 
sermon on the same text where he says, 'The testimony of the S p i r i t i s 
an inward impression of the soul, whereby the S p i r i t of God d i r e c t l y 
witnesses to my s p i r i t , that I am a c h i l d of God'.*^ I n other words, 
i t seems that what T i l l i c h has provided us with here i s a contemporary 
int e r p r e t a t i o n of the t r a d i t i o n a l doctrine of assurance, r i g h t l y seeing 
i t as the subjective appropriation of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , which i s made 
possible only by the work of the S p i r i t * But by using the word j u s t i f i -
cation to refer to both the objective r e a l i t y and the subjective 
experienee, his discussion i s not as clear as i t might be* 
I n his preliminary remarks on j u s t i f i c a t i o n , T i l l i c h raises some 
important issues, but there are some points which need to be challenged* 
Although there i s a sense i n which the term 'acceptance1 may stand f o r . 
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' J u s t i f i c a t i o n ' i n our contemporary understanding, i t should be pointed 
out that the two are not synonymous. There i s i n the concept of 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n (New Testament! dikaiosune) a strong element of forgiveness 
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which i s not necessarily present i n the idea of acceptance at a l l * J 
I n f a c t , throughout his discussion on j u s t i f i c a t i o n T i l l i c h plays down 
the element of forgiveness altogether* This comes out c l e a r l y i n his 
c r i t i c i s m of the phrase 'the forgiveness of sins'* His r e j e c t i o n of 
the concept of forgiveness when applied to God's dealings with man on 
the grounds that such a concept presupposes that he who forgives must 
also be forgiven i s j u s t not acceptable. The fa c t that t h i s i s so i n 
human relations stems from the universality of man's s i n , not from the 
nature of forgiveness, and T i l l i c h should have seen t h i s * His argument 
i s e n t i r e l y unconvincing* I n f a c t , one suspects that the real reason 
why T i l l i c h i s not happy with the concept of forgiveness i s that i t 
emphasises the eternal d i s t i n c t i o n between God and man which alone 
makes meaningful relationships, including that of forgiveness, possible* 
Whereas i n T i l l i c h ' s theology of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , the divine-human r e l a t i o n -
ship i s swallowed up i n a transcendent union i n which the i n f i n i t e 
accepts the f i n i t e as part of i t s e l f , and i n which context therefore 
the word 'acceptance' i s more applicable* 
T i l l i c h ' s remarks on the r e l a t i o n between j u s t i f y i n g f a i t n and 
radical doubt are stimulating, but i t would be a mistake to caricature 
them as a doctrine of ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n by doubt', as William Nicholls has 
done. 1^ To say that T i l l i c h would allow j u s t i f i c a t i o n by any other 
means than the grace of God would be a complete misrepresentation of his 
teaching. I t would be equally wrong to say that T i l l i c h i s suggesting 
that one i s j u s t i f i e d through doubt, that doubt i s the vehicle of the 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the doubter i n the same way that f a i t h i s the vehicle 
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of the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the believer* I t is. rather the utmost serious-
ness or concern about the meaning of l i f e that radical doubt reveals 
that becomes the vehicle f o r his j u s t i f i c a t i o n * He i s j u s t i f i e d ' i n 
spite o f his doubt because of his ultimate concern* I n saying t h i s , 
T i l l i c h r e f l e c t s the influence of Martin Kahler. This i s how he 
summarises Kahler's teachings 
Not only he who i s i n s i n but also he who i s i n doubt 
i s j u s t i f i e d through f a i t h * The s i t u a t i o n of doubt, even 
of doubt about God, need not separate us from God* There 
i s f a i t h i n every serious doubt, namely, the f a i t h i n the 
t r u t h as such, even i f the only t r u t h we can express i s 
our lack of t r u t h * But i f t h i s i s experienced i n i t s 
depth and as an ultimate concern, the divine i s present; 
and he who doubts i n such an a t t i t u d e i s " j u s t i f i e d " i n 
his thinking* So the paradox got hold of me that he who 
seriously denies God, affirms him**"? 
The l i n k here with T i l l i c h * s own understanding of f a i t h as ultimate 
concern stands out c l e a r l y , and i f f a i t h i s to be understood i n t h i s 
way then i t i s legitimate to say that i t i s secretly present i n the 
ultimate 'concern of him who doubts r a d i c a l l y . But we have already 
questioned whether the b i b l i c a l concept of f a i t h can adequately be 
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expressed i n t h i s way, suggesting that the ultimate concern of which 
T i l l i c h speaks i s more akin with man's quest f o r the divine rather than 
the response of f a i t h , seeking rather than fin d i n g * That t h i s element 
i s present i n the s i t u a t i o n of radical doubt no one would deny, and 
i n t h i s sense, the one who doubts i s i n the same position as the one who 
seeksi both look f o r the ultimate i n l i f e and meaning, whether the 
search i s expressed i n r e l i g i o u s terminology or not. But to say that 
such a man i s j u s t i f i e d through the seriousness withi n his doubt i s 
l i k e saying that he who seeks has already found. I t i s more true to say 
that he who i n his concern f o r t r u t h has come t o that point where he . 
realises that he w i l l never f i n d the answer of himself i s now poised at 
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the gateway t o the kingdom of God* He i s now i n that s i t u a t i o n where 
the S p i r i t can break through and reveal to him the things of Christ i n 
a meaningful and dynamic way. This i s indeed a paradox - though not 
the paradox to which T i l l i c h i s r e f e r r i n g . Only he who has become aware 
of his moral or i n t e l l e c t u a l inadequacy i s ready to receive the Christ, 
and when the man who doubts r a d i c a l l y reaches t h i s point he i s para-
doxically nearer t o his acceptance by God than i f he were i n some super-
f i c i a l state either of doubt or re l i g i o u s allegiance. Certainly one 
detects here a working of the S p i r i t , a work of prevenient grace, bringing 
man to a moment of c r i s i s , the moment of t r u t h when the S p i r i t i s able 
to grasp him and draw him i n t o the experience of the New Reality. This 
one would a f f i r m most strongly. But so f a r i t i s a preparation f o r 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n , not the experience i t s e l f , and i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how 
T i l l i c h can pretend that i t i s * 
T i l l i c h provides us with a useful summary of the difference between 
the three main Protestant t r a d i t i o n s i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e towards sancti-
f i c a t i o n * One would cer t a i n l y wish to a f f i r m that the central element 
i n the process of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n , as Luther so clearl y saw, i s the d i r e c t 
work of the S p i r i t i n the l i f e of the in d i v i d u a l helping him to reach 
his decisions i n the l i g h t of love i n t u i t i v e l y and i n s t i n c t i v e l y , thus 
freeing him from the l e t t e r of the law. But no one can l i v e i n such a 
continued state of ecstasy, and i n t h i s context T i l l i c h * s characterisation 
of Luther's description of the Christian l i f e as a continuous o s c i l l a t i o n 
between ecstasy and despair i s a v a l i d one. Nevertheless, i t i s surely 
i n these periods of doubt and despair, when the S p i r i t of love i s not 
i n t u i t i v e l y recognised, that the Christian w i l l need some di r e c t i o n from 
'the law' as to what he should do, even though t h i s need may stem from 
the anxiety l e s t God should be offended. I n f a c t , Luther himself makes 
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169 t h i s point* ' But i s t h i s not also to say that the majority of 
Christians need guidelines and principles to help them i n t h e i r s p i r i t u a l 
growth, i n addition to the ecstatic impact of the S p i r i t ? So there i s a 
sense i n which the Calvinist emphasis on the law as an aid to s p i r i t u a l 
d i s c i p l i n e must exist side by side with Luther's emphasis on d i r e c t 
S p i r i t u a l experience* Clearly there are dangers i n an exclusively 
Calvinist approach, and a too r i g i d adherence to the syllogismuB ethicus 
oan well lead to bondage rather than l i b e r t y . Any doctrine of sanoti-
f i c a t i o n must contain both elements i f i t i s to be a satisfactory i n t e r -
pretation of growth i n the S p i r i t * 
There i s a sense i n which the P i e t i s t approach to s a n c t i f i c a t i o n , 
despite i t s emphasis on perfection, does at least t r y to hold these two 
elements together, and one feels that T i l l i c h could have been more 
sympathetic towards the P i e t i s t point of view i f only f o r this reason* 
I n f a o t , i f T i l l i c h had been more aware of recent theological expositions 
of the doctrine of perfection stemming from the Wesleyan t r a d i t i o n , 
i t s e l f strongly influenced by Pietism, which emphasise the importance of 
distinguishing between what may be called ' r e l a t i v e ' and 'absolute' 
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perfection, he would have realised that there i s much i n t h i s t r a d i t i o n 
that resembles his own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n as a continual 
process* The idea of a ' r e l a t i v e ' perfection, which understands perfection 
not as an absolute achievement, but as a dynamic process i n which growth 
i n the s p i r i t u a l l i f e of the individual prooeeds i n such a way that 
there i s a perfection constantly maintained i n proportion to the rate 
of growth and r e l a t i v e to the measure i n which the individual becomes 
open to the impact of the S p i r i t , i s not an impossible concept, and 
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ce r t a i n l y merits f u r t h e r theological enquiry. 1 Because the emphasis 
has here moved from perfection as a state of being to perfection as a 
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continual process, one feels that T i l l i c h ' s analysis would have benefitted 
from some reference to these trends i n the so-called P i e t i s t t r a d i t i o n * 
Certainly any contemporary doctrine of the S p i r i t cannot ignore them* 
I n f a c t , T i l l i c h himself seems to have some such idea of r e l a t i v e 
perfection i n mind when he speaks of 'images of perfection'* I t i s 
obvious that he i s not using the term 'perfection' here i n any absolute 
sense* Absolute perfection i s possible only when a l l e x i s t e n t i a l barriers 
between man and God are overcome, a state reached only beyond t h i s l i f e 
i n the presence of the Divine. His emphasis on the i n f i n i t e distance 
between man and God i n the present context shows that he i s not using 
the word i n t h i s way, but much more i n the sense we have outlined above. 
Man when grasped by the S p i r i t can only be fragmentarily or r e l a t i v e l y 
perfect i n t h i s l i f e , although t h i s may be a genuine anticipation of 
the absolute perfection of eternal l i f e . This i s why we can a f f i r m w i t h 
T i l l i c h that i n such a state of r e l a t i v e perfection, i n the l i f e of the 
saint, even i n the l i f e of him who l i v e s most closely to God, doubt w i l l 
i nevitably remain* What T i l l i c h f a i l s to go on to say i s that i n the 
state of eternal l i f e , beyond the present order of things, according to 
the New Testament doubt i t s e l f w i l l be swallowed up i n knowledge* Or 
as Paul summarises i t , 'Now we see only puzzling reflections i n a mirror, 
but then we s h a l l see face to faoe* My knowledge now i s p a r t i a l ; then 
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i t w i l l be whole, like.God's knowledge of me1* 
One must also ask whether T i l l i c h i s being r e a l l y f a i r to the 
P i e t i s t when he says that his emphasis on the certainty that accompanies 
an immediate awareness of the presence of God i s r e a l l y t r y i n g to a n t i -
cipate a f u l l mystical union to the extent that the need f o r f a i t h i s 
undermined. Apart from the f a c t that i t i s extremely un l i k e l y that the 
P i e t i s t , with his strong evangelical t r a d i t i o n , would diminish the role 
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of f a i t h i n t h i s way. there i s no reason why the emphasis on certitude 
should i n any way seek to anticipate f u l l mystical union, especially 
the sort of union i n which the separation between man as subject and God 
as object, or vice-versa, i s overcome. So f a r as one can t e l l , the 
P i e t i s t has never led us to believe that the 'most immediate and intimate 
f e e l i n g of union with the divine' i s the same thing as a transcendent 
union i n the sense i n which T i l l i c h defines i t , and there i s cer t a i n l y 
no evidence f o r t h i s sort of thinking i n the theology of men l i k e Spener 
and Zinzendorf. I t i s also extremely u n l i k e l y that he who stands with i n 
the P i e t i s t t r a d i t i o n today would support a theology whioh would allow the 
entire elimination of doubt i n t h i s way*. He may a f f i r m a certitude of 
the presence of God because of the intimate presence of the S p i r i t i n 
the heart of the believer, but this i s not the same as saying that i n 
th i s l i f e our knowledge of God i s complete. 
I n f a c t , one wonders why T i l l i c h should spend time i n castigating 
the P i e t i s t f o r his alleged emphasis on mystical union i n the Christian 
experience when he himself goes on to a f f i r m a place f o r i t i n every 
genuine expression of f a i t h . Because f a i t h i s essentially the divine 
S p i r i t grasping a man, he says, then i n every state of f a i t h there i s 
an experience of the presence of the i n f i n i t e w i t h i n the f i n i t e , trans-
cending the subject-object s p l i t between them, so that wi t h i n the essence 
of f a i t h the mystical category i s given. Thus, he concludes, f a i t h and 
the experience of mystical union belong to each other i n the process 
of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n . What we would question here i s T i l l i c h ' s precise 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of such a mystical union i n terms of the transcending 
of the cleavage between subject and object i n which one realises one's 
173 
unity with the divine. One cannot see how he can r e a l l y reconcile 
t h i s concept w i t h his own affirmation i n t h i s same context of the 
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Protestant p r i n c i p l e of the ' i n f i n i t e distance between man and God', f o r 
i t would seem that mystical union, when f u l l y achieved, must remove t h i s 
distance altogether. Admittedly, T i l l i c h does not allow the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of a t o t a l mystical union i n th i s l i f e , but the implication behind his 
concept of transcendent union i s that the distance between man and God i s 
not ultimately i n f i n i t e , but rather preliminary, f o r t h i s world only. 
Nevertheless, i n so f a r as the process of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n i s a sharing 
i n the l i f e of the S p i r i t , such a mystical union can be fragmentarily 
realised i n the here and now. I n face of t h i s , surely i f one i s to be 
true to the Protestant p r i n c i p l e which T i l l i c h affirms but also seems 
to undermine, the only mysticism one can possibly allow as an element 
i n s a n c t i f i c a t i o n i s one i n which union w i t h God i s seen not i n terms 
of a t o t a l unity of being, but i n terms of a perfect unity of r e l a t i o n -
ship i n which f a i t h eternally remains. To say this i s to a f f i r m a 
role f o r mystical experience i n the Christian l i f e , but i t i s also to 
say that i n i t s reappraisal of mysticism, Protestantism can accept no 
other form 1han that which i s Christocentric. This does not mean that 
every v a l i d form of mysticism has to have a specific Christ-label 
attached to i t , but rather that the S p i r i t who i n i t i a t e s i t i s none 
other than the S p i r i t of Christ. And as there are no grounds f o r believing 
that the message of Christ i s one which i n v i t e s man int o ontological 
union with God, so any form of mysticism which attempts to achieve t h i s 
type of union, i n which the eternal d i s t i n c t i o n between God and man i s 
transoended, i s unacceptable to Protestantism and unrequired i n the 
prooess of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n . 
I t i s also with t h i s reservation i n mind as to the precise meaning 
of self-transcendence that one must assess the four principles which 
T i l l i c h l i s t s as c r i t e r i a i n any understanding of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n f o r 
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today. I t i s c e r t a i n l y true that an increased sense of communion with 
God which enables man to see his d a i l y experiences of l i f e i n a new 
dimension i s a v a l i d c r i t e r i o n of growth i n the Christian l i f e , but 
mystical awareness i n the sense i n which T i l l i c h understands i t i s by 
no means the same thing. The Christian should also be ready to discern 
between what i s a genuine desire f o r self-transcendence i n the sense i n 
which we have defined i t and the desire to escape from the l i m i t a t i o n s of 
e x i s t e n t i a l l i f e which i s behind so much of contemporary pseudo-mystical 
thinking and practice. With these reservations, one can accept T i l l i c h ' s 
four principles as a valuable aid to providing a twentieth century i n t e r -
pretation of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n . The c r i t e r i a of increased awareness, freedom 
and relatedness a l l have the advantage of taking the doctrine out of the 
s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l i g i o u s cage i n which i t has been locked f o r so long. L i f e 
cannot be l i v e d apart from the world and i t s ambiguities, and personality 
cannot be developed i n religious i s o l a t i o n . So there i s need to see 
more cl e a r l y what i t means f o r the man who i s grasped by the S p i r i t to 
l i v e w i t h i n the world, and what t h i s means f o r his growth i n the Christian 
l i f e . These are cer t a i n l y points which merit fu r t h e r expansion i n a 
contemporary understanding of the work of the S p i r i t . 
IV. THE SPIRITUAL COMMUNITY AMD THE CONQUEST OF RELIGION 
We have followed through with T i l l i c h how the divine S p i r i t i s 
effe c t i v e both i n the l i f e of the S p i r i t u a l Community as represented i n 
the church, and i n the l i f e of the 'S p i r i t u a l personality' as represented 
by the individual i n the context of the church. We have seen how the 
S p i r i t conquers the various ambiguities of l i f e i n respect of each of 
these considerations, communal and personal, i n a fragmentary manner, 
pointing above the ambiguities, of existence to the l i f e of the New 
Reality. Basically then the church i s not a narrowly religious community, 
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but 'the anticipatory representation of a new r e a l i t y , the New Being as 
community1; and the in d i v i d u a l member of the church i s not a narrowly 
religious personality, but 'the anticipatory representation of a new 
r e a l i t y , the New Being as p e r s o n a l i t y ' . ^ ^ The real purpose of the 
religious function therefore, whether i n community or personality, i s 
not an end i n i t s e l f , but to point beyond i t s e l f to the true actualisa-
t i o n of the New Being i n community and i n personality, or i n other words, 
i n every part of l i f e * This i s what T i l l i c h means when he says that 
r e l i g i o n i n the narrower sense i s conquered, f o r the coming of Christ 
was not to found a new ' r e l i g i o n ' which would supersede the o l d , but 
to transform the already ex i s t i n g state of things i n l i f e as a whole* 
Thus the gap between the r e l i g i o u s and the secular i s removedi f a i t h 
becomes, not a mere set of b e l i e f s , but a state of being grasped by an 
ultimate concern i n every part of one's l i f e , and love no longer negates 
the dimensions of l i f e f o r the sake of a non-dimensional 'relig i o u s ' 
transcendence, but seeks to reunite that which i s separated i n a l l 
dimensions, including the dimension of s p i r i t * 
Because r e l i g i o n i t s e l f i s conquered by the S p i r i t , T i l l i c h 
continues, t h i s means that the profanising and demonising of r e l i g i o n i s 
also conquered* The f a c t that the members of the church, through t h e i r 
church membership, participate also i n the S p i r i t u a l Community, means 
that the tendency to profanise r e l i g i o n i n t o a sacred mechanism of 
structure, dogma and r i t u a l form, w i l l continually be resisted w i t h i n 
the church i t s e l f , insofar as the S p i r i t i s able to break through as i t 
did f o r example at the time of the Reformation* When t h i s happens, 
morality and culture are affirmed as di r e c t concerns of the ultimate 
j u s t as much as r e l i g i o n , so that there i s no f u r t h e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
f o r any d i v i s i o n between the sacred and the secular, and i n t h i s way 
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the grounds f o r secular protest against r e l i g i o n are undermined* Simi-
l a r l y , the demonisation of r e l i g i o n i s conquered when r e l i g i o n i t s e l f 
i s overcome by the S p i r i t . Any self-affirmed greatness by the church 
i s demonic, whether i t be a church's claim to represent the S p i r i t u a l 
Community unambiguously i n i t s own structure, or the individual church 
member's self-assurance which arises from his association with such a 
church, f o r i n so doing the open aspect of the demonic which seeks to 
i d e n t i f y the f i n i t e with the i n f i n i t e becomes obvious. The conquest of 
r e l i g i o n by the S p i r i t u a l Presence, says T i l l i c h , w i l l prevent such a 
claim to absoluteness, i t w i l l show that no church represents God to 
the exclusion of any other, i t w i l l undercut the in d i v i d u a l member's 
claim to an exclusive possession of the t r u t h by i t s witness to the 
fragmentary and ambiguous nature of a l l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the t r u t h . No 
man can boast about his grasp of God when he himself i s the one who i s 
grasped by the S p i r i t i 'no one can grasp that by which he i s -grasped -
175 
the S p i r i t u a l Presence 1. J 
T i l l i c h feels that a l l t h i s i s summarised i n his concept of the 
Protestant p r i n c i p l e , which emphasises the i n f i n i t e distance between 
man and God* 
The Protestant p r i n c i p l e i s an expression of the conquest 
of r e l i g i o n by the S p i r i t u a l Presence and consequently an 
expression of the vi c t o r y over the ambiguities of r e l i g i o n , 
i t s profanisation, and i t s demonisation. I t i s Protestant 
because i t protests against the tragic-demonic self-elevation 
of r e l i g i o n and liberates r e l i g i o n from i t s e l f f o r the other 
functions of the human s p i r i t , at the same time l i b e r a t i n g 
these functions from t h e i r self-exclusion against the mani-
festations of the ultimate. 
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Such a p r i n c i p l e , therefore, underlines the f a c t that no r e l i g i o n i s to 
be i d e n t i f i e d with the divine i t s e l f , or considered as the sole sphere 
of the S p i r i t ' s a c t i v i t y . I t i s not merely to be applied to the Protestant 
churches, but to every church as a concrete expression of the S p i r i t u a l 
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Community. And though i t i s a pri n c i p l e which has been betrayed by 
every church at some time or another, i t i s s t i l l e f f e c t i v e i n every 
denomination as the force which prevents profanisation and demonisation 
from destroying i t . But having said t h i s , the Protestant pr i n c i p l e 
cannot exist by i t s e l f , and alongside the assertion that man can never 
comprehend God i n a l l his fulness must be placed the symbols of those 
experiences i n which God has opened up something of himself f o r man to 
understand i n his own l i m i t e d way through the impact of the S p i r i t . This 
i s what T i l l i c h means by 'Catholic substance'. So i n a world where God 
i s transcendent, he i s also intimately present, even though his presence 
may be ve i l e d , open only to the eyes of f a i t h . T i l l i c h frequently 
summarises a l l t h i s i n his formula 'Protestant principle and Catholic 
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substance'• The Catholic substance affirms that i n every manifes-
t a t i o n of the S p i r i t , God i s t r u l y present, grasping the l i f e of man; 
the Protestant p r i n c i p l e prevents such manifestations from becoming 
i d e n t i f i e d with God himself. And i n so f a r as t h i s p r i n c i p l e i t s e l f 
i s the most profound r e s u l t of the S p i r i t ' s impact upon man, who realises 
thereby that nothing he can say or do can adequately express God i n a l l 
his fulness, then such a p r i n c i p l e , says T i l l i c h , 'is the expression 
of the vi c t o r y of the S p i r i t over r e l i g i o n * . 
Evaluation 
The formula 'Protestant pr i n c i p l e and Catholic substance* which l i e s 
behind what T i l l i c h has to say here provides us with an important c r i t e r i o n 
i n our assessment of the nature and function of the church and the place 
of the individual w i t h i n i t . i n t h i s discussion he has most c a r e f u l l y 
drawn the d i s t i n c t i o n between the inner nature of the church as the comm-
unity of the S p i r i t (and correspondingly between the inward nature of the 
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Christian as one who i s renewed by the S p i r i t ) and the outward forms, 
symbols and structures that the church must use i n the world (and corre-
spondingly the l i f e of the i n d i v i d u a l Christian as a man among men). I n 
this d i s t i n c t i o n his formula 'Protestant principle and Catholic substance' 
helps us to see that whereas i t i s necessary f o r the S p i r i t to use 
structures and symbols to make his presence known i n the world, forms 
which are inevitably taken from the world i t s e l f and f i l l e d out with 
'Catholic substance', there are no grounds ei t h e r f o r asserting that 
such forms are thereby sacred i n themselves, and therefore unalterable, 
v a l i d f o r a l l time, or f o r confusing them with the divine to which they 
point, with the res u l t that they become demonic, since there i s an 
i n f i n i t e distance between the divine l i f e and the l i f e of man. Such an 
understanding may well be of great help to the church both i n i t s l i f e 
i n the world and i t s r e l a t i o n to the world, and i n i t s own ecumenical 
discussions. But i t i s also important f o r us to see that T i l l i c h ' s 
formula i s of considerable theological significance as w e l l , holding 
together the polar emphases on transcendence and immanence i n the doctrine 
of God, the 'Catholic substance' underlining the immanence of the 
S p i r i t u a l Presence w i t h i n the world, using the forms of the l i f e of the 
world to reveal himself to man, the 'Protestant p r i n c i p l e * pointing to 
the f a c t that the same S p i r i t i s f a r above and beyond the inevitable 
l i m i t a t i o n s of any such forms. Certainly one may wonder whether T i l l i c h 
does not, i n f a c t , i n his doctrine of the ultimate transcendent u n i t y , 
place himself i n the position where he must eventually abandon the t r u t h 
f o r which his own formula stands, with the result that the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the transcendence and immanence of God remains v a l i d only i n 
a preliminary, e x i s t e n t i a l context; and t h i s i n i t s e l f i s a serious 
c r i t i c i s m . But t h i s apart, one would nevertheless a f f i r m that here we 
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have a formula which has v i t a l significance f o r our understanding of the 
r e l a t i o n between the Holy S p i r i t and the world. The t r u t h i t expresses 
holds together important complementary aspects of the nature of God and 
points out the way i n which revelation can become possible. 
I n t h i s context i t i s also s i g n i f i c a n t to note how the same formula 
stands behind what T i l l i c h has to say about the future of r e l i g i o n . I n 
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his l a s t lecture delivered i n the University of Chicago, he saw 
theology as standing at a crossroads. One way pointed along the secular 
road, 'a r e l i g i o n of non-religion', 'a theology-without-God language 1; 
the other way was to develop a theology of the history of r e l i g i o n . 
T i l l i c h feels that i t i s along t h i s l a t t e r road that r e l i g i o n must t r a v e l 
i f i t i s to maintain i t s i n t e g r i t y . Yet along that road r e l i g i o n i s 
challenged to break through everything that would prevent 'a free 
approach to the history of religions'', whether i t be the exclusiveness of 
orthodoxy or the r e j e c t i v i t y of secular i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Only a theology 
which recognises the un i v e r s a l i t y of the divine revelation i n a l l r e l i -
gions and at the same time which subjects every r e l i g i o n to the concrete 
revelation i n the Christ-event i s able to break through these barriers 
and provide a v a l i d r e l i g i o n f o r the f u t u r e . Such a r e l i g i o n , i n which 
the t r u t h inherent i n both universal and concrete aspects i s recognised, 
i s termed by T i l l i c h 'the r e l i g i o n of the concrete S p i r i t ' . This way 
forward, which T i l l i c h was beginning to explore i n the l a t t e r years of 
his l i f e , brings the idea of the Protestant pr i n c i p l e and Catholic 
substance onto a much wider stage: Every r e l i g i o n , as a concrete 
expression of the S p i r i t u a l Presence, must be seen to be transcended 
i n the name of the ultimate to which i t points; yet at the same time the 
concrete substance of every r e l i g i o n i s affirmed and p u r i f i e d as i t i s 
brought face to face with the Christ, who as the supreme symbol of the 
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Presence of the divine i n human l i f e brings to a head within himself 
everything to which every other v a l i d symbol points* Now although 
T i l l i c h ' s assertion that C h r i s t i s the supreme symbol of the divine 
Presence needs much further elucidation from a Christological stand-
point, a factor which i t s e l f must influence our understanding of the 
r e l a t i o n between the C h r i s t i a n revelation and other r e l i g i o n s , i t 
nevertheless remains true that h i s formula as i t i s here expressed w i l l 
provide a useful c r i t e r i o n i n any assessment of the work of the S p i r i t i n 
the t o t a l r e l i g i o u s dimension of human l i f e and experience* 
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27. Ephesians 4»3ff. 
28. John 16:13. 
29. The Wholeness of the Church, London, 1949, p. 71* 
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31. See The ProteBtant Era, pp. a l i i f f . , and Christentum und Soziale 
Gestaltungi Stuttgart, 1962. 
32. See p a r t i c u l a r l y the Roman Catholic contributions to the symposium 
Steps to Ch r i s t i a n Unity (ed. by John A. O'Brien, London, Pontana 
Books, 1965). 
33. ST, I I I , p. 195. 
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37« I b i d . , p. 196. 
38. I b i d . 
39* I b i d . , p. 197. 
40. I b i d . 
41. I b i d . , p. 202. 
42. The function of reception-mediation does, of course, open up the 
whole question of the r e l a t i o n between priesthood and l a i t y . I n 
an essay i n The Protestant Era on 'The Protestant P r i n c i p l e and 
the P r o l e t a r i a n Situation', T i l l i c h points out that the Protestant 
p r i n c i p l e overcomes the gap between the sacred and the secular 
spheres i n the l i f e of the church, p a r t i c u l a r l y where t h i s gap i s 
refle c t e d i n the dichotomy between the ordained minister and the 
layman. Protestantism, he says, demands 'a more ra d i c a l l a i c i s m ' 
than Catholicism' (p. 174). I n Protestantism, 'the minister i s a 
layman with a special function within the congregation . . . 
qualified for the'fulfilment of t h i s function by a c a r e f u l l y regulated 
professional training'. Every layman i s potentially a p r i e s t , j u s t 
as every secular realm i s potentially r e l i g i o u s . The quasi-
priesthood that arose i n the Lutheran churches a f t e r the Reformation 
was a betrayal of Luther's own pronouncement of the universal 
priesthood of a l l believers. To defend such a priesthood, as many 
Protestant laymen are concerned to do, either out of deference to 
obsolete t r a d i t i o n or e l s e because of 'pseudo-priestly' fanaticism, 
i s to re- a s s e r t past elements which have already been rejected by 
prophetic and theological c r i t i c i s m . The task of the layman i n t h i s 
respect i s always 'to challenge any conscious or unconscious attempt 
of ministers or theologians to set up a reli g i o u s sphere as separate 
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from his "secular" l i f e and his "seoular" work. Only by doing 
t h i s can he share f u l l y i n the receiving and mediating work of 
the church* 
43. ST, I I I , p. 203. 
44» I b i d . 
45- ST» I f P. 297. 
46. ST, I I I , p. 204. 
47* R i t s c h l writes, 'Since, then, there e x i s t s a danger that we should 
pray for blessings which i t i s not God's w i l l that we should receive, 
the ultimate resting of the soul i n the contrary w i l l of God i s a 
manifestation of that thanksgiving by which every petition ought to 
be ruled and, according to circumstances, limited'. (A* R i t s c h l , 
The C h r i s t i a n Doctrine of J u s t i f i c a t i o n and Reconciliation, Eng. 
Translation by H.R. Mackintosh and A.B. Macaulay, Edinburgh, 
T. and T. Clark 1902, p. 646). 
48, ST_,III, p. 204. See Rom. 8t26. 'We do not even know how we ought 
to pray, but through our i n a r t i c u l a t e groans the S p i r i t himself i s 
pleading for us, and God who searches our inmost being knows what 
the S p i r i t means, because he pleads for God's own people i n God's 
own way 1. (N.E.B.). 
49* T i l l i c h expands these thoughts i n a sermon on t h i s text from 
Romans ('The Paradox of Prayer', The New Being, pp. 135ff). After 
reminding the l i t u r g i c a l churches that they should ask themselves 
whether t h e i r c l a s s i c a l formulas prevent people of today from 
praying e f f e c t i v e l y , and the no n - l i t u r g i c a l churches that they 
should ask themselves whether t h e i r spontaneity may at times profane 
prayer and deprive i t of i t s mystery, he asks whether prayer i s r e a l l y 
possible at a l l . I t i s , he says, according to Paul, humanly impossible, 
impossible because we are praying to someone nearer to us than we are 
to ourselves, because we are addressing someone who can never be 
addressed as object because he i s always subject, because we are 
t e l l i n g something to him who knows not only what we should t e l l him 
but also the unconscious ground from which our conscious words grow. 
The only way, therefore, i n which prayer i s possible i s that God 
himself prays through us, when we pray to him. 'God Himself i n usj 
that i s what S p i r i t means . . . "God present", with shaking, i n -
sp i r i n g , transforming power. Something i n us, which i s not we 
ourselves, intercedes before God for us' (p. 137). The gap i s bridged 
by God, and t h i s profound symbol of God praying to himself for us i s 
meant to point to that astonishing f a c t . And because God knows 
everything that there i s to know about us, even the depths of our 
unconscious being, he i s indeed the one alone who can e f f e c t i v e l y 
bring us into his own presence. That i s why words themselves are 
inadequate1 that i s why they must be replaced with 'sighs too deep 
for words'. So 'the essence of prayer i s the act of God who i s 
working i n us and r a i s e s our whole being to Himself . . . Only i n 
terms of wordless sighs can we approach God, and even these sighs 
are His work i n us' (p. 138). 
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r i t u a l act into his unconsciousness, even i f he understands almost 
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re l i g i o u s education have a decisive function. I t opens up the sub-
conscious l e v e l s of the children f o r the ultimate mystery of being' 
(p. 156). 
58. ST, I I I , p. 208. 
59. I b i d . , P. 209. 
60. I b i d . 
61. I b i d . , P. 210. 
62. I b i d . , P. 200. 
63. I b i d . , P. 210. 
64. I b i d . , P. 211. 
65. I n one of his 
to mock the s t y l e s of previous generations: 
An a r t i s t i c style i s honest only i f i t expresses the rea l s i t u a t i o n 
of the a r t i s t and the cu l t u r a l period to which he belongs. We can 
participate i n the a r t i s t i c s t y l e s of the past i n so f a r as they 
were honestly expressing the encounter which they had with God,-man 
and the world. But we cannot honestly imitate them and produce 
for the c u l t of the church works which are not the r e s u l t of a 
355 
creating ecstasy, but which are learned reproductions of creative 
ec s t a s i e s of the past* I t was a r e l i g i o u s l y s i g n i f i c a n t achieve-
ment of modern architecture that i t liberated i t s e l f from t r a d i t i o n a l 
forms which, i n the context of our period, were nothing but trimmings 
without meaning and, therefore, neither a e s t h e t i c a l l y valuable nor 
r e l i g i o u s l y expressive. (Theology of Culture, p. 48)• 
66. ST, I I I , p. 213. 
67. Theology of Culture, p. 74» 
68. T i l l i c h saysi According to the multidimensional unity of l i f e , the 
dimension of s p i r i t includes a l l other dimensions - everything 
v i s i b l e i n the whole of the universe, ( i t ) reaches into"the physical 
and biological realm by the very f a c t that i t s basis i s the dimension 
of self-awareness. Therefore, i t cannot be expressed i n words only. 
I t has a v i s i b l e side, as i s manifest i n the face of man, which 
expresses bodily structure and personal s p i r i t . This experience of our 
d a i l y l i f e i s the premonition of the sacramental unity of matter and 
S p i r i t 1 . (ST, I I I , p. 214). 
69. See below, pp. 369ff. 
70. See above, pp. I f f . 
71. ST, I I I , p. 215. 
72. I b i d . , p. 216. 
73* T i l l i c h c i t e s as examples Plate and the S t o i c s , Boehrae and Schelling, 
and modern e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s l i t e Heidegger. 
74* He c i t e s as representatives of t h i s school of thought A r i s t o t l e 
and the Epicureans, Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant and Hegel. 
75- ST, I I I , P. 217. 
76. Theology of Culbure, p. 1Z1. 
77« ST, I I I . TP« 218. 
78. I b i d . , p. 219. 
79. I b i d . 
80. These words are not a c t u a l l y used by Jesus, but he implies t h i s 
teaching, c f . Mt. 61 14f, and Mt. 181 23ff. 
81. ST, I I I , p. 220. 
82. I b i d . , p. 221. 
83. I b i d . 
84. I b i d . , p. 222. 
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85. I b i d . , pp. 224f. 
86. I b i d . , p. 225. 
87. I b i d . 
88. I b i d . , p. 226. 
89. I b i d . 
90. I b i d . 
91. I b i d . , p. 227. 
92. The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 92. I n his- essay 'The End of 
the Protestant Era?' (The Protestant Era, p. 230), T i l l i o h has t h i s 
to say: 'The most important contribution of Protestantism to the 
world i n the past, present and future i s the princip l e of prophetic 
protest against every power which claims divine character for 
i t s e l f - whether i t be church or state, party or leader • . . The 
prophetic protest i s necessary f or every church and for every secular 
movement i f i t i s to avoid disintegration. I t has to be expressed 
i n every situation as a contradiction to man's permanent attempts 
to give absolute v a l i d i t y to his own thinking and acting. And 
t h i s prophetic, Protestant protest i s more necessary today than at any 
other time since the period of the Reformation, as the protest 
against the demonic abuse of those centralised authorities and 
powers which are developing under the urge of the new coll e c t i v i s m . . 
Without t h i s prophetic c r i t i c i s m the new authorities and powers w i l l 
n e cessarily lead toward a;new and more far-reaching disintegration. 
This c r i t i c i s m requires witnesses and martyrB. Without these, 
the prophetic and Protestant protest never has been and never w i l l 
be a c t u a l ' . 
93. ST, I I I , p. 228. 
94* See above, p. 217. 
95» Theology of Culture, p. 50f« The whole essay, 'Aspects on a Religious 
Analysis of Culture', i s relevant* 
96. ST, I I I , p. 228. 
97. I b i d . , p. 229. 
98. I b i d . , p. 230. 
99. Op. o i t . , p. 12. 
100. I b i d . , p. 10. 
101. John 14:26. 
102. e.g. J.A.T. Robinson says, 'The prerequisite . . . of reformation, 
as of a l l e l s e , i s s e n s i t i v i t y - s e n s i t i v i t y to what the S p i r i t i s 
saying to the churches, and to,the world' (The New Reformation? 
London, S.C.M. Press, 1965, p. 17). 
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103* So also Michael Harperi 'Everything must be brought to the touch-
stone of the Scriptures, which must obviously be more thoroughly and 
ca r e f u l l y read than ever before' (As at the Beginning. London, 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1965, p. 120)7 
104* John Wesley s a i d , 'You are i n danger of enthusiasm i f you depart 
ever so l i t t l e from Scripture', (quoted by Harper, op. c i t . . p. 120). 
105. Op. c i t . , pp. I l 8 f . 
106. See A. Dru (ed . ) i The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard, London, 
Pontana Books, 1958, p. 97. 
107* Hebrews 4:16. 
108. P h i l . 4«19, cp. 4»6. 
109. Mt. 21i22. 
110. See Eph. 6 s 18. I t i s inte r e s t i n g to note that shortly before h i s 
death, when asked by a j o u r n a l i s t i f he ever prayed, T i l l i c h 
r eplied, 'No, but I meditate 1 (quoted by P. Schaeffer, The God 
Who i s There. London, Hodder Paperback, 1970> p. 78). 
I l l * For a contemporary re-appraisal of contemplation i n Protestant 
c i r c l e s , see J . Neville Ward, The Use of Praying. London, Epworth 
Press, 1967, pp. 35f-
112. This stands out c l e a r l y i n the contrast between the two Liverpool 
cathedrals, the Roman Catholic building bearing a stamp of authen-
t i c i t y which the Anglican one can never have* 
113. See P h i l . 3i 12-14* 
114* See Luke 9s 23ff, and 18s l 8 f f . 
115« ST, I I I , p. 231. 
116. I b i d . , p. 232. 
117. I b i d . 
118. I b i d . , p. 233-
119. I b i d . . p. 234. 
120. I b i d . , p. 235* 
121. I b i d . 
122. I b i d . . p. 236. 
123. I b i d . . p. 237. 
124. I b i d . 
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125. I b i d . , p. 238. 
126. I b i d . , p. 239-
127. I b i d . , p. 240. 
128. I b i d . , p. 241. 
129. Objectively, says T i l l i c h , t h i s i s what the Cross of Christ points 
to: God accepting the unacceptable, participating i n man's 
estrangement and thereby conquering the ambiguities of good and 
e v i l i n a unique, d e f i n i t e and transforming way. This paradox of 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n , revealed i n C h r i s t , was central to the experience 
of a l l three great formative theologians, Paul, Augustine and 
Luther, though they may have expressed i t with s l i g h t l y d ifferent 
emphases. T i l l i c h f e e l s that although Luther, for example, con-
centrates more on the individual aspects of the paradox, and indeed 
to a great extent tends to emphasise t h i s at the expense of i t s 
wider significance i n a n ' e c c l e s i a s t i c a l or even cosmic setting, 
yet his affirmation that j u s t i f i c a t i o n does mean acceptance for 
the individual i s deeply profound and f u l l of meaning for contem-
porary man, as the best insights of modern psychology would 
confirm, ( i b i d . ) • 
130. ST, H I , p. 241 
131* Augustine says, 'Everyone who knows that he has doubts knows with 
certainty that something i s true, namely, that he doubts. He i s 
c e r t a i n , therefore, about a truth. Therefore everyone who doubts 
whether there be such a thing as the truth has at l e a s t j i truth 
to set a l i m i t to h i s doubt; and nothing can be true except truth 
be i n i t . Accordingly, no one ought to have doubts about the 
existence of the truth, even i f doubts a r i s e for him from every 
possible quotation' (Of True Religion, xxix. trans, by J.H.S. Burleigh, 
Library of C h r i s t i a n Classics,- Vol. VI, Augustine: E a r l i e r Writings, 
London, SCM Press, 1963, p. 262.). 
132. SIS., I l l , p. 243. 
133* ' I t i s the best instrument f o r enabling (believers) d a i l y to l e a r n 
with greater truth and ce r t a i n t y what that w i l l of the Lord i s which 
they aspire to follow, and to confirm them i n t h i s knowledge . . . 
The Law acts l i k e a whip to the f l e s h , urging i t on as men do a 
lazy sluggish ass. Even i n the case of a s p i r i t u a l man, inasmuch 
as he i s s t i l l burdened with the weight of the f l e s h , the Lavr i s a 
constant stimulus, pricking him forward when he would indulge i n 
s l o t h ' ( C a l v i n , I n s t i t u t e s , Bk. I I , Ch. V I I , para. 12.). The same 
emphasis i s to be found i n other C a l v i n i s t writings. 'The law was 
given as a direction of l i f e , a rule of walking to believers' (the 
17th Cent. Samuel Bolton, i n The True Bounds of C h r i s t i a n Freedom, 
rep. London, Banner of Truth Press, 1964, p. 83); 'The law was also 
given as a reprover and corrector for s i n , even to the s a i n t s ; I say, 
to d i s c i p l i n e them and reprove them for s i n • . • The law was given 
to be a spur to quicken us to duties. The f l e s h i s sluggish, and the f lavr i s " i n s t a r s t i m u l i " (of the nature of a spur or goad) to quicken 
us i n the ways of obedience 1 ( i b i d . , p. 83)• 
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134. Luther, Treatise on Good Works (1520), Luther*s Works. Vol. 44, 
St. Louis, Concordia, 1966, pp. 17ff. 
135* ST, I I I , p. 245. 
136. I b i d . , p. 246. 
137» I b i d . , p. 247. 
138. The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 136. 
139* ST, I I I , p. 248. 
140. I b i d . , p. 249. 
141. I b i d . , p. 250. 
142. I b i d . , p. 251. 
143. I b i d . 
144. I b i d . , p. 252. 
145. I b i d . , p. 253. 
146. See above, pp. 3l8f., l 8 2 f . 
147. ST» H I , P. 254. 
148. I b i d . 
149« I n h i s sermon on 'The Witness of the S p i r i t to the S p i r i t * (The 
Shaking of the Foundations, pp. 139ff.) T i l l i c h speaks of the doubt 
that stems from the gap between the Chr i s t i a n and God as the very 
work of the S p i r i t i t s e l f , as the way i n which the S p i r i t throws us 
back i n dependence on him. Commenting on the text, 'Likewise the 
S p i r i t helpeth our i n f i r m i t i e s . . .' (Romans 8) he says, 'Paul 
recognises the f a c t that usually we are possessed by weakness which 
makes the experience of the S p i r i t and the right prayer'impossible. 
But he t e l l s us that i n these periods we must not believe that the 
S p i r i t i s f a r from us. I t i s within us, although not experienced 
by us . . . To the man who longs for God and cannot find him; to the 
man who wants to be acknowledged by God and cannot believe that He 
i s ; to the man who i s s t r i v i n g for a new and imperishable meaning 
of his l i f e and cannot discover i t - to t h i s man Paul speaks. We 
are each such a man. Just i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , where the S p i r i t i s 
f a r from our consciousness, where we are unable to pray or to 
experience any meaning i n l i f e , the S p i r i t i s working quietly i n 
the depth of our souls. I n the moment when we f e e l separated from 
God, meaningless i n our l i v e s , and condemned to despair, we are not 
l e f t alone . . . I n feeling t h i s against f e e l i n g , i n believing t h i s 
against b e l i e f , i n knowing th i s against knowledge, we, l i k e Paul, 
possess a l l . Those outside that experience possess nothing*. The 
experience of doubt i t s e l f becomes the very stepping-stone to a 
higher awareness of the presence of God i n our l i v e s . 
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150. OT, i n , p. 257. 
151* T i l l i c h i s quite sure that i t i s unfortunate that Protestantism has 
come to r e j e c t mysticism as i t has done, for t h i s makes it"doubly 
d i f f i c u l t to make any r e a l communication between Protestant 
C h r i s t i a n i t y and the great religions of the East* He f e e l s that 
t h i s has caused a c e r t a i n reaction i n Protestant countries against 
Protestantism i t s e l f i n favour of more mystical expressions of 
r e l i g i o n , and c i t e s the present influence of Zen Buddhism i n the 
West as an example of t h i s . But he also notes that there i s a new 
assessment of mysticism i n Protestant c i r c l e s taking place. Greater 
emphasis i s being placed on contemplation i n the l i f e of prayer, 
greater emphasis on silence i n Protestant worship, a renewed emphasis 
on l i t u r g y over against preaching and teaching. A l l t h i s Protestantism 
must welcome and encourage: the sort of mysticism i t must r e j e c t 
i s that which attempts union with the divine through a s c e t i c or 
other means at the expense of the profound truthB for which the 
doctrines of human g u i l t and divine acceptance stand. This means 
that f o r the Protestant churches, there can be no mysticism without 
f a i t h , and no s a n c t i f i c a t i o n without j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 
152. ST, I I I , p. 255-
153. See above, p. 253. 
154* For an analysis of the New Testament concept of regeneration, see 
the a r t i c l e by C.E.B. Cranfield i n A Theological Word Book of the 
Bible (ed. A. Richardson, London, SCM Press, 1950, p. 30). 'The 
New Testament,* he says, 'indicates the absolute contrast between 
two kinds of l i f e and the momentousness of the passing from the one 
to the other by metaphors of creation . . . resurrection . . . and 
b i r t h . The need for radical renewal . . . i s most c l e a r l y expressed 
i n John 3: 3,5* The new l i f e i s s p i r i t u a l , and can be originated 
only by God . . . The change can be effected only by God, and i s 
sheer miracle', ( i t a l i c s mine). 
155. Romans 6» 4ff« 
156. I I Cor. 5: 17. 
157* Egh. 2: I f . 
158. Jas. 1: 18. 
159* Jn. 3i 3,6. 
160. ST, I I , p. 205. 
161. I b i d . , p. 206. 
162. The Shaking of the Foundations, pp. 130ff. 
163. Rom. 8» 16. 
164. Wesley's Forty-Four Sermons, London, Epworth Press, rep. 1950> P« H5« 
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l65» For an analysis of the meaning of dikaioBuhe, see C.K. Barrett, 
The E p i s t l e to the Romans, London, Black, 1957, pp. 74ff» Barrett 
comments, ' J u s t i f i c a t i o n then means no legal f i c t i o n but an act of 
forgiveness on God's part . . . Far from being a legal f i c t i o n , 
t h i s i s a creative act i n the f i e l d of divine-human r e l a t i o n s ' . 
166. W. Nicholls, op. c i t . , pp. 248ff. 
167. The Protestant Era, pp. xf. 
168. See above, p. 185. 
169. Luther, Treatise on Good Works, see above, note 134* 
170. See for example W.E. Sangster, The Path to Perfection, London, 
Epworth Press, 1957; H. Lindstrom, Wesley and Sanotification, 
London, Epworth Press, 1950» and C;W. Williams, John Wesley's 
Theology Today, Epworth Press, I96O, pp. l67ff. 
171* Such a perfection has been popularly defined as 'giving as much as 
one knows of oneself to as much as one knows of God'. ( I have 
been unable to trace the source of t h i s phrase, but I owe i t to 
the Rev. J.E. Bolamof Eastbourne). 
172. I Cor. 13«12. 
173* See above, p. 202 , for a discussion on T i l l i c h ' s concept of 
mystical union. 
174. ST> I I I , p. 258. 
175* I b i d . , p. 260. 
176. I b i d . 
177. See also i b i d . , pp. 7> 130. 
178. Included i n The Future of Religions, ed. by J.C. Brauer, New York, 
Harper and Row, 1966, pp. 80ff. (See Perspectives, pp. x x x i i i f . ) 
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CHAPTER FIVE THE SPIRIT AND THE AMBIGUITIES OF CULTURE 
I . THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND CULTURE 
Before dealing s p e c i f i c a l l y with the ambiguities of culture and the 
way i n which they are resolved under the impact of the S p i r i t , we must 
f i r s t look at what T i l l i c h says about the e s s e n t i a l r e l a t i o n of r e l i g i o n 
and culture i n the l i g h t of the S p i r i t u a l Presence. 1 As we have seen 
already, i n T i l l i o h ' s view, morality, culture and r e l i g i o n are e s s e n t i a l l y 
one, even though under the conditions of existence they are estranged 
2 
and appear as separate functions. I t i s part of the purpose of the 
divine S p i r i t to bring them together again i n an e s s e n t i a l unity. As 
f a r as culture i s ooncerned, t h i s brings to the fore the problem of the 
r e l a t i o n between the churches, as representatives of the S p i r i t u a l 
Community, and the culture i n which they are placed. T i l l i c h sees a two-
fol d r e lationship. Because the S p i r i t u a l Community i s the dynamic essence 
of the churches, the churches become the media through whioh the S p i r i t 
can work i n the community as a whole towards the self-transcendence of 
culture; but i n so f a r as the churches i n e v i t a b l y d i s t o r t the S p i r i t u a l 
Community i n t h e i r own ambiguous existence, then t h e i r influence on 
culture i t s e l f can be d i s t o r t i n g and ambiguous, and f o r t h i s reason i t 
i s equally as wrong to subject culture to a church i n the name of the 
S p i r i t u a l Community as i t i s to keep the churches withdrawn from general 
c u l t u r a l l i f e . Nevertheless, there can be no f u l l impact of the S p i r i t 
on any c u l t u r a l function unless there i s f i r s t l y what T i l l i c h c a l l s an 
'inner-historioal representation of the S p i r i t u a l Community i n the 
c h u r c h ' A n d t h i s remains true despite the f a c t that the S p i r i t i s 
already l a t e n t l y a t work i n a preliminary or preparatory sense i n other 
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groups and individuals, whether i n the sense of preparing f o r a f u l l 
manifestation of the S p i r i t u a l Community i n a church, or even i n a 
residual sense i n those situations where the ohuroh has l o s t i t s essen-
t i a l power but the r e s u l t s of i t s o r i g i n a l impact on a culture s t i l l 
remain, keeping a l i v e to some extent the self-transcendence of i t s 
c u l t u r a l c r e a t i v i t y * However, this means that the S p i r i t cannot be bound 
to the churches, with t h e i r Word and sacraments* I t i s free to make i t s 
impact on any culture, preparing a r e l i g i o u s community i n i t s midst, and. 
i n the context of that community, men and women who are ready to receive 
i t . 
With t h i s i n mind, T i l l i c h establishes three pr i n c i p l e s concerning 
the r e l a t i o n between r e l i g i o n and culture. The f i r s t i s what he c a l l s 
'the principle of the consecration of the seoular',^ which stems d i r e c t l y 
from the freedom of the S p i r i t to work i n the whole of l i f e , not merely 
i n the r e l i g i o u s sphere, so that every part of l i f e i s open to the S p i r i t , 
not j u s t the l i f e of the church. T i l l i c h sees t h i s 'emancipation of 
the secular' as a feature of the ministry of C h r i s t himself, something 
that was rediscovered at the time of the Reformation* I t s e f f e c t i s 
far-reaching. I t immediately crosses swords with those who say that the 
only way of saving culture from i t s potentially destructive ambiguities 
i s to c a l l f o r a r e v i v a l of r e l i g i o n i n i t s narrower sense* For apart 
from giving the impression that r e l i g i o n i s merely a safeguard to be 
used to bolster up a decaying culture or nation, rather than having a 
spec i a l function of i t s own, thereby 'using the ultimate as a tool f o r 
something non-ultimate 1, suoh people make the fundamental error of 
thinking that the S p i r i t i s t i e d to the use of r e l i g i o n alone i n order 
to exert any impact onscultural a c t i v i t y * Such a mistake oan only be 
made, says T i l l i c h , by those who l i m i t the freedom of the S p i r i t to the 
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churches as sole representations of the S p i r i t u a l Community. Against 
t h i s attitude the principle of the consecration of the secular must 
stand. I n f a c t , even seoular forms which are a c t u a l l y h o s t i l e to r e l i g i o n 
can be consecrated i n t h i s wayi the S p i r i t can work i n and through them, 
awakening s o c i a l conscience, or giving man a deeper understanding of 
himself, or breaking the power of those superstitions that are encouraged 
by the churches. The S p i r i t i s not averse even to using ' a n t i - r e l i g i o u s ' 
means i f t h i s w i l l r e s u l t i n a transformation of secular culture - i n 
f a c t , quite often by these means the S p i r i t e f f e c t s important changes 
i n the l i f e of the churches themselves. And the Protestant churches, i f 
they are i n any way true to the princ i p l e which gave them b i r t h , w i l l 
surely be the f i r s t to r e a l i s e t h i s * 
Nevertheless, to say that the S p i r i t does not only use r e l i g i o n to 
make h i s presence f e l t within secular society i s not the same as saying 
that r e l i g i o n can be dispensed with, and i t i s important to emphasise 
t h i s i n the present s i t u a t i o n . Here T i l l i c h d i f f e r s from many of the so-
c a l l e d 'secular theologians* of today. I n f a c t , he would maintain that 
i n the long run, a lack of concrete h i s t o r i c a l r e l i g i o n would lead to a 
t o t a l s e c u l a r i s a t i o n or profanisation of l i f e , which would i n turn r e s u l t 
i n the self-destruction of society.** Without the conoreteness of r e l i g i o u s 
symbols, devotion and fellowship, the r e a l substance of r e l i g i o n would 
eventually disappear, and with i t the sense of the divine Presence i n 
l i f e as a whole. The very purpose of r e l i g i o u s a c t i v i t y i s to remind 
man that God i s indeed present i n the whole of l i f e i without i t there 
would be no reminder and the power of the presence of the divine would 
be l o s t . I n other words, though re l i g i o u s symbols and a c t i v i t i e s 
ultimately may be disoarded, yet they are s t i l l necessary i n the existen-
t i a l sphere because of man's estrangement from the ground of h i s being* 
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•We are a l l poor people because we a l l have the fundamental tendency 
toward the secular, toward going out from the presence of God, f l e e i n g 
from God* And religions-are-the r e s t r a i n i n g , the balancing power*.** 
I t may w e l l be that there are times when r e l i g i o u s a c t i v i t i e s can blind 
us to the presence of the divine i n secular l i f e , and when t h i s happens 
the churches have f a i l e d i n t h e i r purpose, but even so there are times 
when the church, l i k e a treasure chest, opens up i t s divine treasures to 
men, and i t i s important that i n those times there should be those who 
are ready and able to participate i n i t s symbolio tpower« 
The second princi p l e whioh determines the r e l a t i o n between r e l i g i o n 
and culture i s the 'convergence of the holy and the s e c u l a r 1 * I n one 
sense, the secular i s the r e s u l t of r e s i s t a n c e to any a c t u a l i s a t i o n of 
self-transcendenoe, but t h i s resistance, T i l l i c h points out, i s ambiguous, 
f o r though i t laudibly prevents the f i n i t e from being merely swallowed 
up i n the i n f i n i t e , and though i t r i g h t l y opposes the claim of the 
churches to represent the transoendent d i r e c t l y and exclusively, i t 
oannot ultimately r e s i s t the universal function of self-transcendence, 
for to do so would be to leave the f i n i t e i t s e l f empty and meaningless, 
cut off from the i n f i n i t e source of i t s being* The f i n i t e must inevitably 
ask the question of l i f e above i t s e l f , and i n doing so i t necessarily 
moves i n the d i r e c t i o n of self-transcendence. So 'the secular i s driven 
toward union with the holy, a union which a c t u a l l y i s a reunion because 
8 
the holy and the secular belong to each other'. But i f t h i s i s true, 
j u s t as the secular cannot e x i s t without the holy, so also the holy 
oannot e x i s t without the secular. I t cannot i s o l a t e i t s e l f , for i f i t 
does so i t not only loses i t s claim to represent that which concerns 
man ultimately, i t also f a l l s into self-contradiction* For even an 
isolated form of the holy must use language, patterns and ideas, which 
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themselves are forms of secular culture« 'the simplest proposition i n 
which the holy t r ies to isolate i t s e l f from the seoular i s secular, i n 
9 
form'* So the holy has need of the secular to give content and 
expression to i t se l f* Nevertheless, the secular frequently resists 
this attempt by seeking adamantly to stand alone* So, says T i l l i c h , 
there i s 'claim and counterclaim'* Nevertheless, i n spite of th i s , 'there 
i s a convergent movement of the one toward the other; the principle of 
the convergence of the holy and the secular i s alvays effect ive '* 
These two principles, says T i l l i c h , are rooted i n a t h i r d , 'the 
essential belongingness of re l ig ion and culture to each other** I t i s 
this principle to which the statement that ' r e l ig ion is the substance of 
culture and culture the form of r e l i g ion ' re fe rs*^ So i n this oontext, 
i t i s necessary to reassert that ' r e l ig ion cannot express i t s e l f even 
i n a meaningful silence without culture, from which i t takes a l l forms 
of meaningful expression1, and that 'culture loses i t s depth and inex-
haust ibi l i ty without the ultimacy of the u l t i m a t e ' . 1 1 I n f ac t , T i l l i c h 
observes that this la t te r point i s exactly what has happened i n our 
contemporary situation* The concentration of man's ac t iv i t ies on the 
methodical investigation and transformation of his world, including 
himself, and the consequent loss of the dimension of depth i n his encounter 
with r e a l i t y , i s painful ly obvious i n modern industr ial society* 'Reality 
has lost i t s inner transcendence or, i n another metaphor, i t s transparency 
fo r the eternal • * . The result i s that God has become superfluous and 
12 
the universe l e f t to man as i t s master'* Creativity has become a 
human quali ty, the state of man's estrangement i s ignored, and man be-
comes demonically enslaved i n the ambiguities of his own attempts at 
self-sufficiency* As he puts i t , 
When the religious substance of humanism disappeared, the 
mere form was l e f t , abundant, but empty • • • Cultural goods 
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have become trimmings, means f o r having a good time, 
but nothing ultimately serious, nothing through which 
the mystery of being grasps us. Humanism has become 
empty«13 
The reaction of the church against this i n retreating into i t s own 
traditional past and creating a supranatural above the natural realm, 
has only served to emphasise the current divorce between culture and 
re l ig ion , a divorce which l ibera l theology clearly f a i l ed to overcome 
i n that i t tended to soft-pedal the message of the New Reality. But 
the current protest against the s p i r i t of industr ial society such as one 
finds i n existentialism opens the way, says T i l l i c h , fo r a new assess-
ment of man's encounter with r ea l i t y , and makes i t possible i n this 
context f o r the theologian to assert the essential belongingness of 
culture and re l igion together* 
Evaluation 
There i s l i t t l e to of fer at this juncture i n the way of c r i t i c a l 
comment. One would agree basically with what T i l l i c h has to say here 
about the relat ion between re l ig ion and culture, and particularly the 
way i n which they must be held together i f the l i f e of man i s to be 
seen i n something more than merely humanistic categories. The three 
principles he enunciates to explain this relationship are sound enough, 
and underline important issues, though i n a very real sense the three 
principles are basically one and the same, and clearly overlap. Some-
times one feels that T i l l i c h ' s desire f o r orderly systematisation leads 
him to make rather a r t i f i c i a l divisions, and this i s a case i n point. A 
more important point concerns the mutual need of the holy and the secular 
f o r each other. The secular cannot exist without the holy, says T i l l i c h , 
and equally the holy cannot exist without the secular. What perhaps 
he does not bring out clearly enough is that the holy does not need the 
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secular i n precisely the same way as the secular needs the holy. I n 
the f i r s t place, the holy's need of the secular is that i t must use i t s 
forms of expression to manifest i t s e l f i n the existential world. 
Without this no revelation is possible, and i n this sense, one could 
say that the holy cannot ' ex is t ' without the secular. But this i s by 
no means the same as saying that without the secular the holy cannot be, 
and though T i l l i c h does not actually say th i s , i t does need underlining. 
I t certainly cannot be said that the secular is i n any way necessary to 
the rea l i ty of the holy i t s e l f , f o r to say this would have the effect 
of making God as equally dependent on the world as the world i s on God. 
One feels that this point must be made i n so f a r as any dialect ical 
interpretation of the relation between God and the world, such as T i l l i c h 
seems to favour, could well lead to this sort of statement, which i s 
quite unacceptable from the standpoint of orthodox theology. But secondly, 
when one turns to the secular's need of the holy, the situation is such 
that although the secular may not acknowledge i t s need of the holy, 
even perhaps repudiating the holy i t s e l f , this does not a l ter the fact 
that i t s need f o r the holy i s i n the nature of an absolute necessity, 
not only to give i t ultimate significance, as T i l l i c h points out, but 
also f o r i t s very l i f e . The world i s dependent on God, and without 
God i t could not be. So whilst man may not f ee l the need of the holy 
i n the preliminary concerns of his everyday l i f e , he must constantly 
be reminded that without the creative and sustaining power of the 
divine Sp i r i t the whole of l i f e would cease to be. So the holy's 
need of the secular is relat ive, whereas the secular's need of the holy 
is absolute. As T i l l i c h ' s treatment stands i t needs strengthening to 
bring out this difference more forceful ly* 
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Nevertheless, one welcomes T i l l i o h ' s comments concerning contem-
porary secular theology and his warning that such a theology may well 
result i n a to t a l denial of transcendence* His fears seem j u s t i f i e d i n 
l igh t of the current 'Death of God' school, and the way i n whioh this 
type of theology i s prepared to deny the presence of the divine i n the 
midst of l i f e * Despite Gilkey's claim that the 'Death of God' theology 
14 
has acoepted from T i l l i c h the campaign against theism, i t i s clear 
from what T i l l i c h says here that the proponents of this school of thought 
are moving i n a rather d i f ferent direction altogether* Though T i l l i c h 
may reject the idea of a personal divine being, he by no means rejects 
the concept of God i t s e l f , whioh seems to be the inevitable conclusion 
of much of the thinking of men l ike Hamilton and Altizer* By asserting 
that the presence of the holy i n the midst of l i f e , manifested through 
the S p i r i t , i s that alone which gives l i f e significance and meaning, 
T i l l i c h i s not only disclaiming any connection with such a theology, 
but also fo rce fu l ly underlining the sp i r i tua l bankruptcy of theological 
atheism* Any tendency that modern secular theology may have to move i n 
the direction of denying the transcendent certainly does not have T i l l i e n ' s 
blessing* 
I I * TOWARDS A THBONOMOUS CULTURE 
We have already seen how, i n his analysis of culture, T i l l i c h 
emphasised the numerous ambiguities with which the area of cultural 
creat ivi ty i s beset, and how these ambiguities reach their climax i n the 
realisation that i t is impossible to f u l f i l every potential of the creative 
function i n a prooess of actualisation which i s what the humanistic 
ideal would suggest*1^ I f the fu l f i lmen t of the self-creative function 
of man cannot be realised i n this way, i n a 'horizontal d i rec t ion ' , then 
i t must break out of th i s into another direotion altogether, and this 
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leads to the possibi l i ty of culture 'transcending i t s e l f * This i t can 
only do, T i l l i c h maintains, when i t i s grasped by the power of the divine 
Sp i r i t , which alone enables i t to f u l f i l i t s e l f* This leads us to ask 
the question, 'What happens to culture as a whole under the impact of the 
Spiri tual Presence?', a question which T i l l i c h seeks to answer by devel-
oping more f u l l y the concept of theonomy* 
The concept of theonomy i s one which T i l l i c h frequently uses* I t 
i s based on the belief that the divine Spi r i t i s present i n the whole 
of l i f e as i t s essential ground* Whatever i s open to and directed towards 
17 
this divine depth can be called 'theonomous'. 1 But theonomy i s not to 
be confused with heteronomy, which presupposes that God i s al ien to man 
and can only come to him from the outside, imposing himself upon him* On 
the other hand, neither i s i t to be confused with autonomy, which suggests 
that man i s the source and measure of his own l i f e and behaviour, the 
master of his own destiny, which can result i n anarchy* Bather does 
theonomy perceive that i n the depth of every human l i f e the divine i s 
at work, not as something strange or foreign to man, but as that i n which 
the l i f e of man is rooted and participates. So theonomy transcends 
autonomy i n that i t recognises the true souroe and power from which a l l 
autonomy springs. In this sense i t resists a l l secular forms of auto-
nomy i n the same way as i t resists a l l religious structures of a heter-
onomous nature. I n so doing, i t stands over against the refusal to 
a f f i rm the presence of the divine Sp i r i t in human l i f e as well as the 
attempt to express the impact of that presence i n terms of a r i g i d super-
imposition* 
A theonomous culture, then, i s one which i s open towards the divine 
Spi r i t who i s recognised as the source and ground of a l l cultural acts* 
Because of i t s participation i n the Sp i r i t i t i s *a culture i n which the 
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ultimate meaning of existence shines through a l l f i n i t e forms of thought 
and action; the culture i s transparent, and i t s creations are vessels 
18 
of a sp i r i tua l content'• I t i s a culture which thereby communicates 
the experience of holiness i n every part of i t s l i f e - from a painted 
flower to a hymn, or even a po l i t i c a l document* I n a theonomous environ-
ment, nothing w i l l be unconsecratedi ' i n a l l i t s forms' i t w i l l be 
'open to and directed toward the divine'* But this does not mean that 
i t w i l l violate cultural autonomy, f o r though theonomy and autonomy are 
not the same they are not necessarily contradictory* On the contrary, 
just as ' Sp i r i t f u l f i l s s p i r i t instead of breaking i t ' , theonomy w i l l 
a f f i rm the autonomous forms of every creative process, but i n such a way 
as to show that every autonomous form i s not merely the f i n i t e expression 
i t seems to be on the surface, but receives i t s real power and s i g n i f i -
19 
cance from the theonomous depths i n which i t s l i f e i s rooted* ' I n the 
his tor ical s i tuation, T i l l i c h recognises, however, that there i s a real 
danger here, fo r the very concern to preserve the theonomous significance 
of culture may well give rise to heteronomous principles which clamp down 
on a l l autonomous forms i n the name of the S p i r i t , seeking to impose 
only those forms which are f e l t to express the experience of the ultimate* 
So theonomy is distorted into heteronomy, a dis tor t ion which has unfortun-
ately characterised much of the church's approach to culture down through 
the ages* And by seeking to impose certain patterns of cultural ac t iv i ty 
upon man 'from the outside' so to speak, i t has frequently threatened 
to destroy the genuine autonomous impulse by forcing man to confozm to 
certain forms and structures* 
This enslavement of every form of autonomous expression inevitably 
leads to a rebellion on the part of autonomy, i n which vigorously inde-
pendent autonomous forms w i l l seek to break through and destroy the heter-
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onomous forms which hold them down. The danger is that i n so doing. 
autonomous forms of culture w i l l also threaten any element of theonomous 
concern that may remain* Such a si tuation, T i l l i c h points out, i s 
characterised by a 'self-complacent humanism' which 'cuts the ties of a 
c iv i l i s a t i on with i t s ultimate ground and aim, whereby, i n the measure 
i n which i t succeeds, a c iv i l i s a t i on becomes exhausted and sp i r i tua l ly 
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empty'• The cultural forms i t produces w i l l appear only i n their 
f i n i t e relationships' as the to ta l ly secular autonomy now seeks to work 
towards the fu l f i lment of as many human potential i t ies as are possible, 
rushing aimlessly ahead i n a horizontal direction,as we saw i n our 
analysis of the ambiguities of culture* The impossibility of securing 
such a f u l f i l m e n t , with the f rus t ra t ion and sense of purposelessness 
that i t causes, gives rise to the question of how the cultural function 
can be f u l f i l l e d . The only answer to this question is to l i f t i t out 
of i t s horizontal context and see that i t s fu l f i lment l ies i n a ' ve r t i c a l ' 
direction, i n the realisation that once again every cultural act can be 
an expression of the divine Spi r i t i n man, open to the ultimate meaning 
and significance of l i f e as a whole* Such a direction transcends every 
individual aim and answers the humanistic indefiniteness about 'where-to?' 
which springs from a purely f i n i t e term of reference beyond which secular 
humanism cannot go* I t i s , of course, the genuinely theonomous answer, 
21 
which sees a l l cultural forms ' i n their relat ion to the unconditional 1, 
i n relation to the divine Spiri t* So the struggle between heteronomy 
22 
and autonomy leads inevitably to the search f o r a 'new theonomy', a 
search which is resolved only under the impact of the Sp i r i t , whereby 
oulture again comes to realise i t s significance and depth. And 'wherever 
this impact i s ef fect ive , theonomy is created, and wherever there i s 23 theonomy, traces of the impact of the Spiri tual Presence are visible*• 
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T i l l i c h refers to those times i n history when a new theonomy 
24 
appears as k a l r o i , the moment of impact of the divine Spir i t i n the 
realm of culture* i n which the depth and significance of human l i f e and 
history are revealed* Such moments are preceded by an attitude of 
'creative wai t ing ' , sparked o f f by the secularised and emptied autonomous 
type of culture to which we have referred* For the Christian, of course, 
the unique and universal kairos i s the appearance of Jesus as the 
Christ, but the history of re l ig ion and philosophy provide other examples* 
T i l l i c h feels that i t i s possible f o r such a theonomy to 'characterise 
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a whole cul ture ' , maintaining that one of i t s most complete expressions 
was i n the early and high Middle Ages 'before i t s nominalistic disinte-
26 
gra t ion ' , when i t effected a balance between heteronomous and autonomous 
trends* But even at those times when i t does not appear as the dominant 
force i n a particular culture, i t s presence can be observed to some extent, 
and on occasions i t w i l l come into direct conf l i c t with whatever element 
i s predominant, whether heteronomous (as i n the later Middle Ages) or 
autonomous (as i n the Enlightenment)* I t w i l l be seen, then, that though 
the viotory of the Sp i r i t i n establishing a theonomous culture i s never 
existential ly complete, neither can i t be t o t a l l y destroyed* ' I t s 
victory i s always fragmentary because of the existential estrangement 
underlying human history, and i t s defeat i s always l imited by the fact 
27 
that human nature i s essentially theonomous'* 1 
Turning to more specific cultural acts, T i l l i c h feels that the 
impact of the Sp i r i t i n creating theonomy helps to resolve one of the 
most fundamental ambiguities of a l l cultural a c t i v i t y , that of the s p l i t 
28 
between subject and object* Man has never successfully resolved this 
cleavage, though he has constantly attempted to do so i n a variety of 
ways, such as mystical experiences and the erotic aspect of human love* 
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A l l that he has been able to do has been to anticipate i n some way the 
ultimate resolution of the problem. Such an anticipation, however, is 
only a genuine fragment of the unity of subject and object when i t i s 
the result of the impaot of the divine S p i r i t . Consequently i t iB i n 
the theonomous si tuation, where the Sp i r i t breaks through and grasps 
the cultural realm, that the ambiguity of subject and object i n the 
creative act, fragmentarily disappears. So 'the Spir i tual Presence drives 
the ambisulties of 
toward the conquest of/culture by creating theonomous forms i n the d i f f e r -
ent realms of the cul tural self-creation of l i f e ' . 
T i l l i c h deals i n turn with the three basic types of function which 
he has already outlined i n the sphere of culture! t ru th and expressiveness, 
purpose and humanity, and power and just ice. Turning f i r s t l y to the 
functions of t ruth and expressiveness, he looks i n i t i a l l y at language, 
where the subject-objeot cleavage is immediately apparent* 'No language 
is possible without the subject-object cleavage and that language i s 
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continuously brought to self-defeat by this very cleavage'• ' .But i n a 
theonomous si tuation, T i l l i c h maintains, language i s fragmentarily 
liberated from bondage to the subject-object schemei ' i t reaches moments 
i n which i t becomes a bearer of the Sp i r i t expressing the union of him 
who speaks i n an act of l inguis t ic self-transcendence'. So we should 
not think of the word which bears the Sp i r i t as grasping some object 
opposite the speaker, but as expressing and 'giving voioe* to something 
which transcends both subject and object. The most important way i n 
which this occurs is through the Sp i r i t ' s creation of a verbal symbol, 
which we may ca l l I the Word of G o d O 0 This Word of God, or the ' S p i r i t -
determined human word', i s not bound to any particular revelatory event, 
nor is i t confined to any re l ig ion or even to re l ig ion at a l l , f o r i t 
appears wherever the Spi r i t takes hold of man, whether as an individual 
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or as a group* Such language is beyond the power of every type of 
l inguis t ic ambiguity* I t conquers the polarity of poverty and abundance* 
since under the Sp i r i t ' s impact 'a few words become great words',"^ as 
a l l holy books demonstrate* Yet the impact of the Sp i r i t i s by no means 
confined to holy books - every use of language, every type of l i t e ra ture , 
can become the Word of God i f the Sp i r i t grasps him who speaks or writes 
and elevates his words so that they become the bearer of the Spi r i t to 
man. I t conquers also the ambiguity of par t icular i ty and universality, 
i n so f a r as every expression of a particular encounter with rea l i ty 
under the impact of the Sp i r i t transcends that encounter by pointing to 
and sharing i n the universal Logos, which i s the cr i ter ion of every 
particular logos* I t conquers the ambiguity of indefiniteness, which is 
inevitable i n everyday language because of the i n f i n i t e distance between 
the 'language-forming subject' and the 'inexhaustible object ' , not by 
trying to grasp an object which w i l l always escape i t , but by expressing 
a union between subject and object i n a l inguis t ic symbol which i s both 
indef ini te and def ini te at the same time, indef ini te because i t leaves 
the potential i t ies of both subject and object open, def ini te because i t 
alone i s able to express the character of that particular encounter 
adequately. And f i n a l l y , i t conquers the ambiguity which stems from the 
fact that language not only oommunioates but also on occasions prevents 
genuine communication* For because language cannot real ly penetrate to 
the centre of the other se l f , i t not only reveals, i t also conceals, i t 
not only opens up, i t also distorts* The Spirit-determined word however 
reaches the centre of the other person, not i n a merely descriptive 
ao t iv i ty , but by 'unit ing the centres of the speaker and the l istener i n 
32 
the transcendent unity '* So wherever the Spi r i t i s present, estrange-
ment i n terms of language i s overcome, as at Pentecost, and the possi-
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b i l i t y of dis tor t ing the language from i t s natural meaning i s removed* 
' I n a l l these respects,' says T i l l i c h , 'one could say that the ambiguities 
of the human word are oonquered by that human word which becomes the 
divine Word'* 
Theonomy also conquers the subject-object cleavage i n the cognitive 
sphere, the realm of knowledge*^ T i l l i o h l i s t s three examples where this 
cleavage i s most pronouncedi i n the fac t that every cognitive act must 
use abstract concepts, which inevitably ignore the concreteness of the 
situation; i n the fact that i t can never know anything other than pa r t i a l ly , 
despite the fact that 'the truth is the whole'; and i n the fact that 
whatever concepts and arguments i t uses, they are patterns which are 
applicable only to the world of objects and their interrelations* A l l 
this is unavoidable on the f i n i t e level* What i s needed i s a -type of 
knowledge which can transcend these l imitat ions and help us to see things 
as they t ru ly are, and especially i n relat ion to the eternal* Such 
knowledge i s the creation of the divine S p i r i t , and i t i s mediated to us 
through the language of universals, which are 'vehicles f o r the elevation 
of the par t ia l and concrete to the eternal, i n which t o t a l i t y as well 
as uniqueness are rooted'* This i s what religious knowledge real ly i s -
'knowledge of something particular i n the l i gh t of the eternal and of 
the eternal i n the l igh t of something part icular ' • I n this sort of know-
ledge, he maintains, the ambiguities of both subjectivity and object ivi ty 
are overcome* 
The impact of the Sp i r i t resolves not only the ambiguities of 
knowledge i t s e l f , but also the ambiguities i n the method of knowledge* 
Tied to a subject-object scheme, the subject t r ies to grasp i t s object 
through making observations and reaching conclusions* But when the subject-
object scheme i s overcome by theonomous cognition, conclusion by observa-
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t ion is transformed into insight by participation, a way of knowing which 
i s not so much a method as a state of being elevated into transcendent 
unity* I t i s this sort of knowledge which i n fact forms the essence of 
revelation, fo r revelation i s none other than cognition determined by 
the Spir i t* As we have already seen, this revelation i n T i l l i o h ' s 
opinion i s not to be confined to those revelatory experiences on which 
the actual religions are based, f o r the divine Wisdom or Logos i s equally 
present i n the wisdom of many wise men, and where such wisdom i s , there 
also the divine Spi r i t i s to be found* Such wisdom is to be 'distinguished 
from object i fying knowledge by i t s a b i l i t y to manifest i t s e l f beyond the 
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cleavage of subject and object 1 , and i n this sense i t would be appro-
priate to c a l l theonomous knowledge 'Spirit-determined wisdom'* This 
does not mean that i t negates or discards autonomous knowledge or the 
ordinary means of receiving that knowledge, f o r the Sp i r i t i s concerned 
to discern and maintain the in tegr i ty of both types of knowing* Never-
theless, i t i s important to recognise that there is a knowledge that i s 
over and above the accumulation of facts based on empirical observation, 
a knowledge which i s direct ly given under the impact of the Sp i r i t of 
God. 
The search fo r expressiveness, the aesthetic function of culture, 
presents similar problems. The f i r s t problem i s whether the arts 
express the subject or the object* A second concerns the precise re la-
t ion of man to the whole realm of aesthetic expression* The former problem 
can only be resolved i n the l i gh t of the answer given to the l a t t e r , and 
this constitutes what T i l l i c h calls the problem of aestheticism* I t arises 
because i n the subject-object scheme, the aesthetic function can create 
images only f o r the purpose of aesthetic enjoyment, and whilst this may 
be well i n keeping with the creat ivi ty of the human sp i r i t* i t hardly 
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leads to genuine participation* This situation can only be overcome by 
the impact of the divine S p i r i t , who makes subject and object one i n 
mutual participation* So the answer we give to the second question is that 
man can only participate i n that which he seeks to express through the 
work of the Sp i r i t within him* I n the l i g h t of th i s , the answer we give 
to the f i r s t question as to whether the arts express the subject or the 
object i s that i n a theonomous situation they express neither, rather 
do they express the union of the two i n the Spir i tual Presence* This 
leads us to ask the inevitable question as to whether one particular 
a r t i s t i c style i s more theonomous than another* T i l l i c h admits that 
this is not an easy question to answer, f o r whereas i n theonomous cog-
n i t ion , the theologian who seeks to answer th is type of question does 
so by using a particular philosophy which he feels is best suited to 
his purpose or to the human situation i n which he finds himself, i n the 
realm of art the situation i s not exactly the same, f o r particular 
a r t i s t i c styles do not f a l l into such clearly marked categories as d i f f e r -
ent types of philosophy* For our purpose, i t would be much more accurate 
to speak of certain s t y l i s t i c elements, which are present i n a l l a r t i s t i c 
traditions to a greater of lesser degree, even though one w i l l usually 
predominate* Of the three s t y l i s t i c elements commonly accepted, the 
r ea l i s t i c , the ideal is t ic and the expressionistic, T i l l i c h feels that 
the l a t t e r i s most able to express the self-transcendence of l i f e i n that 
' i t breaks away from the horizontal movement and shows the Spir i tual 
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Presence i n symbols of broken f in i tude '* I n every period i t has there-
fore been the genuine expressionistic element which has given rise to 
great works of religious art* Hence when rea l i s t elements predominate the 
f i n i t e i s accepted i n i t s f in i tude , and when idealis t elements predominate 
the f i n i t e i s represented i n i t s essential potent ial i ty , ignoring i t s 
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existential disruption or salvation* Only expressionism can real ly 
give a transcendent appreciation by breaking through into the ver t ical 
dimension, and fo r this reason i t i s the genuinely theonomous element i n 
aesthetic creativity* 
Turning to the functions of purpose and humanity, T i l l i c h notes 
that i n the realm of technical ac t iv i ty the basic ambiguity of the 
subject-objeot scheme i s seen i n several ways* i n the confl ic ts which 
result from the unlimited possibi l i t ies of teohnical progress, i n man's 
f i n i t e l imitations which hamper his adjustment to the things he has 
produced, i n the production of means for ends which become just means 
with no ultimate end, and i n the technical change of parts of nature 
into mere technical objects. He feels that a l l these ambiguities can 
be.overcome only 'by producing objects which can be imbued with subjective 
qualit ies; by detezmining a l l means toward an ultimate end, and,, by so 
doing, l i m i t i n g man's unlimited freedom to go beyond the g i v e n ' . ^ A l l 
this i s possible under the impact of the Sp i r i t . I n the f i r s t place, 
as f a r as the Sp i r i t i s ooncerned, no thing i s merely a thing, i t i s 
rather the bearer of form and meaning, and thus a possible object of 
eros, and this applies even to tools, whether primitive or complex* 
'This eros toward the technical Geatalt,* he-says, ' i s a way i n which a 
theonomous relat ion to technology can be achieved', and as long as i t i s 
not corrupted by sinister motives, i t has a genuinely theonomous character. 
So, although the technical object i s a potent factor i n causing cultural 
ambiguity, needing i t s e l f to be transcended, i t does not necessarily 
conf l ic t with the idea of theonomy, and for this reason i t can be meaning-
f u l l y imbued with subjective quality* 
I n the second place, under the impact of the Sp i r i t i t i s possible 
to determine a l l teohnical production towards an ultimate end* There i s 
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i n contemporary technology a trend towards what T i l l i c h calls 'emptiness'," 
( 
/ 
seen, f o r example, i n the current obsession with gadgets* Gadgets, he 
says, are not e v i l i n themselves, but to gear a whole economy towards 
their production, repressing the question of an ultimate end of technical 
production, or what i s the purpose behind i t a l l , i s no less than 
demonic. Purposefulness i s reduced to emptiness* Only when the attitude 
towards technical possibi l i t ies and production i s radically changed under 
the impact of the Spi r i t w i l l such a problem be resolved* As he himself 
puts i t , 'The divine S p i r i t , cutting out of the ver t ical direction to 
resist an unlimited running-ahead i n the horizontal l i n e , drives toward 
a technical production that i s subjected to the ultimate end of a l l l i f e 
•>Q 
processes - Eternal L i f e ' * Or, as we might express i t , when man i s 
grasped by the Sp i r i t , he is no longer interested i n a mul t ip l i c i ty of 
production fo r i t s own sake, he i s concerned rather that whatever he does 
produce shall open up i n some measure the quality of l i f e as i t i s i n 
the context of the Kingdom of God* 
Thirdly, the impact of the Spi r i t overcomes the destructive 
capacities of technical production* T i l l i c h reminds us that the road to 
destruction i s even more t e r r i f y i n g than the trend to purposelessness, 
part icularly i n the present period with the production of atomic warheads* 
I n no other si tuation i s the potential i ty f o r good and e v i l i n the same 
means of production so clearly pronounced, and the demonic possibi l i t ies 
give r ise quite r igh t ly to an ever-increasing concern* But under the 
impact of the S p i r i t , the destructive side of a l l such production would 
be banned, not by authoritarian res t r ic t ion which i s real ly a heterono-
mous solution, but by a change i n the desire to produce things which have 
destructive aims as their main intention* Such a solution is unimaginable 
without the Spir i tual Presence, because 'the ambiguity of production and 
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destruction cannot be conquered on the horizontal l eve l , even fragmen-
t a r y ' . 3 9 
I n the personal-communal function of culture, the Sp i r i t conquers 
the ambiguities i n a l l forms of determination, whether i t be se l f -
determination, other-determination or personal participation. The ambi-
guity of self-determination, rooted i n the s p l i t between the self as 
subject and the self as object i n which the one t r ies to determine the 
other i n the direction of 'the good' from which i t i s estranged, implies 
that i n the existential situation no centred self is f u l l y identical 
with i t s e l f . Hence there arises the 'search fo r identi ty*, which can 
only be resolved when the Sp i r i t takes hold of a person and unambiguously, 
albeit fragmentarily, re-establishes his true ident i ty . 'The self which 
has found i t s ident i ty i s the self of him who is "accepted" as a unity 
i n spite of his d i s u n i t y ' . ^ Similarly, the ambiguities of other-deter-
mination are also clearly rooted i n the subject-object s p l i t , and f o r 
this reason the necessity of overcoming the dilemma of se l f - res t r i c t ion 
or self-imposition by the one who educates or guides is impossible. On 
the one hand, i f he who guides res t r ic ts himself completely he w i l l be 
t o t a l l y ineffec t ive , a passive observer who has done nothing to free 
the other from his ambiguities. On the other hand, i f he imposes himself 
upon the other, he violates the other's personality by depersonalising 
him and making i t impossible fo r him to reach a genuine fu l f i lment of his 
own l i f e i n which he f ree ly responds to the aim of his own existence. This 
l a t t e r attitude i s part icularly prevalent i n any form of brainwashing, 
i n which the objeot beoomes the 'perfect example of the principle of 
conditioned ref lexes ' .^ 1 But the impact of the S p i r i t , argues T i l l i c h , 
sets man free both from mere subjectivity and from mere objec t iv i ty , so 
that t ru ly theonomous eduoation and counselling leads him towards the 
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ultimate i n l i f e which gives him freedom without internal disruption* 
' I f the educational or guiding communion between person and person i s 
raised beyond i t s e l f by the S p i r i t u a l Presence, the s p l i t between subject 
and object i n both relations i s fragmentarily conquered and humanity i s 
fragmentarily achieved'• 
The need for personal participation i n the other person a r i s e s 
from the f a c t that one's own humanity can be r e a l i s e d only i n reunion 
with the other* This leads to the two ambiguities present i n every 
person-to-person encounter, that of subjection, i n which the subject 
t r i e s to take over the other person, or that of surrender, i n which the 
subject gives himself up to the other one* E i t h e r way, says T i l l i c h , 
there i s no r e a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , for these solutions lead inevitably to 
the destruction of those they seek to unite* I t i s the v e r t i c a l dimension 
of self-transcendence which again comes to the rescue, affirming that the 
other person 'can be reached only through that which elevates him above 
J O 
h i s self-relatedness't the other person's l i f e i s entered by means of 
the transoendent unity i n which both persons participate* So the impact 
of the S p i r i t u a l Presence pierces the s h e l l of s e l f - s e c l u s i o n so that 
•the stranger who i s an estranged part of onels s e l f has ceased to be 
a stranger when he i s experienced as coming from the same ground as one's 
s e l f * I n t h i s way, concludes T i l l i c h , theonomy preserves humanity i n 
every human encounter* 
F i n a l l y , T i l l i c h turns to the ambiguities of power and j u s t i c e 
present i n the communal function. The f i r s t of these i s exclusiveness, 
the d i r e c t r e s u l t of the li m i t a t i o n s placed on a community by i t s necessary 
inclusiveness. Under the impact of the S p i r i t , says T i l l i c h , two things 
happen* The f i r s t i s that the churches themselves, as representatives 
of the S p i r i t u a l Community, are changed from re l i g i o u s communities which 
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possess a c e r t a i n amount of demonic exclusiveness, into holy communities 
with universal inolusiveness, even though at the same time they r e t a i n 
t h e i r i d e n t i t y as churches* I n t h i s way, through the churches, the 
S p i r i t i s able i n d i r e c t l y to influence the secular community. I n the 
second place, the S p i r i t influences more d i r e c t l y the ooncept of j u s t i c e 
i n secular society by being imperceptibly instrumental i n the creation 
of more embracing u n i t i e s through which those who are rejected by smaller 
groups become part of a larger group, a process which continues u n t i l a l l 
see that they are part of the l a r g e s t group, mankind i t s e l f t 'family-
ezclusiveness i s fragmentarily overcome by friendship-inclusiveness, 
friendship-rejection by acceptance i n l o c a l communities, olass-exclusiveness 
by national-inclusiveness, and so on'o^ T i l l i c h does point out, however, 
that there i s a difference between t h i s S p i r i t - c r e a t e d inclusiveness and 
the c o l l e c t i v e inclusiveness of t o t a l i t a r i a n s o c i e t i e s , which i n f a c t 
destroys any true community, and therefore against which the S p i r i t i s 
firmly seto 
The second ambiguity, that of equality, a r i s e s from the f a c t that 
•equality of what i s e s s e n t i a l l y unequal i s as unjust as inequality of 
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what i s e s s e n t i a l l y equal'* To resolve t h i s d i f f i c u l t problem,says 
T i l l i c h , the S p i r i t must unite the 'ultimate equality' of everyone 
oalled into the S p i r i t u a l Community with the 'preliminary inequality' 
that stems from a person's s e l f - a c t u a l i s a t i o n as an individual* I t can 
only do t h i s i f i t both conquers any e x i s t e n t i a l inequality of men (such 
as one finds i n situations l i k e slavery) which obscures t h e i r ultimate 
equality and makes i t i n e f f e c t i v e , and i n addition preserves that pre-
liminary e s s e n t i a l inequality which can be seen i n the, different g i f t s 
which men possess by r e s i s t i n g forms of communal equality, l i k e t o t a l i -
t a r i a n society, i n which the preliminary, inequality of men i s obliterated* 
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I n t h i s way the ultimate equality of a l l men i s made one with t h e i r 
preliminary inequality! 'with the affirmation of the ultimate equality 
of a l l men, the S p i r i t u a l Presence affirms the polarity of r e l a t i v e 
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equality and r e l a t i v e inequality i n the actual communal l i f e 1 , ^ thereby 
producing a genuine theonomy* 
Perhaps the most obvious ambiguity i n the communal realm, says 
T i l l i c h , i s that of leadership and power* Having no physiological 
centredness, the community must create centredness by some form of r u l i n g 
group, i t s e l f represented by an individual, i n which the oommunal 
oentredness i s embodied* The problems that stem from t h i s are obvious, 
for the r u l e r and h i s group, i n a c t u a l i s i n g the power of being of the 
whole community which they represent, w i l l inevitably a c t u a l i s e t h e i r 
own power of being also, and t h i s makes tyranny a very r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y * 
But the anarchical reaction against t h i s impasse i s equally as demonic, 
i n addition to the f a c t that such a reaction i n i t s e l f provokes further 
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tyrannical measures. The s i t u a t i o n thus gets out of hand, and there 
i s danger of t o t a l disintegration* To put i t sucoinctly, 
The centre of power i s only the oentre of the whole as long 
as i t does not degrade i t s own o e n t r a l i t y by using i t for 
p a r t i c u l a r purposes* I n the moment i n whioh the representa-
t i v e s of the centre use the power of the whole f o r t h e i r 
p a r t i c u l a r s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n they cease to be the actual centre, 
and the whole being, without a centre, disintegrates*47 
Such ambiguity, claims T i l l i c h , i s conquered under the S p i r i t ' s impact, 
by which the members of the r u l i n g group, including the r u l e r , 'are able 
in p a r t 
to s a c r i f i c e t h e i r subjectivity/by becoming objects of t h e i r own r u l e 
along with a l l other objects and by transferring the s a c r i f i c e d part of 
yifl 
t h e i r s u b j e c t i v i t y to the ruled'• This p r i n c i p l e i s e s s e n t i a l to the 
concept of democracy, even though one must be extremely careful not to 
i d e n t i f y democracy i t s e l f with any p a r t i c u l a r democratic constitution 
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which seeks to a c t u a l i s e the democratic principle* But wherever the 
princip l e i t s e l f i s at work, the S p i r i t u a l Presence i s to be found* 
The two remaining ambiguities i n the realm of communal j u s t i c e 
r e l a t e to the j u s t i c e of the law, i n the sense i n which the law beoomes 
a 'power-supported l e g a l system'* These are the ambiguities of the law's 
establishment and i t s execution* The f i r s t , says T i l l i c h , i s s i m i l a r 
to that of leadership* 'The j u s t i c e of a system of laws i s inseparably 
tied to j u s t i c e as conceived by the ruling group, and t h i s means that the 
s p i r i t of every act of l e g i s l a t i o n w i l l i n e x t r i c a b l y unite the s p i r i t of 
j u s t i c e and the s p i r i t of the controlling powers* So j u s t i c e implies 
49 r i n j u s t i c e ' * ' When the S p i r i t i s i n control t h i s ambiguity i s removed, 
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and the law becomes theonomously 'the j u s t i c e of the Kingdom of God', 
not i n the sense that i t i s a r a t i o n a l system of j u s t i c e superimposed on 
the l i f e of any communal group, but i n the sense that the S p i r i t u a l 
Presence working from within the l i f e of the group removes the i n j u s t i c e s 
of the law by combatting those ideologies which seek to j u s t i f y them* 
Sometimes t h i s f i g h t has been waged through the church, sometimes through 
prophetio movements within secular society, but wherever i t influences 
those who have charge of the law to change i t accordingly, the r e s u l t 
may be appropriately c a l l e d 'theonomous l e g i s l a t i o n ' * The second ambiguity, 
that of the execution of the law, has two aspeots* I n the f i r s t place, 
T i l l i c h points out, i t depends on the power of those who judge, who i n 
t h e i r turn are dependent on t h e i r own t o t a l being, so that t h e i r judge-
ments express not only the meaning of the law but also t h e i r own attitudes* 
The prophetic s p i r i t must always be ready to expose any bias i n favour 
of c l a s s or vested i n t e r e s t s or the dangers of temperamental influences 
i n making j u d i c i a l decisions that may accrue from such a situation* The 
second aspect of the ambiguity of the law's execution a r i s e s from the 
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abstract nature of the law and the consequent d i f f i c u l t i e s i n applying 
i t to s p e c i f i c cases* The usual way of trying to overcome this i s to 
make more and more laws to f i t more and more sit u a t i o n s . But t h i s never 
works, and ultimately there must l i e between the abstraction of the law 
and the concreteness of each s i t u a t i o n the wisdom of the judge, which 
he can apply only i n so f a r as he comes under the impact of the S p i r i t , 
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'theonomously inspired'*- So we can affirm that the 'abstract majesty' 
Of the law does not mean that i t i s a t l i b e r t y to override ind i v i d u a l 
differences, i n the same way as i t s admission of those differences i n no 
sense deprives i t of i t s general v a l i d i t y * 
At this point we have reached the stage where we venture into 
the proper realm of morality, for i t i s morality that d i r e c t l y underlies 
a l l forms of j u s t i c e and a l l expressions of humanity as well as i n d i r e c t l y 
underlying a l l functions of c u l t u r a l c r e a t i v i t y . 
Evaluation 
I t should be borne i n mind that what T i l l i o h has to say about the 
impact of the S p i r i t upon culture t i e s i n with what he has already said 
about the way i n which the ambiguities of culture are resolved i n the 
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l i f e of the churches* Consequently there i s some r e i t e r a t i o n here, 
though he i s obviously concerned i n t h i s present context with a much wider 
sphere than that of the churoh* His concept of a theonomous culture i s 
c l e a r enough, but one must immediately challenge his assertion that our 
grounds for affirming such a concept l i e i n a doctrine of ontological 
participation of a l l f i n i t e forms of expression i n the divine S p i r i t * 
One does not have to accept T i l l i c h ' s interpretation of the r e l a t i o n 
between God and the f i n i t e world i n order to affirm that through the 
impact of the S p i r i t a oulture may be transparent to i t s ultimate meaning 
and i t s creations f i l l e d out with s p i r i t u a l content. Any doctrine of 
387 
creation which takes the relationship between God and man s e r i o u s l y w i l l 
recognise that no culture can t r u l y f u l f i l i t s purpose unless i t i s open 
to the creative power of the S p i r i t of God* But t h i s i s not a case of 
forcing upon man's creative a c t i v i t y some dir e c t i o n from the outside* 
a l i e n to himself* I t i s rather to affirm that man cannot t r u l y be him-
s e l f and f u l f i l h i s capaoity for c u l t u r a l c r e a t i v i t y i n the right direction 
unless God i s at work within him, helping him to see and make known h i s 
own significance within the t o t a l purpose of God f o r the created order* 
Such a s i t u a t i o n i s c e r t a i n l y theonomous* I n no way does i t v i o l a t e 
man's own i n t e g r i t y , yet at the same time i t maintains the affirmations 
of C h r i s t i a n monotheism. 
I n the same way one would question T i l l i c h ' s concept of theonomous 
union as the means by which the S p i r i t overcomes the gap between subjeot 
and object i n man's c u l t u r a l experience* One would agree, of course, with 
his assertion that there are many ambiguities which inevitably a r i s e from 
t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the areas of communication, 
knowledge and a r t , but the solution he proposes i s d i f f i c u l t to accept* 
His conviction that such ambiguities can only be resolved by the creation 
t i 
of a theonomous union i s based on the b e l i e f that both subject and object 
have a common ground i n the divine S p i r i t which makes i t possible to 
affirm t h e i r e s s e n t i a l ontologLcal unity and to experience t h i s fragmen-
t a r i l y i n the present order under the S p i r i t ' s impact. This again pre-
supposes a continuity between the divine S p i r i t and the f i n i t e world which 
we cannot affirm. I n f a c t , i t i s very d i f f i c u l t to put any sensible 
interpretation on the idea of a theonomous union of an ontological nature 
at a l l . I t would seem that i f we are going to use the concept of union 
between subject and object i t must be interpreted i n a rather different 
way. What we can confidently a s s e r t i s that he who i s t r u l y grasped by 
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the S p i r i t i s given a deeper insight and powers of understanding than he 
may normally possess, g i f t s which enable him to enter into an experience 
of the object concerned which transcends the s u p e r f i c i a l contact made i n 
everyday l i f e and which creates a sense of oneness with one's object 
which one never knew before. But when we say t h i s we are using 'oneness' 
i n a metaphorical senses we are not suggesting that there i s an onto-
l o g i c a l union hidden somewhere i n the depths* 
I t i s with t h i s i n mind that we must assess T i l l i c h ' s concepts of 
theonomous language, knowledge and a r t * Nevertheless, having made t h i s 
basic c r i t i c i s m , we should not be blinded to the fa c t that there are 
also many things of value i n what he has to say* For example, the. 
concept of a theonomous language need not be seen as a simple destruction 
of the subject-object d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i f we view i t as that which breaks 
down the ba r r i e r s between men and makes r e a l communication possible, so 
that a new understanding i s created through the very words that are used* 
This has very r e a l importance f o r the doctrine of the S p i r i t * I t emphasises 
that the S p i r i t can take hold of human language and use i t i n such a way 
that a new relationship i s formed between him who speaks and him who 
l i s t e n s . Indeed, t h i s affirms T i l l i c h ' s . contention that theonomous language 
i s not some language 'given from above' which can be substituted f o r 
ordinary everyday speech. I t i s ordinary everyday speech as i t i s taken 
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and used by God for his purposes of healing and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . Such 
a conoept of theonomous language i s summarised for us by Paul, who says, 
This i s what we disouss. using language taught by no human 
wisdom but by the S p i r i t . We interpret what i s s p i r i t u a l 
i n s p i r i t u a l language.54 
We must note, however, T i l l i c h ' s f a i l u r e to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between 
the B i b l i c a l word and any other human language that i s used by the S p i r i t * 
By asserting that any human word that i s grasped by the S p i r i t can become 
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the Word of God, and by lumping together a l l holy books as examples of 
S p i r i t - f i l l e d l i t e r a t u r e , he i s f a i l i n g to recognise any i n t r i n s i c 
difference between the Bible as the Word of God and any other word that 
the S p i r i t may use* I n f a c t , i t i s true to say that he never r e a l l y 
tackle8 t h i s problem of the way i n which the Bible may d i f f e r or may not 
d i f f e r from other 'holy books' or language i n i t s capacity as the Word 
of God, e i t h e r here, or previously, where he discussed i n more d e t a i l 
the Bible as the medium of the S p i r i t * ^ Certainly i f one takes h i s 
e a r l i e r statement seriously, that the Bible i s not the Word of God 
unless i t becomes the bearer of the S p i r i t to someone ( which t i e s i n 
rather neatly with what he says here), then t h i s must mean that the 
Bible i s presumably no more and no l e s s theonomous than any other human 
wordi both have the capacity to become theonomous, to bear the S p i r i t , 
but are not a c t u a l l y so u n t i l the S p i r i t takes them and uses them. 
However, i f there i s no e s s e n t i a l difference between the Bible and any 
other l i t e r a t u r e or language, then T i l l i c h i s surely running r i g h t against 
the grain of C h r i s t i a n theology, which even though i t may not accept a 
l i t e r a l inerrancy of the B i b l i c a l word, does i n no uncertain terms em-
phasise the uniqueness of the Bible over against any other book, prec i s e l y 
because of the supreme revelation i t records, and i n v i r t u e of which i t 
i s able to bear the S p i r i t to man i n a unique way. I f T i l l i c h intends 
to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between the Bible and other examples of theonomous 
language, then he has blurred the d i s t i n c t i o n so much that one i s unable 
to say j u s t where the difference l i e s . What perhaps could have been 
pointed out i s that i n the Bible as the Word of God one finds a much more 
controlled use of language which makes i t potentially more s i g n i f i c a n t , 
i n so f a r as i t enshrines the symbols and experiences of God's revelation 
i n history which makes i t possible i n a very special way for i t to become 
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the bearer of the S p i r i t to men* 
Again, one finds i n T i l l i c h ' s comments on theonomous knowledge 
points of obvious value and others which one would question* One i s 
c e r t a i n l y not happy with the e s s e n t i a l l i n k he makes between S p i r i t u a l 
knowledge and the concept of universals. There i s oertainly no b i b l i c a l 
warrant for t h i s , and to make theonomous cognition dependent on such a 
controversial concept i s something which we c l e a r l y cannot accept* To 
know a thing 'in i t s e l f , which i s c e r t a i n l y an important part of 
theonomous knowledge, i s j u s t not the same as understanding some abstract 
essence of which i t i s allegedly a p a r t i c u l a r concrete manifestation* 
This sort of statement f a l l s into the very trap of ignoring the d i s t i n c t i v e -
ness of the p a r t i c u l a r which T i l l i c h has already condemned* For t h i s 
reason we must r e j e c t T i l l i o h ' s d e f i n i t i o n * Nevertheless, we can 
oertainly affirm that there i s a knowledge which comes through intimate 
experience which brings together the knower and the known i n a f a r deeper 
way than ordinary perception permits - rather s i m i l a r , i n f a c t , to what 
the Hebrews meant by da'ath* I t i s along these l i n e s perhaps that we 
oan understand something of what theonomous knowledge i s t the intimate 
experience of another person, thing or s i t u a t i o n , i n the context of which 
the S p i r i t opens up a new depth of understanding. I t i s t h i s sort of 
knowledge of which presumably Paul i s speaking i n h i s f i r s t l e t t e r to the 
Corinthians, the divine knowledge that enables a man to speak with wisdom, 
the s p i r i t u a l experience which enables him to give s p i r i t u a l judgments 
and make s p i r i t u a l insights* Only such a knowledge as t h i s w i l l enable 
man to overcome the estrangement between himself and h i s world, as the 
S p i r i t gives him deeper understanding and insight through the experiences 
of l i f e i n which he grasps h i s whole being* The theological significance 
of t h i s i s well expressed by Paul, when he says, 
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God has revealed i t to us by the S p i r i t , f or the S p i r i t 
falhoms everything, even the depths of God • . . No one 
can understand the thoughts of God, except the S p i r i t of 
God.56 
The experience of being grasped by the S p i r i t enables us to know theono-
mously as we oome to understand something of the thoughts of God himself. 
T i l l i c h ' s comments on the role of the S p i r i t i n a r t i s t i c expression 
are i n t e r e s t i n g , though there i s need for some c l a r i f i c a t i o n i n h i s 
discussion on expressionism. Even allowing that t h i s type of a r t has 
greater p o s s i b i l i t i e s of being open to the impact of the S p i r i t than 
any other, we oannot conclude that any expressionistic work of a r t i s 
therefore theonomous. How the a r t i s t may view or f e e l about a ce r t a i n 
thing i s not necessarily how the S p i r i t sees i t . T i l l i c h has not i n f a c t 
provided us with any c r i t e r i o n which helps us to determine whether a 
p a r t i c u l a r e x p r e s s i o n i s t i c work i s theonomous or not. I n any case, to 
provide such a c r i t e r i o n would be extremely d i f f i c u l t , partly beoause 
the interpretation of a r t necessarily involves a subjeotive element and 
partly because the theologian i s obliged to correlate h i s theology with 
philosophical thought and not simply interpret expressions of aesthetic 
experience. These are points which i n themselves he could have made with 
advantage. 
Again, i n the realm of technical a c t i v i t y , T i l l i c h ' s claim that 
the way to theonomy i s through the achievement of a unity of purpose i s 
acceptable, but h i s language i s p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t i n t h i s context, 
e s p e c i a l l y the way i n which he speaks of the need for eros towards the 
technical object. One f e e l s that t h i s oould lead to some ludicrous 
s i t u a t i o n s , even though a man may sometimes develop an almost e r o t i c 
relationship with his car.' Here p a r t i c u l a r l y , with regard to man's r e l a -
tionship with the tools he uses, the idea of an ontologioal unity must 
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give way to a purposive unity, whereby man participates i n the purpose 
for which the tool was created, though t h i s of i t s e l f i n no way guarantees 
that the purpose w i l l be a good one rather than a demonic one. I n f a c t , 
i t i s important that both the motive behind the creation of toolB and the 
use to which they are put should be subjected to the guidance of the 
S p i r i t , which means that anything that creates r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and harmony 
.between men i s permissible, whereas anything that alienates men from 
each o$her or seeks to destroy merely for the sake of destruction w i l l 
not be allowed* 
I t i s a pity that T i l l i c h ' s otherwise excellent disoussion on the 
ambiguities of human r e l a t i o n s , whether personal or i n community, should 
again be marred by the d i f f i c u l t concept of a theonomous union of an 
ontological nature* This oomes out c l e a r l y i n h i s discussion on the role 
of the S p i r i t i n the area of other-determination, where he says that 
'the stranger who i s an estranged part of one's s e l f has ceased to be a 
stranger when he i s experienced as coming from the same ground as one's 
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s e l f . I n t h i s statement T i l i i c h i s quite c l e a r l y affirming an e s s e n t i a l 
point of i d e n t i t y between subject and object which needs to be experienced, 
a l b e i t fragmentarily, i f t r u l y theonomous relationships are to be estab-
l i s h e d . But i t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t to plaoe any orthodox interpretation 
on t h i s doctrine. I n any case, as f a r as b i b l i c a l theology i s concerned* 
there are no grounds whatever f o r saying that the healing of estrangement 
i n human relationships necessitates the overcoming of ontological separ-
ation between man and man* The C h r i s t i a n doctrine of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n has 
no such trappings* Nevertheless, t h i s does not mean that the element 
of unity i s absent from a S p i r i t - f i l l e d society* But i t i s a unity which 
i s the r e s u l t of the healing of estrangement, not i t s precondition* I t 
i s a unity, furthermore, which seeks to preserve the eternal d i s t i n c t i v e -
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ness of both subject and object, rather than transcend i t i n ontologioal 
union. Such a unity would emphasise a sharing together of the deeper 
things of l i f e , or p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a common experience, or having a 
togetherness of purpose, or experiencing a genuine, empathetic concern 
for the other person which enables one to see things from h i s point of 
view and enter into the depths of h i s sufferings. A l l these things, of 
course, are the marks of a society or culture which i s dominated by the 
s p i r i t of agape. I t i s perhaps s i g n i f i c a n t that i n h i s discussion on 
the meaning of theonomy i n the realm of personal and communal r e l a t i o n s , 
T i l l i c h ' s use of such a word i s noticeably sparse. Notwithstanding t h i s , 
we would affirm that the c u l t u r a l forms and patterns of behaviour of any 
society that i s r i g h t l y c a l l e d 'theonoraous', must show the mark of agape 
more than any other. The divine S p i r i t i s above a l l the S p i r i t of love, 
and hence a theonomous culture must be supremely one where love abounds. 
I n the l i g h t of t h i s , there are one or two minor points which may 
f i n a l l y be r a i s e d . The f i r s t i s to question T i l l i c h ' s strange assertion 
that the way i n which the S p i r i t resolves Hxe tension between in c l u s i o n 
and r e j e c t i o n i n society i s by creating larger and larger groups, so 
that he who i s rejected by the smaller group i s accepted within the context 
of the larger. One wonders whether such a theory works out i n practice. 
I t i s j u s t not true that a person who i s rejected by a small group w i l l 
always discover a deeper sense of belonging by his acceptance into a 
larger community. The larger community w i l l frequently have the tendency 
to depersonalise the i n d i v i d u a l , l o s i n g him i n a sea of humanity, and 
t h i s can have a disastrous e f f e c t on the person concerned. I t i s only 
at the more personal or intimate l e v e l , i n the smaller group i n f a c t , that 
the sense of r e j e c t i o n can r e a l l y be overcome i n any meaningful way, and 
i t i s surely here that one should look for the work of the S p i r i t . One 
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has grave reservations therefore i n accepting t h i s sort of theological 
assertion when there i s so much evidence of a sociological nature which 
suggests otherwise* Secondly, there i s danger that the concept of a 
preliminary inequality of g i f t s may m i l i t a t e against the conviction that 
the work of the S p i r i t produces an equality of opportunity* Although 
i t i s c e r t a i n l y true that men do not have equality of g i f t s , i t i s 
equally true that God i s no respecter of persons, and t h i s surely means 
that i n a theonomous society the S p i r i t w i l l work towards that s i t u a t i o n 
i n which there w i l l be an equal degree of opportunity f o r a l l * 
The third point of c r i t i c i s m a r i s e s from T i l l i c h ' s assertion that 
'theonomy can characterise a whole culture'* T h i s phrase i s ambiguous 
i n so f a r as i t could be taken to mean that there are cultures which have 
a r i s e n i n the course of history which are completely characterised by 
theonomy. Now on T i l l i c h ' s own understanding t h i s i s u n l i k e l y , even 
impossible, owing to the e x i s t e n t i a l l i m i t a t i o n s of l i f e and i t s ambi-
gui t i e s * I t i s nothing more than a t h e o r e t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y , and t h i s 
point should have been made more c l e a r l y . On the other hand, one can 
c e r t a i n l y affirm that c e r t a i n cultures have a greater theonomous element 
than others* The d i f f i c u l t y a r i s e s , of course, when one comes to decide 
whioh these cultures are. One f e e l s that to some extent there w i l l always 
be some difference of opinion here, i n so f a r as different people w i l l 
see the working of the S p i r i t i n d i f f e r e n t ways* Hence, T i l l i c h sees 
high mediaeval culture as that whioh i s most transparent to the divine 
S p i r i t , and one f e e l s that part of h i s reason for saying t h i s i s that i n 
mediaeval thought there was a degree of philosophical understanding, 
stemming from the C l a s s i c a l t r a d i t i o n , which to a great extent permeated 
the whole culture of the Middle Ages, creating i n i t s c u l t u r a l patterns 
a love of knowledge and a quest for t r u t h . Others, however, who seek to 
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l i s t the marks of a theonomous culture, w i l l be more concerned with the 
way i n which agape finds expression i n the realm of human relationships 
and s o c i a l j u s t i c e * They would point out that no society can begin to 
c a l l i t s e l f theonomous where love i s not found i n every sphere of l i f e * 
True to the teaching of the New Testament, they would affirm that the 
divine S p i r i t i s above a l l the S p i r i t of love* And to fi n d examples of 
such cultures, they would perhaps turn away from mediaeval times and 
look elsewhere* Nevertheless, one f e e l s that i n any genuinely theonomous 
culture, because the S p i r i t i s concerned with the whole of l i f e , the quest 
for truth and the practice of love must go together* And one also f e e l s 
that, despite the obscurity of much of his language, i n the f i n a l a n a l y sis 
t h i s i s what T i l l i o h himself would want to say* 
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CHAPTER SIX THE SPIRIT AND THE AMBIGUITIES OF MORALITY 
In his discussion on the way i n which the Sp i r i t resolves the 
ambiguities of morality, T i l l i c h makes an i n i t i a l differentiation 
between 'theological* and 'theonomous' ethics. By •theological ethics' 
he means an ethical system which i s based on revealed information 
concerning ethical problems, an interpretation of ethics whioh he rejects 
i n favour of what he calls 'theonomous ethics 1, which he defines as 
ethical principles or processes 'described i n the li g h t of the Spiritual 
Presence'.* I t i s important, he says, to see that theonomous ethics 
are not foreign to man, superimposed from above, but are rather ethics 
'from within', whioh are aware of their ultimate depth and concern* 
There i s thus no fundamental conflict between theonomous and autonomous 
ethicsi theonomous ethics are autonomous ethics i n the l i g h t of their 
ultimate significance* This is why the theologian, when he discusses 
ethical problems, must be prepared to cast off his theologian's mantle 
which i s characterised by i t s concern with revealed truth and the formu-
lation of that truth i n propositions, i n order that i t may be clearly 
seen that the moral imperative i s not a series of such propositions 
imposed on man from the outside,but something that comes from within, 
welling up from the depths of his being. T i l l i o h recognises, however, 
that there are those who would claim that the very element of ultimate 
concern and significance which distinguishes theonomous from autonomous 
ethics, and which has i n fact given rise to certain traditions of 
morality, i t s e l f violates the autonomous principle* He cannot agree 
with t h i s , and i n reply asks whether i n actual fact autonomous ethics 
i t s e l f can ever be completely independent of some tradition which ex-
presses, however indirectly or unconsciously, some element of ultimate 
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concern* 'Even the most outspoken re l a t i v i s t s cannot avoid something 
2 
absolute 1* So, whilst autonomous ethics may be autonomous with respect 
to their method) i n that they reject heteronomous formulations of 
morality superimposed from without* they can never be autonomous in 
respect of their 'religious substance1, their experience of an ultimate 
concern* In a l l autonomous ethics the theonomous element is present, 
'however hidden, however secularized, however d i s t o r t e d * I t i s when 
this element i s consciously expressed, under the impact of the divine 
S p i r i t , through free discussion and deliberation and not through any 
attempt to determine, that theonomous ethics is born. Thus theonomy i s 
never intentional, never deliberately enforced from outside, or else i t 
would become heteronomy and thus legitimately rejected. 'The moral 
imperative i s not a strange law, imposed on us, but i t i s the law of our 
own being'.^ Real theonomy is born from withint i t 'is autonomous 
ethics under the Spiritual Presence'. 
T i l l i c h i s concerned i n the main with two sets of moral ambiguities -
those of personal self-integration and those of the moral law* To some 
extent he has already spoken of the way i n which the Spirit resolves 
these ambiguities i n the l i f e of the Christian and i n the l i f e of the 
5 
church. Here he i s dealing with the same issues i n a wider context* 
I n his earlier discussion on the ambiguities of personal morality, or 
self-integration,^ he pointed out that i n the movement between self-
identity and self-alteration, certain choices have to be made which raise 
the d i f f i c u l t problem of whether the actual should be sacrificed for 
the potential or whether the potential should be sacrificed for the 
actual. This seemingly impossible dilemma, says T i l l i c h , can only be 
fragmentarily resolved under the impact of the Spiritual Presence. By 
taking the personal centre into the transcendent unity of the universal 
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centre, a unity which embraces the content of a l l possible encounters, 
the Spirit raises i t above i t s temporal encounters with r e a l i t y , and 
so liberates the essential being of the person from the contingencies 
of freedom and destiny which characterise the existential situation* I n 
accepting this liberation, the person makes the 'all-inclusive sacrifice', 
and i n so doing finds the 'all-inclusive fulfilment'. This, says T i l l i c h , 
i s the only unambiguous sacrifice a man can make* Nevertheless, because 
i t i s made i n the existential situation, i t must remain both fragmentary 
and open to distortion by the ambiguities of l i f e * 
I n the l i g h t of t h i s , T i l l i c h considers three sets of recurring 
questions which pinpoint more specifically the ambiguities of sacrifice* 
The f i r s t concerns the number of contents of the encountered world one 
is able to take into oneself whilst at the same time preserving the 
balance between self-identity and self-alterationi 
How many contents of the encountered world can I take into 
the unity of my personal centre without disrupting i t ? And, 
how many contents of the encountered world must I take into 
the unity of my personal centre i n order to avoid an empty 
self-identity?7 
T i l l i c h ' s answer to this question is that when the personal centre i s 
related to the universal centre, only those contents are allowed entry 
which help i t to realise i t s essential being, i t s unity with the universal 
centre* This judgment i s arrived at not by any arbitrary decisions, but 
only through the wisdom of the S p i r i t , which i s concerned both to main-
tain the self's identity without impoverishing i t , and simultaneously 
drive towards i t s alteration without disrupting i t * I n this way, says 
T i l l i o h , the S p i r i t oonquers the two-fold anxiety which logically preceded 
the transition from essence to existence, that of not actualising one's 
essential being and that of losing oneself i n one's self-actualisation* 
So i n the power of the Spirit i t i s possible for man's essential being to 
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appear existentially as i t conquers the element of distortion within 
the Reality of the New Being, such as one sees supremely i n Jesus as 
and man 
the Christ, i n whom the eternal unity of God/becomes actual under existen-
t i a l conditions without being conquered by them* 
The seoond set of questions concerns the direction of l i f e t 
Into how many directions can I push beyond a given state 
of my being without losing a l l directedness of the l i f e 
process? And, into how many directions must I try to encounter 
reality i n order to avoid a narrgwing-down of my l i f e -
process to monolithic poverty?° 
Til l i c h ' s reply i s that where the S p i r i t i s effective, ' l i f e i s turned • * . 
g 
toward the ultimate within a l l directions', the all-inclusive direction 
of depth which aots as the criterion of choice between a l l directions* 
The man who is thus orientated by the S p i r i t , the 'saint', knows both 
where to go and where not to go, and i s able to tread successfully on 
the tightrope between 'impoverishing asceticism' and 'disrupting l i b e r t i n -
ism1* Because many people do not know which direction to take i n l i f e , 
their lives become restricted or frustrated, but this can be overcome 
by the Spirit who preserves the unity i n divergent directions - both 
the unity of the self and the unity of the directions, which reconverge 
i n the direotion of the ultimate* 
The third set of questions i s basics 
How many potentialities, given to me by virtue of my being 
man and further, by being this particular man, can I actualise 
without losing the power to actualise anything seriously? 
And, how many of my potentialities must I actualise i n order 
to avoid the state of mutilated humanity?*0 
Man is obviously limited i n the number of potentialities he oan f u l f i l , 
by his own finitude* Even mankind as a whole,.because of i t s historical 
limitations, w i l l never f u l f i l a l l i t s possibilities, l e t alone the 
individual! 1 Such a situation cannot be changed, of course, by the 
Spiritual Presence, for the f i n i t e cannot become i n f i n i t e just li k e that, 
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but the Spirit can nevertheless help man to accept his finitude and i n 
this way give new meaning to the sacrifice of his potentialities by 
removing i t s tragic and ambiguous character* I n such a sacrifice* man 
realises that every power of being which he possesses i s not his i n an 
absolute sense, i t i s his only because i t i s given to him* By accepting 
this, he comes to see that the humanistic ideal of the all-round person-
a l i t y , a 'God-man idea', i n which every potentiality i s actualised is 
clearly impossible* Even Jesus himself, the 'God-man image', was not 
an all-round personality i n this sense* Nevertheless i n him we do see 
what i t means to sacrifice a l l one's potentialities for the sake of 
the one potentiality which man himself cannot aotualise, 'uninterrupted 
unity with God'.1* So whereas the humanistic idea of autonomous personal 
fulfilment suggests that man can actualise what he can be, directly and 
without sacrifice, the concept of theonomous personal fulfilment, deter-
mined by the S p i r i t , takes the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of sacrificing certain 
possibilities much more seriously, and gathers them up i n the one a l l -
inclusive sacrifice, i n which man, under the Spirit's impact, sacrifices 
a l l his potentialities i n so far as they l i e on the horizontal plane, to 
the vertical direction, the direction of the ultimate, for the sake of 
his unity with God* I n so doing he views his potentialities i n a new 
l i g h t , and i n this way receives them back, f u l f i l l e d or u n f u l f i l l e d , as 
a g i f t from the divine* 
Having dealt with the ambiguities of personal morality, T i l l i c h 
turns to those concerned with the moral law, particularly i n i t s heter-
onomous and autonomous expressions. In a previous chapter we saw how 
he considered the nature of these ambiguities under three headsi the 
validity of the moral imperative, the r e l a t i v i t y of the moral content, 
and the power of moral motivation; suggesting that the ambiguities of 
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each can only be resolved i n the li g h t of agape t the reality of love 
12 
which is the ground of man's essential being* This answer means that 
the moral law i s both affirmed, i n the sense that i t i s an expression 
of what man essentially i s , but also transcended i n i t s legal expression 
as a commandment and threat which stands against man i n his existential 
estrangement* 'Love contains and transcends the law'.^ This may be 
taken by some to mean that love i t s e l f becomes the all-embracing law 
summarised i n the commandment 'Thou shalt love'* But i f this were so, 
i t would s t i l l f a l l prey to the ambiguities to which a l l law is subjected* 
One can never demonstrate the v a l i d i t y of agape i f one thinks of i t i n 
this sort of way. In fact, ultimately love cannot be a commandment at 
a l l , for no man can f u l f i l any command to love i n his state of existential 
estrangement. And i f he cannot love, 'he denies the unconditional 
validity of the moral imperative, he has no criterion by which to choose 
within the flux of ethical contents, and he has no motivation f o r the 
fulfilment of the moral law'. For this reason T i l l i c h prefers to speak, 
of love as a reality rather than a laws ' i t is not a matter of ought-to-
be - even i f expressed i n imperative form - but a matter of being'."^ 
And such a r e a l i t y , claims T i l l i o h , can only be realised when one i s 
grasped by the Spirit who creates love i n the l i f e of man and enables 
him to f u l f i l i t * As he puts i t i n one of his sermonsi 
I t i s a matter of being, determined by the presence of the 
divine S p i r i t . Love i s the f r u i t of the S p i r i t , and there 
is no love without the Sp i r i t . Love i s not a matter of law. 
As long as i t i s commanded, i t does not exist. Neither i s 
i t a matter of sentimental emotion. I t i s impossible for 
the natural man, and i t i s ecstatic i n i t s appearance, like 
every g i f t of the Spirit.!5 
So theonomous morals, as distinct from heteronomous and autonomous 
morals, are not commandments, but 'morals of love as a creation of the 
S p i r i t ' . ^ Thus the basis of theonomous morality is 'the presence of 
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the Spirit of God i n our s p i r i t 1 . ' and i f this i s disregarded 
Christianity becomes reduced to a system of moral commandments, which 
T i l l i c h feel8 has so often unfortunately characterised Protestantism* 
A l l this becomes an aotualised reality when a person is elevated 
into the transcendent unity of the divine l i f e * The Spiritual Presence 
reunites his estranged existence with his essence, which i s exactly what 
the moral law commands, and i n this way demonstrates i t s universal 
val i d i t y . This unconditional validity of the moral law i s i n no sense 
contradicted by the historical r e l a t i v i t y of specific ethical codes, 
because the vali d i t y of such codes themselves lies i n the extent to 
which they are an expression of love and thus confirm the reunion of 
man's existential with bis essential being* So the unconditional char-
acter of the formal moral imperative is united with the conditional char-
acter of i t s ethical content, 'love i s unconditional i n i t s essence, 
conditional i n i t s existence*. I t i s therefore a fundamental mistake 
to elevate any ethical content of love to unconditional v a l i d i t y : the 
imperative alone is unconditionally valid* 
This lead8 us to the problem of the content of the law. T i l l i c h 
observes that there are two types of content i n the moral law* the 
moral demands made i n concrete situations, and the abstraot norms which 
are derived from ethical experiences i n relation to these concrete 
situations. The individual inevitably swings backwards and forwards be-
tween these two alternatives, and this raises the question of an unam-
biguous criterion for making ethical decisions* Such a criterion, says 
T i l l i c h , must be agapet which fragaaentarily overcomes the tension between 
the abstract and concrete elements i n every moral situation* How then 
i s love related to these two elements? I n the f i r s t plaoe, 'in relation 
to the abstract element, the formulated moral laws, love i s effective 
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through wisdom*, the moral laws of a religion or philosophy which 
express the wisdom and ethical experiences of the past* But this does 
not give the ethical formulation i t s e l f unconditional v a l i d i t y : a l l 
moral laws must continually come under judgment according to whether they 
are adequate to a given situation or not, and i n those oases where they 
have ceased to be effeotive or threaten to become destructive, they may 
have to be rescinded altogether* Secondly, i n relation to the specific 
situation, love becomes effective through courage* Because of the 
obvious limitations of abstract norms i n concrete situations, there are 
occasions where love must transcend the wisdom of the past, and to do 
so i t w i l l need courage, 'the courage to judge the particular without 
subjecting i t to an abstract norm - a courage which can do justice to 
the p a r t i c u l a r * * ^ But courage implies risk, the r i s k even of misunder-
standing a situation and the possibility of mistakenly acting against 
love i t s e l f * So again, T i l l i c h affirms that 'true morality i s a morality 
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of risk', i t 'lives i n the unsafely of risk and courage'* And i t i s 
only to the degree that Spirit-created love prevails i n a man that this 
conorete decision i s unambiguous* So, 
with respect to moral content, theonomous morality is 
determined by the Spirit-created love* I t is.supported 
by the Spirit-created wisdom of the ages * . . I t i s made 
concrete and adequate by the application of the courage 
to love to the unique s i t u a t i o n a l 
Finally, says T i l l i c h , love is the motivating power i n theonomous 
morality, not indeed as law, but as grace, and grace i s none other than 
the effective presence of love i n man, made possible through the impact 
of the Spirit* 'Grace i s the impact of the Spiritual Presence that makes 
22 
the fulfilment of the law possible - though fragmentarily'* I t i s a 
free g i f t , given without merit. So we can say that 
love i s the source of grace. Love accepts that which i s 
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unacceptable and love renews the old being so that i t 
becomes a new being. Medieval theology almost identified 
love and grace, and rightly so, for that which makes one 
graceful is love. But grace i s , at the same time, the 
love which forgives and accepts.23 
Theonomous morality is the only morality which makes 'the fulfilment 
of the law' possible, and every other type of morality lacks this u l t i -
mate motivating power. Affirms T i l l i c h , 'Only love or the Spiritual 
Presence can motivate by giving what i t demands'. 
So T i l l i c h ' s judgment on a l l non-theonomous ethics i s t h i s , they 
are inevitably ethics of law, and law can only intensify and aggravate 
estrangement. I t can show neither the power of motivation, nor the 
principle of choice i n the concrete situation, nor the unconditional 
validity of the moral imperative. Only love can do thi s , love which i s 
not man's creation, but the creation of the Sp i r i t , the g i f t of grace. 
And theonomous morals are the morals of love* 
Evaluation 
Tillien's attempt to differentiate between theological and theono-
mous ethics f a i l s to a great extent because of his rather narrow under-
standing of the nature of the former. This he seems to interpret as a 
heteronomous system of ethics based on a divine authority external, and 
therefore alien, to man. But there i s no reason why theological ethics 
should be interpreted i n this way. Admittedly i n i t s history the church 
has frequently sought to impose the divine law upon men by means of 
ethical systems which have every characteristic of heteronomy, but this 
does not mean that theological ethics as such i s thereby discredited. 
His own concept of theonomous ethics i s surely no less theological because 
i t i s not formulated heteronomously, unless of course one denies that 
the concept of theonomy has any theological significance. In any case, 
his rejection of the word 'theological' i n this context hardly complies 
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with, his usage of i t i n the rest of his system. He does not hesitate 
to c a l l his system theological, despite the fact that he most strongly 
rejects a heteronomous conception of God. To be consistent with what he 
says here, he would therefore have to say that his own system was theon-
omous rather than theological, and this he does not do. We see no 
reason, therefore, why he should reject theological ethics as such, for 
his own understanding of ethics is just as theological as any heteronomous 
system, though expressed of course i n a significantly different way. 
On the other hand, our criticism of Tillion's interpretation of 
theonomy must also apply here. I f the ground for any theonomous under-
standing of ethics i s , as T i l l i c h implies, that God and man are ultimately 
one, sharing the same essential nature expressed in agapet this i s clearly 
unacceptable. But a theonomous understanding of morality need not be 
buil t on this presupposition at a l l . I f God has made man i n his own 
image, then we must assume that because God i s love, man also i s made to 
love and to f u l f i l himself i n love. This means that i n his search for 
morality, he cannot rest u n t i l his every action springs from love. Yet 
this is not a morality imposed upon him from without, i t i s a morality 
which stems from his own nature, the way i n which he has been made, the 
purpose for which he haB been created. Such a morality of love i s i n no 
sense alien to man, and can therefore r i g h t l y be called theonomous. 
What we can affirm with' T i l l i c h i s that the conoept of theonomous 
morality rightly emphasises that man can only become a tr u l y moral being 
when he i s grasped by the divine S p i r i t within his own l i f e , so that he 
is able to love freely and completely as he enters into the experience of 
the divine love. Or as John puts i t , 'We love, because he f i r s t loved 
us'. 4 The statement that without the S p i r i t there is no true morality, 
no depth of agape« w i l l always remain true. Similarly, we can affirm 
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that this Spirit-created morality cannot be adequately or legitimately 
expressed i n heteronomous terms* The Spirit of love working within a 
man cannot be tied down to specific regulations, even though this work may 
be traced i n certain broad patterns of a c t i v i t y , and at times even tabu-
lated and codified i n documents of wisdom for man's benefit and guidance* 
I t i s when these documents and codes are invested with heteronomous author-
i t y that the freedom of the Spirit i s restricted, and this the Christian 
must constantly resist, remembering that 'the law of the Spirit of l i f e 
25 
i n Christ Jesus made me free from the law of sin and death** J Thus 
although this i s not the place to enter into a discussion on Christian 
ethics, we can certainly say that the affirmation of the dependence of 
morality on the Spirit neither makes Christianity moralistic nor rules 
out a genuine secular morality* 
Finally, we have already had occasion to cross swords with T i l l i c h ' s 
26 
reading of morality i n terms of self-integration* This, as we have seen, 
is to suggest that the primary purpose of our relationships with the 
world, including other people, i s that we may use i t and them, and take 
from i t and them those things that are necessary, for our own development 
towards maturity* So anything which hinders self-integration is to be 
avoided, and anything that helps i t i s permissible and to be encouraged* 
This comes out very forcefully i n the three sets of questions T i l l i c h 
asks about the ambiguities of sacrifice and the answers he gives* One 
decides whether sacrifice i s permissible or not, not according to whether 
i t i s i n the interests of the other person, but whether i t helps one to 
achieve the development of one's own essential being* To this we must 
take exception. I f the real function of the Spirit i s to help man to 
see what is necessary i n his relation with others for hiB personal well-
being, or what i s inadvisable, what he ought to sacrifice and what he 
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ought to preserve, then i t seems that this i s a most inadequate way of 
describing the Spirit's relation to morality. Is this a l l that a theon-
omous morality i s for? Surely a tru l y theonomous morality is one in 
which agape i s central, an agape which i s primarily other-centred, not 
self-centred, which loves the other person for his own sake, and not for 
self-gratification* I f any self-integration or satisfaction follow i n 
the wake, i t i s a by-product. Such things - even i f one sees them as 
indirectly the work of the Spirit i n man - are hardly the completion of 
morality i t s e l f * 
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CHAPTER SEVEN THE HEALING POWER OF THE DIVINE SPIRIT 
I n our study of T i l l i c h ' s doctrine of the S p i r i t so f a r , we have 
seen how the divine S p i r i t , through i t s impact on l i f e , resolves the 
ambiguities i n the functions of morality, culture and r e l i g i o n * I n t h i s 
f i n a l seotion, T i l l i c h turns his a t t e n t i o n to the nature of the S p i r i t ' s 
a c t i v i t y w i t h i n the world and the way i n which i t s impact on l i f e can he 
appropriately described as a work of healing* His f i r s t concern i s with 
the actual r e l a t i o n of the S p i r i t to those dimensions of l i f e which 
precede the human dimension of s p i r i t * Has the S p i r i t u a l Presence, he 
asks, a r e l a t i o n to l i f e i n general? There are two answers, he says, to 
th i s question* I n the f i r s t place, there can be no d i r e c t impact of the 
S p i r i t on these dimensions. 'Divine S p i r i t appears i n the ecstasy of 
human s p i r i t but not i n anything which conditions the appearance of 
s p i r i t ' * * I n f a c t , to assert otherwise, he maintains, would be to think 
of the S p i r i t u a l Fresenoe rather i n the form of an 'intoxicating sub" 
Btanoe, or a stimulus f o r psychological excitement, or a miraculous 
physical cause'• I t i s true that b i b l i c a l l i t e r a t u r e abounds i n a l l 
sorts of miraculous effects a t t r i b u t e d t o the work of the S p i r i t , from 
the v i r g i n a l conception of Jesus to the Pentecostal g l o s s o l a l i a , yet 
nevertheless one must beware of taking these stories l i t e r a l l y * To do 
so would tend to make the divine S p i r i t i n t o a ' f i n i t e , though extra-
ordinary, oause beside other causes', some sort of physical matter i n 
which both i t s S p i r i t u a l i t y and i t s d i v i n i t y are l o s t * I n f a c t , to 
describe the S p i r i t even as a substance of higher power and di g n i t y than 
others i s to abuse the word ' S p i r i t ' , f o r even were there higher natural 
substanoes than we know, they would s t i l l be lower than the s p i r i t of 
man and therefore not open to the divine S p i r i t ' s impact* To avoid t h i s 
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way of thinJcLng i t i s essential, says T i l l i c h , to a f f i r m that the divine 
S p i r i t has no impact on p r e - s p i r i t dimensions, whether inorganio or 
organio, biological or psychological* 
Even so, he continues, i f one maintains that l i f e i s one i n i t s 
many dimensions, then t h i s does imply an i n d i r e c t influence of the 
S p i r i t on l i f e i n general. The impact of the S p i r i t u a l Presence on the 
human s p i r i t must imply some sort of impact on every dimension which 
constitutes man's being and makes possible the appearance of s p i r i t i n 
him. I n oreating theonomous morality, f o r example, the S p i r i t w i l l also 
a f f e c t the s e l f - i n t e g r a t i o n of the psychological s e l f , which i n turn 
affects biological s e l f - i n t e g r a t i o n , and so on, back to the basic physical 
and chemical processes. But i t i s important, says T i l l i c h , not to think 
of these implications as a chain of causes and ef f e c t s , reaching backwards 
from the S p i r i t through the human s p i r i t to each other realm. For 'the 
multidimensional unity of l i f e means that the impact of the S p i r i t u a l 
Presence on the human s p i r i t i s at the same time, an impact on the psyche, 
2 
the c e l l s , and the physical elements which constitute man's i t i s 
present to a l l dimensions of l i f e ' i n one and the same Presence 1• So the 
impact of the S p i r i t on the whole of l i f e i s e x i s t e n t i a l l y l i m i t e d to 
those areas where the preceding dimensions are brought to t h e i r f u l f i l -
ment i n the dimension of s p i r i t , i n the context of which alone the 
influenoe of the divine S p i r i t i s known* 
The t o t a l impact of the S p i r i t on the whole of l i f e , T i l l i c h 
points out, must await the coming of the Kingdom of God, a universal 
concept whioh transcends the e x i s t e n t i a l l i m i t a t i o n s of the S p i r i t ' s 
a c t i v i t y i n time and space* The function that unites the uni v e r s a l i t y 
of the Kingdom with the fragmentary nature of the S p i r i t ' s a c t i v i t y w i t h i n 
the e x i s t e n t i a l order i s that of healing which i s present i n both, and 
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which i s an essential element i n the t o t a l work of salvation*^ Healing, 
of course» presupposes disease, which T i l i i c h has defined as the d i s i n t e -
gration which results i n any being i f either of the two poles of s e l f -
i d e n t i t y or s e l f - a l t e r a t i o n i s so predominant that the balance of l i f e 
A 
i s disturbed. The work of healing i n the organic realm f o r instance 
necessitates breaking the predominance of one pole and revi v i n g the 
influence of the other, thus working f o r the s e l f - i n t e g r a t i o n of a centred 
l i f e * But i n so f a r as disintegration occurs i n the whole of l i f e , and 
j u s t as there are many types of disease a r i s i n g from d i f f e r i n g processes 
of disintegration, so also there must be many d i f f e r e n t ways of healing 
and many d i f f e r e n t sorts of healers* The question f o r us, says T i l l i c h , 
i s 'whether there i s S p i r i t u a l healing, and i f i t e x i s t s , how i t i s 
related to the other ways of healing, and f u r t h e r how i t i s related to 
that kind of healing which i n the language of r e l i g i o n i s called "salva-
t i o n " ' . 5 
T i l l i c h recognises that although our contemporary understanding of 
disease and healing i s concerned with the whole person, yet there are 
many d i f f e r e n t ways of healing, each of which w i l l be used appropriately* 
The relationship between S p i r i t u a l healing and these other forms of 
healing i s not an easy one, and T i l l i c h feels that i t has been p a r t i c u -
l a r l y confused by the ambiguous concept of ' f a i t h healing'• The way i n 
which t h i s l a t t e r concept i s normally used would lead him to associate 
i t with 'magical healing 1 rather than healing under the genuine impact of 
the S p i r i t . I n f a c t , the use of the word ' f a i t h ' i n t h i s connection i s 
nothing less than a d i s t o r t i o n of the r e a l meaning of the word i n t o ideas 
of concentration and auto-suggestion, n a t u r a l l y produced under psycho-
l o g i c a l conditional i t has nothing to do with being grasped by the 
S p i r i t u a l Presence* This i s not to say that there i s no value i n f a i t h 
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healing, despite i t s magical element.. 'Faith healing can be and has 
been quite successful} and there i s probably no healing of any kind 
which i s completely free from elements of magic '•** But though one may 
recognise t h i s as one way of healing, one must constantly bear three 
things i n minds f i r s t l y , such healing i s not healing through f a i t h , 
but through magioal concentration; secondly, though the nature of i t s 
impact may be j u s t i f i e d as an element i n human encounter, i t should be 
remembered that i t s p o t e n t i a l i t i e s can be destructive as well as creative; 
and t h i r d l y , i f i t excludes the other ways of healing i n p r i n c i p l e i t i s 
always predominantly destructive* None of these things can be said about 
the healing of the S p i r i t * 
The practice of f a i t h healing through prayer and cer t a i n sacra-
mental acts has, of course, found i t s way i n t o the church as much as 
elsewhere, and T i l l i c h admits that i t i s not always easy to distinguish 
between t h i s sort of prayer and the genuine Spirit-determined prayer f o r 
health and healing. Nevertheless, the S p i r i t - d i r e c t e d prayer, which i s 
characterised by a r e a l surrender to God of one's concern f o r the person 
who i s sick, i s ready t o 'accept the divine acceptance of the prayer 
whether i t s overt content i s f u l f i l l e d or not', whereas the magioal 
sort of prayer, whioh merely uses God as a t o o l f o r i t s r e a l i s a t i o n , w i l l 
'not accept an u n f u l f i l l e d prayer as an accepted prayer, f o r the ultimate 
aim i n the magic prayer i s not God and the reunion with him but the 
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object of the prayer, f o r example, health'* Thus a genuine prayer f o r 
health ' i n f a i t h ' i s not an attempt at f a i t h healing, but an expression 
of the state of being grasped by the divine S p i r i t , 'by a power that i s 
greater than we are, a power that shakes us and turns us, and transforms 
us and heals us. Surrender to t h i s power i s f a i t h ' * One sees t h i s 
supremely at work, of course, i n the l i f e and ministry of Jesus, who i n 
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his own person bears the New Being which i s created by the S p i r i t * This 
same healing ministry i s continued by others who have been grasped by 
the S p i r i t and who have experienced the healing of the S p i r i t i n t h e i r 
own l i v e s . And 'we belong to these people, i f we are grasped by the 
new r e a l i t y which has appeared i n him. We have his healing power our-
o 
selves 
The r e a l answer concerning the r e l a t i o n between d i f f e r e n t ways of 
healing under the impact of the S p i r i t begins with the assertion that 
healing under the divine S p i r i t i s no less than what theology c a l l s 
salvationi the t o t a l i n t e g r a t i o n of the personal centre through i t s 
elevation i n t o what i s symbolically called 'the divine centre', the 
transcendent unity of a l l l i f e * I n t h i s experience of healing and salva-
t i o n the receiving function i s f a i t h and the actualising function lovei 
so 'health i n the ultimate sense of the word, health as i d e n t i c a l with 
salvation, i s l i f e i n f a i t h and l o v e ' , 1 0 a l i f e which i s unambiguous 
though fragmentary* But t h i s does not mean that the healing impact of 
the S p i r i t can replace other methods of healing, as ' f a i t h healers' often 
claim, f o r every disorder of man cannot be ascribed to s p i r i t u a l estrange-
ment. As T i l l i c h has already pointed out, each form of sickness must 
be treated with tne appropriate form of healing* Conversely, other 
methods of healing cannot replace the impact of the S p i r i t , as certain 
schools of psychiatry i n t h e i r approach to man's e x i s t e n t i a l predicament 
seek to do* The psychiatrist may well be able to cope with man's 
neurotic anxiety, for. example, but he cannot cope with his e x i s t e n t i a l 
anxiety, bis anxiety about being i t s e l f . He cannot do so because he 
does not recognise the v e r t i c a l dimension i n l i f e , that such anxiety can 
only be resolved by the S p i r i t u a l Presence i t s e l f who grasps man and takes 
him i n t o the transcendent u n i t y , thereby overcoming His e x i s t e n t i a l 
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estrangement which l i e s at the root of a l l his anxiety and g u i l t * 
However* T i l l i c h i s pleased that a new appreciation of the complementary 
nature of the various ways of healing i s now taking place, even though 
such an appreciation must take care not to confuse the d i s t i n c t i v e role 
of each* A l l forms of healing are indeed complementary, but no form 
oan act as a substitute f o r any other*** 
F i n a l l y , T i l l i c h reminds us that healing i s necessarily fragmentary 
i n a l l i t s forms, a s i t u a t i o n which not even the impact of the S p i r i t 
oan change* 'Manifestations of disease struggle continuously with mani-
festations of health, and i t often happens that disease i n one realm 
enhances health i n another realm', and vice-versa. He cites the example 
of a healthy athlete who has a l l the symptoms of neurosis and the healthy 
a c t i v i s t who hides his e x i s t e n t i a l despair. This can be none other, 
because of human f i n i t u d e j and i n the end, no healing, not even healing 
under the S p i r i t u a l Presence, oan l i b e r a t e man from the f i n a l i n e v i t a b i l i t y 
of death. The question of healing, therefore, and w i t h i t the question 
i 
of salvation, goes beyond the healing of the individual to healing through 
history and beyond h i s t o r y , and leads to the question of Eternal L i f e 
and the Kingdom of God. I n the end, 'only universal healing i s t o t a l 
12 
healing - salvation beyond ambiguities and fragments'* I t i s at t h i s 
stage that we cross the boundary from the S p i r i t u a l Presence to the 
Kingdom of God, the substance of the second h a l f of the t h i r d volume of 
T i l l i c h ' s Systematic Theology* 
Evaluation 
There are several points i n t h i s f i n a l section r e l a t i n g to the 
healing power of the S p i r i t which need to be discussed* I n the f i r s t 
place, T i l l i c h ' s assertion that there i s no d i r e c t impact of the S p i r i t 
i n the pre-human dimensions i s not altogether clear* The immediate 
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reaction to t h i s statement would be to point to the f a c t that i n t r a d i -
t i o n a l Christian thinking, the S p i r i t has always been intimately associated 
with the natural world, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n terms of his creative a c t i v i t y 
and sustaining power* Even i f one does not allow a pneumatological 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Genesis l i 2 , there are other b i b l i c a l texts which 
point to t h i s * Two passages i n the Psalms speak of the a c t i v i t y of 
the S p i r i t of Yahweh i n creation: 'By the word of the Lord, the heavens 
were made, and a l l t h e i r host by the S p i r i t of his mouth',and, 'When 
thou sendest f o r t h the S p i r i t they are created; and thou renewest the 
face of the ground'.^ But T i l l i c h r a r e l y mentions the S p i r i t i n the 
context of creation* We should not conclude from t h i s , of course, that 
he has no place f o r the S p i r i t i n creation* Indeed, his d e f i n i t i o n of 
God as S p i r i t must be f i l l e d out with his a f f i r m a t i o n that i t i s the 
S p i r i t who unites the f i r s t and second p r i n c i p l e of the Godhead, power 
15 
and meaning, thus making c r e a t i v i t y possible* I f the S p i r i t then 
actualises the potential w i t h i n the Divine Ground and expresses i t i n 
the Logos, we are surely intended to i n f e r from t h i s that i t i s through 
the S p i r i t that both creation and sustentation ocour* But unfortunately 
t h i s i s a theme which T i l l i c h never e x p l i c i t l y develops and consequently 
one i s l e f t somewhat i n the dark. Nevertheless, perhaps Schelling can 
give us a clue here as to the d i r e c t i o n i n which T i l l i c h ' s "thought i s 
moving. Schelling develops the idea that i n a l l the dimensions preceding 
the human dimension the S p i r i t i s indeed active, but not consciously so* 
The creation and the continuance of the material world i s the unconscious 
a c t i v i t y of the S p i r i t * ^ I n t h i s sense nature can be referred to as 
17 
the 'unconscious poetry of the S p i r i t ' , who cannot act consciously 
u n t i l man appears, when that which has previously been slumbering now 
18 
becomes awakened* T i l l i c h ' s silence on any conscious a c t i v i t y of the 
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S p i r i t before man may well suggest that he follows his acknowledged 
master along these l i n e s * Hence, he i s unable to speak of a d i r e c t 
impact of the S p i r i t upon nature i n t h i s sense* However, we are not 
bound to accept Schelling's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the S p i r i t ' s a c t i v i t y * I t 
would c e r t a i n l y be much more i n l i n e with orthodox Christian thinking 
to a f f i r m that the S p i r i t i s d i r e c t l y and purposively a t work i n the 
whole evolutionary process, ac t i v e l y bringing i t to i t s climax i n man* 
Christian theology knows nothing of Schilling's unconscious S p i r i t s i t 
knows only a personal S p i r i t who i s consciously a l i v e i n every segment 
of the universe* I f indeed T i l l i c h does follow Schelling at t h i s point, 
then his doctrine of the S p i r i t i s very d i f f e r e n t from, the b i b l i o a l 
conception and from what the Christian f a i t h has always taught* 
We must allow f o r the f a c t , however, that i n the present context 
T i l l i c h i e dealing s p e c i f i c a l l y with the healing work of the S p i r i t , 
i n which case i t may be that he i s asserting only that there can be no 
healing by the S p i r i t i n nature u n t i l the work, of redemption begins i n 
man. There are two points here* I n the f i r s t place, despite what 
T i l l i c h says, there i s surely a sense i n which the S p i r i t ' s work of 
healing i s always present i n the world of natures c e r t a i n l y t h i s i s 
what the doctrine of providence, sustenance, preservation, or whatever 
we c a l l i t , implies* This work of healing may indeed be described as 
the natural prooesses at work, healing over the scars created by natural 
disaster, restoring the equilibrium so essential to the natural forces, 
but f o r Christian theology t h i s i s nevertheless the S p i r i t at work w i t h i n 
the natural world he has created, constantly bringing order out of chaos, 
l i g h t out of darkness, continually at work i n opposition to the forces of 
destruction that exist w i t h i n the natural world. I n t h i s sense, the 
S p i r i t i s d i r e c t l y engaged i n the work of healing i n those dimensions 
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which precede the dimension of s p i r i t * However, there i s a sense i n 
which the f i n a l work of redemption i n the natural world must await the 
* 
healing work of Christ i n man, a work which has begun but which w i l l not 
be completed t i l l the end of the age* I n t h i s context the words of Paul 
are relevant, where he speaks of the whole creation waiting with eager 
expectation f o r God's sons to be revealed, when f u l l l i b e r a t i o n s h a l l 
19 
occur* ' So the f u l l impact of the S p i r i t on the other dimensions of 
l i f e must await the redemption of man, a redemption which i s already 
i n d i r e c t l y applied to nature i n so f a r as man himself contains w i t h i n his 
own being a l l other previous dimensions* I n t h i s context we can perhaps 
agree with T i l l i c h that as yet there i s no d i r e c t impact i n the sense 
of ultimate healing* But t h i s i s not to deny that the S p i r i t i s d i r e c t l y 
at work i n the universe w i t h i n the natural processes, creating and 
sustaining and restoring, u n t i l the day of ultimate salvation arrives* 
The role of the S p i r i t i n the ministry of healing i s of considerable 
importance and the church i t s e l f i s becoming increasingly aware of t h i s 
rediscovered sphere of the S p i r i t ' s a c t i v i t y * One therefore welcomes 
the attention T i l l i c h gives to t h i s topic* Nevertheless, h i s condemnation 
of f a i t h healing i s f a r too generalised and indiscriminate* I t i s j u s t 
not true that a l l forms of f a i t h healing are operative through magical 
concentration (a term which, i n c i d e n t a l l y , T i l l i c h f a i l s t o define)* 
Whether one c a l l s i t f a i t h healing or not, there i s c e r t a i n l y a form of 
healing i n which f a i t h i n the power of the S p i r i t t o heal, supported by 
the prayer of intercession, plays an important r o l e . I t may indeed be 
more accurate to c a l l such healing ' S p i r i t u a l healing', i n so f a r as he 
who i s sick i s healed by the S p i r i t through the vehicle of f a i t h , but 
t h i s i s not to minimise the role of f a i t h , as T i l l i c h seems to do. Now 
i t i s true that T i l l i c h does speak of f a i t h i n his concept of S p i r i t u a l 
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healing, but his d e f i n i t i o n of f a i t h as 'surrender to the power of the 
S p i r i t * seems to be intended, i n the context i n which i t i s used, to r u l e 
out the idea that f a i t h i s i n any way concerned with specifio answers to 
specific prayers. One does not see why t h i s should be so, and to main-
t a i n that i t i s so would i n f a c t immediately invalidate the majority of 
instances of healing i n the New Testament, as well as many such cases 
i n the ministry of the church throughout i t s history and at the present 
time. This, however, does not seem to concern T i l l i c h , who i s prepared 
to r e j e c t any concept of S p i r i t u a l healing which does not f i t i n w i t h 
his own categories of thought. I n so doing he either ignores an important 
part of the S p i r i t ' s a c t i v i t y altogether or else debases i t by charac-
t e r i s i n g i t as the mere exercising of magical powers. Clearly t h i s w i l l 
not do. 
Nevertheless, i t i s r i g h t that healing should be seen w i t h i n the 
t o t a l context of salvation, as T i l l i c h underlines* The S p i r i t i s con-
cerned with the whole of man, not j u s t a part* The story of the healing 
of the paralytic confirms t h i s * I n t h i s sense, salvation i t s e l f i s 
r i g h t l y understood i n terms of healingi the healing of man as a person, 
the healing of relationships between man and man, the healing of his 
estrangement from God* Consequently the work of salvation i s concerned 
with every part of man's l i f e and i s operative i n a l l : i n morality, 
culture and r e l i g i o n ; i n the l i f e of the S p i r i t u a l Community w i t h i n the 
church, i n the l i f e of the ind i v i d u a l w i t h i n the context of the S p i r i t u a l 
Community* The divine S p i r i t i s he who heals every ambiguity of l i f e , 
and though the t o t a l i t y of healing cannot come wi t h i n the present order 
of things, every act of healing, every act of salvation, points towards 
t h i s end, and demonstrates the S p i r i t breaking through into our midst* 
T i l l i c h expresses, as we must expect him to do, a l l t h i s i n his usual 
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ontologlcal framework. Yet t h i s should not prevent us from asserting 
with him, despite any difference of mechanics or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , that 
the t o t a l healing of man and nature can come only through the impact 
of the S p i r i t u a l Presence. The f i n a l consummation can only come i n an 
eschatological context,, which i s beyond the terms of reference of our 
present study* L i f e i n the S p i r i t then becomes l i f e i n the Kingdom of 
God. Yet the S p i r i t takes the things of the Kingdom, the New Reality 
of which T i l l i c h so often speaks, and makes them fragmentarily r e a l i n 
the l i f e of the present world, as a foretaste of that which i s to come* 
As Berkhof puts i t , ' A l l these operations are the "powers of the.age to 
20 
come"; they are a l l summarised i n the work of the Holy S p i r i t * • 
8 
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At the very beginning of our study, mention was made of the s i g n i -
f i c a n t emphasis T i l l i c h places i n his theology on the concept of p a r t i -
cipation. This concept, which we found d i f f i c u l t to define with 
precision, i s closely a l l i e d to a f u r t h e r concept which has constantly 
arisen i n our study of the S p i r i t , that of the transoendent unity of 
unambiguous l i f e , i n t o which he who i s grasped by the S p i r i t i s taken, and 
within which he i s able to overcome the subject-object cleavage of the 
e x i s t e n t i a l order. Seeing that these two concepts hang closely together, 
i t i s not surprising that the concept of the transcendent unity of unam-
biguous l i f e i s no less d i f f i c u l t to define than that of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 
But because i t i s so cruoial to any f u l l understanding of the doctrine 
of the S p i r i t u a l Presence i n T i l l i c h ' s theology, we must look at i t a 
l i t t l e more closely. To know what l i f e i n the S p i r i t means, we must 
know what the transcendent unity of unambiguous l i f e e n t a i l s . 
I t has appeared from our study that the concept of the transcendent 
unity of unambiguous l i f e i s fundamentally a description of the divine 
l i f e , the l i f e of ultimate r e a l i t y , i n which there i s no subject-object 
s p l i t , but i n which the subject and object p o l a r i t i e s are completely 
and unambiguously united, with no estrangement between them. By being 
taken i n t o the divine l i f e under the impact of the S p i r i t man comes to 
realise that his basic unity with the world l i e s i n the f a c t ,that both 
he as subject and the object he enoounters, whether i t be another person, 
or a thing, have one common ground of being i n the l i f e of God which 
transcends every e x i s t e n t i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . Now i t may seem that on 
the surface i t i s f a i r l y clear what T i l l i c h i s saying, that i n the depth 
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dimension of b e i n g - i t s e l f both subject and object are one i n t h e i r 
ultimate ground* But when we probe a l i t t l e more deeply, what i s not 
so easy t o understand i s whether he i s implying that because i n the 
transcendent un i t y of unambiguous l i f e , i n the divine l i f e and ground 
of being, both subjeot and object f i n d t h e i r deeper u n i t y , then there 
i s ultimately no d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between the two* Obviously i n t h e i r 
e x i s t e n t i a l state, though a fragmentary unity may be realised, d i f f e r e n -
t i a t i o n remains* But does t h i s mean that u l t i m a t e l y , when the shackles 
of earthly existence have been cast aside, there i s no fu r t h e r d i f f e r e n -
t i a t i o n ? Does p a r t i c i p a t i o n of subject i n object, and object i n subject, 
effected by the S p i r i t , mean eventually a complete merging of the one 
i n t o the other, with a resultant loss of i n d i v i d u a l i t y ? I s there any 
plaoe, i n f a c t , f o r i n d i v i d u a l i t y i n the Spirit-determined transcendent 
unity of unambiguous l i f e ? 
Let us consider the case, f i r s t of a l l , where both subjeot and 
object are men* I n the e x i s t e n t i a l world they are separate, which means 
f o r T i l l i c h , 'estranged'* Nevertheless, they are both one i n t h e i r 
essential humanity, the common ground of a l l i n d i v i d u a l members of the 
human race. T i l l i c h ' s view i s that by being taken by the S p i r i t i n t o 
the transcendent unity of unambiguous l i f e they are each, both subject 
and object, able to participate i n each other by p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e i r 
essential humanity, thus overcoming t h e i r subject-object s p l i t * But 
does t h i s mean that i n the transcendent un i t y of unambiguous l i f e , i n 
the context of the divine L i f e , there are no indi v i d u a l men, but only 
an essential humanity? Much depends, of course, on what i t means t o 
overcome the subject-object s p l i t * We met t h i s d i f f i c u l t y i n discussing 
the meaning of unity i n r e l a t i o n to the concept of love, but here the 
problem i s much more acute, because now we are thinking of what t h i s 
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unity ultimately involves, outside the l i m i t a t i o n s of the e x i s t e n t i a l 
order* 
I t i s not easy to decide what T i l l i c h 1 s answer to t h i s problem i s * 
At times he asserts the need to r e t a i n a proper emphasis on i n d i v i d u a l i t y 
as the necessary pole to that of p a r t i c i p a t i o n * * P a r t i c i p a t i o n i s not 
i d e n t i t y , he claims. Yet over against t h i s one has to set his statement 
that 'the stranger who i s an estranged part of one's self has ceased to 
be a stranger when he i s experienced as coming from the same ground as 
2 
one's s e l f * I n such a statement as t h i s , i f p a r t i c i p a t i o n does not 
imply i d e n t i t y , i t a t least implies something very similar* At any 
rate, such a sentence crosses over the boundaries of the i n d i v i d u a l s e l f 
i n such a way that d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between subject and object becomes 
almost impossible and i n d i v i d u a l i t y u l t i m a t e l y meaningless* 
Perhaps some l i g h t i s thrown on t h i s problem i n the l a t t e r part 
of Volume 3 of his Systematic Theology, where T i l l i c h t a lks about the 
eschatological symbols* Here he introduces the i n t e r e s t i n g concept of 
'essentialisation', which refers to the state of being through which 
the i n d i v i d u a l participates i n eternal l i f e * However, t h i s e s s e n t i a l i -
sation, he points out, i s not j u s t returning to what a thing essentially 
i s - i t i s not a mere sinking back i n t o the essence which preceded 
actualisation - i t i s rather that 
the new which has been actualised i n time and space adds 
something to essential being, un i t i n g i t with the positive 
which i s created w i t h i n existence, thus producing the 
ultimately new, the "New Being", not fragmentarily as i n 
temporal l i f e , but wholly as a contribution to the 
Kingdom of God i n i t s f u l f i l m e n t * . . Parti c i p a t i o n i n 
the eternal l i f e depends on a creative synthesis of a 
being's essential nature with what i t has made of i t i n 
i t s temporal existence.3 
The essentialisation of humanity, therefore, i n the context of unambi-
guous l i f e , means that man's e x i s t e n t i a l p a r t i c u l a r i t y i s i n some way 
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united with his essential humanity to oreate something new* I t i s 
essential manhood with a new important f a c t o r added) the f u l f i l m e n t of 
essential being through the experience of actualisation. I t i s , i n 
other words, a 'new humanity'• For T i l l i c h , then, i t seems that the 
value of man's i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s that i t has provided the e x i s t e n t i a l 
element which goes towards making t h i s creative synthesis possible* What 
i s not so clear i s whether or not the i n d i v i d u a l , once he has made his 
contribution to essentialised humanity, has any continuing l i f e as an 
ind i v i d u a l . Whatever the answer to t h i s question, i t i s clear that the 
dominant concept i s that of essentialisation, i n which the ind i v i d u a l 
l i f e i s of a secondary concern, the means to the desired end of a f a r 
wider f u l f i l m e n t and a f a r deeper ontological unity* 
Our understanding of essentialisation i s taken f u r t h e r i n another 
passage where T i l l i c h talks about the fate of the ' l o s t ' . 
He who i s estranged from his own essential being and 
experiences the despair of t o t a l s e l f - r e j e c t i o n must be 
to l d that his essence participates i n the essences of a l l 
those who have reached a high degree of f u l f i l m e n t and 
that through t h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n his being i s etern a l l y 
affirmed. This idea of the essentialisation of the. 
i n d i v i d u a l i n unity with a l l beings makes the concept of 
vicarious f u l f i l m e n t understandable*** 
I n t h i s passage i t seems that the boundaries of individual d i f f e r e n t i a -
t i o n are so violated that they no longer matter. What ultimately matters 
i s that the individual i s essentialised, and i n t h i s essentialisation 
becomes one with other individuals i n such a way that i t i s possible to 
'cross over* from one to the other* Even i f one ind i v i d u a l has not 
f u l f i l l e d himself through his own personal humanity, he can nevertheless 
do so because hi s essence i s one with the essence of those who have thus 
f u l f i l l e d themselves. I t seems that here the l i v e s of individuals have 
become so merged i n t o a state of essentialisation that i t has become 
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exceedingly d i f f i c u l t to f i l l any t a l k of continuing i n d i v i d u a l i t y with 
i n t e l l i g i b l e meaning* 
So when T i l l i c h says that i n the Spirit-determined transcendent 
unity of unambiguous l i f e the subject-object s p l i t i s so overcome that 
i t becomes possible to participate i n the l i f e of the other one through 
the common essence of humanity, one feels that to say the very least, 
individual d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s being treated less than seriously. I t i s 
quite clear that i n the experience of unity which unambiguous l i f e 
u ltimately provides, the important element i s that of essentialised 
humanity as such, rather than men as individuals with i d e n t i t i e s of t h e i r 
own. This being so, i t seems that what T i l l i c h i s ultimately leading 
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to i s a contemporary restatement of the Averroist heresy, which i n t e r -
preted man's immortality i n c o l l e c t i v e terms rather than the standpoint 
of Christian theology, which has always affirmed a place f o r the ind i v i d u a l 
i n the l i f e of e t e r n i t y . 
The second question regards the r e l a t i o n between subject and object 
i n the context of the transcendent unity when subject and object belong 
to two d i f f e r e n t modes of existence, between man on the one hand and 
other species of l i f e on the other. Here the problem i s complicated 
by the f a c t that Christian theology has not normally envisaged any sort 
of continuing l i f e f o r those in d i v i d u a l forms of l i f e other than man. So 
i n a sense we are r a i s i n g an issue which i n Christian c i r c l e s would not 
normally be raised. But i n so f a r as T i l l i c h speaks of a unity between 
man and the objects he encounters w i t h i n his world, fragmentarily 
realised i n the S p i r i t u a l experience of the transcendent unity of unam-
biguous l i f e , we must t r e a t such a question seriously. One must ask 
then what i s the nature of t h i s unity and to what extent the ind i v i d u a l 
'selves' are retained. 
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Such a problem must obviously be resolved i n the l i g h t of T i l l i c h ' s 
concept of the multidimensional unity of a l l l i f e , according to which 
a l l other dimensions are present and f u l f i l l e d i n man as the dimension 
of s p i r i t . I n his essentialisatLon, therefore, man i s bringing every 
previous dimension to i t s f u l f i l m e n t i n unity with himself* The answer 
then would seem to be that the unity that i s experienced beyond the 
l i m i t a t i o n s of the e x i s t e n t i a l world i n the context of the transoendent 
unity of unambiguous l i f e i s a t o t a l awareness of one's essential unity 
with the whole of l i f e i n a l l i t s dimensions, which includes the essence 
i n which any object which has been encountered i n the world i s grounded* 
Man, i n his eternal l i f e , brings nature to i t s f u l f i l m e n t , but i s aware 
of nature not as being constituted of many individual e n t i t i e s , but 
rather as the essences and dimensions which are now f u l f i l l e d i n his 
own essentialised humanity. Our only comment here i s that , i n t e r e s t i n g 
as t h i s point of view may be, we have r e a l l y moved outside the realm of 
theological assertion to that of metaphysical speculation* Though the 
Christian f a i t h has always affirmed that the redemption of nature i s 
closely connected with the salvation of man, i t has never specified what 
place, i f any, non-human forms of l i f e may have w i t h i n the l i f e of 
ete r n i t y * 
But by f a r the most important problem that arises from the S p i r i t -
i n i t i a t e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n of man i n the transcendent unity of unambiguous 
l i f e i s the nature of the relationship between man and God, between the 
human s p i r i t and the Divine S p i r i t * Bight at the beginning of t h i s 
essay we were concerned about the precise r e l a t i o n between the f i n i t e 
and the i n f i n i t e i n T i l l i c h ' s theology, and whether the doctrine of 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n implied that the f i n i t e was continuous w i t h the i n f i n i t e , 
that the l i f e of man was continuous with the l i f e of God* There are two 
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references which would c e r t a i n l y imply that t h i s i s so. 'God i s i n f i n -
i t e 1 , says T i l l i c h , 'because he has the f i n i t e w i t h i n himself united 
with h i s i n f i n i t y ' J * * and, 'The f i n i t e i s p o t e n t i a l l y and essentially an 
7 
element i n the divine l i f e ' * Both of these statements express quite 
c l e a r l y the b e l i e f that the f i n i t e i s an essential element i n or part 
of the l i f e of God* Though i t i s not to be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the fulness 
of God, i t i s nevertheless a part of the divine L i f e * From t h i s we take 
i t that the divine S p i r i t brings the human s p i r i t i n t o a transcendent 
unity w i t h God by helping i t to see that beyond the subject-object order 
of e x i s t e n t i a l r e a l i t y i t i s one with the divine S p i r i t as the f i n i t e 
aspect of the S p i r i t u a l Presence with whom i t i s essentially united* So 
there i s a point of i d e n t i t y , a point of continuity, which makes both 
one* This conclusion i s reinforced by T i l l i c h ' s assertion that any 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between the human s p i r i t and the divine S p i r i t can 
only be maintained as long as the subject-object structure remains, but 
once t h i s has been overcome and l e f t behind, as i t w i l l be when the 
human s p i r i t i s t o t a l l y , rather than fragmentarily, grasped by the divine 
g 
S p i r i t , any preliminary and t r a n s i t o r y d u a l i t y w i l l fade away* I n t h i s 
case, the problem i s whether i n the ultimate transcendent u n i t y , once 
the d u a l i t y between the f i n i t e and the i n f i n i t e has been overcome, the 
f i n i t e s p i r i t of man retains any d i s t i n c t i v e i d e n t i t y as an element 
within the divine l i f e , or whether i t i s absorbed or assimilated i n t o the 
l i f e of ultimate r e a l i t y , with the consequent loss of any meaningful 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y * 
This i s why our discussion on the two types of mysticism to which 
T i l l i c h r e f e r s , the 'mysticism of dissolution', whioh i s prepared to 
s a c r i f i c e any i n d i v i d u a l i t y f o r the sake of the ultimate, and the 
'mysticism of love', whioh demands the ultimate d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of 
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subject and object, was so s i g n i f i c a n t . 7 For though i t seemed that 
T i l l i c h was t r y i n g to have both forms of mysticism, despite t h e i r incom-
p a t i b i l i t y , one cannot r e a l l y escape the conclusion t h a t , i n spite of his 
regard f o r the Christian mysticism of love, he i s driven t o believe that 
a personalistic mysticism must eventually be transcended i n favour of 
a monistic mysticism, wherein the human s p i r i t i s taken i n t o the l i f e 
of the divine. I t i s d i f f i o u l t to see how i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n the complete 
i d e n t i t y of man can possibly remain. Certainly T i l l i c h ' s suggestion that 
i n the transcendent unity the human s e l f i s centred i n the divine centre 
rather than i t s e l f would imply that the preservation of a s p e c i f i c a l l y 
human i d e n t i t y would be gravely compromised.^ 
I n the l a s t few pages of his Systematic Theology* T i l l i c h has t h i s 
to say. 
I t i s appropriate to ask about the r e l a t i o n of the Divine 
L i f e to the l i f e of the creature i n the state of essential-
i s a t i o n or i n Eternal L i f e . Such a question i s both unavoid-
able • . • and impossible t o answer except i n terms of the 
highest religious-poetic symbolism.H 
So any t a l k of the individual s e l f i n r e l a t i o n to God, any attempt to 
describe the r e l a t i o n between the human s p i r i t and the divine S p i r i t 
i n the context of eternal l i f e , i s r e a l l y nothing more than a piece of 
relig i o u s poetic symbolism. Beyond t h i s T i l l i c h i s unwilling to go. 
Nevertheless, one feels j u s t i f i e d i n concluding that T i l l i c h ' s analysis 
of the r e l a t i o n between the human s p i r i t and the S p i r i t of God must 
lead inevitably to that point where ultimately the s p i r i t of man, 
through a process of e s s e r i a l i s a t i o n , i s v i r t u a l l y absorbed i n t o the 
divine L i f e , the transcendent unity of unambiguous l i f e , i n which every 
preliminary and t r a n s i t o r y d u a l i t y between the f i n i t e and the i n f i n i t e 
i s f i n a l l y overcome. 
However, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to reconcile t h i s oonclusion with b i b l i c a l 
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theology a t a l l . There i s nothing i n the New Testament to suggest 
that the ultimate purpose of the impact of the S p i r i t on man i s to 
bring him i n t o a transcendent unity with God i n which his own i n d i v i -
d u a l i t y i s at r i s k . I n f a c t , the b i b l i c a l understanding of the r e l a t i o n 
between the divine S p i r i t and the human s p i r i t , maintaining as i t does 
a clear d i s t i n c t i o n between them, could hardly give r i s e to such an idea 
i n any shape or form. Though there i s ce r t a i n l y testimony to the i n -
dwelling of the divine S p i r i t i n the l i f e of the Christian i n the New 
Testament, there i s nothing which suggests any form of continuity or any 
point of i d e n t i t y between the s p i r i t of man and the S p i r i t of God, nothing 
which implies that they are ultimately and essentially one* This means 
that at the very heart of T i l l i c h ' s pneumatology there i s a grave defect 
which stems from an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of r e a l i t y whose roots l i e i n classical 
ontology and German idealism rather than b i b l i c a l theology. I n the 
f i n a l analysis, we suggest that the Christian doctrine of the Holy 
S p i r i t and the concept of transcendent unity are completely incompatible* 
I I 
Two other general points of c r i t i c i s m of T i l l i c h ' s doctrine of 
the S p i r i t may be made. I n our discussion on T i l l i c h ' s analysis of the 
doctrine of the T r i n i t y we noted how the S p i r i t was described as a 
'moment' i n the eternal d i a l e c t i c of the divine l i f e , the ontological 
p r i n c i p l e which unites every f i n i t e expression with i t s i n f i n i t e ground* 
Just as t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the T r i n i t y stems from philosophical spec-
ul a t i o n based on an essentially monistic view of r e a l i t y rather than 
b i b l i c a l revelation, so also T i l l i c h ' s understanding of the S p i r i t as 
'moment' i s rather d i f f e r e n t from the personal, active and l i v i n g S p i r i t 
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of the New Testament. This i n e v i t a b l y raises the problem of the person-
a l i t y of the S p i r i t . Certainly i t would not be easy meaningfully to 
apply the concept of personality to an ontological p r i n c i p l e or a moment 
i n the d i a l e c t i c of l i f e . For t h i s reason i t i s highly s i g n i f i c a n t that 
T i l l i c h r a r e l y speaks of the divine S p i r i t i n a personal way at a l l - he 
i s content to use the neuter pronoun i n almost every case. This suggests 
that the S p i r i t f o r T i l l i c h cannot be adequately described i n personal-
i s t i c categories, and t h i s t i e s i n very neatly with his r e j e c t i o n of 
b i b l i c a l personalism. Certainly he uses personal symbols when t a l k i n g 
about the S p i r i t , but i t i s f a r from clear what the personal nature of 
these a t t r i b u t e s mean i n the context of the divine l i f e . And admittedly 
he refers to God as ' P e r s o n a l - i t s e l f i n so f a r as he i s the ground of 
a l l personal being, but whether t h i s means any more than God having the 
capacity w i t h i n himself to produce personality, or the divine S p i r i t 
having the potential to give r i s e to personality i n the form of the human 
s p i r i t , i s d i f f i c u l t to say. I n any case, what ultimate meaning or 
value can one place on the concept of personality when i n the process of 
essentialisation personal i n d i v i d u a l i t y seems to be l i t t l e more than a 
necessary, though ultimately dispensable, stage on the road to f u l f i l -
ment? These questions help us to see that when T i l l i c h thinks of the 
Holy S p i r i t , he i s thinking of something rather d i f f e r e n t from the New 
Testament concept and what the church has normally taught, both of which 
take the personality of the divine S p i r i t with the utmost seriousness* 
This does not mean that the doctrine of the personality of the S p i r i t does 
not need to be interpreted afresh i n the modern age. But i t at least 
suggests that any contribution that T i l l i c h has to make to such a r e i n -
terprets t i on has severe problems which must be taken seriously and by no 
means accepted u n c r i t i c a l l y . 
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The other point i s to ask whether T i l l i c h ' s doctrine of the 
S p i r i t i s s u f f i c i e n t l y c h r i s t o l o g i c a l l y grounded* As we have seen, 
f o r T i l l i c h Jesus as the Christ i s he who bears the New Being to 
man, whereas the New Being I t s e l f i s actually the creation of the 
divine S p i r i t * Now without wishing to minimise i n any way the 
S p i r i t ' s regenerative work, we must ask whether t h i s sort of thinking 
* 
does not e f f e c t i v e l y subordinate Jesus as the Christ to the divine 
S p i r i t i n such a way that his sole function becomes none other than 
to show man what the New Reality i s , whilst at the same time affirming 
that the real work i s done by the S p i r i t himself who grasps man and 
takes him i n t o his new creation, the transcendent unity of unambiguous 
l i f e * I t seems to me, however, that to say t h i s hardly does j u s t i c e 
to the basic c h r i s t o l o g i c a l assertion that i n Jesus Christ God has 
acted personally and decisively i n man's redemption, thereby reconciling 
the whole world to himself* I n the New Testament the Christ i s f a r 
more than the essential c r i t e r i o n of a genuine S p i r i t u a l experience* 
He i s 'the Word made f l e s h ' , to whom the S p i r i t i n his turn bears 
witness and whose atoning work he makes real w i t h i n the hearts of 
men. And the new l i f e which the S p i r i t brings i s a l i f e which i s made 
possible precisely because t h i s i s so* 
Consequently, one feels that what may be called the ' h i s t o r i c a l 
necessities' of the Gospel are toned down considerably i n T i l l i c h ' s 
theology. I t i s t h i s that has led some c r i t i c s of T i l l i o h to ask whether 
i n f a c t we have here a h i s t o r i c a l Gospel, i n which the h i s t o r i c events 
of the Cross and Resurrection are all-important and not j u s t symbolically 
s i g n i f i c a n t , or a mystical Gospel, i n which the aim and purpose of a l l 
r e l i g i o u s symbols, including the Cross and Resurrection, i s to bring men 
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i n t o the transcendent unity i n the power of the S p i r i t * The same 
point arises i n his discussion on the Word, where his emphasis that the 
b i b l i c a l word, l i k e any other word, cannot become theonomous u n t i l the 
S p i r i t takes hold of i t does not s u f f i c i e n t l y recognise the nature of 
the b i b l i c a l word as the record of God's mighty acts i n h i s t o r y , culmin-
ating i n the l i f e , death and resurrection of Jesus Christ* I f Protestant 
theology has sometimes tended to swing too much i n one d i r e c t i o n i n 
respect of these issues, emphasising the h i s t o r i c a l element at the 
expense of the experiential, i t may well be that to some extent i n his 
attempt to redress the balance T i l l i c h has swung too f a r i n the opposite 
d i r e c t i o n . D i f f i c u l t as i t may be, i t i s essential that a perfect 
balance be maintained between the objective work of God i n Christ and 
the subjective appropriation of that work i n and through the power and 
presence of the Holy S p i r i t * Consequently, there must be an emphasis on 
the awareness of the divine i n the midst of l i f e , yet i t must be an 
awareness that has been baptised in t o the h i s t o r i c a l revelation of God 
i n Christ* There must be experience, yet i t w i l l be an experience of 
the S p i r i t who i s promised to men by the Christ who died and rose again* 
There must be the S p i r i t , yet the S p i r i t i s always the S p i r i t of Christ, 
who takes and reveals the things of Christ. I n other words, T i l l i c h ' s 
doctrine of the S p i r i t would have greatly benefitted i f he had taken the 
h i s t o r i c i t y of the Gospel more seriously, instead of giving the impression 
that .this very h i s t o r i c i t y i s a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence* 
I I I 
Nevertheless, having made these c r i t i c i s m s , i t would be completely 
mistaken to suggest that there i s l i t t l e of value i n T i l l i c h ' s doctrine 
of the S p i r i t * Cur study has shown that t h i s i s f a r from the case* 
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There are many implications of T i l l i c h ' s thought which have positive 
significance* One such i s his very emphasis on the experience of the 
S p i r i t , which one can c e r t a i n l y a f f i r m , even though one would deny the 
ontological basis f o r that experience which T i l l i c h asserts. The i n -
dwelling of the S p i r i t i s an important aspect of both New Testament and 
Reformed theology, even though nineteenth and twentieth century theolo-
gians have tended to tread with caution when dealing with such a theme* 
This may i t s e l f have been p a r t l y responsible f o r the o v e r - i n t e l l e c t u a l i -
sation of the Christian message i n contemporary orthodox Protestantism 
from Ritschl onwards, together with the re j e c t i o n of anything that has 
the s l i g h t e s t suspicion of what has been g l i b l y called 'emotional*• 
Thus any emphasis on the devotional l i f e and i n t e r i o r communion with God 
has often been downgraded i n orthodox Protestant c i r c l e s , and i n so doing 
there has been a refusal to admit a genuine Christooentrio mysticism, 
which has frequently been characterised as mere s u b j e c t i v i t y or f e e l i n g * 
I n doing t h i s , Protestantism has come very close to denying the l e g i t i -
mate experiential aspeot of the S p i r i t ' s a c t i v i t y , leaving i t i n the 
main to lef t - w i n g evangelical sects* I n order to restore the balance, 
there must.indeed be a new theological assessment of the nature and rol e 
of S p i r i t u a l experience, which must in e v i t a b l y lead to a much more com-
prehensive understanding of pneumatology* I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that those 
theologies which have underplayed the experiential or subjective aspects 
of the Christian Gospel have said f a r too l i t t l e about the Holy S p i r i t , 
and one feels that T i l l i c h has done much to remedy t h i s defect, and t h i s 
not least w i t h i n the context of his own Lutheranism.*^ As we have j u s t 
said, t h i s does not mean that the objective, h i s t o r i c a l basis of the 
Gospel can be ignored, but that the two aspects must be held together 
as necessarily complementary. 
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I n the second place, T i l l i c h has reminded us that any d i v i s i o n 
between the doctrine of the S p i r i t and the doctrine of the church i s 
theologically u n j u s t i f i a b l e * I t i s well-known that one of the most 
s i g n i f i c a n t features of post-war theology has been an intensive theolo-
gical exploration i n t o the nature and function of the church* stemming 
no doubt from the dual concern f o r unity w i t h i n the ranks of the church 
and a new conception of i t s place w i t h i n the secular world* Lesslie 
Newbigin, i n his contribution to the debate about the church i n the 1950s, 
emphasised that i n considering the nature of the church i t was not 
s u f f i c i e n t merely to take i n t o account the t r a d i t i o n a l 'Catholic* and 
'Protestant' emphases, but also that the 'Fentecostalist' emphasis on 
the church as the 'community of the S p i r i t ' must have i t s proper place*"^ 
Certainly a l l three emphases are present i n T i l l i c h , but the s i g n i f i c a n t 
feature i s that he, unlike most other great systematic theologians, sets 
the doctrine of the church f i r m l y w i t h i n the context of the doctrine of 
the S p i r i t . I n t h i s , of course, he follows Calvin, though his emphasis 
on the inward nature of the S p i r i t u a l Community i s f a r more s i g n i f i c a n t 
than Calvin could ever allow* This does not mean that T i l l i c h i s sub-
j e c t i v e i n his ecclesiology, but i t does mean that by going f u r t h e r than 
Catholic or Protestant theologies have gone i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n , he has 
given us a doctrine of the church which has a healthy balance between 
the objeotive and subjective l i n e s of approach* By affirm i n g that the 
essential nature of the church i s that of a S p i r i t - f i l l e d community, 
even though he describes t h i s i n ontological categories which we f i n d 
d i f f i c u l t to understand, he has moved theology away from a description 
and analysis of the church i n purely formal, i n t e l l e c t u a l or even 
sociological terms to something much more th e o l o g i c a l l y . s i g n i f i c a n t * 
Furthermore, i n an age when there i s an increase i n secularisation 
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which influences the very l i f e of the church i t s e l f . T i l l i c h has em-
phasised i t s S p i r i t u a l function i n a way which needs to be underlined* 
Now l e t us be quite clear here. Few have emphasised more than T i l l i c h 
the need f o r secular involvement, and few have worked out so pains-
takingly the theological implications of the presence of the' S p i r i t i n 
secular l i f e . And c e r t a i n l y no one has sought to j u s t i f y t h i s p o s i t i o n 
any more c a r e f u l l y than T i l l i c h , despite the f a c t that we are not happy 
with the ontological framework i n which he does t h i s , and i n t h i s 
context, his introduction of the concept of the late n t church i s one 
which has found ready acceptance among those who wish to a f f i r m the 
presence of the Holy S p i r i t i n the whole of l i f e * Yet, at the same time, 
no one i s aware of the dangers of secularisation more than T i l l i c h , and 
his insistence on the r e l i g i o u s dimension as that which alone can point 
to the ultimate meaning and significance of l i f e stands i n clear and 
healthy contrast to those who would reduce the role of the church to 
nothing more than secular involvement and f u l f i l m e n t i n a horizontal 
direction* His placing of the church f i r m l y w i t h i n the context of the 
doctrine of the S p i r i t i s a reminder to contemporary theology that w i t h -
out the S p i r i t the church would lose i t s true raison d'etre* 
And f i n a l l y , T i l l i c h ' s emphasis on the r o l e of the S p i r i t i n the 
areas of morality and culture i s one which has great relevance at the 
present time. Such an emphasis i s necessary i f society i s to prevent 
a genuine and legitimate secularisation from being distorted i n t o an 
ar i d secularism. There are, of course, certain things we have had 
occasion to question i n T i l l i c h ' s analysis, such as his reading of moral-
i t y i n terms of s e l f - i n t e g r a t i o n , his eagerness to i n t e r p r e t agape i n 
classioal terms, the ontological basis f o r his concept of theonomy. Yet 
what r e a l l y stands out i n his discussion i s his insistence that when the 
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S p i r i t grasps man, he grasps him i n every area of l i f e * not j u s t the 
narrowly r e l i g i o u s sphere* Together with t h i s affirmation i s the equally 
important assertion that the S p i r i t i s already at work i n l i f e even 
before his Presence may be overtly acknowledged, i n those places where 
morality, culture and r e l i g i o n already seek to point beyond themselves 
to a transcendent presence i n the midst* So T i l l i c h r i g h t l y affirms 
that there i s no l i m i t t o the S p i r i t ' s a c t i v i t y * I n an age when there 
i s an increasing r e j e c t i o n of organised r e l i g i o n these affirmations are 
tremendously important* God cannot be pushed out beyond the extremities 
of l i f e when he i s already a t the heart of i t * For t h i s reason one 
welcomes T i l l i c h ' s theology of culture and morality as an essential con-
t r i b u t i o n to the doctrine of the S p i r i t * 
At one stage i n his analysis, T i l l i c h describes Paul as primarily 
a theologian of the S p i r i t * I t i s not perhaps i n any Pauline sense that 
one would apply t h i s t i t l e to T i l l i c h himself* But our. study has shown 
that he has made a contribution that i s valuable to the developing 
doctrine of the S p i r i t i n our time* For t h i s reason one may dare to say 
that his very mistakes are an i n s p i r a t i o n to fur t h e r theological i n v e s t i -
gation* 
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APPENDIX 
PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND TO TILLICH'S THEOLOGY 
I t would be impossible to trace i n a few pages the various p h i l o -
sophical and theological t r a d i t i o n s that l i e behind T i l l i c h ' s thinking* 
I n confining ourselves to a few observations on more recent thought) 
i t i s nevertheless important to point out that the whole spectrum of 
philosophical and theological thinking from the early Greeks onwards 
has played i t s part i n helping to formulate his theological outlook* 
His indebtedness p a r t i c u l a r l y to the c l a s s i c a l - i d e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n i s 
quite clear and i t i s impossible t o understand T i l l i c h without some know-
ledge of t h i s t r a d i t i o n . Yet i n so f a r as t h i s t r a d i t i o n i t s e l f appears 
prominently i n the idealism of 16th and 19th century German philosophy, 
we shall ooncern ourselves only with these l a t e r formulations* One 
introductory word may be said, however* T i l l i c h follows i n the t r a d i t i o n 
that i s concerned i n the main with the concept of synthesis, the synthesis 
of philosophy and theology, of the f i n i t e and the i n f i n i t e , of reason 
and revelation, of God and man. I n t h i s he continues the l i n e which 
runs from Parminedes through Plato, Augustine and the Franciscans to 
Boehme, Spinoza and Leibniz, and on i n t o the 19th century i d e a l i s t 
t r a d i t i o n , over against the l i n e which runs from A r i s t o t l e to Thomas 
Aquinas, and which T i l l i c h f e l t was responsible f o r the nominalist and 
p o s i t i v i s t philosophies which followed, leading t o 19th and 20th century 
empiricism. These two t r a d i t i o n s form the substance of his essay, 'The 
Two Types of Philosophy of Religion',''' i n which he seeks to demonstrate 
that only i n an ontological philosophy which stresses the ultimate 
i d e n t i t y of the one and the many can the problem of the relationship 
between God and the world, between the divine and the human, be resolved. 
445 
This does not mean that there are not concepts which are common to both 
t r a d i t i o n s , as indeed are p o t e n t i a l i t y and a c t u a l i t y , and essence and 
existence* But f o r T i l l i c h the mention of terms i n themselves are not 
important* What matters i s the context i n which they are used* And he 
believes that the only acceptable context i s one i n which the du a l i t y 
of the subject-object scheme i s overcome i n a basic unity that l i e s 
at the heart of a l l r e a l i t y , a l l t r u t h and a l l meaning. Furthermore, 
he i s convinced that the ancient doctrine of the logos supports t h i s 
point of view* This doctrine asserts that there i s a basic logos 
structure i n r e a l i t y as a whole which can be met and understood by the 
ra t i o n a l structure of the human mind precisely because there i s a point 
of i d e n t i t y between the two, made possible by the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the 
f i n i t e i n the universal logos. T i l l i c h believes that i t i s t h i s sort 
of thinking that l i e s behind the Johannine Prologue when i t affirms 
that the world was made through the Logos, the same Logos who i s the 
l i f e and the l i g h t of every man, shining i n the darkness, making revela-
t i o n possible* Whether t h i s i s what John means or not, the ultimate 
i d e n t i t y of the f i n i t e and i n f i n i t e logos i s basic to T i l l i c h ' s system, 
and i n t h i s concept he sees the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a bringing together 
of philosophical and theological t r u t h * 
I t i s generally acknowledged that the modern period i n philosophy 
begins with Kant (1724-1804)* Although he stands i n a d i f f e r e n t p h i l o -
sophical t r a d i t i o n , there are two areas of Kant's thought which were of 
significance f o r T i l l i c h * The f i r s t i s the important d i s t i n c t i o n Kant 
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makes between phenomenal and noumenal knowledge* The phenomenal world 
i s the world as we know i t , or more accurately, the world as i t i s 
transformed through the process of knowing* I n t h i s knowledge, the 
categories of time and space, q u a l i t y and quantity, causality and sub-
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stance, are a l l Important. On the other handy the noumenal world i s 
the world 'as i t i s ' , beyond the l imitations and distortions of human 
Knowledge. I t i s , i n contradistinction from the phenomenal world, the 
true rea l i ty of things that we cannot know - or at least, we cannot 
know through pure or theoretical reason* I t i s to such a world, says 
Kant, that God belongs. I n one sense i t may be said that tnis sort of 
division approximates to that which T i l l i c h makes between the existential 
and essential worlds. The existential (paralleled by the phenomenal) 
world i s made up of things as they appear to us, i t i s part of our 
experience, and we belong to i t as part and parcel of i t . The essential 
(paralleled by the noumenal) world, on the other hand, i s the world 
which i s 'hidden' from us, which we cannot know at f i r s t hand, yet the 
world that i s t ru ly real . The significant difference, of course, between 
T i l l i c h ' s theology and Kant's view of rea l i ty l ies i n the concept of 
symbolism, whereby T i l i i c h i s able to a f f i rm that the existential i s 
symbolic of the essential because of i t s participation i n i t . This 
sort of thinking i s absent i n Kant who has neither a concept of symbol 
nor one of participation. Yet i n a sense, the question he raises of how 
we can know rea l i ty as such, does prepare the way f o r these concepts 
to arise i n later philosophical thought. 
Tne way i n which Kant does arrirm knowledge of the noumenal world 
i s through practical rather than theoretical reason.^ There can be no 
intel lectual understanding of rea l i ty as i t i s i n i t s e l f , but there can 
be an understanding which comes through the moral awareness that i s found 
i n every man. In this way man i s able to distinguish between the pheno-
menal se l f , as observed through the senses, and the transcendental se l f , 
known through moral experience. The transcendental se l f , which i s the 
real se l f , reveals i t s e l f through the consciousness of moral obligation, 
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the sense of 'ought' which stands over against what a man appears to be, 
and which therefore opens up to him what i s his true nature* This 
categorical, or moral, imperative i s something which comes from within , 
from man's real se l f , cal l ing him to become i n the phenomenal world what 
he essentially i s . From this concept of the moral imperative, by which 
man comes direotly into contact with the noumenal world, Kant postulates 
the existence of God, who i s ultimately responsible f o r the moral law, 
freedom, by which man i s able to f u l f i l the moral law, and immortality, 
which makes i t eternally possible f o r every man to achieve that f u l f i l -
ment* Now whilst T i l l i c h could clearly not accept any such postulation 
regarding the existence of God, there i s a significant parallel here i n 
that both Kant and T i l l i c h underline an essential relation between real i ty 
and morality, a fact which possibly l inks Kant with the classical t r ad i -
t ion i n T i l l i c h ' a mind* Kant's affirmation that the moral imperative i s 
not something foreign to man, but is grounded i n his true self and there-
fore opens up man's essential nature so that man may respond to i t and 
thereby f u l f i l himself i s very similar to T i l l i c h ' s def in i t ion of morality 
i n terms of self-integration* Similarly the very l i n k which Kant makes 
between the autonomous law which expresses man's true being and God as 
the originator of that law, suggests some such concept as theonomous 
morality, by which T i l l i c h affirms that there is no contradiction between 
the divine moral law and the expression of one's essential humanity, 
seeing that the divine i s that which i s found i n the depths of every man* 
Thus, while i t would be wrong to suggest that T i l l i c h was i n any way 
dependent on Kant, there are these important parallels between them* 
The influence of the thinking of Schleiermacher stands out very 
clearly i n T i l l i c h ' s writings. Like T i l l i c h , Schleiermacher also was 
concerned to build his theology into a system,^ and many of the presuppo-
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sitions which he uses as a basis are similar to those used by T i l l i c h . 
Fundamental to Schleiermacher's thought i s the concept of absolute 
dependence, frequently though not always j u s t i f i ab ly characterised as 
•feel ing '• Though Schleiermacher on occasions narrowed down this concept 
to a subjective emotionalism, his idea of absolute dependence was much 
more significant than that* I t i s an absolute dependence that results 
from an immediate and in tu i t i ve awareness of the presence of the divine 
i n human experience! i n self-consciousness* God-consciousness i s to be 
found. This i s not then a merely subjective feel ing, i t i s an awareness 
of the i n f i n i t e pressing i n upon one and breaking through the forms of 
f i n i t e existence. I t i s an 'immediate consciousness of the universal 
existence of a l l f i n i t e things i n and through the I n f i n i t e , and of a l l 
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temporal things i n and through the E t e r n a l T h i s realisation of one's 
unity with the divine i s what Schleiermacher interprets as Eternal L i f e , 
a state of being i n which the dis t inct ion between man and God i s v i r t u a l l y 
removed. To share i n Eternal L i fe means to experience God i n one's 
own l i f e i n the present, and to surrender one's personality to the 
Eternal One i n the future* This i s how he puts i t t 
The personal immortality you speak of outside time and 
beyond i t i s i n t ru th no immortality at a l l . None but he 
who surrenders his own personality, i n i t s transcience, to 
God i n His eterni ty, none but he i s real ly immortal. I n 
the midst of f ini tude to be one with the I n f i n i t e and i n 
every moment to be eternal is the immortality of religion* 
Therefore strive af ter i t , strive even here to annihilate 
your personality and to l i ve i n the One and the A l l * " 
Schleiermacher has no time therefore fo r a God who stands over against 
man as an 'object* who can be approached* For him God pervades the 
7 whole, 'the absolute and undivided Unity beyond and beneath a l l things ' , 
and as such i t i s misleading to ca l l him a person* I n fac t , as T i l l i c h 
himself points out, Schleiermacher i s very unwilling to ascribe person-
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a l i t y to God at a l l , preferring to use the term • s p i r i t u a l i t y ' . One 
sees here perhaps a parallel with T i l l i o h ' s use of the expression 
'Spir i tual Presence'. Certainly such an approach to the doctrine of 
the relationship between God and the world i s one which has influenced 
T i l i i c h , even though i t may not have come direct ly from Schleiermacher 
himself but rather from the common t radi t ion i n which they both stand. . 
Schleiermacher f e l t that the real nature of religious experience 
was everywhere the same. This does not mean that he had no time fo r 
religions as such, f o r i t is the religions which both arise from and 
keep alive religious experience* This may seem to reduce Christianity 
to the same level as the other rel igions, but the uniqueness of Christ-
iani ty l i e s i n the fact that at i t s heart i s the Christt i t ' i s 
essentially distinguished from other such fa i ths by the fact that i n i t 
everything has relat ion to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of 
Nazareth'• The significance of Jesus of Nazareth i s that i n him the 
awareness of God i s unbroken, so that i n his l i f e there is perfect coin-
cidence of the i n f i n i t e and the f i n i t e . The same awareness can be realised 
i n the church through the 'unifying S p i r i t ' , which makes possible a sort 
of mystical union with Christ. I t i s Christ, then, who, as the Archetype 
of humanity, makes i t possible f o r man to overcome his estrangement from 
the I n f i n i t e , and be reconciled to God. Here again, one cannot help but 
notice important parallels with T i l l i c h ' s thought* 
The revival of the classical-idealist position i n 19th century 
German philosophy is perhaps due to Hegel'* more than any other philoso-
pher, and his type of thinking, particularly his dialect ical interpreta-
t ion of r e a l i t y , has considerably influenced T i l l i c h ' s systematic approach 
to theology. I t i s , of course, impossible to do justice to the Hegelian 
synthesis i n a few brief paragraphs. Like Schleiermacher, his interpre-
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tation of rea l i ty i s basically monistic. His fundamental idea i s that 
the I n f i n i t e Sp i r i t , or the Absolute, actualises i t s e l f i n time and 
space, f i n a l l y reaching the point of consciousness i n man himself, and 
particularly i n man's awareness of the Absolute. I n this process he 
detects three 'moments' - the essential Power of the Absolute, the exter-
nalising of i t s e l f i n f i n i t e r ea l i t y , and the returning to i t s e l f i n a 
consciousness that has been made possible through the evolutionary 
process culminating i n man. Or to put i t i n another way, when the 
Absolute goes out from i t s e l f , i t necessarily becomes 'estranged' from 
i t s e l f , so that f i n i t e rea l i ty can be thought of i n terms of estranged 
rea l i ty , and i t is the thi rd moment i n the creative process that makes 
possible the reconciliation of the estranged nature with the Absolute from 
which i t came. A l l this points to a dialect ical t r iad i n the Hegelian 
concept of r e a l i t y , which he f e l t was a val id ontological reinterpretation 
of the doctrine of the Tr in i ty . The same struoture can also be observed 
i n the working of the mind, and this leads Hegel to assert that the 
rational i s the real , and the real i s the rat ional , i n so fa r as this i s 
a truth which i s rat ionally comprehended. From this perception, i t i s 
possible to speak of God as the dynamic, creative mind which pervades the 
whole. Where Hegel d i f f e r s from Schleiermacher i s that the affirmation 
of the identi ty of the f i n i t e with the I n f i n i t e i s not possible merely 
through religious experience, but more s ignif icant ly through philosophical 
ref lec t ion , or, to use an expression more i n vogue today, philosophical 
speculation. . Thus, Hegel's philosophy becomes known as 'speculative 
philosophy'• As T i l l i c h himself summarises Hegel's thought! 
There i s a point of identi ty between God and man insofar 
as God comes to self-consciousness i n man, and insofar as 
man i n his essential nature i s contained together with 
everything i n the inner l i f e of God as potent ial i ty . The 
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process i n which God creates the world and f u l f i l s 
himself i n the world i s the means whereby the i n f i n i t e 
abundance of the divine l i f e grows i n time and space* 
God is not a separate ent i ty , something finished i n 
himself, but he belongs to the world, not as a part of 
i t , but as the ground from which and to which a l l things 
exist* This i s the synthesis of the divine and human 
s p i r i t . l 0 
T i l l i c h might almost have been wri t ing these words about his own theo-
logical system! 
Hegel, however, is much more insistent on leaving behind the world 
of religious symbols than T i l l i c h , and feels that only i n pure specula-
tive thought, where these impediments to true understanding are cast aside, 
can the ident i ty of God and man be t ru ly perceived* We must, f o r example, 
get behind the symbol of the historical Christ to the t ruth to which i t 
points, namely the ultimate identi ty of the divine and the human i n 
essenoe, or as Mackintosh puts i t , ' that the l i f e of man i s the l i f e of 
God i n temporal form, and that the two natures, the divine and the 
human, can only realise themselves through v i t a l unity with each other*.^ 
Here there is an obvious s imi lar i ty with T i l l i c h ' s thought, but T i l l i c h 
is much more rea l i s t ic i n his assessment of the necessity f o r the reten-
t ion of the religious symbol* 
But moreso than Hegel, i t is the ideas of Hegel's contemporary 
Schelling that influenced T i l l i c h . There were two main phases i n 
Schelling's philosophical career. I n the earlier phase, he was very 
much influenced by Spinozist ways of thinking, and developed his own 
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Identitatphilosophie, i n which he affirmed the basic identi ty of a l l 
things i n their I n f i n i t e substance* For Schelling, the Absolute trans-
cended any dis t inct ion between subjectivity and objectivity* I t i s , i n 
fac t , the 'pure identity* of subjectivity and objectivity"^ that led 
Schelling to emphasise the divine presence immanent within the world of 
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nature. The natural world as we see i t , he explained, was, as the 
external object i f ica t ion of the Absolute, a kind of 'symbol' of the 
divine, or ideal nature, and i n this way he gave to nature a new dignity 
which was entirely d i f ferent from the approach of his other contemporary 
Fichte, who set the self over against nature, and gave the impression 
that nature was there to be used f o r the glory of man. I t was part of 
Schelling's philosophy of nature that through the upward movement i n 
nature oulminating i n man, nature comes to know i t s e l f , the decisive 
point i n this process being the development of the human sp i r i t* Unti l 
this point the Spir i t at work within the natural world was unconscious, 
slumbering, but i n man i t breaks out of i t s unconsciousness i n a new 
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awakening. This i s rather similar to Hegel's point about the Absolute 
coming to understand i t s e l f i n man. I t also f i t s very neatly into the 
same sort of dialect ical framework. But Schelling's philosophy of nature 
did not stop with the relationship between the s p i r i t and the natural world* 
The creative world of man i s also part of the same wholes man creates 
the means by which he comes to understand something of the meaning of 
reality* Schelling pays particular attention to a r t i s t i c creations* Art 
he defines as the means by which the identi ty of the unconscious and the 
conscious elements within the natural and sp i r i tua l dimensions of l i f e 
i s i n tu i t i ve ly perceived through a concrete form* 'The same power which 
acts without consciousness i n producing nature, the unconscious poetry 
of the S p i r i t , aots with consciousness i n producing the work of a r t ' * ^ 
Thus, i n true Romantic s tyle, Schelling affirms that art demonstrates 
that the true nature of the Absolute cannot be understood by seeking to 
explain i t , but only through i n t u i t i o n , so that beauty and truth are 
ultimately one. There i s , i n Schelling, therefore, the beginnings of a 
theology of culture. A further element of the philosophy of identi ty was 
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the interpretation of eternal l i f e not as a continued existence af ter 
death, but as the essentialisation of man's being i n the divine l i f e - A l l 
these elements i n Schelling's early philosophy, the identi ty of the 
f i n i t e and the i n f i n i t e , the symbolic power of nature, the f u l l flowering 
of l i f e i n the dimension of s p i r i t , a new interpretation of culture, and 
the emphasis on eternal l i f e as essentialisation into the l i f e of the 
divine, i n which the philosophy of essentialism is dominant, are to be 
found i n T i l l i c h ' a thought. 
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I n the second phase of his philosophy, Schelling dealt with what 
may be called exis tent ia l , positive concerns, as over against the more 
abstract, essential concerns of his earlier thought* He did not deny 
his essentialism, howevert i n fact , he bu i l t on i t , starting with the 
presupposition that i n the divine l i f e there i s held i n permanent tension 
both w i l f u l and rational elements, which because they are eternally 
united with the Absolute, never break away from each other and thus never 
become disruptive* ( In th i s , Schelling himself was influenced by the 
Medieval philosopher-mystic Boehme). These three elements - w i l l , 
reason and unity - correspond to the dialectical structure of rea l i ty 
which we have already noted i n Hegel* I n man, as f i n i t e being, Schelling 
notes that the same three elements are present, but because of man's 
freedom, the elements of w i l l and reason become estranged, and this opens 
up the possibi l i ty of good and ev i l i n man's nature* Just as freedom i s , 
f o r Schelling, absolutely necessary f o r the 'creation' of man, so also 
the. consequences of that freedom imply a r i sk which makes ev i l inevitable* 
Thus i t can be seen that Schelling's interpretation of e v i l i s i n the 
Platonic t rad i t ion of a 'transcendent f a l l ' rather than the b ib l ica l 
t radi t ion of a moral f a l l i n the sense of an aot of disobedience* This 
poses f o r Schelling the existential questions of anxiety, g u i l t and 
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despair, and while he does not provide us with any answers, he does 
demonstrate that the existential problems of man are rooted not merely 
i n his own l i f e , but i n the very depth of being i t se l f* . I t is clear 
that here again, i n his existential concern and the way i n which he 
accounts fo r the human predicament, we have the seeds of T i l l i c h ' s own 
brand of existentialism, the way i n which he describes the ambiguities 
of l i f e and their origin i n man's freedom and need to actualise himself, 
and the way i n which the duality of the divine and the demonic i s 
accounted fo r i n the very polarities inherent i n the depth of being 
i t s e l f . I f Schelling does not actually correlate his essentialism and 
his existentialism as T i l l i c h does, at least the two strands i n his 
philosophy both have influence on T i l l i c h ' s thought* 
I n so f a r as T i l l i c h describes himself aB a ' f i f t y - f i f t y eesential-
i s t - e x i s t e n t i a l i s t t h e r e are influences of Kierkegaard's exis tent ia l-
ism i n his thinking, though these cannot be considered as significant 
as those which we have so f a r considered* Kierkegaard rebelled against 
Hegel's system, and in this context i t i s interesting that Kenneth 
Hamilton uses Kierkegaard's arguments against Hegel i n his own crit ique 
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of T i l l i c h ' s theology* Nevertheless, one cannot deny that T i l l i c h i s 
no less existential ly concerned than Kierkegaard, but whereas Kierkegaard 
sees the answer to hie concern direct ly in terms of an acceptance of what 
God has done i n Christ, T i l l i c h seeks to reinterpret this i n i t s onto-
logical significance along essentialist lines* Perhaps the most important 
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area of common concern i s the concept of anxiety (Kierkegaard! angst). 
For Kierkegaard anxiety i s deep-rooted ontologically i n man's desire 
to actualise himself lest he lose his ident i ty , yet i n actualising him-
self becomes estranged from his true nature, which results i n ontological 
gui l t* Man becomes chained to despair i n the depths of his being* These 
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are problems which T i l l i c h also deals wi th , as fo r example i n his l i t t l e 
book The Courage to Be* But Kierkegaard would probably have l i t t l e time 
fo r the systematic way i n which T i l l i c h seeks to resolve these questions. 
For Kierkegaard, the answer is provided by God coming into history 'from 
the outside* to o f fe r men salvation i n Christ, a salvation which can 
only be received i n the 'leap of f a i t h * , i n which man acts towards God 
with i n f i n i t e passion. Although T i l l i c h sees here a parallel with his 
own 'ultimate concern1, i t i s clear that he goes much further than 
Kierkegaard i n his attempt to answer the existential problem, and one feels 
that by and large he owes comparatively l i t t l e to the Danish philosopher* 
Perhaps of more significance was the philosophy of Husserl known 
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as phenomenology* I n some ways, phenomenology was not a new philoso-
phy at a l l , and i n fact there are undeniable traces of idealism i n i t * 
As a philosophical method i t i s not particularly easy to describe, but 
b r i e f l y i t is a method i f investigating rea l i ty which begins with the 
concrete phenomena and leads from them to an in tu i t i ve knowledge of 
universal essences. This i s done by 'bracketing 1 the individual existence 
of any object i n question together with any temporarily associated 
phenomena u n t i l one reaches a point where, having bracketed a l l existential 
manifestations, one becomes aware of the thing i n i t s e l f , what i s i t B 
nature, what i t means when set free from the distortions of f ini tude and 
individuality* I n this way one both ' i n t u i t s ' the essences of things 
and their universal meaning through their concrete manifestations* 
T i l l i c h ' s idea of a 'universe of meaning', whilst obviously not direct ly 
borrowed from Husserl, i s clearly influenced by this type of thinking, 
as i s also his analysis of the essence of re l ig ion through religious 
phenomenology. In fac t , he acknowledges his indebtedness to Husserl's 
method when he says that 'theology must apply the phenomenological 
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approach to a l l i t s basic concepts', though there i s a sense i n which -
he reads Husserl's phenomenology i n terms of the classical t radi t ion , and 
fo r this reason tends to go beyond what Husserl has to say* 
Our f i n a l reference i s of rather a d i f ferent type - theological 
rather than philosophical* I t i s to the German theologian Martin Kahler* 
Kahler was T i l l i c h ' s teacher as a student, and there are two particular 
emphases i n his thought which are carried over into T i l l i c h ' s theology, 
and T i l l i c h acknowledges his indebtedness to Kahler f o r both of them* 
The f i r s t point concerns his attitude towards the attempted his tor ical 
reconstructions of the l i f e of Jesus that were current at that time, such 
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as one finds i n the writings of Schweitzer* Kahler not only f e l t this 
was an impossible task, he was also convinced i t was an unnecessary one* 
What really mattered fo r Kahler was the Christ of f a i t h rather than 
any quest fo r the Jesus of history. I t i s the picture of Jesus as the 
Christ that one receives i n the New Testament that i s important - a 
portrait that i s 'guaranteed1 and received by f a i t h rather than by 
historical research. So he distinguished between Jesus of Nazareth and 
the Christ of f a i t h , not i n the sense that they are two di f ferent people, 
but i n the sense that i t was the significance of Jesus as the Christ 
that was all-important. This dis t inct ion comes out very fo rce fu l ly i n 
T i l l i c h ' s Christology, as we saw i n our introductory chapter. The 
second influence of Kahler on T i l l i c h was his idea that a man could be 
j u s t i f i ed through the ultimate seriousness to be found i n the depths of 
his doubt. No man can reach to t a l certainty i n his quest for God - even 
in his f a i t h there is an element of doubt springing from the gap between 
man and God. Kahler saw this doubt as a sort of intel lectual sin which 
was analogous to sin of a more moral nature* I f , he said, one i s j u s t i -
f i ed despite one's sin i n a moral sense, one can also be j u s t i f i e d despite 
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one's sin i n an intel leotual sense, i n spite of one's doubts* Doubts 
need not stand between man and God* T i l l i c h . took hold of this thought of 
Kahler's and developed i t i n the l igh t of his own concept of ultimate 
concern, aff irming that i f , i n the depth of his radical doubt, man was 
s t i l l concerned fo r the ultimate, then he was jus t i f ied* 
One could, of course, trace the influence of other philosophers 
and theologians on T i l l i c h ' s thought* Apart from the long classical 
t radi t ion , coming into the more contemporary period there are names l ike 
Otto, Schopenhauer and Heidegger, a l l of whom may be said to add to the 
philosophical background of T i l l i c h 1 8 thought. But in this brief summary, 
we have selected what we consider to be the major figures. The s i g n i f i -
cant thing is that there i s hardly any theological or philosophical 
thought throughout history from early Greece to the contemporary Western 
world that does not come under his scan. Part of. his greatness has been 
i n his a b i l i t y to use the contributions of great thinkers from a l l time, 
perhaps the only exception to this being the more recent philosophers 
of the posi t iv is t school, building into his system those insights which 
he f e l t to be of permanent value to theology. Even though we may disagree 
with many of his conclusions, he was, i n more senses than one, a great 
synthetist* 
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Notes to Appendix 
1. Theology of Culture, pp. l O f f . 
2. Critique of Pure Reason ( l78l) . 
3. Critique of Practical Reason (1787). 
4« Speeches on Religion (1799) a »d The Christian Faith ( l 8 2 l ) . 
5* Speeches, trans. J. Oman, quoted i n Caldecott & Mackintosh, op. c i t . , 
p. 260. 
6. Speeches, quoted by H.R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, London, 
Fontana Books, 1964, p. 59* 
7* H.R. Mackintosh, o p . c i t . . p. 67. See also Perspectives, pp. 99 ff» 
8. The Christian Faith, quoted by H.R. Mackintosh, i b i d . , p. 72. 
9« The Phenomenology of Mind (18O6) and various Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion. 
10. Perspectives, p. 122. 
11. Op. c i t . . p. 108. 
12. System of Transcendental Idealism (l800), Philosophy and Religion (1804). 
13. See F.C. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 7» Part I , New York, 
Image Books, 1965, P> 137* 
14. I b i d . . p. 150. 
15* Philosophy of Revelation and Mythology (1846). 
16. Perspectives, p. 245* 
17» K. Hamilton, op. o i t . 
18. S. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread (1844), The Sickness unto Death 
(1849). 
19. B. Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, New York, 
Harper and Row, 19&5* 
20. ST, I , p. 118. 
21. See Perspectives, pp. 213ff•, and The Protestant Era, pp. x f . 
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